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About This Book
Since 1989, the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE) 
has provided a forum for the presentation and discussion of new knowledge on 
development economics. The conference aims at promoting the exchange of ideas 
among researchers, policy makers, and students interested in development issues 
and emphasizes the contribution that empirical research in economics can make 
to understanding development processes and to formulating sound development 
policies.
Conference papers are reviewed by the editors and are also subject to internal 
and external peer review. Some papers were revised after the conference to refl ect 
the comments made by discussants and/or participants from the fl oor. As a result, 
discussants’ comments may refer to elements of the paper that no longer exist in their 
original form. Most discussant’s comments were not revised.
The conference took place in Stockholm, Sweden, from May 31 to June 2, 2010. 
Fourteen papers were presented at the conference: four keynote addresses and ten 
plenary session papers, as well as nine commentaries. All of them are gathered in 
this volume with the exception of three plenary session papers and their respective 
commentaries that were already committed for publication elsewhere. Unless other-
wise noted, participation affi liations identifi ed in this volume are as of the time of 
the conference.
The conference also featured the launch of the Global Development Debates, a 
joint effort by the Development Economics Department, Poverty Reduction and 
Economic Management Network, and the World Bank Institute. The theme of this 
fi rst debate was “Development Challenges in a Postcrisis World,” which was also 
the theme of the conference. The debate was moderated by Stephanie Flanders 
from the BBC and had Abhijit Banerjee, Partha Dasgupta, Eric Maskin, James 
Mirrlees, and Robert Solow as panelists. The discussion was wide ranging and 
included issues related to globalization, inequality, the role of the state, and the 
problems of poverty.
The planning and organization of the conference was a joint effort by Sweden’s 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance and by the World Bank. 
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CLAUDIA SEPÚLVEDA, ANN HARRISON, AND JUSTIN YIFU LIN*
The twenty-second Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE) 
took place in Stockholm, Sweden, from May 31 to June 2, 2010. The main theme 
of the conference was “Development Challenges in a Postcrisis World.” The theme 
refl ects the mood and the concerns of the development community as the recent 
global fi nancial crisis, now widely known as the Great Recession, continued to cap-
ture the minds of economists and development practitioners while uncertainties on 
the strength of the recovery and its long-term implications for development remained.
A crisis presents an immediate challenge that has to be faced but also an opportu-
nity to address long-term problems and to reconsider established conventions. With 
this in mind, this year’s volume includes papers on fi ve areas of inquiry: environ-
ment and climate change, development strategies in a post-crisis world, the political 
economy of fragile states, new ways of measuring welfare, and lessons learned from 
social programs and transfers.
Working Together in Times of Crisis: Development Aid and the Power 
of Ideas
The opening addresses by Anders Borg, Minister for Finance of Sweden; Justin Yifu 
Lin, World Bank Senior Vice President and Chief Economist; and Gunilla Carlsson, 
Minister for International Development Cooperation of Sweden, all focused on the 
need for cooperation among countries to overcome development challenges and the 
importance of research as the foundation for sound policymaking.
In his opening address, Minister Borg reminds the audience that, even during 
 crisis, we need to continue to have ambitious policies when it comes to development. 
He highlights the important role that the World Bank has played during the crisis 
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by increasing lending and draws attention to Sweden’s commitment to development 
refl ected in the continual allocation, even in a time of global recession, of 1 percent 
of its gross national income (GNI) to aid. Minister Berg concludes by pointing out 
that one of the lessons from the crisis is that all countries and institutions must work 
together to maintain global economic stability.
Justin Yifu Lin in his address echoes the view by Minister Berg that the world is 
experiencing the largest development challenge since the Great Depression. In Lin’s 
view, governments have adopted economic measures to stabilize the banking sector 
and fi scal stimulus packages to avoid the worst-case economic scenarios. The global 
recovery, however, is still fragile and, therefore, innovative solutions are needed. 
Lin proposes a global recovery initiative with a focus on infrastructure investments 
in developing countries. The funds for this initiative should come from high-income 
and reserve-rich countries. Lin argues that such a program would benefi t both high-
income and developing countries as infrastructure investments in developing coun-
tries would boost exports, manufacturing employment, and growth in high-income 
countries, while reducing poverty, enhancing growth in the developing world, and 
facilitating the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs). It is a 
win-win solution.
Lin concludes by quoting John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory of Employ-
ment Theory and Money. In the last sentence of the last chapter, Keynes wrote, “But 
soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interest, which are dangerous for good or evil.” 
Today, faced with a similar situation in the world economy, Lin acknowledges that 
the world needs good ideas and the ABCDE can help generate ideas that can make a 
difference for developing countries and the world.
Gunilla Carlsson, Minister for International Development Cooperation of Swe-
den, continues in her address the discussion initiated by Borg and Lin, namely 
the importance of ideas for solving development challenges. Carlsson points out 
the importance of research as a foundation for sound policy making and calls for 
increasing a developing country’s research capacity and research on development 
issues, as well as innovative ways to stimulate communication and collaboration 
among researchers, evaluators, policymakers, and development practitioners to effec-
tively tackle the major global development challenges that we face.
Carlsson concludes by discussing the new initiative by the Swedish government, 
called Open Aid, to adapt development aid to today’s realities and the opportunities 
that globalization and technological developments have created. This new initiative 
aims to combat poverty as effectively as possible by opening aid to public control 
and ideas from sources around the world.
Overcoming the Samaritan’s Dilemma in Development Aid
The impact of development aid on growth, poverty alleviation, fostering democracy, 
and other outcomes has been debated intensively in academic and policy circles, 
as well as in the press.  The late Elinor Ostrom, 2009 Nobel Laureate in Econom-
ics, argues that much of aid’s disappointing results are related to the  incentives 
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 generated by development aid institutions. In her view, an understanding of the 
incentives that confront donors and recipients requires knowledge of the fundamental 
collective-action problems that these players face. The problems include motivation 
in the provision of public goods (health, public safety), provision and  maintenance of 
common-pool resources (forest, oceans, etc.), and the Samaritan’s Dilemma. Other 
perverse incentives common in aid include asymmetric power relationships, rent 
seeking and corruption, and missing information.
Ostrom applies the above framework to analyze and evaluate the incentive structure 
within the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and SIDA-
supported projects in India and Zambia. The general fi ndings of these fi eld studies, as 
well as interviews at SIDA, can be summarized as: a) type of project affects the likeli-
hood of sustainability with infrastructure projects still very attractive to development 
agencies because they generate immediate benefi ts and move a large amount of money 
with low staff time but they may do little else; b) small investments in building human 
skills can be effective in building productivity and self-reliance if designed well for the 
local environment; c) feedback from citizens in recipient, as well as donor, countries 
to their own offi cials and development assistance staff is lacking; d) motivated staff is 
not suffi cient to overcome the many incentives to spend money rather than time on the 
project; and e) enhancement of individual learning about sustainability by long-term 
assignments, continued fl ow of information about projects, and career advancement 
based to some extent on past participation on successful projects are needed.
On the basis of these fi ndings, Ostrom concludes by noting that development 
problems are diffi cult to tackle and there are no magic bullets to solve collective 
action problems, but a step forward is to dig into understanding the incentives of 
each situation, fi t what is being done to the local culture and circumstances, and 
make sure the participants understand the benefi ts and see them as legitimate.
Learning Growth and Development
As customary in a festschrift, Joseph Stiglitz’s paper is inspired by the work of the 
honoree, Partha Dasgupta. In this case, the topic chosen is innovation because it 
is central to development and has been a source of concern to Partha and himself 
since they were graduate students. Stiglitz remembers the heady days in Cambridge 
when he and his colleagues anticipated “putting a golden nail in the coffi n of capi-
talism.” He then proceeds to attempt to do exactly that by arguing that markets by 
themselves do not yield effi cient solutions for promoting innovation in part because 
knowledge is a public good.
Stiglitz develops a general theory of growth and development based on endog-
enous learning (with endogenous capital constraints) derived from underlying 
market imperfections. He argues that such a model with its underlying neoclassical 
model with well-functioning markets provides a policy framework that is markedly 
different from that of the Washington consensus. Within this setup, he proceeds to 
analyze the infant industry argument for protection based on the theory of learning. 
He concludes that, whether learning is internal or external to the fi rm, the market 
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equilibrium in general will not be Pareto effi cient and, therefore, there is a role for 
government in correcting the market misallocations.
Given that there are large spillovers and externalities and imperfections in the 
industrial structure, Stiglitz proposes to create incentives to expand parts of the 
economy that generate spillovers. Thus, design an industrial policy whose goal is not 
to pick winners but to identify these externalities and support them. One goal would 
be to use instruments that give broad-based support, such as the types of subsidies 
and other forms of support used in East Asia. Since the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) has restricted the use of such subsidies, he suggests using the exchange rate 
as a tool of industrial policy.
Weak States, Strong States, and Development
The donor and development communities often mention lack of state  capacity as 
one of the main obstacles for development in weak states. Torsten Persson using 
the tools of political economy and economic theory presents a unifi ed framework 
on how to think about fragile or weak states (see Figure). The main question he 
attempts to answer is why we observe development clusters that tend to combine 
effective state capacity (fi scal and legal capacity), absence of political violence, and 
high per capita income.
Persson breaks down this question into three sub-questions: What factors infl uence 
effective state capacity? What factors drive political violence? What explains the clus-
tering of state institutions, violence, and income? Persson argues that a state’s institu-
tional capacity to levy taxes and support a legal system is constrained by its history of 
investments in legal and fi scal capacity. Investment in common interest public goods 
such as fi ghting external wars, political stability, and inclusive political institutions are 
conducive to building state capacity. In contrast, civil war and internal confl ict are 
damaging to building state capacity. All of these capacities vary in conjunction with 
each other because of their common determinants, their inherent complementarities, 
and the various feedback loops they generate. If a state is good at keeping internal 
Common vs.
redistributive
interests
Cohesive
political
institutions
Resource or
(cash) aid
independence
Repression
Civil war
Legal capacity Income
per capitaFiscal capacity
FIGURE I.1
Determinants of State Capacity and Political Violence
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peace, for example, then citizens are more willing to pay taxes, more taxes can pay for 
a better legal system, and a better legal system helps to keep the peace.
Persson concludes by exploring the implications of this unifi ed framework for the 
allocation of development assistance. If development assistance is to work, according 
to the author, the donor’s focus should be on whether recipient governments invest 
in public goods and the fi scal and legal capacity of their governments.
Personal Histories and Poverty Traps
A conventional view of poverty is that individuals’ socioeconomic prospects are 
largely under their own control. Income rewards productive efforts. The observed 
persistence of poverty across generations, however, has led to an increasing interest 
in the concept of poverty traps.
Partha Dasgupta tackles this issue by stressing the importance of distinguishing 
between describing poverty and explaining poverty. Dasgupta’s interest is in the 
 latter. In particular, he is interested in understanding the complementarities and cir-
cular nature of causal processes, or positive feedback loops, involved in poverty and 
how they may lead to poverty traps. In a poverty trap, individuals fail to rise or lack 
access to threshold levels of capital (human, physical, natural, or other) that spur 
well-being. Dasgupta models the link and positive feedbacks from malnutrition and 
infectious diseases at an early stage of an individual’s life to the lack of acquisition 
of socioeconomic competencies in early childhood, to its impact on the capacity for 
physical work and endurance later on life, and to wages and the capacity to obtain 
the food needed to improve nutritional status given origin in a poverty trap.
Dasgupta concludes by offering fi ve morals from his research on poverty traps: 
a) the high maintenance costs of good physical and emotional health underlie the 
existence of poverty traps and b) it is a manifestation of complementarities among 
the inputs that humans need to survive; c) human capital formation is complemen-
tary over time and d) that a personal history has a long reach, affecting not only the 
person in question but also its descendants; and e) in low-income countries, absolute 
poverty is a cause and a consequence of unequal distribution of assets.
Environmental Commons and the Green Economy
Both Thomas Sterner and Ramon López characterize the world’s current growth 
pattern as unsustainable and offer potential answers on how to turn this situation 
around. Sterner starts by recognizing that the hopes for a grand deal were shattered 
at Copenhagen in December 2009 and that “green growth” has been promoted 
as an alternative path. He points out that green growth is no magic bullet because 
growth, green or not, will boost demand for energy and coal is normally the cheap-
est source. He suggests, however, that, if green growth is taken seriously, it can be 
viewed as a bridge to facilitate a fi nal (and maybe elusive) global treaty with close to 
total  participation that can deal with the ethical issues of fairness and distribution.
6    |    CLAUDIA SEPÚLVEDA, ANN HARRISON, AND JUSTIN YIFU LIN
Sterner argues that the costs of climate abatement are suffi ciently high to motivate 
industries and countries to focus on effi ciency and, therefore, the need to strive for a 
unique price of carbon and negotiate a global agreement with close to total participa-
tion. This solution will take time. In the meantime, emissions must be reduced, both 
to reduce pressure on the atmosphere and—perhaps most importantly—to learn. 
A number of initial steps have been taken, such as experiments with “green” cars, 
new fuels, energy effi ciency in buildings, solar heating, solar and wind power (in the 
European Union and the United States), and other clean development mechanism 
projects for new technology in developing countries. China’s fi ve-year economic 
plan, passed in March 2011, championed energy effi ciency and pollution reduction 
as central to its plan for generating economic growth. It is, of course, too early to see 
the outcome of these initiatives but they clearly demonstrate that economic growth 
in the coming years will be tied to an emerging low-carbon economy.
Sterner concludes by saying that these actions may be symbolic but are embryonic 
as well. Green growth is no panacea. It is a new direction, not merely an instrument. 
He believes that all too soon, the policies applied in many countries will not be tough 
enough in the absence of a global international treaty that internalizes the global 
externalities involved. In the end, green growth policies can help bring all countries 
some steps closer to the necessarily binding global commitment.
Ramon López strengthens Sterner’s assessment by presenting mounting evidence 
that, in the past few decades, the world’s pattern of growth and consumption 
has become unsustainable as the result of the emergence of new industrial giants 
(NIGs) such as China and India among others, and the increasing scarcity of natural 
resources in developing countries. These structural changes have entailed a signifi -
cant tightening of the link between global growth and commodity prices with the 
world commodity supply becoming more inelastic. López shows that growth in 
advanced countries has been characterized by a “dematerialization” of its produc-
tion from manufacturing, forestry, fi shing, etc. to services and a “materialization” of 
consumption. This sharp divergence in the structure of consumption and production 
in advanced countries has meant an increasing reliance on developing countries as 
suppliers of primary commodities and manufacturing goods made only possible by 
the emergence of NIGs. But it also has brought an increasing net demand for food, 
energy and raw materials. This increased connection between commodity prices and 
growth after the incorporation of the NIGs has happened at a time when natural 
resources in developing countries have become less abundant as these countries have 
become more aware of the environment costs in the ecosystem. Thus, the observed 
pattern of growth and consumption has advanced countries not by becoming envi-
ronmentally cleaner but by becoming better at dumping their pollution on the rest 
of the world.
What will be the impact of the global crisis on the commodity supply curve given 
the structural change already observed in the pattern of world production and con-
sumption? López argues that the impact will be determined by the macroeconomic 
policies prior to the crisis, the stringency of environmental regulatory regimes, 
domestic policies in response to the crisis, and country characteristics associated with 
factor endowments, population density, and poverty levels.  Given that it is too early 
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to have empirical evidence about the impact of the current crisis, he relies on two 
previous crisis episodes, the 1995 Mexico Peso crisis and the 1997–99 Asia crises, 
as empirical references. Loópez suggests that the impact of the current crisis is likely 
to exacerbate environmental scarcities in the developing world and may eventually 
force further tightening of environmental policies over the long run in response to 
such degradation. This, in turn, may make the commodity supply curve even steeper 
in the future, thus reinforcing the sensitivity of commodity prices to world economic 
growth.
López concludes by pointing out the need to end the support of public policies 
that discriminate in favor of the “materialization” of consumption. Policies such as a 
carbon tax, as well as several other consumption taxes that focus on material goods 
but exclude services, would be steps in the right direction, as well as a dematerializa-
tion of public expenditures by increasing the provision of public social goods includ-
ing education, health, environmental protection, etc.
Post-Crisis Debates on Development Strategy
Openness to trade is a well-accepted component of many successful growth strate-
gies of emerging market economies. Nevertheless, the role that government policies 
have played in guiding the industrial structural transformation ahead of a country’s 
factor endowment—leapfrogging—have been controversial. Opinions vary but the 
empirical evidence is scarce in part because it is more diffi cult to measure the degree 
of leapfrogging than the extent of trade openness. Shang-Jin Wei and co-authors 
move forward this debate by providing empirically evidence of whether leapfrogging 
strategies work.
Wei and co-authors undertake a systematic look at the evidence across countries 
using gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth equations for the period 
1992–2003 to assess the effi cacy of a leapfrogging strategy. To quantify the degree 
of leapfrogging that an economy may exhibit, they use country’s detailed export 
data instead of production data because the latter is not available for most develop-
ing countries in an internationally comparable classifi cation and, when available, 
has a relatively coarse industrial classifi cation. Leapfrogging is measured using four 
alternatives indicators: EXPY, the productivity level associated with a country’s spe-
cialization pattern; a modifi ed EXPY using unit value; EDI, an export dissimilarity 
index that measures the discrepancy between a country’s exports and that of G-3 
countries (European Union, Japan, and United States), and ATP, a measure of export 
sophistication using high-tech exports as the export bundle.
After testing a series of specifi cations controlling by the initial level of GDP, human 
capital, institutional variables and using instrumental variable techniques, the authors 
fi nd a lack of strong and robust support for the notion that a leapfrogging industrial 
policy strategy can reliably raise economic growth. They conclude by recognizing that 
there may be individual success stories, but there are also failures and, if leapfrogging is 
a policy gamble, there is no systematic evidence that suggests that the odds are favora-
ble. Finally, they suggest two areas for further research. The impact of  leapfrogging 
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strategies on the “import side” because the use of tariffs and other polices to reduce 
the import of high tech or high value added products can give domestically produced 
goods an advantage and versions of leapfrogging strategies, if moderate or subtle, that 
attempt to exploit latent comparative advantages may be more successful.
The Political Economy of Fragile States
James Fearon revisits the issue posed by Torsten Persson’s keynote address, that is, 
the association of the concept of fragile states with weak institutions and political 
violence. Even though the concept of fragile states remains murky, aid agencies have 
produced operational criteria to identify fragile states using, in most cases, governance 
indicators. Fearon points out that most of the cross-national patterns on the onset 
of civil war can be explained by putting state capabilities at the center. He explores 
using three different perceived governance indicators widely used by the developing 
community—the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG)—and whether these governance indicators can be used to predict civil 
violence in subsequent years.
His empirical strategy consists of logistic estimates of the probability of the onset 
of civil war or lower-level confl ict. The data for civil war and confl icts are obtained 
from the Uppsala Confl ict Data Program (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute Oslo 
(PRIO) Armed Confl ict Dataset. The estimates controlled by population and GDP 
lagged by one period those affected by oil-producing country, political instabil-
ity, civil war or confl ict in the previous year and governance indictors. The results 
confi rm that a country that was judged in one year to have worse governance than 
expected given its income level has a signifi cantly higher risk of civil war and confl ict 
during the next fi ve to ten years. This is true for the three sets of governance indica-
tors but is weaker for the CPIA.
In addition, these results have implications for the debate about the causes of civil 
wars and confl ict by supporting the hypothesis that low income per capita is strongly 
related to confl ict risk because it is a proxy for low state capabilities rather than 
related to a labor market effect by which young people join rebel factions. Fearon 
concludes suggesting that more research is needed to gauge the impact of govern-
ance on other objective indicators of government performance, such as the quality of 
public goods, education, health, etc.
News Ways of Measuring Welfare
In the mid-1970s, Richard Easterlin, the fi rst modern economist to study happiness, 
uncovered a seeming paradox:  Neither did average happiness levels increase over 
time as countries grew wealthier nor was there a clear relationship between average 
per capita GDP and average happiness levels across countries once they achieved a 
certain minimum level of per capita income.
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Daniel Sacks, Betsey Stevenson, and Justin Wolfers revisit the stylized facts on the 
relationship between subjective well-being and income casting doubt on the Easterlin 
Paradox. Using the greatest quantity of data available and different datasets covering 
140 countries (Gallup World Poll, World Values Survey, and Pew Global Attitudes), 
they fi nd that within a given country, rich individuals are more satisfi ed with their 
lives than poorer individuals and that richer countries have signifi cantly higher levels 
of average life satisfaction.  Studying the time series relationship between satisfaction 
and income, they also fi nd that economic growth is associated with increases in life 
satisfaction.
The key innovation of their work is that they focus explicitly on the magnitude of 
the subjective well-being-income gradient (rather than its statistical signifi cance) and 
show that the within-country, between-country, and over-time estimates all point to 
a quantitatively similar relationship between subjective well-being and income. This 
relationship is robust to different levels of aggregation and different data sets with 
the gradient for the log of income between 0.3 to 0.4. They also fi nd that income is 
positively associated with other measures of subjective well-being, including happi-
ness and other upbeat emotions.
They conclude by arguing that the fact that life satisfaction and other measures of 
subjective well-being rise with income has signifi cant implications for development 
economists.  First and most importantly, these fi ndings cast doubt on the Easterlin 
Paradox and various theories by suggesting that there is no long-term relationship 
between well-being and income growth and that economists’ traditional interest in 
economic growth has not been misplaced. Second, the results suggest that differences 
in subjective well-being over time or across places likely refl ect meaningful differ-
ences in actual well-being.
Carol Graham, who has studied the topic of happiness extensively and knows its 
promises as well as its limitations, starts by reviewing all determinants of happiness 
across and within countries of different development levels. She summarizes the 
evidence surrounding the debate on the Easterlin Paradox by stating that both sides 
of the debate may be correct fi rst, because although people in richer countries are 
happier than those in destitute ones but many things other than income contribute 
to people’s happiness regardless of their level of income, including freedom, stable 
employment, and good health, which are easier to come by in wealthier countries. 
Second, the latest studies have used new data from the Gallup World Poll, which 
includes many more (unweighted) observations from small poor countries in Africa 
and from transition economies than did Easterlin’s original studies (as well as his 
more recent ones). These countries in particular have relatively low levels of happi-
ness and have had fl at or even negative rates of growth over time. Thus, rather than 
a story of higher levels of income pulling up happiness at the top, it may be one of 
falling or volatile income trajectories pulling down happiness at the bottom.
Although Graham’s research and that of others have established that the stand-
ard determinants of happiness demonstrate fairly stable patterns worldwide, it has 
also shown that people have a remarkable capacity to adapt to both prosperity and 
adversity. Thus, many people living in conditions of prosperity report to be miser-
able, while many others living in contexts of remarkable adversity report to be 
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very happy. This adaptation conundrum is one of the main challenges that people 
 advocating happiness as a benchmark for development will have to answer. This 
capacity to adapt—and the mediating role of norms and expectations—poses all 
sorts of measurement and comparison challenges, particularly in the study of the 
relationship between happiness and income. Graham asks if we can really compare 
the happiness levels of a poor peasant in India, who reports to be very happy due to 
low expectations and/or due to a naturally cheery character, with those of a success-
ful and very wealthy CEO, who reports to be miserable due to his or her relative 
rankings compared to that of other CEOs or to a naturally curmudgeonly character?
At one level, it suggests that all happiness is relative. At another, it suggests that 
some unhappiness may be necessary to achieve economic and other sorts of progress. 
The examples of migrants who leave their home countries—and families—to provide 
a better future for their children or of revolutionaries who sacrifi ce their lives for the 
broader public good come to mind among others. This also begs more diffi cult ques-
tions. One is whether outside observers, such as development practitioners, should 
tell the poor peasant in India how miserable he or she is according to objective 
income measures in order to encourage that peasant to seek a “better” life. A related 
question is whether we should worry more about addressing the millionaire’s misery 
or increasing the peasant’s happiness. Other unanswered questions that must be 
resolved—or at least further discussed—before happiness can be used a benchmark 
for progress or as an objective of development policy are the defi nition of happiness, 
inter-temporal trade-offs, and cardinality versus ordinality.
Graham concludes that, while all these questions cannot be answered now, the 
discussion raises issues that are important to development policy and forces us to 
think deeply about what measures of human well-being are the most accurate bench-
marks of economic progress and human development.
Social Programs and Transfers: Are We Learning?
Conditional cash transfers are an increasingly popular strategy for poverty-reduction 
programs. Countries like South Africa, however, have experimented with cash trans-
fers that are mean tested but unconditional. Ingrid Woolard and Murray Leibrandt 
review the experience of South Africa on social assistance post-apartheid and the 
role that unconditional cash transfers have had in reducing poverty and other social 
outcomes and make recommendations for the future.
The authors start by pointing out that, at the time of the transition to democracy 
in 1994, the South African social security system (social insurance and social assis-
tance) already was notably well developed for a middle-income country. Since then, 
the social assistance system has evolved in a way that continued and modifi ed some of 
the grants (old age pension, disability grant, and foster grant) and replaced the state 
maintenance grant with the child support grant (CSG). The CSG was introduced in 
1998 and was to be paid to the child’s primary caregiver based on a means test and 
immunization requirements. The program, however, had a low take-up rate. Thus, 
in 2000, the government extended the grant to children seven to fourteen years old. 
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Since then, the CSG has expanded and older age groups have been gradually been 
included. From 2010, all income-eligible children born after 1996 will receive CSG 
until they turn 18 years old. Today, spending on cash transfers is currently at 3.5 
percent of GDP, which is  more than twice the median spending across developing 
economies and is the center piece of the poverty-reduction strategy.
The authors show that the reduction in poverty during the post-apartheid period 
has been associated strongly with the expansion of social grants and that the dis-
bursement of these grants has been strongly redistributive. Also, at the micro level, 
they show that the money fl owing into households through grants has been used in 
part to improve health and education outcomes for household members other than 
the direct benefi ciary. Such impacts are crucial for longer-run poverty alleviation. At 
the same time, the evidence on the labor supply effects of grants is more mixed with 
grants seeming to promote migration in search of employment but also seeming to 
provide some disincentive for resident, working-age household members to look for 
work.
The authors conclude by stating that the current system, which focuses on chil-
dren and the elderly, is something of an artifact of history, rather than a refl ection 
of a coherently designed system. In the absence of a comprehensive social insurance 
system, prime-age adults can only benefi t from social assistance grants if they are 
disabled or are co-resident with a child or elderly person. They believe that the over-
riding goal of economic and social policy has to be the assimilation of many more 
of the unemployed into the labor, but they are cautious about further expansion of 
social grants to this end. Finally, they also are cautious about the associated imposi-
tion of cash conditionalities that are likely to be high in the South African context. 
They argue that the desire to introduce conditionalities seems to be driven by politi-
cal economy considerations, that is, the belief that taxpayers may be more likely to 
support transfers to the poor if they are linked to efforts to overcome poverty in the 
long term, particularly when the efforts involve actions to improve the welfare of 
children although they may be expensive to monitor and enforce.

Opening Address
ANDERS BORG
Thank you very much. I would like to welcome you all to Stockholm. This is obvi-
ously a very beautiful time, when spring is coming to our country after a long and 
cold winter.
We have gone through a winter in the global economy over the past few years, 
and I think we are all hoping that we are seeing the fi rst signs of spring. Politicians 
will have to deal with this crisis for another few years, and researchers will probably 
spend a couple of decades trying to understand what really happened and what les-
sons we can draw from this eruption of dramatic events. Already, we are seeing some 
potentially serious effects on the fi ght against world poverty. People always recon-
sider their spending during an economic crisis, but it is important for us to continue 
to have ambitious policies when it comes to development.
The World Bank has played a crucial role in responding to this crisis, and the Swed-
ish government will continue its close cooperation with and strong support of the Bank. 
We are one of the major donors and one of the major contributors when it comes to 
foreign aid. We believe that individuals and nations have a Samaritan duty to help those 
who are worse off. And from a practical point of view, development policy is good for 
the whole world. Every country that achieves self-sustained growth will contribute to 
world trade, and an open global trade system contributes to the common good.
Sweden contributes 1 percent of its gross national income to foreign aid; we 
encourage other countries to follow our example. For us, development is about core 
values. We need free markets to organize societies, price mechanisms, and property 
rights. We need functioning court systems to help solve confl icts over rights. But we 
also need social cohesion—a system in which the public sector plays a crucial role. 
Investments in energy, infrastructure, and education are essential for development, 
and we assign a high priority to these areas.
One of the main lessons that come out of the crisis is that all these institutions must 
work together, with a strong emphasis on macroeconomic stability. Unsustainable 
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macroeconomic imbalances will contribute to more crises in the world economy, so 
whatever we can do in our own countries to deal with account defi cits and government 
defi cits is of utmost importance to promote stability.
Again, welcome to Stockholm. I hope you will spend some inspiring days here 
and participate in many good discussions on these very important issues of global 
development.
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 Opening Address
JUSTIN YIFU LIN
Minister Borg, Minister Carlsson, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure for the World 
Bank to cohost this year’s Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 
(ABCDE) together with our Swedish colleagues, and it is my honor to welcome you 
to the conference. Since its fi rst meeting in 1989, the ABCDE has become the largest 
gathering of economists from academia, government, international fi nancial institu-
tions, and nongovernmental organizations to exchange new ideas and recent fi ndings 
on research and to discuss development policies. This 21st ABCDE will have four 
keynote addresses—on development aid, state capacity, learning growth and devel-
opment, and poverty traps. We will also have fi ve plenary sessions, ranging from the 
environment and the green economy to development strategies post-crisis, fragile 
states, new ways of measuring welfare, and social transfers. In addition, there will 
be 18 parallel sessions with papers selected from 270 proposals.
This year, we will also launch a global debate, organized by the Development 
Economics Vice Presidency and the World Bank Development Institute. The debate, 
titled “Development Challenges in a Post-Crisis World,” will feature three Nobel 
Prize winners—Eric Maskin, James Mirrlees, and Robert Solow—and two distin-
guished economists—Partha Dasgupta and Abhijit Banerjee. It will be webcast, so 
many people throughout the world can watch it simultaneously.
We have 600 participants, including 5 Nobel laureates and many potential lau-
reates. As we meet here today, the world is experiencing the biggest development 
challenges since the Great Depression in 1929. In fact, when the global fi nancial 
crisis erupted in September 2008, the collapse of equity markets, contraction of 
global trade, and decline of industrial production in many countries were all more 
serious than in the Great Depression. However, we had learned our lessons from the 
past, and governments immediately adopted fi nancial rescue measures to stabilize 
the banking sector and avoid the worst possible scenarios. At the same time, these 
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 governments pledged continued support for free trade, despite the rising unemploy-
ment in their domestic economies. Many governments adopted fi scal stimulus poli-
cies and passed fi nancial restructuring legislation, and now the global economy is 
recovering.
According to our forecast, the overall growth rate for the global economy in 2010 
will be 3.1 percent—a far cry from the 2.1 percent contraction of 2009. Among 
high-income countries, the 2010 growth rate will be 2.2 percent; among developing 
countries, it is likely to be 6 percent. 
However, the foundation of the recovery is still very fragile. Although the crisis 
erupted in the fi nancial sector, the challenge has moved to the real sector; specifi cally, 
the underutilization of global capacity. In the fi rst quarter of 2010, the U.S. capacity 
utilization rate was 73 percent and the Euro-zone rate was 72 percent—both about 
10 percent below normal. A similar situation exists in a number of middle-income 
countries (but not in China, India, or Brazil). With excess capacity, we know that 
the unemployment rate will be high and the incentive for private sector investment 
will be low. In this situation, the fi nancial sector will still be under stress because of 
the danger of nonperforming loans, and slow growth will mean that some countries 
will have sovereign debt pressure. 
So the world is facing a dilemma. In high-income countries, with high underutiliza-
tion of capacity, it is necessary to have a fi scal stimulus; however, this stimulus may 
cause public debt to rise very rapidly. But if governments adopt an early exit strategy 
from the stimulus measures, there is a danger of a double-dip recession, which can 
cause fi nancial trouble or even a sovereign debt crisis. This dilemma will spread to 
the developing countries, because if the high-income countries continue their fi scal 
stimulus measures, the increasing public debt will have a crowding-out effect in the 
fi nancial sectors and interest rates will rise, which will increase the cost of growth in 
developing countries. If the high-income countries exit from the fi scal stimulus, the 
danger of double-dip exists. Declines in the growth rates of high-income countries will 
also negatively affect developing countries through trade, remittance, and capital fl ow. 
This is an important year for the developing countries in terms of meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Seven of the eight goals (except for the 
fi rst one—reducing the world poverty rate by half) have already been derailed. If 
developing countries cannot maintain their growth rates, the world will be even less 
likely to achieve the MDGs. 
What are some possible ways out of this global dilemma? We know that a Keynesian 
type of fi scal stimulus is desirable in the face of large underutilization of capacity; the 
two main challenges are whether the stimulus will be effective in supporting demand 
and whether the public debt accumulation is sustainable. The effectiveness of fi scal stim-
ulus is related to the so-called Ricardian Equivalence; that is, the government increases 
spending while the private sector increases saving. As a result, public debt rises but the 
total demand in the economy may not increase much. The Ricardian Equivalence holds 
only if government spending does not increase productivity. If productivity increases, 
it will promote growth. Government revenue will increase and debt can be paid back. 
In this situation, sustainability, higher taxes, and lower consumption in the future will 
not be an issue. 
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But how can we increase productivity through government fi scal stimulus? Two 
areas have potential. One is related to the green economy, which we will discuss at 
this conference. The other is related to the infrastructure bottleneck that exists in 
many countries, especially developing countries. In high-income countries, the scope 
for investing in infrastructure to release bottlenecks is small, and the green economy 
alone may not be able to boost demand and absorb the underutilization of capacity. 
However, in developing countries the opportunity to invest in the green economy 
and in infrastructure is large, although (except for a few emerging markets, such as 
China, India, and Brazil) many developing countries are facing constraints in their 
fi scal situation as well as on their foreign reserves.
Thus, a possibility exists for a win–win situation in which high-income and for-
eign reserve-rich countries fi nd a way to increase their investments in developing 
countries. Such investment will boost the demand for capital goods produced in 
high-income countries and reduce their excess capacity, while promoting growth 
in developing countries, which will help them avoid the poverty trap and facilitate 
their achievement of the MDGs. In this spirit, recent capital increases in the World 
Bank and other regional development banks will support an increase in investment 
in developing countries; certainly, that is desirable.
This year, we are going to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the International 
Development Association (IDA). IDA is not just for humanitarian purposes; in the 
current global situation, it is also an important way to promote growth in low-
income countries. Sweden should be complimented for its generous support—the 
country’s 2009 contribution was 1.12 percent of gross national income, which 
exceeded the 0.7 percent target for high-income countries.
But if we want to emerge from the global crisis, we need more than money. We 
need ideas so we can select the right projects for the green economy and reduce 
infrastructure bottlenecks. Education and health are also important—investment in 
those areas will increase productivity in the future. Not only do we need to select the 
right areas, we need to have the ability to implement projects. Thus, state capacity 
and governance issues are also important, and these issues will be discussed at this 
conference. Overall, I believe this year’s conference can make an important contribu-
tion to addressing global issues. 
In his opening remarks at the 2004 ABCDE, former World Bank President Jim 
Wolfensohn said, “The fi eld of development economics is a seductive discipline in 
that it offers those working in it the possibility to make a difference.” And 75 years 
ago, at the height of the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes published his 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. In the last sentence of the last 
chapter, he said, “But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are danger-
ous for good or evil.” Today, we face a similar situation in the world economy. The 
world needs good ideas. ABCDE will help generate ideas that will make a difference 
for developing countries and for the world.

Opening Address
GUNILLA CARLSSON
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you, Justin.
Let me start by adding my voice to the chorus of welcomes, from Mr. Borg and 
from the whole of the Swedish government. We are happy to host the ABCDE 2010. 
For me, it is also a great opportunity to discuss the development challenges of today 
and tomorrow with some of the greatest minds—that’s you.
It is obvious that policy making and action in response to major global challenges 
should be based on the best available research. And yet, international studies dem-
onstrate that the links between research and policy are not as strong as they need 
to be. To effectively tackle the current global challenges, there is a great need for 
systematically researched knowledge—underpinned by context-specifi c analysis—to 
guide policy making, political decisions, and implementation. Domestic analytical 
capacity and country-specifi c and region-specifi c expertise through research are key 
if countries are to take part on an equal footing in international discussions on joint 
strategies to tackle shared global challenges. The amount and quality of research 
relevant to developing countries are often insuffi cient. This is due to the lack of 
research capacity in the developing countries themselves, but it is also linked to 
inadequate international production of science-based knowledge concerning poverty-
related development issues. Evidence-based policy approaches have a clear potential 
to strongly affect outcomes in developing countries. Better use of evidence in policy 
making and practice can help reduce poverty and improve economic performance. 
Finding innovative ways to make better use of research results in policy making is 
therefore a necessity.
My hope and expectation is that this ABCDE conference will deepen discussions on 
how to stimulate communication and collaboration among researchers, evaluators, 
policy makers, and practitioners in all parts of the world and in different disciplines 
to effectively tackle the major global challenges we face.
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Sweden is proud to cohost this event with the World Bank, one of our main partners 
in international development cooperation. What distinguishes the World Bank as an 
institution is its combined role as a knowledge bank and a provider of develop-
ment fi nance. One excellent illustration is the Bank’s work in low-income coun-
tries through its International Development Association (IDA). The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was established in 1944 to aid 
the recovery from the destruction of World War II. By the 1950s, it was evident 
that the poorest countries needed loans on softer terms than IBRD could offer. IDA 
was established for this purpose in September 1960 with 15 signatory countries, and 
I am proud to note that Sweden was one of them. Since then, IDA has become the 
leading source of concessional lending to 79 of the world’s poorest countries. IDA 
credits and grants have totaled over US$200 billion, averaging US$14 billion a year 
in recent years. IDA is the largest multilateral recipient of Swedish offi cial develop-
ment assistance. This year, IDA celebrates 50 years of operation, and it has every 
reason to look back with pride on its achievements. 
To give just a few examples, between 2006 and 2009, thanks to IDA, a million 
additional primary school teachers were trained; more than 7 million people gained 
access to basic health, nutrition, and population services; almost 8 million women 
received antenatal care; and 60,500 new piped household water connections were 
established. In the past fi ve years, IDA has built, repaired, or maintained 60,000 
kilometers of rural roads, benefi ting 60 million people in low-income countries.
During its 50 years, one-quarter of its borrowing countries have graduated com-
pletely from IDA. In 1991, China was IDA’s biggest borrower; by 2007, China had 
not only graduated but had become a donor. Refl ecting the increasingly multipolar 
world economy, I expect to see more new donors following this example, and donors 
increasing their contributions. The current replenishment round is an opportunity 
for these emerging donors to play a bigger role. With combined efforts, we can 
eradicate poverty more quickly. In fact—and with all due respect—I sincerely hope 
that our successors will not stand here in another 50 years, celebrating 100 years of 
IDA. After all, the goal of international development cooperation is to render itself 
obsolete. For this to happen, we need to make the necessary enhancements to IDA’s 
Results Measurement System and make sure it is accompanied by a more robust 
results framework. We need to work hard together during this replenishment period 
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). And we must continue to 
target Africa, the continent that is lagging furthest behind on the MDGs.
Together with other donors, Sweden has encouraged IDA to highlight three par-
ticular issues in the coming three years. First, postconfl ict and fragile states  present 
the greatest development needs and the most challenging circumstances. These are 
the states in which it is hardest to obtain results, but IDA has to make good use of 
our money here, too. Second, gender equality must be seriously addressed for IDA’s 
poverty reduction efforts to be as effective as they can possibly be. And third, IDA 
and the entire World Bank must develop a coherent approach to address climate 
change. IDA is an excellent expression of multilateral cooperation. It is also the 
product of the intellectual work of many people, including the participants at 
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this conference. I trust that IDA will continue to evolve—to contribute to a 
world free of poverty and to translate the latest academic fi ndings into best practices 
on the ground.
Let me take this opportunity to say a few words about the key priorities for the 
further improvement of Swedish bilateral aid. As you heard from our minister of 
fi nance, we are proud to be the biggest aid donor in the world, but we need other 
countries to join us to ensure suffi cient resources, as well as enough interest and 
strategies to deal with global poverty. 
When I fi rst took offi ce as minister for international development cooperation, I 
had one overarching priority: to ensure that Swedish aid would be effi cient and effec-
tive, and would deliver concrete development results for people living in poverty. We 
have made progress, but I still feel frustrated at times. Why does change come about 
slowly, or at least slower than we hope and need? Why have we not come further?
One of the fi rst measures I undertook was to limit the number of Swedish partner 
countries and increase country focus. I have also been very strict in ensuring that 
Swedish aid is provided in a maximum of three sectors in each partner country. 
Furthermore, we have launched a strategy for our participation in multilateral devel-
opment cooperation. A fundamental premise for all these measures was the focus on 
effi ciency, effectiveness, and results. The world is changing rapidly. Looking back 
only a couple of decades, we take things for granted now that we could only imagine 
then. The Internet is probably the most obvious example. However—and this is of 
great concern to me—the way we do development cooperation changes slowly and 
not at the same pace as the changes in the world. It is only natural that bureaucratic 
structures are slow to change, but in this area we have no time to lose. Poverty is 
acute today, and yet here we are, working with development cooperation models 
developed decades ago. We are trying to improve in many ways. For example, 
within the EU we are working on division of labor and complementarity, and we are 
promoting the use of partner country systems to limit transaction costs and increase 
ownership. This is all very useful and important work. But is it enough?
I think we need to approach development cooperation from a new point of view, 
and the ABCDE conference can assist in this. A basic issue for me, as minister for 
international development cooperation, is ensuring that we get the best possible 
value for our money. I need to know how the resources made available by Swed-
ish taxpayers are spent. I have, therefore, focused on three issues that I believe are 
key to ensuring effective development cooperation. The fi rst issue is corruption and 
the absolute need to tackle it. The second is the need for increased measuring and 
understanding of results from the projects and programs to which we contribute, 
both as an objective to ensure that we are doing the right thing and as a means to 
continuously improve our methods and strategies. The third issue is the challenge of 
development contributions in a changing world, including through innovation in a 
broad sense of the term. 
I have launched an agenda—Open Aid—to address these issues and to further 
improve Swedish development cooperation. We need increased openness through 
active transparency that promotes accountability, scrutiny, and improved knowledge 
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about aid. Increased openness to participation promotes innovation and ensures that 
we receive expertise from different spheres of society. And increased openness 
promotes cooperation among new and increasing numbers of actors in develop-
ment. Every aspect of Open Aid is underpinned by transparency, participation, 
and cooperation.
The Open Aid vision and the reform process in general are ongoing efforts. Your 
deliberations during these coming days will make an important contribution, and 
I would like to challenge you to refl ect on the matters I’ve just mentioned. Share 
your ideas. Agree or disagree. Only then can we be sure that we make full use of 
the resources around us and that we are equipped in the best way possible to reach 
our objectives of eradicating poverty and giving every person an opportunity to 
develop.
Thank you for all the excellent preparations for this conference. Thank you all for 
coming and, once again, we welcome you to ABCDE Sweden.
Keynote Addresses

Overcoming the Samaritan’s 
Dilemma in Development Aid
ELINOR OSTROM
We all have been in situations where we hear people criticizing aid to developing 
countries. Some people say, “Don’t do it anymore.” Others say, “Do it better.” 
There is considerable doubt in the world that development aid is increasing economic 
growth, alleviating poverty, promoting social development, or fostering democratic 
regimes. We need to have a positive, sustainable impact, and that is not always hap-
pening. So it is important that we dig in and understand why some of our policies 
are not sustainable and why some people keep saying they need more money, while 
others say, “Well, we just can’t help from the outside. It’s got to be from inside.” 
Some focus on how long it takes to make a big impact, while others say the reason 
for diminished or unsuccessful outcomes is too many perverse incentives. This last 
reason is most important—many development aid incentives are perverse.
In a study of development aid commissioned by the Swedish International Devel-
opment Cooperation Agency (Sida)—one of the best development assistance agencies 
in the world—Krister Andersson, Clark Gibson, Sujai Shivakumar, and I did fi nd 
perverse incentives within the organization. We then checked with our colleagues at 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank, and 
discovered that many of these perverse incentives exist across many development aid 
agencies. This spurred us to write a book about our fi ndings, which was published by 
Oxford University Press as The Samaritan’s Dilemma (Gibson et al. 2005).
First, we need a shared basic defi nition of “development.” What we and many 
other people mean by development is that people around the world are realizing 
improved well-being through production and exchange of private goods, as well 
as cooperation and coordination in providing public goods and common-pool 
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resources. Most aid personnel agree that governments provide the macroinstitutional 
environments within which development can be realized. One of the puzzles we 
are trying to solve is why some of the greatest efforts have not led to enhanced devel-
opment. At the very heart of trying to achieve development assistance are collective-
action problems. In many situations, to move ahead, we need the contributions of 
many participants in public health, in the management of resources, and in a variety 
of settings. 
What Is a Dilemma?
The Prisoner’s Dilemma was devised by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, 
and expanded in Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action (1965) and Har-
din’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968). Hardin asked whether benefi ts can 
be obtained by a person who is making no contribution while others are contribut-
ing. He pointed out the incentive for a person, who can receive free benefi ts, is not 
to contribute, which may result in overuse of resources or underprovision of public 
goods. So there is a potential confl ict in most of the real problems of the develop-
ing world and in the developed world’s ability to solve collective-action problems. 
Besides the incentive problems, we have a wide variety of information prob-
lems. In many instances, we have missing information. We have situations that are 
asymmetric—some people hold the information and others who need it do not have 
access to it. And throughout development aid processes, we have principal-agent 
problems; for example, when employees who work directly with development activities 
know more about what they do than their managers but do not share the information. 
When the real goals of donors and recipient country organizations differ, substantial 
principal-agent problems can occur.
Part of the problem is motivational—getting honest offi cials to oversee public 
goods, sharing knowledge about the process and progress, and knowing that we are 
providing the public goods. Most provision of public goods involves collective dilem-
mas, and some people say, “Oh, just turn it over to the government.” But that has 
not always been a successful strategy. Government involvement may be very helpful, 
but it is rarely suffi cient. Also, the provision of common-pool resources also involves 
the potential for a collective dilemma. 
The Samaritan’s Dilemma
In 1975, James Buchanan wrote about the Samaritan’s Dilemma, pointing out that 
a person may want to help someone in need but faces the question “Do I or don’t 
I?” The Samaritan tries to think through how the recipient will respond to help. 
In theory, the recipient has two strategies: put in high effort or put in low effort 
(fi gure 1). The equilibrium of a Samaritan’s Dilemma game is that the Samaritan gives 
help and the recipient puts in low effort. The equilibrium in the lower righthand 
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corner of fi gure 1 is the highest immediate joint payoff in this situation. Food aid 
(fi gure 2) is an example in which people often say, “Gee, this is a terrible dilemma.” 
If the Samaritan provides food relief, the recipient could put in high effort by using 
it and making an investment in new infrastructure and new ways of harvesting food, 
because the recipient has the food to support the effort. But the recipient could 
also just eat the food and not do anything to improve self-support. There are a fair 
number of documented instances in which people have stopped growing food when 
relief was made available. This is an example of a bad equilibrium, because the 
donor is trying to help people develop new agricultural techniques and new ways of 
producing things rather than just providing them with food.
Most infrastructure construction includes a Samaritan’s Dilemma. For instance, 
the humanitarian provision of health aid can have these kinds of results. So we face 
the risk that all long-term development might become a Samaritan’s Dilemma. We 
need to be aware of this problem when we think about how we provide aid.
Puzzles Related to Aid
Besides the Samaritan’s Dilemma, we may encounter many asymmetric power rela-
tionships (Gibson and Hoffman, 2011). Some of our contemporary efforts in devel-
oping countries are trying to offset earlier forms of asymmetric power, where we 
have been concerned about elite capture and how we can overcome it. But sometimes 
when we try to help, we make it worse.
It is not just that developing countries have problems, and we who have all the 
knowledge should go in and solve them. We must be aware that these problems 
are complex, and that we often contribute to them when we try to help. Yes, many 
of the countries in need of aid lack contemporary, effective institutions, but many 
have had very effective institutions over a very long time. They have been changed, 
sometimes by internal mandates and sometimes by our own actions. The develop-
ment assistance dynamic includes a number of actors in what we call an “octangle,” 
representing the tangle of relationships that can exist (fi gure 3).
Let us take a look at the octangle in fi gure 3. A donor government might relate 
to a recipient government in government-to-government activities. Or there might 
recipient
high effort low effort 
samaritan
no help 2,2 1,1
help 4,3 3,4
FIGURE 1.
Samaritan’s Dilemma
Source: Adapted from Buchanan 1977, 170.
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be a triangle that includes other donors. Meanwhile, the development agency 
within the donor government and the sectoral ministries within the recipient 
government are relating both hierarchically and across the same level. There are 
private groups on both sides. And then you have the implementing organizations. 
We have studied development assistance relationships across many countries and 
IDA sectoral ministries
implementing organizations
donor government recipient government
private groups and
constituent beneficiaries
private groups and
constituent beneficiaries
other donors
FIGURE 3.
The International Development Assistance Octangle
Source: Adapted from Gibson et al. 2005, 64.
Note: IDA = international development agency.
recipient
high effort low effort 
samaritan
no food
Save funds,
but watch
starvation
occur
despite
farmers’
hard work. 
Try to
improve farm
productivity
but
starvation
occurs.  
Save funds
and no
results.  
Do not try to
overcome
long-term
starvation.
relief food
Watch
farmers
improve
short-term
and long-term
nutrition.  
Eat relief
food and
improve
farm
productivity.
Watch
farmers eat
but not grow
any food.  
Eat relief
food and
do not farm.
FIGURE 2.
An Example of the Samaritan’s Dilemma: Food Relief
Source: Adapted from Gibson et al. 2005.
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repeatedly found the octangle—the macrostructure always has an element of 
“tangledness” to it.
Each dyad or triad is subject to motivational, informational, and power problems. 
Many participants want short-term benefi ts. If you have a one-year budget, you want 
results in that year, because you are not going to get more money the next year if you 
do not spend this year’s budget. A failure at any one of the nodes can lead to failure 
at others, so we can have a system that is working fi ne until one thing fails and affects 
others. It is not a self-correcting system. One of the advantages of a market for 
private goods is that it can self-correct. We need to be thinking about how to add 
self-correcting mechanisms to the development aid octangle.
We have too many stakeholders and not enough real ownership. The incentives 
for various participants are problematic, and the benefi ciaries are not important 
stakeholders in the octangle; they are just the recipients. If you are going to try to 
improve development, recipients/benefi ciaries need to be active, or we do not have 
development.
What Do We Invest in Development Aid?
When we did our empirical work, we chose to do research in two countries we knew 
very well. Sujai Shivakumar was born and raised in India and had already conducted 
long-term research there. Clark Gibson had done long-term research in Africa, 
particularly East Africa. So we chose India and Zambia, Krister Andersson and I 
have spent considerable time at Sida headquarters in Stockholm, and we have both 
conducted research in various developing countries. We chose natural resources and 
the problem of developing agriculture and infrastructure as the basis of our research 
design. We then asked each country agency—from Sida to the local agencies—to 
nominate their best projects. We were not able to do a long-term study, so we 
decided to look at Sida staff rated as their best projects to see whether and how they 
were handling the Samaritan’s Dilemma. 
From the fi eld studies and from talking with colleagues across development agen-
cies around the world, we found that infrastructure projects were very attractive 
to development assistance agencies. This is probably still true, from what I have 
heard from development assistance colleagues in the past year or two. You can get 
a budget, you can go out there, you can build a road, and then you can point to that 
road. You can move large sums of money with a small staff. You may also be able 
to involve fi rms from the donor country. USAID, for example, funds a very large 
number of U.S. fi rms that do consulting work plus construction and engineering 
work all over the world. 
One comparative example comes from a long study of irrigation in Nepal, 
more than 200 systems that colleagues and I have studied intensely (Joshi et al. 
2000). The agency-based systems that have received huge amounts of fi nancial 
assistance from various donors are not able to outperform the farmer-managed 
systems. The farmer-managed systems—built on infrastructure the farmers have 
constructed out of mud and rocks—produce more food, produce more water for 
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the tail-end farmers, and are economically more effi cient than some of the very 
large donor projects in which the infrastructure has been built for the recipients. 
The reason: The agency-based projects did not pay attention to property rights 
and were simply turned over without any effort to understand the incentives 
needed to keep them going. When we help with infrastructure, we must be very 
careful to work with the recipients to produce a successful, sustainable project 
(see Ostrom et al., forthcoming). 
We also need to be thinking about how we support human skills to build pro-
ductivity. How can we design systems so that people who receive funds and produce 
results get more money in the future, and those who do not produce get less? To 
achieve this goal, we have to keep records over time, invest in human knowledge, 
evaluate productivity, and base future projects on results. This investment will be 
substantial. When offi cials at USAID, the World Bank, Sida, and other development 
aid agencies ask me to describe successful development projects, I tell them about an 
ingenious intervention in Nepal and their reaction is often, “Oh, that would require 
a very large amount of our human capital, and we don’t have that many staff.” Most 
of the successful projects we have studied have involved large amounts of human 
capital compared with the proportion of engineered capital (Lam and Ostrom 2010). 
An agency can have a highly motivated staff, young people coming in with new ideas, 
investments in improvements, and high morale in the home offi ce, but is this enough? 
I believe that these are necessary but not suffi cient conditions for learning how to 
achieve sustainable development.
Sustainability of a Project
How can the individual in a development agency learn about sustainability, and how 
can that learning be enhanced? One way is through a long-term assignment. Projects 
frequently take fi ve to seven years—if a person is there at the beginning or the mid-
dle or the end, he or she has a sense of the processes at different stages. We found 
in most projects we studied that people who were there at the beginning were not 
there in the middle or at the end, so there was no long-term involvement or learning. 
But even if a person is not involved in a project over the long term, he or she can 
pass information along, so the next person knows what happened earlier. Retaining 
young staff so they work with you for a long time is important, and people have to 
have a sense that their career advancement is based on performance.
There is often a huge variation in the length of assignments. One person may have 
a fi ve-month assignment while another has been doing the same job for 18 years. 
People with longer assignments are often in a headquarters offi ce and never get into 
the fi eld. Many fi eld assignments last for only one to three years, which means the 
person is there at the beginning or the middle or the end, with little or no continuity 
within the project.
A lot of moving around means that staff receive knowledge of what is going on in 
the recipient country, at headquarters, in infrastructure, and in agriculture, but the 
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rapid shifts back and forth do not allow the person to learn enough about any one 
area to gain the kind of expertise required for long-term design. When we have asked 
development aid staff about their assignments, most say the quick turnover rate has 
an adverse effect. For example, one person told me, “I just started to learn and then 
they shifted me somewhere else. I was learning the local language, and now I’m in 
a different place and I don’t have the local language.” That is a common problem. 
Also, there is often very little communication or participation in follow-up on a 
project after a person has moved on to another project. 
Another factor in the development assistance world is temporary contracts. And 
part of that is due to the budget that determines how a project moves forward. For 
instance, an agency’s budget allows a certain amount for a project that must be spent 
in a year but does not allow the hiring of full-time employees. Many aid personnel 
are temporary, with contracts ranging from 3 to 12 months. How can an agency 
maintain continuity on a project and how does one’s career move forward when 
there is a collective-action problem within the organization itself? In this case, no 
single staff member is responsible for the project’s performance. The octangle teaches 
us that many people and organizations are involved in a project, and the opportu-
nity exists to point fi ngers and blame others for problems, especially when there is a 
succession of temporary staff in each organization. I think part of the solution is to 
establish long-term assignments for staff members. This will also enable more accu-
rate performance evaluation for promotion within the agency.
How can we enhance organizational learning about sustainability? I believe there 
are fi ve techniques. The fi rst is to evaluate a project at midterm rather than just at 
the end. If an evaluation occurs at the end of a seven-year project, for instance, 
there is no chance of improving something that was not working right from the 
beginning. Problems are not noted until after the project is over. Second, it is very 
important to involve benefi ciaries in evaluations, because they are key actors. If they 
are not involved, they do not have a voice. They need to receive the reports so they 
can participate in the discussions and the learning. Third, cumulative knowledge 
about factors (such as ownership) that lead to sustainability is important. All factors 
must be included in the evaluations, so the information can build as the project pro-
gresses. Fourth, information must be exchanged between the research world and the 
world of action, and compared among projects within a development aid organiza-
tion and among similar projects developed by all aid agencies. The fi fth technique 
is to make evaluations useful. Performance criteria should be uniform across evalu-
ations, so knowledge can be accumulated and discussions about improvements can 
be productive.
How do we learn from the evaluations and how do we make them more use-
ful? Critical reports exist on projects that were evaluated in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (Carlsson, Köhlin, and Ekbom 1994; Cracknell 2001). The authors 
found that evaluations were conducted too late to be useful and did not involve 
the benefi ciaries. My colleagues and I were struck by the lack of ownership. If 
you are going to have an effective project, the recipients have to have some sense 
of ownership. I have checked with USAID colleagues and other agency personnel, 
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and they say that evaluation still frequently comes at the very end of a project and 
rarely involves benefi ciaries.
If we decide we are going to work on a certain aspect, we should be sure our 
evaluation process looks at that aspect. We did a content analysis of 16 evaluation 
reports to see what they considered factors for success. Of the 16, only one men-
tioned ownership (Gibson et al. 2005, chapter 11), and most of the reports did not 
mention sustainability. If we want to build sustainable development projects, we 
need be doing a thorough analysis of them, sometimes going back 5 or 10 years 
after project completion to fi nd out what has happened. We have been doing that in 
some of our research, because we have been studying forestry, irrigation, and other 
resources in the fi eld where earlier projects were completed. We look at them and 
record our careful observations; frequently we have found no impact of government 
management over a 5- to 10-year period but have found that community-managed 
forests tend to improve forest conditions in the same time period (Chhatre and 
Agrawal 2008, 2009; Hayes 2006;).
We need to make the evaluations useful and develop some sense of what criteria 
we should be using. But how do we get back and forth between the university and 
the world of action? In talking with Sida staff, we found that 85 percent believed 
evaluations were ineffective, but nothing was happening to change them at that 
time—lots of informal discussions but no effort to move ahead. And we did not fi nd 
an internal and self-conscious effort of Sida managers to stimulate learning about 
factors leading to success or failure of their projects. We also asked about seminars 
that bring together all the people who are working on infrastructure around the 
world to talk about why projects work here and not there. We did not fi nd anything 
like this at Sida, USAID, or other development aid organizations. I do not think we 
have had a lot of that at the World Bank either. We need to build these sorts of 
efforts.
Another arena that needs work is the budget process. The main problem is try-
ing to get the money spent each year, because if it is not spent this year, it will not 
be available next year. This budgetary pressure is a universal problem and one we 
need to understand. The offi cial policy of most development agencies is to discour-
age the use-it-or-lose-it approach; however, when project staff have spent all their 
money by a certain date, they are often feted with champagne or a party. We need 
to ask ourselves if we are rewarding the wrong behavior and not dealing with the 
problem. 
One way of dealing with the mad dash to use up the money is to continue fund-
ing projects. If a project is already out there and we have “leftover funds,” let’s just 
keep it going. But that is not always the best strategy. We have found, in general, 
that the type of project affects the likelihood of sustainability. We studied efforts to 
transfer electricity over huge transmission lines without charging a fee to households; 
no income meant that the electricity agency in the country did not have a budget to 
sustain itself. As a result, it had to go back to the development agency to get more 
money to continue providing electricity (Gibson et al. 2005, chapter 9). Ed Araral 
(2009) conducted a fascinating study in the Philippines of more than 2,000 irrigation 
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systems and found the same lack of incentives. If the farmers do not invest in keep-
ing the system going, they can go back to the development agency and ask for help 
to repair the system that they could have maintained. The development agency usu-
ally comes through with new funds. Decentralization has recently become another 
panacea, but it is not a universal success (Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2006; 
Andersson and Ostrom 2008). The Samaritan’s Dilemma works itself out in a wide 
array of settings around the world.
Conclusion
It is important for us to recognize that there are no magic bullets and that these are 
tough problems. Instead of assuming that we have a panacea and taking action, we 
have to dig in and understand the incentives of a situation (Ostrom, Janssen, and 
Anderies 2007). We need to broaden our decision base, and we need multiple strate-
gies, knowing that they will not work in every case (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 
2010). It is not easy to overcome these problems. We have to fi t what we are doing 
to local culture and circumstance. And the participants have to understand what we 
are trying to accomplish and see it as legitimate and something they want to pitch in 
on (Shivakumar 2005).
So, what can we all do? I think we need to revisit the concepts of ownership 
and sustainability in terms of how we create projects in which people have real 
ownership and want to sustain over time, rather than simply handing out money. 
We need to examine the role of consultants. In our research, we encountered 
many nongovernmental organizations that were profi t makers in disguise, simply 
trying to fi nd the money. We also need to understand that public goods are dif-
ferent from common-pool resources; that enhancing a market is different from 
getting health care; and that we accomplish these tasks in different ways. We 
need to understand the politics. We need to understand the pressure to disperse 
and spend the money, which is a very big problem. We need to use evaluations 
more effectively. 
Understanding all these factors requires time. We need to help build institu-
tions, but we cannot build institutions primarily from the outside. Yes, we can 
build the hardware, but in our resource studies around the world, we repeatedly 
fi nd that hardware is only part of what is needed to achieve development. With-
out the software of institutions, projects do not do well or last. We need much 
better work and communication back and forth, and I must say that academia 
has not functioned as well as it should have. When I go out to study various kinds 
of problems around the world, some colleagues in my department say, “Why are 
you studying that? You should be studying the government and parliament, not 
farmers.” We need academia to get involved and not just work at offi cial levels of 
government. We need to be developing the theory and testing it so we are moving 
ahead. We have a lot of work to do; if we can work together on these issues, I think 
we will move ahead.
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Learning, Growth, and Development: 
A Lecture in Honor of Sir Partha 
 Dasgupta
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ*
It is a great pleasure to deliver this address to honor my long-time friend and coau-
thor Partha Dasgupta. Our friendship and collaboration go back some 45 years to 
the mid-1960s, when we were both students and research fellows at Cambridge. 
At the time, it was perhaps the most exciting place in economics in the world. To 
its own luminaries (Robinson, Kaldor, Meade, Champernowne, Farrell, Kahn, and 
Sraffa, to name but a few) were added a roster of visiting greats: Solow, Arrow, 
Radner, Minsky, and Diamond. And a younger generation of economists was just 
emerging, including future stars like James Mirrlees, Geoff Heal, Tony Atkinson, and 
Partha Dasgupta
We were all enthralled by growth theory, attempting to understand what makes 
economies grow and why some economies grow better than others. But there was, 
at the same time, an ongoing debate about capitalism. There was not then the pre-
sumption that prevailed for the three decades beginning with Margaret Thatcher 
and Ronald Reagan—that markets were effi cient and stable. On the contrary, one 
of the memorable moments was when Frank Hahn fi rst derived his results on the 
dynamic instability of markets;1 as he put it, he had put the golden nail in the coffi n 
of capitalism. We were concerned too about the inequality and poverty that seemed 
to accompany capitalism, and about the problems of development. There was still a 
hope that planning could replace a fl awed market.
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Even in those heady days, Partha stood out. He tackled new problems and raised 
new questions, some of which he would pursue in later years. Not since Edgeworth 
(1925) had an economic theorist tried to think deeply about population policy 
(Dasgupta 1969). The environment was not the concern that it is today—this was 
before the oil price shocks of the 1970s turned everyone’s attention to the issues. 
Partha’s pioneering work with Geoff Heal defi ned the fi eld of the economics of 
natural resources for a generation (Dasgupta and Heal 1979). 
The high hopes all of us shared for Partha’s future contributions to economics 
have been more than realized. Year after year, his papers have presented insights 
into an increasing range of topics, and he has been joined by an increasingly large 
constellation of collaborators. But most monumental was his work An Inquiry into 
Well-Being and Destitution, (Dasgupta 1993), which identifi ed the nexus between 
development, growth, inequality, and the environment. No one who read that work 
or his subsequent related work (e.g., Dasgupta 2001) could ever approach the prob-
lems of development as they had before. 
Our interests overlapped in many ways; even when we were not writing 
together, his thinking infl uenced me. We worked together on issues of taxation,2 
cost-benefi t analysis (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1974; Dasgupta, Blitzer, and Stiglitz 
1981), research and development (R&D) and innovation (the subject of this essay) 
(Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980a, 1980b, 1981a, 1982, 1988a, 1988b; Dasgupta, 
Gilbert, and Stiglitz 1983), risk,3 and natural resources,4 and on research pro-
jects that involved intertwining issues of natural resources, innovation, market 
structures, and uncertainty.5 At other times, we worked in parallel; for example, 
on theories of effi ciency wages, on markets with imperfect information, and on 
theories of social capital.6 My most recent project, as chair of the International 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress 
(Fitoussi, Sen, and Stiglitz 2010), was in many ways inspired by An Inquiry into 
Well-Being and Destitution. 
Endogenous Learning and Development: Schumpeterian Economics
It is customary in a festschrift to write a paper inspired by the work of the honoree. 
In this case, there are so many topics I could have chosen. But I shall choose one that 
I believe is central to development, that has been a source of concern to Partha and 
me since our days as graduate students, and on which we collaborated extensively in 
the following years: innovation.7
While much of the most widely read work in growth theory of the 1960s assumed 
exogenous technical progress, that was an assumption of convenience. We spent 
much time talking about and attempting to model the determinants of the pace of 
innovation (later called endogenous growth theory).8
Solow’s seminal work (1957), in which he showed how one could decompose 
the sources of economic growth, had demonstrated why this task was so important: 
The vast majority of increases in per capita income were attributable to technologi-
cal change (the unexplained Solow residual) rather than capital accumulation. To 
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leave unexplained the determinants of technological change was, in short, to leave 
unexplained most of growth. 
In the context of development, the matter was even more compelling. As I have 
repeatedly noted, what separates developed from less developed countries is not 
just a gap in resources but a gap in knowledge. The pace at which developing 
countries grow is largely determined by the pace at which they close that gap. Con-
ventional economics and development theory and practice have given short shrift 
to these issues. They have focused on how to increase static effi ciency; that is, given 
the state of knowledge within the country, how to move the country closer to its 
production (or utilities) possibilities curve. This was the focus of the Washington 
Consensus policies, including trade liberalization. But that meant policy was focus-
ing on something that was, in a sense, of second order importance: gains in moving 
to the production possibilities curve (say, as a result of trade liberalization) were 
one-off. Increases in income attributable to higher investment were dwarfed by 
those attributable to closing the knowledge gap. If one could only understand how 
to close that gap more rapidly and how to move the knowledge frontier out at a 
faster pace, one might be able to design policies that would have far larger impacts 
on standards of living. Ignoring the most important source of increases in income 
was bad enough; making matters even worse was that policy conclusions focusing 
only on static considerations and ignoring dynamics were likely to be wrong and 
misguided. For instance, if technological change is exogenous (and there are no 
problems of information asymmetries, no environmental externalities, etc.), the 
presumption is that markets are effi cient and the role for government is very lim-
ited. But that may not be the case when technological change is endogenous.9 One 
of the major objectives of this paper is to explore the design of optimal government 
interventions.
Trade-offs can exist between static effi ciency and dynamics. From the perspective 
of long-term well-being, it may be optimal to maintain static ineffi ciencies—possibly 
forever—because of dynamic benefi ts that might be generated by such seemingly 
distortionary behavior. 
The idea of static versus dynamic trade-offs is familiar: The patent system intro-
duces an ineffi ciency in the use of knowledge by restricting its free fl ow (because 
knowledge is a public good, with nonrivalrous consumption, when provided to an 
additional individual it does not subtract from that available to others). Moreover, 
patents reduce competition and in some cases even give rise to (perhaps temporary) 
monopolies, which in turn give rise to static ineffi ciencies. We countenance these 
ineffi ciencies in the belief that the restrictions incentivize research and that the 
dynamic gains outweigh the static costs.10
These concerns are even more central to development economics, where the focus 
of attention should be on how to bring about the transformation of the economy 
and society (Stiglitz 1998). Learning new ways of producing, of doing business, and 
of organizing economic, political, and social activities is at the heart of development. 
Dynamics cannot be ignored. Here we focus more narrowly on “economic learning”: 
improving workers’ productivity. In this context, the central issue is how can devel-
oping countries maximize these knowledge-related improvements in productivity or, 
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more accurately, balance out the short-run costs and the long-run gains? Exploring 
this issue is the central objective of this paper. 
Arrow’s (1962a, 1962b) pioneering work provided a framework for analyzing 
endogenous technological progress: Some progress was the result of deliberate allo-
cation of resources to R&D, while much was learning that occurred as one produced 
or invested (learning by doing.)11 Here, we explore the improvements in productivity 
that result from learning by doing.12 
Arrow noted that market structure (i.e., whether there was a monopoly or com-
petition) affected incentives to innovate. But market structures themselves are endog-
enous. Knowledge can be viewed as a fi xed cost; sectors in which R&D or learning 
are particularly important can be viewed as natural monopolies.
In short, if technological progress is endogenous, there is a raft of market failures: 
Markets are not likely to be perfectly competitive; benefi ts of research or learning 
are likely to spill over to others; fi rms engaged in research will appropriate only a 
portion of the societal benefi ts arising from their research; and attempts to strengthen 
appropriation will introduce further distortions in the economy. Many of these mar-
ket failures (e.g., those arising from imperfections of competition and the inability to 
appropriate all the benefi ts of R&D) may result in underinvestment in research.13 Yet 
attempts to correct this problem—for example, through strong patent protection—
may result in overinvestment: The private return from obtaining a patent typically 
exceeds the social return, which is simply the availability of the knowledge shortly 
before it otherwise would have been available. 
Markets may not only invest too much or too little in research, they may invest 
too much in some kinds of research (me-too patents in the drug industry) and too 
little in others (especially in basic research). 
Analyzing the effi ciency of the market is a complex task, and at the time Partha 
and I embarked on our work, a third of a century ago, few attempts had been made 
to do so. Remarkably, in spite of the constant praise of the market system’s “innova-
tiveness,” we found no general theorems on the effi ciency of markets with respect to 
the pace and direction of innovation. In a series of papers, we modeled the interac-
tions between industrial structure and the pace of innovation, viewing them as both 
endogenous and simultaneously determined (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980a, 1980b). 
Only in such a context could one begin to analyze the effi ciency of markets. 
We were, I think, greatly infl uenced by the ideas of Schumpeter (1912, 1943), 
who had been long neglected by the mainstream. Schumpeter had argued—and we 
agreed—that if there was virtue in a market economy, it lay more with its dyna-
mism, its ability to innovate, than with the kind of allocative effi ciency stressed by 
the standard Arrow-Debreu model. Schumpeter grasped the dynamic/static trade-off 
and thus took a more benign view of monopolies. Monopolies could generate the 
profi ts necessary to fund research—especially important in an era when fi nancial 
markets were less developed, and venture capital fi rms did not exist. Borrowing to 
fi nance speculative research was limited because, if the research project failed, there 
was nothing for the lender to seize. In real estate, at least there is some collateral. 
As a result of my research on the economics of information, I had less sanguine 
views of markets and monopoly. Markets in which information was endogenous 
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were generally not effi cient (see Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986). Beginning in the late 
1960s, I had explored the nature of these ineffi ciencies. In Stiglitz (1975a), I showed 
that there could exist Pareto inferior equilibria, and in Newbery and Stiglitz (1982), 
we showed that trade restrictions could make everyone in all countries better off. But 
then, in Stiglitz (1975), I showed that the economics of information and the econom-
ics of knowledge were very similar.14 Both information and knowledge had public 
goods properties and large associated externalities. Given that we had established the 
ineffi ciency of market economies in which information was endogenous, it was also 
clear that economies in which knowledge was endogenous would also be ineffi cient. 
There was a presumption against unfettered markets. 
As a point of departure, we wanted to test the robustness of some of Schumpeter’s 
ideas, which for the most part had not been formally modeled but nonetheless had 
come to be accepted as part of the conventional wisdom. At the same time, we 
wanted to shed light on some key policy debates. 
Economists had long been preoccupied with the dangers of monopolies. Schum-
peter dismissed these worries—in his view, in these dynamic settings conventional 
competition would be replaced by Schumpeterian competition. Competition for the 
market would replace competition in the market, and there would be a succession 
of monopolies. Schumpeter seemed to countenance monopoly: He saw it as a small 
price in static ineffi ciency to pay for a greater pace of innovation associated with 
monopoly. 
Our analysis called into the question the way Shumpeter had posed the ques-
tions. We argued that if market structure itself were endogenous and affected by, 
say, the technology of technological progress, the right question was not the effect 
of monopoly power on innovation but under what circumstances the market struc-
ture that emerged endogenously would lead to effi cient allocation of resources to 
innovation. Or, more broadly, what government interventions would enhance soci-
etal well-being? Such interventions could take a myriad of forms: antitrust policies, 
patent laws, government-funded research, or government incentives for research; 
for example, through the tax system. Until the development of the modern theory 
of the economics of information, the presumption in conventional economics was 
that markets, by themselves, result in effi ciency (with well-known exceptions, such 
as those associated with pollution). Schumpeterian competition seemed to create a 
similar presumption for dynamic economies, in which the center of attention is on 
innovation. 
Our results also called into question much of the conventional wisdom and some 
of what Schumpeter claimed.15 For instance, Schumpeter too easily dismissed the 
distortions that arose from monopoly and underestimated the ability of monopolies 
to maintain their position. Firms had an incentive and the means to deter entry of 
rivals and maintain their monopoly (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980b, 1988b; Gilbert 
and Newbery 1982). Some of these actions, though privately profi table, were highly 
socially costly (Stiglitz 1981, 1987b). Monopolization could result in both short-
run ineffi ciencies and a slower pace of innovation.16 We wrote about this before 
Microsoft’s abuses became well known. In a sense, our work laid out a framework 
to evaluate claims about the benefi ts associated with attempts to limit competition, 
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explaining both the private incentives and the high social costs of these anticompeti-
tive practices.
The Infant Industry Argument for Protection
In a later work, we linked this broad conceptual work to our interest in development 
and, in particular, to the question of industrial policy and whether innovation and 
learning17 provided a justifi cation, for instance, for industrial tariffs (Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz 1988a). While earlier literature had developed the infant industry argument 
for protection, conventional wisdom in the previous quarter-century had moved 
against it.18 
This reaction was partly for reasons of political economy: The infants never grew 
up, and the argument often seemed more abused than used (America’s ethanol subsi-
dies are a case in point). Not content with these political arguments—especially since 
the most successful countries, those in East Asia, had arguably employed industrial 
policies with considerable success—many economists attacked the economics itself. 
Critics of infant industry protection argued that learning by itself does not imply a 
market failure. Firms take learning benefi ts into account in their behavior. They are 
willing to produce at a loss, knowing that they will be more competitive in the future. 
Dasgupta and I provided what was perhaps the obvious answer to this argument: 
Firms faced capital constraints. They couldn’t borrow to make up for their shortfall. 
The retort was that even if capital market imperfections existed, it made more sense 
to correct those imperfections than to create new ones. If the government couldn’t 
correct the market failure, it should subsidize the fi rms directly rather than through 
distortionary tariffs.
But Dasgupta and I provided a novel retort to this retort, based on insights from 
the emerging fi eld of information economics—one to which the critics of industrial 
policy have never offered an effective reply. We argued that capital market imper-
fections result from information imperfections, and these information imperfections 
help explain why subsidies may not work. The government may not know which 
fi rms to subsidize, just as the market may not know which fi rms to lend to; it may 
not know which fi rms will be most successful in learning or in R&D. But with a 
tariff or other trade interventions (such as the exchange rate interventions described 
below), the fi rms that believe they will be profi table—with their learning—self-select 
into the market.19 
Partha and I thus provided a fully articulated rationale for infant industry protec-
tion based on information asymmetries and a theory of learning by doing. But while 
the model provided a convincing refutation of the critique of the infant industry 
argument, it did not fully answer the question of when and how the government 
should intervene (putting aside political economy considerations). 
One of the reasons countries engage in infant industry protection is that they want 
to enter the fast-moving high-growth sectors—sectors with signifi cant learning. The 
industrial sector is subject to faster learning than agriculture, so countries wanted 
to move into that sector. But industry was not their current comparative advantage; 
without some government intervention, they could not enter the industrial sector and 
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therefore could not learn. Unfettered markets can keep a country from entering more 
dynamic sectors, especially if the learning is external to the fi rm. 
But this argument for infant industry protection is not fully convincing,20 as all 
countries will benefi t from the learning as a result of lower prices, so long as markets 
remain competitive. Moving into a more dynamic sector does not guarantee a coun-
try greater (innovation) rents. 
Consider a two-country, two-good model, in which we assume all persons have 
the same utility function ln U = .5 ln C1 + .5 ln C2.21 Each good is produced by labor 
alone; the two countries are the same size; and country 1 specializes in good 1, while 
country 2 specializes in good 2. It is trivial to show that half of global income goes 
to country 1, half to country 2. If country 1 has rapid technical progress (endogenous 
or exogenous) but goods are produced competitively, prices will fall in proportion to 
productivity, so that while revenue per unit produced falls in proportion to produc-
tivity, revenue per hour remains the same. Country 2 benefi ts fully from country 1’s 
learning (Skeath 1993, 1995). It should not envy the other country that has special-
ized in the seemingly more dynamic sector. 
A rationale may still exist for encouraging the more dynamic sector, but it lies 
elsewhere—with the externalities the tradable high-learning sector generates, for 
instance, to the nontradable sector. Here we provide the real answer to the critics 
of industrial policy. Industrial policy is not focused on picking winners, and it is 
not predicated on the belief that government can do a better job than the private 
sector of picking winners. It is based on the notion that learning involves spillovers 
(externalities) that will be imperfectly internalized in a market economy, and that 
in circumstances in which learning might largely be internalized—where there is 
a monopoly—the distortions created by the monopoly itself require government 
intervention. 
I present here a general theory of growth and development based on endogenous 
learning with endogenous capital constraints derived from underlying market imper-
fections. It is based on joint work with Bruce Greenwald on what we call the “infant 
economy argument for protection.” The theory offers a policy framework that is 
markedly different from that of the Washington Consensus, which rests on neoclas-
sical models with well-functioning markets in which technology is either fi xed or, if it 
is changing, the changes are simply assumed to be exogenous, unaffected by anything 
the government might do. The latter theory focuses on the importance of allocative 
effi ciency given a level of technology. Theories of endogenous learning, by contrast, 
focus on the determinants of learning.22 Unlike the standard infant industry theory, 
the theory presented here examines how a society, not just a particular sector, learns.
The theory shows that in some circumstances Schumpeter’s criticism of compe-
tition may contain a grain of truth; in general, with full competition, the pace of 
innovation is suboptimal. There may even be a grain of truth in his perspectives on 
monopoly: Monopolies are more likely to internalize the benefi ts of learning (R&D), 
and this factor by itself would suggest a faster pace of innovation. But monopolies 
constrain production, and that means that they have less incentive to innovate, as 
Arrow long ago argued. And even with monopoly, there are likely to be important 
spillovers to other sectors, the benefi ts of which the monopolist will not take into 
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account. In short, neither unfettered competitive markets nor unbridled monopolies 
are likely to lead to socially effi cient levels of innovation. Government policies—
sometimes called industrial policies—are required. In the context of a highly simpli-
fi ed model, we characterize those policies, identifying both broad-based and sectoral 
policies that would lead to welfare improvements and a higher level of innovation.
Outline of the Paper
I proceed methodically in the analysis of the infant economy argument for protec-
tion based on the theory of learning. I fi rst consider a closed economy, explaining 
why government intervention is desirable. In the context of a closed economy, I fi rst 
consider a two-period model, and then investigate long-run growth models. Next, I 
examine the special case of government intervention in the context of monopolistic 
competition. The remainder of the paper considers an open economy, asking when 
countries that are stuck in the less dynamic sectors suffer as a result. To answer that 
question, I construct a model of dynamic trade equilibrium. First I consider a model 
that contains only tradable commodities, then I introduce nontradables. The remark-
able result is that, in the presence of certain policy restrictions, not only might it be 
desirable for countries to promote exports and not only might exchange rate policy 
be an effective mechanism for doing so, but it may even pay countries to permanently 
maintain an exchange rate that is so undervalued that it creates permanent reserve 
accumulations.
Like much of the modern economics of the public sector, the nature of the optimal 
interventions depends on the instruments and powers of government. Whether the 
government can abolish monopolies or undo their distortionary behavior has impli-
cations for the desirable levels of research and learning. It makes a difference, too, if 
the government can raise revenues to subsidize or support research or learning only 
through distortionary taxation rather than through lump sum taxes. The econom-
ics of the second best is of particular relevance here: R&D and learning give rise to 
market imperfections, and all policies have to take into account the presence of these 
imperfections (sometimes referred to as distortions) if they cannot undo them. Well-
designed distortions in one market can partially offset distortions in others. 
I use the word “distortions” with care: Common usage suggests that governments 
should simply do away with them. But as the term has come to be used, it simply 
refers to deviations from the way a classical model with, say, perfect information 
might function. Information is inherently imperfect, and these imperfections cannot 
be legislated away. Nor can the market power that arises from the returns to scale 
inherent in research be legislated away. That is why simultaneously endogenizing 
market structure and innovation is so important. Similarly, the costs associated with 
R&D (or the “losses” associated with expanding production to “invest” in learning) 
cannot be ignored; they have to be paid for. Monopoly rents are one way of doing 
so, but—as I argue here—a far from ideal way. There are ways to impose even dis-
tortionary taxes (i.e., taxes that give rise to a loss of consumer surplus) that increase 
societal well-being and the speed of innovation. 
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Government Intervention in Closed Economies with Learning by 
Doing
When there is learning by doing, today’s production has benefi ts for the future. We 
must ask, will fi rms take that into account, and what are the consequences of not 
doing so? 
The answers to these questions revolve around whether the learning is internal to 
the industry or internal to the fi rm. If learning is internal only to the fi rm, then the 
larger the fi rm, the lower its cost. Each fi rm is, in a sense, a natural monopoly. There 
cannot be competition. And, in general, when competition is restricted, market allo-
cations are not effi cient. But now there are two ineffi ciencies: In addition to the static 
ineffi ciencies associated with the exercise of monopoly power, there may be dynamic 
ineffi ciencies. These may be complex: Products in which fi rms have more monopoly 
power will have less production, and the lower production will lead to less learning. 
Productivity growth in these sectors may, accordingly, be slower.23 In addition to the 
static consequence of the loss of consumer surplus from underproduction, there is a 
dynamic cost: The lower learning and higher costs in subsequent periods associated 
with monopoly today result in lower output in future periods. Of course, labor not 
used in the monopolized sector gets displaced to other sectors, but if those sectors 
are sectors with less learning, the overall rate of growth of the economy is reduced. 
Moreover, monopoly power will result in lower real wages; lower real wages will nor-
mally result in lower equilibrium labor supply; and, if learning depends on produc-
tion (i.e., increases with labor supply), there will be less learning (slower increases in 
productivity) even if the monopolized sectors did not have an advantage in learning. 
In short, we will typically see lower societal innovation with monopoly even in the 
absence of learning spillovers—that is, even where the monopolist fully internalizes 
the benefi ts of learning—for two reasons: (1) because of underproduction in future 
periods as a result of monopoly power, the benefi ts that accrue to the monopolist 
from innovation are lower than they would be with effi cient production; and (2) the 
lower real wages lead to lower production on average and hence less learning. In 
addition, the pattern of production will be distorted from what is optimal; that is, 
the pattern that would emerge from a careful balancing of static costs and dynamic 
gains. If monopoly power is greater in the more dynamic sectors—because those are 
sectors where the natural monopoly nature of learning is strongest—resources are 
displaced from learning sectors to others and, again, there is a presumption that the 
pace of innovation is lower. 
On the other hand, if learning is external to the fi rm—so much so that others 
in the industry benefi t from its learning as much as it does—the industry can be 
competitive, but because of the externality, there will be underproduction of goods 
generating (positive) externalities such as learning. 
In short, whether learning is internal or external to the fi rm, the market equilib-
rium will not, in general, be Pareto effi cient. Government has a role to play in cor-
recting the market misallocations. 
While the result on the ineffi ciency of market equilibrium is robust, the result that 
a competitive equilibrium can exist if there are full spillovers of knowledge is not. 
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If there are not full spillovers, then the fi rm engaging in learning has a competitive 
advantage, and the earlier argument about the existence of a natural monopoly is 
restored. On the other hand, the result that there is always a natural monopoly is 
also not robust. We can obtain an equilibrium with many fi rms if the diseconomies 
of scale are large enough to outweigh the economies of scale in learning. 
In the following analysis, we make two important distinctions. The fi rst distinc-
tion concerns the structure of the product market. As we have noted, endogenous 
learning makes some market structures infeasible: In the absence of full within-
industry spillovers, a natural monopoly exists. With full spillovers, there can be many 
fi rms in the industry; there will be competition, but no fi rm will take into account 
the learning benefi t its production confers on others. It is possible that the market 
might best be described as monopolistically competitive, with only one fi rm in the 
industry but spillovers to other industries. In this case, we will see two distortions: 
underproduction as a result of the exercise of monopoly power and underproduction 
as a result of failing to take into account the learning benefi ts that accrue to others.
The second concerns the nature of spillovers. Traditional analyses assumed full 
spillovers within the sector within the country and no spillovers to other sectors or 
other countries. This is extreme. In fact, the production of any good involves many 
stages, and some of the stages may involve processes that are similar to those used 
in another seemingly distinct sector. The result is that innovations in one sector may 
benefi t other sectors that look markedly different. Inventory control and cash man-
agement techniques affect virtually every fi rm in an economy. Just-in-time production 
or assembly lines are examples of production processes that affect many industries. 
Sectors that are similar may, of course, benefi t more. (Indeed, the same argument 
holds within a sector. An innovation in one technology in a given sector may have 
limited spillovers for other technologies—the spillovers may be greater to other prod-
ucts using analogous technologies.)24 There are equally important economy-wide 
“technologies.” A fi nancial system developed to serve the manufacturing sector may 
equally serve the rural sector. In the discussion in this and the next section, we use a 
general formulation that has as limiting cases no and perfect spillovers. 
Table 1 outlines the three cases. Most of our attention will focus on the cases 
with perfect competition and full spillovers, or monopolistic competition and no 
spillovers.25
One of the important methodological implications of the analysis is that not 
only must one simultaneously consider market structure and innovation (both 
are endogenous), but the analysis must be conducted within a general equilibrium 
framework. In a partial equilibrium context, one might conclude—as Schumpeter 
did—that monopoly was better than competition because it internalized the benefi ts 
TABLE 1. Spillovers and Market Structures
No cross-fi rm spillovers Full cross-fi rm spillovers
Perfect competition X (not feasible) Underinvestment in learning
Monopolistic competition Restricted output Both market distortions
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of learning, without noting adverse general equilibrium effects (in the simple model 
presented here, arising from the impacts on real wages and labor supply). 
Optimal Resource Allocations with Learning: Basic Intuition
It is easy to describe the effi cient resource allocations without learning: In each 
period, the marginal benefi t of producing one more unit of a good must equal its 
marginal cost. In the case of a good produced by labor alone, the marginal rate of 
substitution between the good and leisure (which should be the same for all persons) 
should equal the marginal rate of transformation; that is, the marginal product of 
labor. With learning, producing or investing more today has future benefi ts—lower 
future production costs—and this needs to be taken into account. This can easily be 
done: 
(1) The value of the marginal product + total future cost savings = marginal cost 
today. 
This contrasts with the competitive equilibrium without learning, where
(2) The value of the marginal product = marginal cost today; 
and with the monopolistically competitive equilibrium with learning, where
(3) Marginal revenue product + future cost savings to the firm = marginal cost 
today.
The competitive scenario neglects all the learning benefi ts; the monopolistically com-
petitive fi rms underestimate the static benefi t of production, ignore learning benefi ts 
to other fi rms, and, because production may be lower, assign a lower value even to 
fi rm cost savings. 
Understanding the structure of learning and knowledge dissemination is essential 
to understanding effi cient production. We are concerned with societal learning, not 
just sectoral or fi rm learning. For example, some sectors may have stronger learning 
curves; that is, the elasticity of learning may be larger for a fi rm. But what matters is 
not just the ability of a fi rm or sector to learn but also the benefi ts that sector (fi rm) 
transmits to other sectors (fi rms) and the extent to which it does not appropriate for 
itself the benefi ts of the learning. 
If learning in one sector generates more externalities to other sectors than do oth-
ers, production in that sector should be increased (relative to what it would be in the 
market equilibrium that ignored these learning externalities) at the expense of others. 
The dynamic (future) benefi ts need to be offset against the static (short-run) costs.
Section 1. A Two-Period Model
This section is divided into fi ve parts. First, we consider a “direct control” problem 
in which government can determine the amount of labor allocated to each sector. 
Second, we provide a price interpretation of this optimum. Third, we examine some 
special features of the symmetric sectors case. Fourth, we analyze optimal interven-
tions using standard optimal tax theory (i.e., we investigate indirect control mecha-
nisms through taxes and subsidies), assuming that government can levy lump sum 
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taxes. Finally, we analyze government intervention in more realistic contexts, in 
which government cannot impose such taxes. 
Optimum Learning A simple two-period model in which labor is the only input 
to production suffi ces to bring out the major issues.26 Assume (for simplicity) that 
utility is separable between goods in the two periods and between goods and labor:
 W = U(xt) − v(Lt) + δ[U(xt+1) − v(Lt+1)], (1)
where xt is the vector of consumption {xk
t} at time t and Lt is aggregate labor supply 
at time t. The disutility of work is the same in all sectors, and Lt is aggregate labor 
input in period t:
L L and L Lt k
t t+1
k
t+1
= ∑ = Σ ,
where Lik is the input of labor in sector k in period i. 
Production is described by (in the appropriate choice of units)
 x Lk
t
k
t
= .  (2)
In this simple model, the more output of good j in period t, the lower the produc-
tion costs in period t + 1. We assume
 x L H [L ],k
t+1
k
t+1 k t
=  (3)
where Lt is the vector of labor inputs at time t {Lk
t}.
The learning functions Hk and their properties are at the center of this analysis. In 
the following analysis, two properties of these learning functions will play a central role: 
(a)  Learning elasticity—how much sectoral productivity is increased as a result of an 
increase in labor input. 
We defi ne
 h d ln H /d ln Lk
k
k
t
= . (4)
hk is the elasticity of the learning curve in sector k. 
(b)  Learning spillovers—the extent to which learning in sector i spills over to sector j. 
∂ ∂ ≠H / L > 0, j k,k jt  if there are learning externalities,
while
∂Hk/∂Ltj = 0, j ≠ k, if there are no learning externalities.
At various points in the discussion, we will fi nd it convenient to focus on two 
special cases, one with no learning spillovers and one with full learning spillovers. In 
the special case with no learning externalities, we write, for simplicity
 x L (Lk
t+1
k
t+1
k k
t
= ψ ).  (5)
In the other case, with full learning spillovers, 
Hk = Hj, all j, k.
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Optimization of (1) with respect to Lk
j , j = t, t + 1 yields (in the obvious notation)
 U v’ Bk
t t
k= −  (6)
 U H v’k
t+1 k t+1
= , (7)
where Bk is the learning benefi t from increased output (input) into sector k: 
 B U (x ) L Hk jk
t 1 t 1
i
t 1
k
i
= ∑ + + +δ  (8)
The fi rst equation simply says that in allocating labor in the fi rst period, we 
take into account the learning benefi ts. Bk ≥ 0 implies that, so long as there are any 
learning benefi ts, production the fi rst period goes beyond the level that would have 
occurred with static effi ciency (which entails Uk
t = v’t ). Obviously, sectors with more 
learning benefi ts expand production more. 
To see what that entails more precisely, we focus on three polar cases:
(a) No spillovers.
Hkj = 0 j ≠ k. 
Then
 B h U (x ),k k k k
t t
= δξ  (9)
where
ξk kt 1 kt+1 kt kt(U x /U x ).= +
The magnitude of the learning benefi t depends on the discount rate (the larger 
δ, the more we value future benefi ts) and the learning elasticity hk. Indeed, without 
spillovers, the learning benefi t is simply proportional to the learning elasticity.27
One might have thought that because of the fi xed-cost nature of learning, produc-
tion in larger sectors would have increased more. But the magnitude of expansion 
of production entails a careful balancing of the marginal benefi t of learning (the 
dynamic gain) and the marginal costs of the fi rst period distortion (the static cost). 
The formulas derived in this paper analyze what that entails. In effect, they show 
that what matters is the learning elasticity and not the scale but changes in the scale 
between the two periods, captured by the variable ξk .
Normally, we would expect that, as a result of productivity increases, consumption 
of each good will increase. In the case of separability with respect to consumption, 
U = Σkuk(xk),
and the effect on Ukxk = u’kxk of an increase in xk depends on the elasticity of mar-
ginal utility for commodity k, ηk, where ηk = − dln u’k/dln xk:
dln Uk xk/dln xk = 1 − ηk
Because normally xk
t+1 > xk
t,28 ξk is greater than or less than unity, depending on 
whether ηk is greater or less than unity. If marginal utility diminishes slowly, the 
value of learning is greater. 
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In the case of the logarithmic utility function, ξk = 1, so
 B h U (x )k k k
t t
= δ  (10)
(b) Full spillovers.
The case of full spillovers can most simply be analyzed by rewriting our maxi-
mand (1) as
 Max W = U(xt) − v(Lt) + δ[U(H(xt) Lt+1) − v(Lt+1)]. (11)
For simplicity, we assume homothetic preferences, which allows us to rewrite our 
utility function U = U (φ(x)) where φ has constant returns to scale. This generates the 
fi rst order condition
U’ v’  U’ H (x )L
= U’ [ h */ ],
t
k
t 1
k j j
t 1
j
t 1
t 1
k k k
φ δ φ
φ δ ξ γ
− = − ∑
−
+ + +
+
where 
ξ* = U’t+1 φt+1/ U’t φt,
where 
γk = dln φ/dln xk.
and where we have made use of the result that with constant returns 
∑ = ∑ =+ + + +j j t 1 jt 1 j j t 1 jt 1(x )L H (x )xφ φ φ.
Obviously, as before, if U = ln φ, then ξ* = 1 and 
Bk = U’ t+1 φk [δ hk/ γk].
Bk is proportional to the discount factor δ and the learning elasticity hk , and 
inversely proportional to the share in total consumption in period t represented by 
good k (γk). 
(c) Full spillovers in some sectors and no spillovers in others.
For simplicity, we focus on two sectors, labeled s for spillovers and 0 for no spillo-
vers. Then our maximand becomes  
Max W U(x ,x ) v(L ) [U(H (x ) L , H (x ) H (L ) Ls
t
0
t t s
s
t
s
t 1 s
s
t 0
0
t
0
t 1
= − + + +δ ) v(L )],t 1− +  
yielding the fi rst order conditions 
U v’(L ) H ’(x ) [U  L U H (L ) L ]
h (x
s
t t s t
s
t 1
s
t 1
0
t 1 0
0
t
0
t 1
s
s
s− = +
=
+ + + +δ
δ t st 1 st 1 st 0t 1 0t 1 st) [U (x / x ) U x / x ]+ + + ++
and
U v’(L ) H (x )U H ’(L )  L
h (x ) U x /
0
t t s
s
t
0
t 1 0
0
t
0
t 1
0
0
t
0
t 1
0
t 1
− =
=
+ +
+ +
δ
δ x0t .
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Provided that the learning elasticities are similar, learning induces a far larger 
expansion in the sector with spillovers than the sector without. For instance, with 
logarithmic utility functions, U = aslog xs + a0 log x0, as + a0 = 1
U v’(L ) h (X )/X h U 1 ,s
t t s
s
t
s
t s
s
t 0
s
− = = +
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟δ δ
α
α
while
U v’(L ) a h (X )/X0
t t
0
0
0
t
0
t 0
0− = =δ δh Ut .
Price Interpretation The equations describing the optimal allocation of resources 
have an obvious price interpretation. Let
Utk/v’t = pk
t = marginal rate of substitution between good k and leisure in period t. 
Let qk
t = marginal rate of transformation between labor and good k in period t. 
q 1 for all k,k
t
=
and 
q 1/H , for all k.k
t 1 k+
=  
Then (7) implies that
 p q for all k.k
t 1
k
t 1+ +
=  (12)
In the fi rst-best allocation, in the second period, the consumer price (equals the 
marginal rate of substitution) equals the producer price (equals the marginal rate of 
transformation). 
The fi rst period allocation is somewhat more complicated. Equation (6) implies 
that
 p q p 1 p 1/ 1 ,k
t
k
t
k k
t
k
t
k= − = − = +( )Ω Ω Ω  (13)
where Ωk is the marginal (normalized by the marginal utility) learning benefi t from 
producing more of good k in the fi rst period (this includes the learning benefi ts to 
all sectors):
 
Ω δ[ ]
δ ξ
K k k
t
j j j
t 1
k
j
k
t
jk
j
k
t
B /U U ( )L H /U
d ln H /dlnx >0.
≡ = ∑
= ∑
+Xt+1
 (14)
where  ξjk j
t 1
j
t 1
k
t
k
t
U x
U x
=
+ +
Optimal production entails producing in the fi rst period beyond the point of the 
static effi ciency condition, where marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal 
rate of transformation. The extent to which we expand production depends on the 
direct learning effects and on the indirect benefi ts to other sectors. It is not just the 
direct learning benefi ts that count. If a sector has more spillovers to others, we might 
want to expand its production even if its own learning elasticity is lower. 
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Consider our two polar cases. First, assume there are no learning spillovers, so 
Hkj = 0 for j ≠ k. Then 
Ωk = δ ξkk hk.
In the case of a logarithmic utility function, ξkk = 1. The extent to which the mar-
ginal rate of substitution is less than the marginal rate of transformation (i.e., the 
extent to which production is expanded beyond the level of static effi ciency) depends 
on the elasticity of learning. If marginal utility diminishes rapidly, sectors for which 
there is a lot of learning will have correspondingly smaller values of ξkk, diminishing 
the extent to which output is expanded. The higher d is (the less future utility is dis-
counted), the more important the learning benefi ts are and thus the higher the level 
of production the fi rst period.
Second, consider the case with full spillovers. Then where
ξkk jt 1 kt kt
k k k
U x /U x
h */ .
jt 1=
=
+
+
Ω δ ξ γ
If we implement the optimal allocation through a market mechanism, we encoun-
ter a problem: Production in the fi rst period has to be subsidized, and the subsidies 
have to somehow be paid for. If we can impose a lump sum tax on individuals to pay 
the “learning subsidies,” we can achieve the fi rst-best optimum. In later sections, we 
turn to optimal policies for when we cannot impose lump sum taxes.
The price interpretation is useful because it provides an easy and direct contrast 
between optimal resource allocations and the competitive equilibrium. (We will 
discuss the monopolistically competitive equilibrium later.) In the competitive equi-
librium, 
U /v’ q 1 for all k
U /v’ q 1/H , for all k;
k
t t
k
t
k
t 1 t+1
k
t 1 k
= =
= =
+ +
that is, production in the fi rst period ignores all learning benefi ts but, conditional on 
the learning that has occurred, second period production is effi cient. Clearly, there 
will be underproduction in the fi rst period, especially in those sectors in which learn-
ing is important. 
Symmetric Case The above analysis derived general formulas for analyzing optimal 
production/learning if government could directly control inputs/outputs in every sec-
tor. We also provided a price interpretation of the optimum. Much of our discussion 
focused on the desirability of increasing activities that generate learning externalities 
compared with those that did not.
But there is a broader macroeconomic issue: Even if all sectors were identical 
(symmetric), so that 1/nth of the labor supply ought to (and, in market equilibrium, 
will) be devoted to each commodity, there may be too little output (labor supply) 
in the fi rst period. If labor supply is inelastic and the number of goods is fi xed at n, 
in the symmetric equilibrium, 1/nth of the labor force is allocated to each good. It 
is obvious that the market equilibrium has the effi cient amount of learning in each 
sector; there is no learning distortion, even though there are learning externalities. 
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This is important, for it illustrates the large discrepancy between partial and general 
equilibrium analysis. (Partial equilibrium analysis would have led us to the conclu-
sion that there was an underinvestment in learning.) 
The symmetric equilibrium also provides an easy context in which to compare the 
market equilibrium with the optimum. For simplicity, we will assume no spillovers 
across sectors. 
The social welfare maximization problem can be easily written as
Max U (L /n,L /n,L /n,......) v (L ) L ,L
[U ( (L )
t t t t t t t t 1
t 1 t
− + +
+
{ }
δ ψ L /n, (L )L /n, (L )L /n,......) v (L )],t 1 t t 1 t t 1 t 1 t 1+ + + + +−ψ ψ
where n is the number of commodities, and where we have assumed separability 
between labor and goods but not necessarily between goods; where ψk(Lkt) is the 
learning function giving output per unit input29); and where, because of the assump-
tion of symmetry, we can, without loss of generality, drop the subscript on the learn-
ing function. 
The fi rst order condition can be written
∑ − = − = − ∑ ′ = − ′+ + +U /n v U v U (L )L /n U (L )Lit t it t it 1 it t 1 it 1 itδ ψ δ ψ¨ ¨ t 1+ .
In competitive equilibrium
U v ’ 0,i
t t
− =  
so it is clear that (in general) there is too little production the fi rst period. The only 
exception is the case where Lt is fi xed (i.e., cannot be increased). Then, trivially, the 
market equilibrium is effi cient. 
The fi rst order condition for Lt+1 is 
U (L ) v 0i
t 1 t t 1+ +
−
′ =ψ .
In competitive equilibrium, the price is 1/ ψ(Lit), so that, conditional on the state 
of knowledge in the second period, output is effi cient. 
If the government were to subsidize fi rst period production by t , so that the fi rst 
order condition is 
U v ’(1 ) 0i
t t
− − =τ
and sets
τ* U (L )L /v ,i
t 1
i
t t 1 t
= ′
+ + ′δ ψ¨
raising the revenue through a lump sum tax, then the government can replicate the 
fi rst best optimum.30 
It is useful to rewrite the above expression as31
τ δ[ ]
δ ν ε ν ε
* v L /v L h
h[1 (1 )H ]/{1 1 (1 )H (
t 1 t 1 t t
0 LW 0 LW
=
≈ + + − + +
+ ′ + ′
[ ] 1 )(h 1) }LW+ −ν ε εLw
c ,
where εLw = dln L/dln w, ε
c
Lw is the compensated elasticity of labor supply, 
Ho = H(Lt(τ)) when τ = 0, ν = dln v’/dln L, the elasticity of the marginal disutility of 
work, and, as before, h = ψ’(Lt)Lt/ψ’(Lt) is the elasticity of the learning curve. 
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In the limiting case of the logarithmic utility function, εLw = 1, ε
c
Lw = 1/(1 + ν) and 
the above expression simplifi es to 
δh / 2,
the optimal subsidy is simply related to the discount factor and the elasticity of the 
learning curve.
Even though we can impose lump sum taxes, subsidies distort static allocations. 
Optimal interventions balance these static losses with the dynamic gains. The above 
formulas show the outcomes of this balancing.32 
Optimal Learning with Optimal Taxation: Lump Sum Taxation So far, we have 
derived the optimal allocation (assuming that government directly controls produc-
tion and consumption) and analyzed price interpretations of the resulting equilib-
rium. It may be useful to redo the analysis using more standard techniques in public 
fi nance. We begin by assuming that the government can only impose excise taxes and 
subsidies and lump sum taxes. The government faces an indirect control problem. 
With lump sum taxation, assuming that fi rst period subsidies must be paid by a lump 
sum tax in the fi rst period (i.e., there are no intertemporal budget constraints, so the 
government cannot borrow from the future to fi nance this period’s defi cits), we can 
write social welfare using the indirect utility function, giving the level of utility as a 
function of prices and “income”:
 V ( , x ) V ( ,0)
t t
i i
t 1
i
t 1p p− ∑ + + +τ δ  (15)
 p (1 )i
t
i= − τ  (16)
 p 1/H ,i
t 1 i+
=  (17)
where τi is the fi rst period subsidy to commodity j. Under our normalization, in a 
competitive market without subsidies, the (consumer) price of all goods would be 
unity; a subsidy on good j of tj brings down the competitive price to 1 − τj. In a com-
petitive market, in the second period, the price is just the cost of production. 
There are two spillovers from a subsidy on sector j:
1. An increase in the subsidy on commodity j affects demand (and supply) for com-
modity i. That in turn has two effects: an impact on learning in those sectors (the 
benefi ts of which can spill over to other sectors) and an impact on the govern-
ment’s budget constraint; for example, if demand shifts toward highly subsidized 
products, the government would face a budgetary shortfall, which would neces-
sitate a decrease in the subsidy on some other commodities.
2. The expansion of sector j affects learning in sector i. 
It is easy to establish that, provided the sectors are not too different, it pays to 
subsidize consumption of every good in the fi rst period. But if sectors are very dif-
ferent, it may pay to impose a tax on a sector, even if there is some learning in that 
sector. If the learning elasticity of a sector is much larger than that of others, and 
that sector has large spillovers to others, and there is some sector that is a substitute 
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for the high-learning sector, then it may pay to tax that sector, in order to encourage 
learning in the high-learning sector.33
We can easily derive the optimal tax/subsidy rate34:
 − − − −
+V V [x (dx /d )] V ((1/H ) )H dx /dpj
t
I
t
j
t
j j
t
i k pk
t 1
i
k 2
i
k
iΣ Σ Στ τ δ τj 0.=  (18)
The third term above [Στj(dxjt/dτi)] refl ects the spillovers to the budget constraint: 
the increase in output of sector i affects the aggregate subsidies and, therefore, the 
aggregate lump sum tax. We defi ne 
 δ ρV /V ,I
t 1
I
t+
=  (19)
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, refl ecting the pure rate of time dis-
count plus the diminution of the marginal utility of income as a result of growth. 
(Normally, d is less than unity, and with growth and diminishing marginal utility 
of income, VI
t+1/ VI
t is less than unity, so r is less than one.) Then, using the standard 
“tricks” of optimal tax theory (combining the Slutsky equation with the symmetry 
of the compensated price elasticities), we can rewrite (18) as 
 −Σj (τj/pj) (∂ln xi/∂ln pj)U = ρΦi +  χ, (20)
where Φi = −xj
t Σk (Lk
t+1/Lk
t) Σi h
k
i (τi / pi) (∂ln xjt/∂ln pi)U is the total net marginal learn-
ing benefi t from encouraging the consumption (equals the production in a closed 
economy) of sector j, taking into account potential effects on other sectors, both 
through induced learning in other sectors (as a result of cross elasticities of demand) 
and as a result of learning spillovers,35 and where
χ ρ τ= −+Σ Σjk k kt 1 k 2 jk j j( x ((1/H ) )H ) )(dx /dI),
the net value of learning benefi ts as a result of an increase in income less the net 
increase in subsidies as a result of an increase in income (an increase in income will 
normally lead to an increase in spending).36
This can be interpreted similarly to the analogous expression in optimal tax 
theory: In the absence of learning (where Φi = 0 for all i), the percentage deviation of 
consumption of good i (along the compensated demand curves) should be the same 
for all goods. Now we will make an adjustment: The percentage deviation should 
be larger for those sectors with larger marginal learning benefi ts, but those marginal 
learning benefi ts include not just the direct learning benefi ts but the spillovers to 
other sectors.
Qualitatively, we can see what is implied by considering the case of separable 
demand functions with no spillovers:37
 τi/pi = χ /η´ii (1 − ρhi ζi), (21)
which, for small hi, can be approximated by 
τi ≈ χ (1 + ρhi ζi )/η´ii,
where hi = (∂ln Hi/∂ln Li), the elasticity of the learning curve; η´jj = (∂ln xj/∂ln pi)U, the 
(own) elasticity of (compensated) demand;38 and ζi = (Lit+1/Lit), the ratio in sector i 
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of labor input the second period to that in the fi rst period.39 ζi is itself a function of 
τi. We can use techniques similar to that employed earlier to show that the optimal 
subsidy increases with the learning elasticity and the (compensated) elasticity of labor 
supply, and obviously decreases with the intertemporal price.
(a)  A two-sector case
Now let us assume, as before, two sectors: one (denoted by o) that has no learn-
ing spillover to the other sector and another (denoted by s) that has a full learning 
spillover.
Continuing with the assumption of separability of demand functions,
 τo/po = χ /η´oo (1 − ρho ζo) (22a)
and
 τs/ps = χ [1 + (ρh ζo /(1 − ρho ζo))] / η´ss (1 − ρhs ζs). (22b)
If the two sectors have the same learning elasticity and demand elasticity, we 
will subsidize (expand) sector s (with the spillover), more than sector 0 (without).40 
Similarly, even if sector j has a lower learning elasticity, we may wish to subsidize it 
more. The extent of spillovers is of fi rst order importance. 
(b) Symmetric equilibrium
We can simplify further in the special case of symmetry, discussed above. From 
symmetry, we know that all will face the same price, so we can write our optimiza-
tion problem as (using the obvious notation)
 Max Vt ((1 − τi),. . . . . ., −nτixi) + δVt+1(ci(τi, τj ≠ i), 0),  (23)
where c is the cost of production, i.e. ci = 1/Hi, implying
 − − − ∂ ≠ ∂ +
+ +
≠
+V ( dx /d ) V ((n 1)x c ( , i)/ xI
t
i
t
I
t 1
i j
t 1
i i j j i i
tτ τ δ τ τ τΣ 1 i i j i ic ( , )/ 0∂ ∂ =≠τ τ τ  (24)
or
{ V ( /p) V (L /L ) [(n 1)h h ]}{dlnx /dln } 0I
t
I
t 1
j
t 1
j
t
ij jj i
t
− + − + =+ +τ δ τ ,
where 
d ln ci(τi, τj≠i)/d ln τ = −[(n − 1) (∂ ln ci/∂ ln xj) j≠i + ∂ ln ci/∂ ln xi] d ln x/d ln τ. 
There are direct benefi ts of learning (hjj, the own elasticity of the learning curve) 
and indirect benefi ts (hij, the learning spillovers). 
There are two solutions. If d ln Lt/d ln τ = 0, then (as we argued earlier) there is 
no reason to interfere with the market. But in the more general case, 
 τ/1 − τ = ρ ζ [(n − 1)hij + hjj] (25)
As before, the higher the learning and the more learning spillovers, the higher the 
subsidy. If labor supply is very elastic and there is substantial learning, then Lt+1/L t 
>>> 1, so, again, the higher the subsidy. If there are signifi cant spillovers and many 
sectors, it is the magnitude of the spillovers that really matters.
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No Lump Sum Taxes When government cannot impose lump sum taxes, there may 
still be room for industrial policies. One sector may have more learning benefi ts, so 
that a tax on the other sector to fi nance a subsidy on the learning sector might be 
desirable. 
Consider the following polar model (which will be expanded on in later sections).41 
There is no learning in sector A (the agricultural sector), but sector M (manufacturing) 
has a learning function c(LM), and there are full spillovers to sector A. (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz [2004] argue that it is plausible that not only does manufacturing have 
a higher learning elasticity (hA < < hM) but that there are larger cross-sector learn-
ing spillovers from manufacturing to agricultural than vice versa.) Thus, continuing 
within the optimal tax framework of the previous section, we seek to
 Max Vt((1 − τM), (1 + tA), 0) + δ Vt+1(c(LM), c(LM), 0) (26)
{τM, tA}
where τMxM = tAxA, dtA/dtM = (xM/xA) + τM(d(xM/xA)/dτM
where, as before, τ M is the subsidy on manufacturing and tA is the tax that must be 
levied on agriculture to pay for the subsidy. This implies that 
 V {x x (dt /d )} V c’(L )(x x )dx /d .I
t
M
t
A
t
A M I
t 1
M M
t 1
A
t 1
M
t
M− = − +
+ + +τ δ τ  (27)
The LHS of (27) is the cost of the subsidy/tax—the distortion in consumption 
patterns—while the RHS is the learning benefi t. Optimality requires that the (static) 
marginal cost of a subsidy equal the (dynamic) marginal benefi t. 
As expected, if c’ = 0, the solution to (27) entails τA = tm = 0 : There is no scope 
for distortionary taxation. But if the RHS of (27) is positive, it is optimal to tax A 
(agriculture) to expand M (manufacturing), provided (βM + βA) > 0 :
 τ ρ β β βM t 1 At M M Ah (L /L ) /( ) 0= − + ≥+  (28)
where, as before, ρ = δ Vt+1I/VtI, the discount rate for future income, refl ecting both 
the pure discount factor δ and the normally lower marginal utility of income at t + 1 
relative to t as a result of growth, and where42 
βM = dln xM/dln τM ≥ 0, and
βA = − dln xA/dln τM ≥ 0 .
These are total derivatives, taking into account the indirect effect of the increased 
price of agricultural goods. Thus, normally we expect the subsidy to increase con-
sumption of manufacturing and reduce the consumption of agricultural goods. It 
follows that
(dln(xM/xA)/dln τM = βM + βA.
This is the total change in relative consumption of the two goods as a result of 
the imposition of the subsidy on M paid for by a tax on A, the magnitude of which 
58    |    JOSEPH E. STIgLITz
depends on the elasticity of substitution. If the elasticity of substitution is zero, then 
βM + βA = 0.43
When the elasticity of substitution is zero, ther are neither benefits nor costs 
associated with the imposition of the subsidy/tax scheme. With a small elasticity 
of substitution, because the distortion is low and a tax subsidy is required to elicit 
significant shifts toward manufacturing, it appears that a high subsidy is desirable. 
Again, we obtain the result that the larger the learning elasticity (h) the larger the 
subsidy, and the larger the sensitivity of consumption of manufacturing to a subsidy, 
the larger the subsidy. 
Alternatively, the government may be able to borrow, even if private individuals 
cannot. It can impose taxes the second period to repay the cost of first period subsi-
dies. Take the symmetric case. The government seeks to maximize
Max Vt ((1 - ti),. . . . . ., 0) + d Vt+1((1 + ti) ci(si, sj ñ i), 0)
s.t. Σtixti (1 + r) = Σti xit+1,
where r is the interest rate the government has to pay. In the symmetric case, we can, 
without loss of generality, simplify by assuming only one commodity; dropping the 
subscripts, we have txt (1+ r) = t xt+1. 
The first order condition is 
t[VtI xt - d(1 + r) Vt+1I xt [1 + βt + βt+1]] + d Vt+1I xt+1 c’xt βt = 0,
where, in the obvious notation,44
βt = dln xt/dn t > 0
and
βt+1 = -dln xt+1/dn t, 
or simplifying
t [1 - r(1 + r) [1 + βt + βt+1]] + r( Lt+1/Lt) h βt = 0.
[1 - r(1+ r) [1 + βt + βt+1]] is the benefit of borrowing money this period to be paid 
back next period. It is negative if r is high or r is small. We focus on the case where, 
in the absence of learning benefits, it would not be beneficial to borrow, that is, 
r(1 + r) [1 + βt + βt+1] > 1. 
In that case, if there is learning, there is an optimal subsidy (financed by borrowing), 
given by
t* = r(Lt+1/Lt) h βt/ r(1 + r) [1 + βt + βt+1] - 1 > 0.
The subsidy is higher the higher the learning elasticity h; the lower the interest 
rate; and the more sensitive first period consumption (production) is to the subsidy 
(i.e., the higher βt is). 
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Section 2. Long-Term Growth
Finite period models have gone out of fashion in economics in favor of infi nite 
period models. To make such models tractable, however, requires much more special 
parameterizations, so that in practice neither model is really more general than the 
other. If there is to be a steady state with learning, since the output per unit of labor 
is increasing steadily, for the labor supply to any sector to be constant, either (a) the 
labor supply must be inelastic and relative prices must be constant or (b) utility of 
consumption must be logarithmic. Logarithmic utility functions have the unattractive 
property that the share of expenditure on each commodity is fi xed. Normally, rela-
tive prices will be constant only with full spillovers (one of the cases we focus on, but 
clearly not general). Alternatively, we can focus on asymptotic behavior; for instance, 
where the fraction of a person’s (society’s) time spent working in any particular sec-
tor approaches some bound. But again, these asymptotes are often of limited interest 
in the short run (and we are always in the short run), especially since in the general 
case of these models, asymptotic allocations of labor to certain sectors go to zero. 
The problems posed by learning models are even more complicated in the case of, 
say, an exponentially growing population. Of course, with a fi nite earth, such models 
face a problem of asymptotically infi nite density, which is, to say the least, uncom-
fortable. But more formally, if learning depends on labor input and labor input is 
always growing, then growth is always increasing, unless there is magically just the 
right amount of offsetting diminishing returns. One can fi nd parameterizations in 
which this occurs, but we should not be fooled—they are very special.
Indeed, there is no theoretical reason to expect the episodic large innovations that 
have transformed our economy—electricity, computers, the automobile—to occur 
with regular periodicity and appropriate magnitude to sustain anything approximat-
ing a steady state. 
In our own lifetime, we have seen dramatic transitions in the rate of population 
growth, to the point where it is even declining in many advanced industrial countries. 
There is a general consensus that the global population will level off (will have to 
level off) at around 9 billion. 
In short, we shouldn’t take steady-state models excessively seriously. They are 
meant to help us think through trade-offs. In some cases—for instance, when we are 
focusing on issues of the demographic transition—more insight might be obtained 
from looking at N period models, where population is expanding in earlier periods 
and stationary in later periods. On the other hand, with a high enough discount, the 
distant future is of little moment, and a model focusing on the short run may provide 
a good approximation. 
In the paragraphs below, we briefl y explore special cases in which a steady state 
exists. We structure the cases so that whatever is optimal at time t is optimal at time 
t + 1; in that case, policy is directed at choosing the optimum steady state. In all the 
cases, the central result is that it is optimal to permanently impose distorting taxes to 
encourage production in the learning sector.
In the previous sections, we have explored models in which the government 
directly controls outputs (inputs), in which it has indirect control through taxes but 
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can impose lump sum taxes, and in which it cannot impose lump sum taxes. We have 
also explored models in which learning is symmetric or asymmetric. In this section, we 
investigate only two cases; the results can easily be generalized to the other contexts. 
Logarithmic Utility Functions We first assume a logarithmic utility function
u ln x , 1t i i
t
i= =Σ Σα α
and
Wt = ut - v(Lt),
which at each moment of time implies (in static maximization)
αi i
t
i
t/x p v’(L ),=  
which in turn implies that
x p /v’(L ).i
t
i i
t
= α  
Expenditure shares are proportional to αi and don’t depend at all on costs. We 
focus on the direct control problem where the government sets {υ, L}, where υi is the 
share of total labor allocated to the production of good i. In the short run, as before, 
we assume the cost of each good is unity. Then
W ln ln L v(L) W ,t i i i
t
o= + − ≡Σ α υ
from which it follows that static optimization entails υi
t  = αi, and 1 = v’(L*)L*. Note 
that the short-run optimum L does not depend on productivity. 
We assume that, as before, productivity at time t + 1 is related to productivity at 
time t by a learning function, which we now write as
P P H ( ),i
t 1
i
t
i
t+
= υL
where Pti is output per unit labor at time t and υL is the vector of labor inputs. If 
L and t are the same at t and t + 1, then 
u u ln H ( ) u g( ).t 1 t i i
t t+
= + = +Σα L Lυ υ
g (υL) is the overall rate of productivity increase (measured here in terms of utility). 
It should be clear that, given the structure of the model, if υL is optimal for time t, 
it is optimal for time t + 1. We can write discounted utility45
W = Σ Wt dt = [Wo + d g/1 - d]/(1 - d),
from which it follows that W is maximized when
∂Wo/∂υi + (d/1 - d) ∂g/∂υi = 0
∂Wo/∂L + (d/1 - d) ∂g/∂L = 0,
from which it follows that we expand production beyond short-run utility maximi-
zation the most in sectors that increase g the most; in this model, industrial policy 
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is a permanent feature of the economy. Moreover, we increase work (labor supply) 
beyond the level of short-run utility maximization. 
It is easy to derive the implications for some special cases. Assume that there are 
two sectors, A and M, and there is learning only in the M sector. Then
g = αMln H(υM L)
and the optimum value of 
υM = αM[1 + hδ/1 − δ]/[1 + αMhδ/1 − δ],
where h = d ln H/dln υM L.
The greater h, the larger the larger the fraction of labor allocated to manufactur-
ing. When h = 0, as expected, υM = αM. By the same token, work at each date is 
expanded beyond the static level, to the point where
1/L − v’ = −hδ αM/(1 − δ)L < 0,
(the static marginal disutility of work exceeds the value of the marginal output), or 
L** now satisfi es
Lv’ = 1 + hδ αM/(1 − δ) = (1 − αM)/(1 − VMt)
Fixed Labor Supply, No Lump Sum Taxation In the second case, the labor supply 
is fi xed and lump sum taxes are not allowed. There are two sectors, denoted A and 
M. Here, we have an additional problem in steady-state analysis: If there is dif-
ferential growth in labor productivity in the two sectors, one sector gets a smaller, 
diminishing share of overall expenditures, except in the special case of unitary 
elasticity of substitution (the logarithmic utility case just analyzed.) Accordingly, we 
focus on the case with full spillover, so that relative prices remain unchanged, and 
with homotheticity, so do relative shares. We assume a homothetic utility function 
of the form 
U U(x , x ) x u(x /x ), 0 <  < 1,M A A
1
M A= =
− +η η
where, as before, η is the elasticity of marginal utility. As before, we impose a sub-
sidy at the rate t on manufacturing paid for by a tax at rate t on agriculture. We can 
write the indirect utility function then as V(1 − τ, 1 + t, I). Static utility maximization 
entails maximizing V with respect to τ:
dV/dt = − xA τ (d(xM/xA)/d τ) VI
 = − xM (dln (xM/xA)/d ln τ) VI
 = − xM [βM + βA] VI
Static effi ciency entails, as before, τ = 0.46 But now assume that there is learn-
ing only in the manufacturing sector but perfect spillover to the agricultural sector. 
Productivity growth is thus H(xM). Again, we have structured the model so that the 
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optimal subsidy at time t is the optimal subsidy at t + 1, and the present discounted 
value of utility is given by
Uo/1 − δ − H−η+1,
which is maximized at
∂
∂
+ −
− ∂ −
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ ∂ ∂ =
− +
− +
ln
U (1 )H
1 H
( (lnH/ lnx )(dlnx /d ) 00
1
1 M M
τ
ηη
τ
η
.
The above expression can be used, as before, to derive the optimal subsidy rate.
Cumulative Experience We take a somewhat different approach in which changes 
in productivity are based not directly on current production but on the change in 
cumulative experience. (Effectively, Arrow’s original model was of this form.) That 
is, we write, in the absence of spillovers,
Qk(t) = Hk (t) Lk (t),
where now, say, productivity depends on discounted cumulative experience E 
according to the function
H (t) [E]k b
k
=
where bk is the elasticity of productivity with respect to experience in sector, and 
where experience E is defi ned by47 
E [ ],o
t
= ∫ L (x)e dxk z(t x)- -
capturing the notion that experiences a long time ago have limited relevance for 
productivity today. In steady state, it is obvious that 
gk = dln Qk/dt = (bk + 1) n,
where n is the rate of growth of population. Even though learning is endogenous, 
we obtain the standard Solow result that the long-term sectoral growth rate is 
determined by the rate of growth of population. The fact that learning is affected 
by experience is still important, because the aggregate growth rate is affected by 
the allocation of resources. Assume, for instance, individual logarithmic utility 
function
Wt = Σαi ln xti − v(Lt), Σαi = 1,
exponential labor force growth at the rate n, and a social welfare function of the 
form
W = ∫ exp {− r + n}Wt,
where r is the discount rate, r > n + g, where g is the rate of growth of utility (output, 
if U has constant returns to scale). In steady state,
W = W*/n + g − r.
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With learning, in steady state, W is increasing at the rate 
g = Σαk (bk + 1) n.
Clearly, allocating more labor to sectors with higher learning elasticities will lead 
to higher rates of growth of utility. As before, let υi and g be the fraction of the labor 
supply allocated to sector i. For simplicity, we can express W* (in steady state) as a 
function of {L, t}. Then, if we want to choose the allocation that 
maximizes W*{L, t}/n + g (L, t) - r
{L, t},
implying that we distort the allocation of {L, t}, relative to static utility maxi-
mization, to increase long-run growth.48 The optimum balances the two effects. 
Because increasing L increases cumulative experience, it increases productivity, and 
long-term social welfare maximization takes this into account. Like an increase in 
the savings rate in the standard Solow growth model, an increase in L does not, 
however, have any effect on long-term growth rates. The allocation of labor does.
Asymmetric Equilibria and the Advantages of Specialization Learning, as we have 
noted, introduces nonconvexities, which may make it desirable for countries to spe-
cialize. The learning curves introduced in the previous section suffer from diminish-
ing returns and therefore don’t capture this effect. If, for instance, there were two 
commodities, with α = ½, then, υ* = ½. 
Assume that 
H (t) [ ] if E E*
H if E < E*
k
0
t b
= ∫ ≥
=
L (x)e dxk z(t x)− −
^
and (E) is a convex function, such that H^ (0) = 1, H^ (E*) = E*b.49
Assume further that 
uk = log xk if xk ≥ 1
    = 0     otherwise
where now xk represents individual consumption. (We introduce this assumption 
because otherwise, as xk goes to zero, the marginal utility of consumption goes to 
infinity, and we always produce both goods.)
It follows that if L is small enough, then optimality may require, say, υ1 = 1, 
υ2 = 0. The economy specializes in one of the two commodities. As we special-
ize in commodity 2, H2/H1 becomes small (there is no cumulative experience in 
producing good 2), so it becomes optimal both statically and dynamically not to 
produce good 1. 
Cumulative Learning from Output A slight variant of the previous model focuses 
on output rather than input. The difference arises from that fact that with learning, 
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output grows more rapidly than input.50 Assume now that the relevant measure of 
“experience” is 
E [ ]
H (t) [ ] ,k b
= ∫
= ∫
0
t k z(t x)
0
t k z(t x)
Q (x)e dx
Q (x)e dx
- -
- -
so in steady state (where the same fraction of labor is allocated to any sector every 
year)
gk = bgk + n = n/1 − b,
where it will be remembered that b < 1. If b > 1, faster growth begets faster growth 
of experience, which begets even faster growth of output. The economy is unstable, 
with potentially super-exponential growth. While the steady states of this model 
look very much like those of the earlier models, in which experience is based on 
labor input, more general versions of this model can give rise to multiple short-run 
equilibria. Assume that Hk (E) does not have constant elasticity.51 Then, assuming 
that at each date, L is fi xed, 
gk = h(E) dln E/dt + n + dln υk/dt. 
Since E and dln E/dt depend on gk, there can be short/medium rate high-growth 
scenarios: A high level of expansion of a sector can lead to a higher elasticity of 
learning (e.g., if there is learning by learning), which supports the higher expan-
sion of the sector. The implications for optimal policy are similar to those dis-
cussed earlier: Even if two sectors initially appear symmetric, it may be optimal to 
focus on one of the two sectors to increase learning; but now it is possible that the 
increased growth induced by the faster learning is further reinforced by a higher 
learning elasticity. 
Monopolistic Competition
A similar analysis applies to a model with monopolistic competition. In the previ-
ous models, there was competition and learning was external to the fi rm, so that 
each fi rm put no value on the learning generated by its production activities. In 
this model, there is only one fi rm in each sector, but there are a suffi ciently large 
number of products that each fi rm can take the wages and prices of other fi rms 
as given. As before, industrial policy depends on the set of instruments available 
to the government; for example, whether it can undo the effects of monopoly and 
whether it can impose lump sum taxes. Here, we assume that the government can 
do nothing about the monopoly power of each fi rm but that in setting, say, a sub-
sidy for any product, it takes into account that markets are distorted as a result of 
monopolistic competition. 
The major difference between this case and those analyzed in the previous sec-
tion is that if there are no cross-sector learning externalities, the monopolistically 
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competitive fi rm internalizes the learning externality. However, the fi rm still does not 
internalize cross-sector demand effects. We begin the analysis, however, by focusing 
on the case in which these can be ignored. The fi rm sets
 (p x dp /dx ) 1 x H /(H )i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t 1
i
i i 2+ = − +δ  (29)
or
p (1 1/ ) 1 hi
t
i i i− = −
′η δζ
or
 p [1 h ]/(1 1/ ),i
t
i i
’
i= − −δζ η  (30)
where (as before) ζi = Lt+1i/Lti, the ratio of the input into sector j at time t to that 
at t + 1, h i = dln Hi/dln Lit, the (own) elasticity of productivity with respect to 
labor input (the learning coeffi cient) and 1/η´i = − dln pi/dln xi, the elasticity of 
demand.
The monopolist obviously doesn’t take into account the consequences of 
his production/pricing decisions on the learning of other fi rms—either through 
spillover effects or through market effects. The latter can be important in the 
case of a nonseparable demand function. But he does take into account his own 
learning, and so sets a price lower than he would if there were no learning. Firms 
with more elastic demand functions charge a lower price (and produce more the 
fi rst period); but fi rms with a more inelastic demand show a greater sensitivity 
to learning (i.e., all fi rms lower their price as h increases, but those with a higher 
markup—lower price elasticity—lower their price more. They have to, in order 
to expand output.) 
The nature of the overall market distortion is, however, complex. For instance, in 
the second period, because of the exercise of monopoly power, the benefi ts of learn-
ing will be smaller. But, given the lower level of output in the second period, ignoring 
spillovers, the fi rm appropriately values the benefi ts of learning, which it sees, at the 
margin, as saving labor.52
There can be distortions in both total labor supply in the fi rst period and in its 
allocation. Consider, for instance, a symmetric equilibrium in which all fi rms have 
the same demand and learning elasticities. The effect of monopolistic competition is 
to change real wages in the fi rst period. If fi rst period labor supply elasticity is zero, 
this has no effect on learning. An awareness of the learning benefi ts drives up the real 
wage, but that is all that happens. First and second period output is unchanged. But 
if there is a positive elasticity of labor supply, the analysis becomes more interesting. 
In the case of myopic monopolistic competition (where no weight is given to the 
value of future learning), fi rst period real wages are lowered as a result of monopoly 
power, labor supply is lowered, output is lowered, and learning is thereby lowered. 
With myopic monopolies, monopoly is unambiguously worse than competition; even 
though neither takes into account the benefits of learning, growth is higher with 
competition than with monopoly. 
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With nonmyopic monopoly, whether learning (growth) is higher with monopoly 
depends on whether
 [1 − δ ζi hi]/(1 − 1/η´i) < or > 1, (31)
that is, on whether 
 d ζi hi > or < 1/η´i. (32)
If the elasticity of demand is low, the elasticity of learning is small, or the rate of 
discount is high, then monopoly is worse than competition, even though the benefi ts 
of learning have been internalized. 
The general principles of government intervention should be clear. Government 
has to correct two market failures and must be careful that in correcting one, it does 
not exacerbate the other. Focusing only on learning, optimal policy entails encourag-
ing production in the fi rst period by a production subsidy fi nanced (if possible) by a 
lump sum tax. If a lump sum tax is not possible but the country can borrow, it pays 
to fi nance the fi rst period subsidy with a second period tax.
Precise prescriptions for the design of optimal intervention depend on what the 
government can do. For instance, if the government can impose a nondistortionary 
profi ts tax and use it to subsidize production in the fi rst and second periods, it can 
presumably fully undo the effects of monopoly. If it can undo the effects of second 
period monopoly, the formulas derived earlier can be used. 
If it can only, say, impose a lump sum tax to fi nance a commodity subsidy in the 
fi rst period, then it seeks to 
 maximize V ( , x ) V ( , 0)
{ }
t t
i i
t 1
i
t 1p p− + + +Στ δ
τ
 (33)
where
 p (1 )i
t
i i= −κ τ  (34)
 p /Hi
t 1
i
i+
= κ  (35)
where
 κi = 1/(1 − 1/η´i), (36)
the monopoly markup over marginal cost. When we introduce a subsidy, we undo 
the fi rst period monopoly distortion and correct the underinvestment in production/
learning distortion.53 If we could impose similar corrective taxation in the second 
period, we could achieve precisely the equilibrium described earlier for the competi-
tion case. If not, we have to take into account the fact that the benefi ts of learning 
are lower, because future production is lower. Hence, in general, optimal subsidies 
will be lower. 
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The more interesting case is that in which there are two sectors, one (manufac-
turing) with a full learning spillover and the other (agriculture) with no learning. 
In this case, it can be shown that not only is a subsidy on manufacturing desirable, 
there is even some presumption that it should be larger with monopoly than with 
competition.
We now have
 Max Vt(κM (1 − τM), κA (1 + tA), 0) + δ Vt+1(κM c(LM), κA c(LM), 0) (37)
{τM},
where, as before, the subsidy to manufacturing is fi nanced by a tax on agriculture. 
 
V {( ) x x d(x /x )/d )}
V c’(L )( x
I
t
M A M A A M M A M
I
t 1
M M M
t 1
κ κ κ τ τ
δ κ
− −
= − ++ + κ τA A
t 1
M
t
Mx )dx /d ,
+
 (38)
where, it will be recalled, 
dtA/dτM = (xM/xA) + τMd(xM/xA)/dτM.
The following differences from the earlier equation (27) are apparent:
 (a)  The change in relative prices may correct or exacerbate a distortion in relative 
consumption caused by differences in demand elasticities. In the case where 
demand elasticities are the same, the LHS of (38) simplifi es to 
− τM(d(xM/xA)/dtτM) κAxA ,
which is negative.
 (b)  Lowering costs has a multiplicative effect on prices in the next period, so the 
benefi ts of learning are enhanced. In the case where demand elasticities are the 
same, the benefi ts are multiplied by a factor κM = κ A. Moreover, an increase 
in the subsidy leads to a decrease in the price by a multiple (and an increase in 
the price of the agricultural good by a corresponding multiple), so that with 
monopoly, dxtM/dτM is much larger than with competition. Moreover, under 
normal assumptions, c’ with monopoly is higher but xMt+1 + xAt+1 is smaller, 
because real wages are smaller and productivity is lower. 
Open Economy
The most interesting context for analyzing government intervention is that of a small, 
open, developing economy. The question is, should it use trade policy (tariffs or for-
eign exchange intervention)? Such policies change the structure of the economy. Can 
it do so in ways that will enhance learning and promote welfare? And even if it can, 
are these the best instruments available?
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Two-Sector Economy
First, consider a two-sector economy, comprising agriculture and manufacturing, 
in a Ricardian world in which labor is the only input to production. In the simplest 
version of this model, the country can produce both goods and exchange some of the 
tradable goods for imports. 
The developing country is small relative to the global economy and is assumed 
initially to have a comparative advantage in the agricultural good. The agricultural 
good has no direct learning potential but industrial production has considerable 
learning potential, and the benefi ts of learning spill over perfectly to the agricultural 
sector. This is important, because it means that the relative price of agriculture and 
industrial goods remains fi xed. 
In the absence of protection (or some other industrial policy), the small developing 
country specializes in agriculture and hence has no growth. It stagnates, while the large 
developed country continues to grow. The gap between the two increases over time.54
With protection—say, in the form of quotas—the country produces some of the 
industrial good, generating some learning, which spills over to the rest of the econ-
omy. There is a static ineffi ciency, but so long as the learning is suffi ciently great, the 
static ineffi ciency is more than offset by the dynamic benefi ts.
Assume, for instance, that the labor supply is (in the absence of intervention) fi xed 
at unity (this is just a normalization);55 that a fraction of the labor force π is assigned 
to the industrial sector; that the short-term productivity in the industrial sector rela-
tive to that in the advanced industrial country is γ < 1 (where we have normalized 
productivity abroad at unity); and that a proportion of the production of the agri-
cultural sector λ is traded for industrial goods from the developed country (at a price 
of unity). Then, at any moment in time,
 U = αM ln M + (1 − αM) ln A (39)
= αM ln (π γ + (1− π)λ) + (1 − αM) ln ((1 − λ)(1 − π )) = U*.
It is easy to show that U is maximized at π = 0; that is, the country specializes in 
the production of agricultural goods. This is the conventional static result.56
But now we assume that the country’s rate of productivity increase is g(π), g’ > 0; 
that is, the rate of productivity growth increases with the size of the industrial sector. 
There is full spillover from the industrial sector to the agricultural sector. Because of 
this assumption (and a similar assumption in the global market), the country’s com-
parative advantage remains with agriculture. The problem facing the country in the 
next period is essentially the same problem facing the country this year. If consump-
tion of both goods at t + 1 is (1 + g) times consumption at t, Ut+1 = Ut + ln (1 + g). 
Hence, if δ is the discount rate, the present discount value of utility is57
 W ≡ [U* + δ(ln (1 + g)/1 − δ)]/(1 − δ). (40)
And it is no longer the case that maximizing social welfare (W) entails π = 0. It 
immediately follows that 
 ∂U*/∂ln π + G g δ/(1 − δ) = 0, (41)
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where G = dln g/dln π, which implies that, so long as G > 0 (there is a marginal 
benefi t to learning) optimality requires that π > 0: The dynamic benefi ts of learning 
exceed the static costs. Industrial policies pay off. The greater the learning elasticity 
and the higher δ (the lower the discount factor), the higher π; that is, the higher the 
optimal static distortion.
This framework requires industrial policies that allow for a limited industrial sec-
tor, even though the country has a comparative disadvantage in that sector in the 
short run and, in this model, even in the long run. That is, in our Ricardian model, 
with full spillovers, technological change does not change the country’s comparative 
advantage. The fact that the country’s industrial sector never becomes competitive 
(the infant never grows up) is not necessarily an argument against industrial policies, 
when the learning spillovers are great enough.
In this model with a linear technology, the easiest way to implement the desired 
level of domestic production is through a quota, which ensures that at the equilib-
rium price, the desired amount of manufactured goods are produced at home. With 
increasing costs, there exists an optimal tariff, which would result in the desired level 
of domestic production.
Nontraded Sector
Finally, we consider a variant of the canonical Ricardian model in which there are 
three goods: exports, imports, and a nontradable. Government intervention can 
affect either the price of tradables relative to nontradables or the price of imports 
relative to exports. 
A slight variant of the previous model yields precisely the same results. Let us 
assume a more general homothetic utility function, with the obvious notation
U* = U(M, A, NT)
= U ((π γ + (1 − π − θ)λ), (1 − π − θ)(1 − λ), θ),
where now θ is the fraction of the labor force allocated to the nontraded sector. 
We again get the result that U* is optimized at π = 0. But again, if the rate of learn-
ing is a function of the size of the industrial sector π, the economy should produce 
industrial goods even though those are not its comparative advantage.
We now consider what happens when international trade agreements restrict the 
use of industrial policies. The only instrument left is the exchange rate. Lowering 
the exchange rate simultaneously decreases the price of exports in foreign currency, 
leading to an increase in the demand for exports, and increases the price of imports 
(in domestic currency, relative to the price of nontraded goods). It thus encourages 
substitution away from imported consumption goods. Increased exports and reduced 
imports lead to a trade surplus. 
In a two-period model, this means that the country consumes less than it could 
in the initial period, offset by increased consumption in the later period.58 As in the 
earlier models without trade, the static distortion (consuming less than what would 
normally maximize utility, based on the equality of the marginal rate of substitution 
70    |    JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
and the interest rate) is justifi ed by the dynamic benefi ts—producing more of the 
export good, say, leads to more learning, which generates a higher level of consump-
tion in the second period than would otherwise be possible. This is true even though 
the range of instruments has now been restricted so the social cost of intervention 
is higher. 
But if the learning effects are strong enough, even in an infi nite period model, 
the benefi ts of expanding exports are suffi ciently great that it may be possible that 
optimal policy requires the country to build up reserves forever, never to use them 
(essentially like throwing money away). We construct a model in which each period 
the world looks as it did the previous period, so that if it is desirable to have a surplus 
at time t, it is desirable to have a trade surplus at time t + 1. (Of course, in a more 
general dynamic model, it may be desirable to have trade surpluses initially, to be 
spent at later dates.) 
Denote the exchange rate by e. Taking labor as our numeraire, and noting that by 
our choice of units the price of the nontraded goods is also unity (in the absence of 
taxes and subsidies, which, by assumption, are precluded), the price (and therefore the 
level of consumption) of the industrial and agriculture good are simply a function of e. 
Hence, we obtain
 U* = U[M(e), A(e), NT(e)], (42)
where consumption of agricultural goods is equal to production minus exports:
 A(e) = (1 − π − θ)(1 − λ), (43)
where, it will be recalled, λ is the share of production exported, and where consump-
tion of the industrial goods is production plus imports, m,
 M(e) = πγ + m. (44)
Static utility maximization requires 
 (1 − π − θ)λ − m = S ≥ 0, (45)
where S is the balance of payments surplus.
((45) is the balance of payments constraint.) 
In a static model, U* is maximized, subject to (45) (the balance of payments con-
straint), 1 ≥ λ ≥ 0, 1 ≥ π ≥ 0, and 1 ≥ θ ≥ 0. It is easy to show in the static model (i.e., 
with no learning) that free trade is optimal and the balance of payments constraint 
is binding:
 π = 0, S = 0, λ > 0. (46)
The equilibrium exchange rate can easily be calculated. In equilibrium, full 
income is
y = θ + e(1 − θ) = y(e, θ).
 NT(e, y(e, θ)) = θ (47a)
 X = 1 − θ − A(e, y(e, θ)) (47b)
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 m = I (e, y(e, θ)) (47c)
 X = m (47d)
where X = exports, and where NT(e, y(e, θ)), A(e, y(e, θ)) and I (e, y(e, θ)) are, respec-
tively the demand for nontraded goods, agricultural goods, and industrial goods, 
and where, because of the lack of comparative advantage in manufacturing, in the 
absence of government intervention, the country imports all manufactured goods. 
(47b) – (47d) can be re-expressed as a function relating e and θ:
1 − θ − A(e, y(e, θ)) = I (e, y(e, θ))
or
 1 − θ = A(e, y(e, θ)) + I (e, y(e, θ)). (48)
(48) and (47a) can be solved simultaneously for e and θ. Equations (47a) through 
(47d) can then be solved simultaneously for the full equilibrium. We assume the 
government controls e, and that the rate of growth depends on QM, the output of 
manufacturing goods, which in turn depends on e. 
In the dynamic model, we can write again
 W ≡ [U* + δ(g)/1 − δ)]/(1 − δ). (49)
We now maximize W with respect to e (recognizing the effect of e on QM) to 
obtain an equation parallel to (41):
 ∂ln U*/∂ln e + G g δ (dln QM/dln e)/(1 − δ) = 0. (50)
If δ g G (dln QM (e)/dln e) > 0, it means that at the optimum e, ∂U*/∂ln e < 0.
Once learning is taken into account, it may pay to have a lower exchange rate 
than the equilibrium exchange rate described earlier. A lower exchange rate will 
mean that exports will increase and imports decrease, and (with the usual restric-
tions on demand functions) there is a trade surplus. It pays to perpetually accumu-
late reserves—to run a surplus—because of the learning benefi ts. (To repeat: This 
requires that no other instruments are available to promote learning; for example, 
through exports.) 
In our Ricardian model, with constant returns to scale, small changes in the 
exchange rate have no effect on production of the industrial good, given the develop-
ing country’s comparative and absolute disadvantage in its production. But lowering 
the (real and nominal) exchange rate enough makes the industrial good competitive. 
Defi ne e** as the exchange rate at which fi rms are just indifferent between produc-
ing industrial goods and importing them. Assume that at e** the government can 
choose a level of industrial output, QM** > 0. Then we can solve for the equilibrium 
allocation of labor to the nontraded sector:
NT(e**, y(e**, θ**)) = θ**.
The equilibrium level of exports is59
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X = 1 − θ** − A(e**, y(e**, θ**)) − QM**/ϒ), 
while the level of imports is
m = I (e**, y(e**, θ**)) − QM**.
At every value of QM**, we can calculate S:
S = X − m. 
Then the optimal level of QM**60 solves
 W**
max
{M**}
{U[I(e**), A(e**), NT(e**)] (ln(1 g)/1 )}/1= + + − −δ δ δ  (51)
subject to
S ≥ 0.
In general, the constraint will not be binding.
If W** > W(e*), it pays to lower the exchange rate to e**. If the optimum QM** 
is such that 
1 − θ ** − A(e**, y(e**, θ**)) − (QM**/ϒ) > I (e**, y(e**, θ**)) − QM**,
it pays the country to accumulate a perpetual surplus. 
We should emphasize the sensitivity of this analysis to the assumptions that we 
have imposed to allow for a steady-state analysis. A fuller analysis would take into 
account the fact that as the country closes the knowledge gap between itself and 
the advanced industrial countries, learning benefi ts may decrease, perhaps to the 
point at which the cost of running a surplus—the lost utility from the foregone 
consumption—exceeds the learning benefi t. The country might then want (as in 
our two-period model) to consume its accumulated surplus. Other factors would 
also affect the country’s desired level of surplus. A country with an aging popula-
tion might want to put aside savings and then, as the aging population enters into 
retirement, reduce that surplus. Such demographic transitions are not analyzed well 
in steady-state models.61 
Some countries have been criticized for contributing to global imbalances by accu-
mulating excessive reserves. In static models, it has seemed irrational for developing 
countries—suffering from capital shortages and with constrained consumption—to 
do so; just as it has seemed peculiar that the United States, with an aging popula-
tion, is running long-term defi cits. This paper shows, however, that once dynamic 
learning benefi ts are taken into account, with suffi cient constraints on industrial 
policies (such as those imposed by the World Trade Organization), the accumula-
tion of reserves by a developing country (beyond a level required for precautionary 
reasons to manage global volatility) may be reasonable if the learning benefi ts are 
large enough. Interestingly, while this policy leads to a lower level of imports initially 
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because of the induced growth, over the longer run, the country’s level of imports is 
actually increased.62 
Concluding Comments
I have argued here that what matters for development is learning and, more 
broadly, technical progress and a developmental transformation. I have focused on 
a simple model of learning, but even within that simple model, we have seen how 
much of recent conventional wisdom about development strategies is overturned. 
The standard paradigm has focused on eliminating market distortions—ensuring 
that the economy is on its static production (or, more generally, utility63) pos-
sibilities curve, based on a given level of knowledge. More important in the long 
run, however, is moving the possibilities curve outward—for advanced industrial 
economies by advances in technology; for developing countries by closing the 
knowledge gap between advanced industrial countries and developing countries; 
and for all countries by ensuring that all fi rms are employing best practices64 as 
rapidly as possible. Moving toward the frontier (for instance, by eliminating all 
tariffs and quotas) might entail slowing down the pace of outward movement of 
the frontier—and slower long-run growth. In the former case, there is but a one-
time gain. 
A full analysis of what makes for a learning economy would take us beyond this 
short paper. We can learn to learn (Stiglitz 1987c)—we can enhance our learning 
capacities. Just as what we produce may affect how much we learn, it may affect how 
we learn to learn. Just as “roundabout means of production” (to use Böhm-Bawerk’s 
terminology) may be more effi cient, roundabout means of learning may be more 
effi cient: We can learn more effi ciently if we fi rst learn how to learn.65
Once one recognizes the importance of learning and developmental transfor-
mation (Stiglitz 1998), analysis must go beyond economics. Education can either 
reinforce norms of statis or persuade young people that change is possible and give 
them tools with which to bring about and cope with change. A variety of institutions 
and institutional arrangements can either promote or prevent the development of a 
culture of change.66
In this paper, we have focused on the economics of learning. From the earliest 
literature on endogenous technological change—when the public-good nature of 
knowledge, the problems of appropriability, and the pervasiveness of spillovers were 
recognized—it was apparent that markets on their own were not likely to be effi cient 
and that the overall effi ciency of the market would depend on market structure in 
rather complex ways—with monopolies restricting output but internalizing the ben-
efi ts of learning. Schumpeter recognized that this was a problem in the second best.67 
He tried to defend monopoly on the grounds (in modern language) that it partially 
solved the appropriability problem and the problems posed by imperfect capital mar-
kets. While the question is in some sense not appropriately posed (market structure 
should be viewed as endogenous, and in the absence of full spillovers, competitive 
markets may be hard to sustain), this paper shows that even though monopolists 
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internalize their own learning benefi ts, the distortion associated with underproduc-
tion (monopoly pricing) may lead to less learning than in a competitive market with 
optimal intervention. 
Until this paper, most of the growth literature has focused on aggregate models 
in which the scope for allocative decisions was very limited (e.g., sectoral alloca-
tions played little role in aggregate growth rates). Insuffi cient attention has been 
paid to the design of policy interventions and the parameters on which they should 
depend to correct systemic market failures, especially in the presence of cross-
sectoral spillovers. This paper has provided a simple context in which market 
distortions—on both the aggregate supply of labor and its allocation—can be ana-
lyzed and the kinds of interventions (typically second or third best interventions, 
predicated on the existence of certain restrictions on the set of admissible policies) 
that might address them. 
The paper thus provides both a case for industrial policies and the beginning of an 
analysis of the optimal design of such policies. Many of the results are not surprising, 
though the simplicity of the forms of intervention (at least in some limiting cases) is 
striking. Simple formulas akin to those arising in the theory of optimal taxation are 
derived. The size of the static distortions (refl ected in subsidies) increases, as expected, 
with learning elasticities and knowledge spillovers—with the latter taking on a par-
ticularly prominent role. Patterns of subsidies are affected, too, in easily understand-
able ways by patterns of demand interdependence. Intertemporal trade-offs are 
captured by the pure rate of discount as well as the rate at which marginal utility of 
income diminishes as a result of increasing productivity (which, in turn, depends on 
the elasticity of marginal utility and the rate of progress), with the intuitive result that 
the smaller the value at the margin of future consumption, the less distortion (the 
smaller the subsidy) to induce learning. But now the intertemporal trade-off is partly 
endogenous and other factors come to play a role, especially the elasticity of labor 
supply. Indeed, in the limiting case of symmetric learning and demand functions, we 
have shown that regardless of the learning elasticity, if the elasticity of labor supply is 
zero, the market equilibrium may be Pareto effi cient. More generally, the magnitude 
of interventions also depends on labor supply elasticities. A particular complicating 
factor which we have noted is that, given the nonconvexities naturally associated 
with learning, optimal intervention may lead to asymmetric equilibria, even when all 
demand and learning functions are symmetric. 
We noted that one of the standard objections to industrial policies in the past 
has been political: the potential for misuse. This poses an important trade-off. 
Broad-based measures such as exchange rate interventions require only that the 
government ascertain that the sectors that would be encouraged by such inter-
ventions have more societal learning benefi ts than the sectors that would be 
discouraged—and there is ample evidence that that is the case (evidenced by the 
success of export-led growth strategies). Firms and sectors within the economy 
self-select, and the expansion of fi rms and sectors with greater learning enhances 
the dynamism of the economy. On the other hand, more targeted interventions 
can lead to even more learning and faster rates of growth. No intervention com-
pletely “solves” the political economy problem: Sectors that benefi t from exchange 
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rate intervention may lobby for the maintenance of that intervention even in the 
absence of learning benefi ts. And some countries have shown that they can man-
age the political economy problems of more targeted interventions. The East Asian 
countries did so by using rule-based systems in which interventions were linked to 
past export success. 
In any case, no government can completely absolve itself of the necessity of 
addressing the issues with which we have been concerned. For while we have focused 
on the use of taxes and subsidies to alter the structure of production and encourage 
more learning, different government investments in infrastructure, technology, and 
education affect different industries differently. In making such decisions, we argue 
that the government should take into account impacts on societal learning that will 
shape the country’s dynamic comparative advantage.
We have focused on a model with a single factor of production: labor. The early 
learning literature68 focused on learning through investment. Obviously, if countries 
learn through investment, there is an argument for encouraging investment, espe-
cially in sectors that have a greater learning elasticity and greater spillovers. Stand-
ard international trade arguments demonstrate that taxes on imports, if imports are 
labor-intensive, will drive up wages and lower interest rates, thus encouraging more 
investment (Korinek and Servén 2010).
We have emphasized the importance of developing policies that maximize effec-
tive learning. In our simple model, we have assumed that different sectors have 
different learning curves, with different spillovers to other sectors. Identifying these 
learning functions is necessary to design appropriate government policies. Else-
where, Greenwald and Stiglitz (forthcoming) have discussed some of the factors 
that contribute to greater learning and greater spillovers. We argue that the manu-
facturing sector may have both greater learning potential and greater spillovers. 
Different countries may have different learning elasticities. Countries that are too 
distant in technology may have more diffi culty closing the gap than countries that 
are somewhat closer, while for some countries there is little gap to close. Hence, 
learning elasticities (at least in some sectors) may be low for both the least developed 
countries and those that are near best practices.
Our simplifi ed model also circumvents a central question: learning toward what 
end? Much of technological change in advanced developed countries has been 
directed toward saving labor, which is viewed as the “scarce factor.” In developing 
countries, however, labor is in abundance—levels of unemployment are often high. 
A reduced demand for labor exacerbates the problem of unemployment. To put it 
another way, in these situations, the shadow wage and the market wage may differ. 
Innovation responds to market wages; innovation in the advanced industrial coun-
tries responds to the high market wages there.
It has long been recognized that technologies that are appropriate for developed 
countries may be less appropriate for developing countries. This means that devel-
oping countries may have less to learn from developed countries than is sometimes 
supposed;69 their learning and research should be directed not so much at saving 
labor (the shadow price of which may be very low) as at saving capital and natural 
resources, and protecting the environment.70 
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Four decades ago, when we were thinking about these issues at Cambridge, Tony 
Atkinson and I introduced the concept of “localized technological change. (Atkinson 
and Stiglitz 1969). Technological change affected only certain production processes. 
An innovation could improve, for instance, some very advanced technologies but 
leave traditional technologies largely unaffected. Indeed, as noted earlier in this 
paper, the spillovers might be greater to advanced technologies in other sectors than 
to simple (say, nonautomatic) processes in the same sector.71 This has an important 
implication: If developing countries resort to learning and adapting technologies 
created for circumstances prevalent in developed countries, the advances may be of 
limited value to their own economies. Emerging markets and developing countries 
need to develop their own research and learning capacities so they can improve the 
technologies that are appropriate to their economic circumstances. Thus, the point 
of industrial policies is not just to catch up to the advanced industrial countries, but 
to promote advances in technology that are appropriate to their circumstances and 
enhance their ability to make additional advances in these technologies. 
Figure 1 illustrates an isoquant with two technologies, one (A) appropriate to a 
high-wage economy, the other (B) appropriate to a low-wage economy. Advances 
in technology in the advanced industrial economy move A downward (lower labor 
requirements per unit of output) but leave B unchanged. If the developing country 
simply borrows (say, with a lag) technology from the advanced industrial coun-
try, it initially gets no benefi t (if it produces the good at all, it continues to use the 
unchanged technology B) until the cost savings from lower labor costs are so over-
whelming that the country switches to A. 
The fact that the country’s technology remains unchanged implies that if it did not 
initially have a comparative advantage in the good (say, the industrial product), its 
comparative disadvantage may increase over time. But even if the country does not 
have a comparative advantage in the good and never will, the nontraded sector (or 
the agriculture sector) might benefi t from spillovers. 
If, however, the country is able to develop its own learning capacities (e.g., 
through industrial policies, which might seem ineffi cient in the short run), it can 
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start improving technology B. Moreover, with capital scarce, the improvements will 
be directed at saving capital, not labor. Indeed, the improvements in its technology, 
if rapid enough, could change its comparative advantage. But even if that did not 
happen, the spillovers to the other sectors—reducing, say, capital but leaving labor 
inputs unchanged—would have far greater benefi ts than those generated from bor-
rowing technology from the advanced industrial country.
The distortions in the bias of innovation are even greater when it comes to saving 
on environmental resources because of the massive mispricing of these resources. 
With no costs associated with carbon emissions, why would there be any incentive 
to reduce them? Social costs associated with the macroeconomic variability linked 
to dependence on imported resources whose prices are highly variable may be far 
greater than the private costs. This provides another rationale for government poli-
cies designed to encourage less dependence on such inputs—and another rationale 
for industrial policies.72
These environmental impacts are important for all countries but especially for 
developing countries, as Dasgupta’s work repeatedly emphasizes.
This brings me back to one of the themes I raised earlier, a theme central to 
Dasgupta’s work. What matters is not gross domestic product but quality of life, 
well-being, and sustainability.73 What that entails—and how it can be increased—
should and can be the subject of rational inquiry. Dasgupta has led the way in 
showing us how that can be done. For that, and for all his other contributions, we 
are grateful.
Notes
 1. Later published; see Hahn (1966). Karl Shell and I extended this result in Shell and Stiglitz 
(1967).
 2. In particular, on the questions of when production effi ciency was desirable, the opti-
mal supply of public goods in the presence of distortionary taxation, and “third best” 
approaches to optimal taxation when there were constraints on the set of feasible taxes. 
See especially Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971, 1972).
 3. See, for instance, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977), where we showed that the presumption in 
favor of tariffs over quotas did not hold in the face of uncertainty and incomplete insur-
ance markets.
 4. This included a large study done for the Department of Energy (Dasgupta et al. 1977).
 5. See Dasgupta, Heal, and Stiglitz (1980); Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981b, 1981c, 1982); 
Dasgupta, Gilbert and Stiglitz (1982, 1983). In many of these studies, we found that the 
study of natural resources provided a concrete context within which we could investigate 
issues of broader concern. 
 6. See, in particular, a paper published in a volume edited by Partha in an area in which he 
has devoted much of his time during the past decade: Stiglitz (2000).
 7. Moreover, the techniques (and second best reasoning) employed below are those we 
employed in our joint papers on public fi nance (see note 3).
 8. Perhaps most notable was the work of Kaldor (1957) and Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962); 
and that of Karl Shell and William Nordhaus (Shell 1966, 1967; Nordhaus 1969a, 
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1969b). Also infl uential were Uzawa (1965), Arrow (1962a, 1962b), and Nelson and 
Phelps (1965). My own paper with Tony Atkinson (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969) was infl u-
enced by Kaldor. I discuss these developments at greater length in my 1990 paper. For a 
more recent contribution to the theory of endogenous growth, with some perspectives on 
the intervening literature, see Stiglitz (2006a).
 9. Indeed, Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1959), in their proofs of the Pareto effi ciency of the 
market economy (the fi rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics), assumed that 
technology was fi xed, or at least that changes in technology were exogenous. As I explain 
below, there are good reasons to believe that when technical change is endogenous, the 
market equilibrium will not be Pareto effi cient.
 10. Whether and under what conditions that is so is, of course, another matter. Elsewhere, I 
have argued that intellectual property rights may actually impede innovation, especially 
if they are not well designed. See Henry and Stiglitz (2010) and Stiglitz (2006b, 2008). 
The adverse effects may be particularly marked in developing countries. See Stiglitz (2004, 
2012).
 11. There is a large empirical literature on the evidence for learning by doing, cited in 
Arrow (1962a) and Solow (1997). See, in particular, Hirsch (1952), Alchian (1963), 
and Argote and Epple (1990). For additional theoretical work, see, for instance, 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1982), Spence, (1981), Cabral and Riordan (1994), and 
Besanko et al. (2010).
 12. Arrow assumed that learning was a by-product of investment. We simplify by assuming 
that it is a by-product of production (the input of labor). We comment briefl y on how 
assuming it was a by-product of investment would alter our conclusions. See also Korinek 
and Servén (2010). Solow (1997) provided an insightful discussion of the Arrow model 
and its limits, as well as a bibliography of some of the research on learning by doing that 
occurred in the intervening 35 years, including the work of Levhari (1966, 1967), Sheshin-
ski (1967), and Young (1991, 1997). 
 13. More accurately, they result in less R&D or less learning than would occur in the fi rst best 
situation; given the lower output associated with monopoly, conditional on the monopoly 
power persisting, the optimal degree of investment in R&D is lower. 
 14. This was one of the central points made in my 1974 lecture before the Association of 
University Teachers of Economics in Manchester (Stiglitz 1975a). In November 1978, I 
elaborated on the problems arising from the public-good nature of knowledge in a lecture 
to an InterAmericn Development Bank-CEPAL meeting in Buenos Aires (published later 
as Stiglitz 1987a). Knowledge is a special kind of public good—a global public good, the 
benefi ts of which could accrue to anyone in the world. After developing the concept of 
international public goods in an address to a UN meeting in Vienna (Stiglitz 1995a), I 
applied that concept to knowledge (Stiglitz1999).
 15. For a broad overview, see my introduction to the 2010 edition of Schumpeter’s classic 
Socialism, Capitalism, and Democracy. 
 16. A point I discussed more extensively in chapter 5 of Making Globalization Work (Stiglitz 
2006b). 
 17. Our thinking in this area was greatly infl uenced by Kenneth Arrow, who fi rst developed 
the theory of learning by doing in his classic paper (Arrow 1962a). I studied general 
equilibrium theory under Arrow at MIT, and he visited Cambridge in 1969–1970, when 
Dasgupta and I were both working there. 
 18. Dasgupta, in his carefully reasoned exposition of the appropriate role of government in 
An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution (1993), seems to express some misgivings as 
to whether the government should undertake industrial policies.
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 19. This is not to suggest that self-selection processes would necessarily be effi cient. Indeed, in 
the absence of coordination, there can easily be too few or too many competitors for the 
patent prize. While the price system may provide an effective way of coordinating produc-
tion and consumption in a static model, it does not and cannot do the same with respect to 
innovation. The virtue of such self-selection processes was, however, that the costs of any 
mistakes fell (for the most part) on those undertaking the research project. Still, markets 
demand compensation for risk-bearing, so innovation is retarded. For a broader discus-
sion of these issues in the context of R&D, see Stiglitz (2008).
 20. We put aside for the moment the earlier objection—that if fi rms would eventually have a 
comparative advantage in the industrial sector, they should have an incentive to invest in 
learning today. We return to this issue later in the paper. 
 21. What is essential in this example is the unitary elasticity of substitution. There are prob-
lems in modeling long-term economic growth with nonunitary elasticity of substitution 
and differential rates of growth of productivity. With an elasticity of substitution less 
than unity, the high-productivity growth sector’s share of global gross domestic product 
shrinks to zero; while with an elasticity of substitution greater than unity, it expands to 
unity. Both limits are uninteresting. At the same time, it is unsatisfactory simply to assume 
a unitary elasticity of substitution. A fi nite period model of the kind presented below 
avoids this modeling dilemma. 
 22. Important inquiries investigating the relationship between learning spillovers, growth, 
trade, and government policy include Young (1991), Hoff (1997), Hausmann and Rodrik 
(2003), and Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007).
 23. Though given the lower level of production, the level of investment in learning/R&D may 
be optimal. 
 24. Atkinson and I (1969) thus described learning as “localized.” Because countries differ, 
too, some learning that may be relevant in one country may be of limited benefi t in other 
countries. Most changes in technology, however, could confer benefi ts across borders. 
And, as we have noted, improvements in skills (techniques) in one sector have spillover 
benefi ts to other sectors in which analogous skills are employed. Hidalgo and colleagues 
(2007) recently characterized the product space, attempting to identify the “capabilities” 
that different sectors have in common. Presumably, if two products entail similar capabili-
ties, learning that enhances a particular capability in one sector will have spillover benefi ts 
to related sectors for which that same capability is relevant. 
 25. If there are spillovers across sectors (products), but spillovers external to the fi rm are 
not full, there is a natural multiproduct monopoly (under our assumptions of linear 
technology) as a result of these natural economies of scope. These economies of scope 
and scale and offsetting diseconomies of scope and scale (e.g., arising from limits of the 
span of control and the benefi ts of managerial specialization) help defi ne the boundaries 
of fi rms. 
 26. Later, we discuss how the results are changed if learning is related to investment, as in 
Arrow’s original paper.
 27. While this is precisely true in the case of logarithmic utility functions discussed below, in 
the more general case, the analysis is somewhat more complicated because of the endoge-
neity of ξk.
 28. Under normal circumstances, growth (an increase in H, productivity) will lead to an 
increase in consumption; but matters are slightly more complicated, as fi rst period 
consumption is subsidized because of the benefi t of learning. If Ho, the increase in pro-
ductivity with no subsidies, is large relative to δ hk (the value of the learning benefi ts), 
then xk
t+1 > xk
t.
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 29. Recall that in terms of our previous notation, ψ is the special case of H where there are 
no spillovers. 
 30. U v U ’(L )Li
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+τ δ*v’ = ψ
 31. The symmetric equilibrium can be treated as if there were a single commodity. Without 
loss of generality, we then write U’t = Ui
t. From the fi rst order condition for Lt, recalling 
that, in equilibrium, xt = Lt
  U’ t (Lt) − vt’(Lt) (1 − τ) = 0,
  we can derive
  dln L t/dln τ = (τ/1 − τ) / ν + η = = (τ/1 − τ)εLwc, where εLwc is the compensated elasticity of 
supply of labor, where ν = dln v’/dln L and η = − dln U’/dln x. This is consistent with our 
earlier notation where ηk is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to commodity k, 
and, in the homothetic case, where η is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to φ. 
From the fi rst order condition for Lt+1, recalling that xt+1 = H( Lt)Lt+1,
  HU’ t+1 (HLt+1) − vt’(Lt+1) = 0,
  we can derive
  dln Lt+1/d ln H = (1 − η)/ν + η = εLw,
  from which it follows that
  dln Lt+1/d ln Lt = h (1 − η)/ ν + η = h εLw.
  Hence, at τ = 0,
  vt+1 ’ Lt+1/vt ’ Lt ≈ 1 + (1 + ν)HoεLw.
  dln [vt+1’ Lt+1/vt ’ Lt]/d ln τ = (1 + ν) {h εLw − 1}(τ/1 − τ) εLwc,
  Hence
  vt+1 ’ Lt+1/vt ’ Lt ≈ [1 + (1 + ν)Ho εLw] {1 + (1 + ν) {h εLw − 1}(τ/1 − τ) εLwc}.
 32. These formulae provide a characterization of the equilibrium, but it is important to note 
that, in general, the elasticities can themselves depend on taxes/subsidies.
 33. Since, in the fi rst period (omitting the superscript t), Σpixi = L + Στixi, at τ = 0,
  Σ dxi/d τj = dL/dτj > 0. Both the income and substitution effects lead to an increased labor 
supply.
 34. We make use of the fact that Vpi = − VI xi.
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  where, as before, hki = dln Hk/dln Lti .
  With separable demand functions and no spillovers, this simplifi es to
  ζj hjη´jj (τj/pj),
  where ζj, hj, and η´jj are defi ned below.
 36. To derive (10), we make use of the Slutsky equation: dxi/dpj = (∂xi/∂pj)U − xj(dxi /dI).
 37. One must take care in interpreting this and other optimal tax/subsidy formulas in this 
paper, because the variables on the right-hand side are typically not constants but functions 
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of the subsidy rate itself. Still, they provide insights into the determinants of the appropri-
ate subsidies for optimally designed subsidies.
 38. The notation is deliberate: η is the elasticity of marginal utility. The fi rst order condition 
for consumption, with constant elasticity, can be written − η ln x = ln v’ + ln p. If v’ is 
constant, then − η ln x = ln p, so dln x/dln p = 1/η. Thus, if income effects are small, there 
is a simple relationship between the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption of good 
i and the elasticity of (compensated) demand. 
 39. With a positive wage elasticity, ζj is normally greater than unity. If there is zero labor 
elasticity and a logarithmic utility function, then ζj = 1 all j. If a sector has elasticity of 
demand less than unity, ζ for that sector is less than unity. In the symmetric case,
  dln Lt+1/d ln H = (1 − η)/ν + η,
  dln Lt+1/d ln Lt = h (1 − η)/ν + η
  Hence at τ = 0,
  Lt+1/Lt ≈ 1 + Ho (1 − η)/ν + η,
  d ln Lt/d τ = (1 − τ) dln Lt/dln w
  Hence
  Lt+1/Lt ≈ {1 + Ho (1 − η)/ν + η} [1 + tt) dln Lt/dln w].
 40. The term ζi complicates the analysis slightly. With the larger subsidy, Lst is increased, 
which by itself decrease ζs,  dampening τs. Sector “0” benefi ts from its own learning, 
and this term by itself increases ζ0 if the elasticity of demand is greater than unity and 
decreases it if the elasticity of demand is less than unity. With a positive wage elasticity, 
ζi would, in the symmetric case, be greater than unity, which in turn increases subsidies; 
the larger the labor supply elasticity, the larger the subsidy.
 41. This model is, in fact, the limiting case of the two-sector model discussed earlier (with 
a sector 0 with no spillovers and a sector s with full spillovers), under the special case 
that ho = 0: there is no learning in the nonspillover sector. It is straightforward to gen-
eralize the results to the case in which there is some learning in the nonspillover sector. 
In this special case, we relabel the sectors, so s = M (for manufacturing) and 0 = A (for 
agriculture). 
 42. Alternatively, we can write βM = (dln xM/d ln (pM/pA))(δ ln (pM/pA)/d ln τM), where dln 
(pM/pA) /d ln τM can be calculated in a straightforward way. Similarly for βA.
 43. Relative consumptions xM/xA is just a function of relative prices (1−τM)/(1 + tA):
  xM/xA = Q((1 − τM)/(1 + τA)). The elasticity of substitution is defi ned as dln (xM/xA)/d ln 
(1 − τM)/(1 + tA)), where dtA/dτM = (xM/xA) + τM(d(xM/xA)/dτM.
 44. Both of these are total derivatives, taking into account the direct effect of the change in τ 
and the indirect effect on the tax in the next period (t).
 45. ut + n = Uo + n g. Σ n g δn = Σ δ g δn/1 − δ = δ g/(1 − δ)2
 46. Recall the defi nitions of βM and βA above.
 47. For convenience, we switch to continuous time. Analogous results hold in the discrete time 
version. 
 48. The full intertemporal maximization problem is somewhat more complicated and can be 
analyzed using standard techniques.
 49. The simplest form is H^ = 1 for E < E*; that is, there is no learning. There is then a discon-
tinuity at E*. 
 50. As we noted earlier, Arrow’s original model focused on learning through investment. But 
with the capital output ratio fi xed, cumulative investment grows with output. 
 51. Long-run steady states require asymptotically constant elasticities. 
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 52. In particular, the value of ζi is sensitive to the elasticity of demand, the amount of learning 
in this sector, the elasticity of labor supply, what happens in other sectors, and so on. As 
we have noted, pti = (1 − δ ζi hi)/(1 − 1/η´i). On the other hand, pit+1 = 1/Hi(1 − 1/η´i). If Hi 
= 1/(1 − δ ζi hi), the price would be the same both periods. The smaller the elasticity of 
demand, the higher the mark-up, so the larger the sensitivity of price to any differences 
between Hi and 1/(1 − d ζi hi).
 53. For instance, in the absence of learning, by setting κi (1 − τi) = 1, or (1 − τi) = 1/κi or
  τ = 1 − 1/κi = 1/η´i, we can correct the monopoly distortion.
 54. It is easy to modify our model to allow a steady-state degree of disparity: all we have to 
assume is that knowledge diffuses freely from the developed to the less developed country 
with a lag of N years. 
 55. As we noted earlier, the assumption of a fi xed labor supply is, however, not innocuous. 
 56. d αM ln (π γ + (1 − π )λ) + (1 − αM) ln ((1 − λ)(1 − π))/d π =
  αM (γ − λ)/(π γ + (1 − π)λ) − (1 − αM)/(1 − π) ≤ 0 for π ≥ 0 (provided γ < 1); at λ = λ*, where 
λ* is the solution to
  d αM ln (π γ + (1 − π)λ) + (1 − αM) ln ((1 − λ)(1 − π))/d λ
  = αM (1 − π)/(π γ + (1 − π)λ) − (1 − αM)/(1−λ) = 0
 57. Ut+1 = Ut + ln (1+g), and, using the same techniques employed earlier,
  W = Σ U*[(1 + t(ln (1+g)))]δt , from which (40) follows directly.
  If U is not logarithmic but exhibits constant elasticity with respect to the scale of consump-
tion (as before), with the elasticity of marginal utility of η, there is a parallel analysis. 
 58. In our simple model, we assume individuals cannot borrow or lend, and simply solve a 
period-by-period static utility maximization problem, determining the allocation of cur-
rent income among the three commodities. But it would be easy in principle (complicated 
in practice) to generalize the results to cases that include individual borrowing and lend-
ing, with precise effects depending on the structure of preferences (e.g., on separability of 
utility functions.) 
 59. Because of the ineffi ciency in the production, it takes, in effect, 1/γ units of domestic labor 
to produce 1 unit of industrial good. Hence, exports are the output of agricultural goods 
minus the consumption of agricultural goods, where the output of agricultural goods is 
total labor supply, less the input into nontraded goods and into the industrial sector.
 60. In effect, the supply curve is effectively horizontal at e**. 
 61. One other interesting aspect characterizes the optimum pattern of reserve accumula-
tion. If, in the earlier stages of development, learning benefi ts are suffi ciently large that 
the country accumulates a surplus, using the indirect utility function, at the margin, an 
increase in the price of tradables (a further reduction in the price of nontradables) has a 
positive effect—it receives more for what it sells; while in later periods, when the country 
has a trade defi cit (using up its surplus), a decrease in the exchange rate (the price the 
country has to pay for the goods it buys) has a negative effect. This provides further impe-
tus for lowering exchange rates (further below equilibrium levels that would prevail in the 
absence of intertemporal effects) in earlier stages and increasing them later—exacerbating 
patterns of “global imbalances.” 
 62. An analysis of the full global general equilibrium effects of such policies, if pursued by 
enough developing countries to have systemic effects, is beyond the scope of this paper.
 63. The utility possibilities curve gives the maximum level of utility for an individual given the 
level of utility of others.
 64. As Greenwald and Stiglitz (forthcoming) point out, even in advanced industrial countries, 
most fi rms operate well below best practices.
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 65. Operationally, we can think of dividing the learning period into two subperiods. In the 
fi rst, we devote ourselves to improving our learning skills; in the second, we use those 
learning skills to learn about the subject at hand. (Here, we ignore the problem posed by 
the possibility of infi nite regress: we can learn how to learn how to learn. . . .)
 66. Sah and Stiglitz (1989a,1989b), Stiglitz (1995b), and Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) show that 
there can, in fact, be multiple societal equilibria. Hoff and Stiglitz (2010) use recent results 
in psychology to underpin an analysis of the interactions between prior beliefs and societal 
change, explaining how some societies can become trapped in a seemingly dysfunctional 
equilibrium for an extended period, while other societies seem to evolve more smoothly. 
Politics and economics also interact: Repressive and authoritarian societies are, in a fun-
damental sense, incompatible with the kind of questioning of authority that is associated 
with a dynamic learning society. See Stiglitz (2010b). 
 67. Before the term “second best” had come into fashion through the work of Meade (1955) 
and Lipsey and Lancaster (1956–1957).
 68. See, in particular, Arrow (1962a). See also Solow (1997).
 69. There is an old (and largely forgotten) literature on the determinants of the factor bias 
of technological change. For a more recent attempt to develop a general theory of the 
endogenous determination of the factor bias and the equilibrium level of unemployment, 
using a variant of the effi ciency wage model, see Stiglitz (2006a).
 70. Some might argue that with globalization, the price of capital has become the same every-
where in the world. But this view ignores the importance of information and other market 
imperfections, the effect of which is to make the effective price of capital higher in some 
countries than in others. See, for example, Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003).
 71. Indeed, that is one of the reasons we have emphasized cross-sector learning spillovers in 
this paper.
 72. This is a lesson Europe learned at some cost: It might have been privately profi table to 
become dependent on Russian oil, but it was socially costly.
 73. This was, of course, the thrust of the Report of the International Commission on 
the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. See Fitoussi et al. 
(2010).
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Weak States, Strong States, and 
Development
TORSTEN PERSSON
My topic, at least partly, is weak or fragile states, which is one of the themes of 
this conference. It is also a central concept in the development policy community. 
International organizations such as the World Bank, the European Union, and many 
national aid organizations—such as the United Kingdom’s Department for Inter-
national Development and the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Authority—have special initiatives for weak states.
What do we mean by weak states? We mean states that cannot do much. They 
cannot support the most basic economic functions; they fi nd it hard to raise any 
substantial revenue; they have a hard time delivering health and education to the 
population; and they have problems maintaining law and order. Unfortunately, this 
is not a rare phenomenon: about 10 percent of countries in the world (20–30 states) 
are seriously weak or have failed, and others are quite close (fi gure 1).
The map is from a 2008 Brookings Institution study. It shows, in black, three 
states considered to have failed: Congo, Somalia, and Afghanistan; and in dark grey, 
seriously weak states, from Haiti on the left to North Korea. Lighter shades of grey 
are other weak countries and those at risk of becoming weak.
The inability of a state to deliver in various dimensions is strongly linked to 
income per capita and to violence of various sorts. Weak states typically have 
massive poverty and are plagued by confl ict and violence. On the other end of the 
spectrum, the developed countries have it all: Incomes are high, institutions work, 
policies are in good order, and confl icts tend to be resolved peacefully.
There is a very strong clustering of state capacity in various dimensions: We 
see few strong economies among the weak states and few weak economies among 
the strong states. We have a multidimensional problem—perhaps the development 
problem—in this clustering of low income, violence, and dysfunctional institutions.
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The state does many things, but we can broadly classify its activities into two 
types: extractive and productive. The extractive capacity of the state is related 
to its ability to raise taxes from broad bases, such as income or value-added 
taxes. For this to work, the state requires an infrastructure that includes various 
compliance institutions, monitoring, and knowledgeable administrators. What 
about productive capacity? This includes the infrastructure to enforce contracts 
or protect property rights and to make the private economy work better, as well 
as the physical infrastructure that supports the private sector; for example, roads 
and the electrical grid.
Let me illustrate with two specifi c measures. One is fiscal capacity, which I will 
measure with total taxes as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). This will be 
an average from the late 1970s onward, using data from the International Monetary 
Fund. The other is legal capacity, which I will measure with an index for the pro-
tection of property rights—an average over the 1980s and 1990s, using data from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This index is quite often used in the 
macro-development literature. These measures are special in some ways, but I could 
have used a host of other proxies for the extractive and productive capacities, and 
the graph would be similar to fi gure 2. 
In this fi gure, we see fi scal capacity (the total tax take) on the vertical axis and 
legal capacity (the property rights protection index) on the horizontal axis. It is 
clear that these are strongly positively related to each other, ranging from Haiti at 
the lower southwest corner up to Sweden in the upper northeast  corner. So much 
for the idea that there is a trade-off between large government and supporting the 
private economy in other ways. To see the clustering with income, consider the color 
of these dots: The light grey dots demark countries with high income per capita in 
1980; the dark grey ones represent those with low income; and the hollow ones, 
FIGURE 1. 
Map of the Weakest States
Source: Brookings Index of State Weakness, 2008.
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those with middle income. The colors line up pretty well, and we can easily see the 
correlation between income and the two forms of state capacity.
Figure 3 shows the prevalence of violence in its most extreme form: civil war. The 
light grey dots represent countries that have not had any civil war since 1950, while 
the dark grey dots represent countries that had at least one instance of civil war dur-
ing this period. Again the clustering is pretty evident.
How do we understand these strong patterns in the data? We have to pose and 
answer three general questions. First, what drives the building of different state 
capacities and why do these capacities move together? Second, what forces drive 
political violence? And third, what drives the correlation among institutions, income, 
and violence?
I will be presumptuous enough to use this opportunity to describe some research I 
am doing with Tim Besley from the London School of Economics on the economics 
and politics of state building and political violence. We are trying to understand the 
observed clustering of income, institutions, and violence, with the goal of building 
a new theory and uncovering some new evidence. Ultimately, we hope to bring the 
notion of state capacity into the mainstream of economics. In this talk, I will only 
be able to scratch the surface, but I will try to give you an idea of our theoretical 
approach and the predictions we have come up with, and show you some correla-
tions in the data. If you want the gory details, you can go to our Web pages and look 
at various research papers, either published or very much in progress. We hope to 
publish a book in 2011 based on the Yrjö Jahnsson lectures we will give in Helsinki 
two weeks from now.1
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Now, let me next talk about the origins of state capacity and the origins of vio-
lence, and how they fi t together.
State Capacity
In terms of existing research, I think we can say that state capacity is ignored or, 
at best, assumed in mainstream economics. The literature on the macroeconomics 
of development views income per capita—and not state institutions—as the central 
outcome to be explained and discussed. When it comes to fi scal capacity, the capac-
ity to raise revenue from certain tax bases is basically assumed in various branches 
of economics. Yes, there are some constraints on taxation, but they tend to come 
from incomplete information or from incentives in the political system. Similarly, the 
administrative capacity to enforce contracts and protect investors generally tends to 
be assumed in fi nance and microeconomics. 
On the other hand, there is considerable focus on state capacity in political and 
economic history. In particular, the fi scal powers of the state are deemed important 
in and of themselves—important for military success and important for state devel-
opment generally. Perhaps the most famous expositor of these ideas is Charles Tilly, 
the political sociologist, who wrote a lot about how war can be a major motive 
to build the fi scal capacity of the state and coined some wonderful sayings, such 
as “War made the state and the state made war”, Tilly (1990). But this branch of 
research largely ignores the building of legal capacity.
Besley and I decided to set up a simple model framework to help us think about 
state capacity formation. A basic idea in this framework is to distinguish between 
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underlying institutions and the policymaking they enable. So, an incumbent govern-
ment’s choice of taxation and regulation would be limited by its fi scal and legal 
capacity, and constrained by the political institutions in place. Incumbents in this 
setting can invest in fi scal and legal capacity—we think about state building as a 
purposeful and forward-looking activity, as investments made by the incumbent 
government, but these investments are made under uncertainty about the future. You 
don’t really know how revenue will be used in the future. Will it be spent on public 
goods or will it be spent on redistribution? You don’t really know the levels of non-
tax revenue in the future: How much revenue will be available from resource rents 
and aid? And you don’t really know about future incumbency: Will you continue to 
hold power, or might power be held by an opposition group? 
This approach identifi es three kinds of situations or states. One is common- 
interest states. Here government revenue is basically used for public goods; for exam-
ple, defense against the threat of an external confl ict. In this situation, any incumbent 
group is going to invest in fi scal capacity.
The second is a redistributive state, in which government revenue, at least on the 
margin, is used to redistribute in the broad sense: giving favors to some groups in 
society (such as the incumbent’s own group) at the expense of other groups. Here, 
the incumbent government is more or less constrained by the prevailing political 
institutions. In the redistributive state, the incumbent group invests in fi scal capacity 
because there is enough political stability.
Finally, there are weak states, in which government revenue is again used for 
redistribution. In such states, political institutions tend to be noncohesive, and there 
are high levels of political instability. In this situation, no incumbent group will want 
to invest in the fi scal capacity of the state. 
Another general fi nding that comes out of this analysis is a complementarity 
result: investment in one type of state capacity tends to reinforce the other. The 
idea is that, if future fi scal capacity is higher, there are additional fi scal benefi ts 
of building legal capacity, which of course will expand market income and hence 
the tax base. Similarly, if future legal capacity is higher, market incomes and tax 
bases will be higher. This, in turn, will increase the motivation to invest in fi scal 
capacity. Thus, if you do more of one type of state building, you tend to do more 
of the other. 
The implications of such complementarity are immediate. First, it’s a natural way 
to think about the forces behind the observed clustering of various capabilities of the 
state. Second, it tells you that if you fi nd determinants for one form of state capac-
ity, they should also determine the other capacity of the state. I will briefl y discuss 
the major determinants that our approach suggests; the primary relationships are 
illustrated in fi gure 4. 
A fi rst determinant is the structure of interests in society: common versus redis-
tributive interests. If common interests are strong—say, because a society wants to 
defend itself against an external enemy—most incumbents will invest in the fi scal 
capacity of the state to raise revenue for these urgent needs. By complementarity, 
you will also get more investments in legal capacity. This is essentially the Tilly idea 
expanded by complementarity with the productive side of the state. 
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Do the data refl ect this simple prediction? Let me show some partial correlations 
between common-interest spending and state capacity without any pretense that we 
are isolating a causal effect. I am going to gauge the past demand for public goods 
by the prevalence of war, the idea being that if in the past a country fought a lot of 
wars, it probably faced a large risk of war. These are conditions under which you 
expect a lot of state capacity to be built in the past, meaning that you would expect 
to see a lot of it today. If we use the Correlates of War data set, we can go back as 
far as 1816 or to independence of the state, whichever is later. For each state, we 
measure how many of those years it was involved in external war. Then we corre-
late that share, partially, with the tax share (fi scal capacity) and the property rights 
index (legal capacity) shown in fi gures 2 and 3. To get the partial correlation, we 
hold constant some other determinants of state capacity, such as cohesive political 
institutions, plus legal origin and continental location.
Figure 5 shows the two partial correlation plots. On the horizontal axis in each 
graph, you have the share of years in external war (actually, the residual of that 
share) once you have held the other variables constant. On the vertical axis on 
the left-hand graph, you have the residual of the tax share of GDP. The partial 
correlation is indeed positive. The slope is about 1, meaning that a country that 
spent 10 percent more of its history at war is currently raising 10 percent higher 
tax revenue as a share of GDP. Similarly, for the measure of legal capacity, in the 
right-hand graph, there is a relatively strong positive correlation: Variation in legal 
capacity is associated with variation in external confl ict. 
The second determinant is the cohesiveness of political institutions. The idea here 
is that, if incumbent groups are strongly constrained by checks and balances in the 
political system, or if opposition groups are well represented, the outcome tends to 
be more cohesive with less emphasis on redistribution and more emphasis on public 
goods. Because of this, there is also more investment in both types of state capacity. 
If we take a look at the data, again, we can see the partial correlation between a 
measure of the cohesiveness of political institutions and state capacity. As a measure 
of the former, I will use constraints on the executive from the Polity IV data set, 
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which goes all the way back to 1800. We look at the period from 1800 (or independ-
ence) until the present and ask how large a share of those years a country had the 
highest score in the Polity IV data set on constraints on the executive variable. (If 
we use the prevalence of parliamentary democracy instead, the results are similar.)
Figure 6 relies on the same approach as fi gure 5; that is, we control for other 
variables and look at the partial correlations between cohesive political institutions 
and both types of state capacity. To the left, we have the relationship between years 
with high executive constraints and fi scal capacity; to the right, the same relationship 
with legal capacity. Again, the positive correlations are evident. The slope in the fi scal 
capacity graph is about 0.1, meaning that if the state had cohesive political institu-
tions for half of its history, it is currently raising about 5 percentage points more 
revenue as a share of GDP. The legal capacity index also shows quite a substantial 
variation associated with these political institutions.
As a third determinant, consider political stability. The idea is that, if you don’t 
have a lot of common interests and you don’t have very cohesive political institu-
tions, redistribution is the main spending activity of governments. If the political 
situation is very unstable, investments in legal and fi scal capacity might come to a 
halt. An incumbent group contemplating expanding the state realizes that a stronger 
state might be used against its own group, and the probability of such a strike-back 
is higher if opponent groups are likely to hold power in the future. So we see a nega-
tive association between political instability and capacity building in this particular 
situation. In many developing countries, of course, this is intimately associated with 
the prevalence of political confl icts. I will return to this point.
What about economic structure? If you hold the level of income constant, the 
structure of the economy—in particular, its resource dependence or independence, or 
its dependence on cash aid—starts to play a role. If you have a large share of resource 
income or aid, there is less motivation to invest in fi scal capacity or legal capacity, 
because the prospective tax bases are also going to be smaller.
Let’s instead hold economic structure constant and think about the level of 
income. Clearly, higher income levels mean higher market incomes and higher 
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prospective tax bases. Incumbent groups then have greater motivation to invest in 
legal and fi scal capacity. However, that argument takes income as given, and there 
will be an association in the other direction as well, where legal and fi scal capacities 
themselves affect income. 
Let us return to the clustering of income and state capacity shown in fi gure 2. We 
have the possibility that low income can cause weak states because low prospective 
market incomes and tax bases reduce the motivation to invest in the state. But weak 
states can also cause low income. Low legal capacity renders incumbents unable 
to support markets, and that tends to keep income down. Low fi scal capacity can 
lead to costly forms of redistribution. If the incumbent government is interested in 
redistributing toward its own group and doesn’t have the ability to use a broad tax-
transfer scheme, it will use other means that may be very ineffi cient, such as tariffs 
or cumbersome regulations, and that will tend to keep income down. Because of this 
two-way feedback between income and state capacity, we can get into virtuous or 
vicious circles that can easily produce clusters of strong states in strong economies 
or weak states in weak economies. 
Figure 4 illustrates the argument I have made so far. Imagine a change over time, 
a period of foreign threat, and a political reform introducing more cohesive politi-
cal institutions. This can lead to greater investments in the state, which feed back to 
income, which feeds back to additional motivation for building the state. I think you 
can see the possibility of a virtuous circle in operation.
Political Violence
So far we have not considered the origins of political violence. One motivation starts 
from a juxtaposition with external violence. In the argument I just made, a risk of 
external violence can promote state building because it boosts the common interest at 
FIGURE 6. 
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the expense of redistributive or group interests. Of course, internal political violence 
is very different. Rather than a manifestation of common interest, it is a manifesta-
tion of an extreme redistributive struggle. We intuitively feel that conditions leading 
to such struggle may entail very different incentives to invest in the state. Another 
motivation, given the state capacity framework I have outlined, is that we want to 
partly endogenize political instability. Finally, a better understanding of political 
violence is valuable in and of itself.
First, we consider some basic facts about civil war and repression, which are, 
sadly, quite common. Civil war is usually defi ned as two-sided violence between 
the government and some insurgency group(s). If you look at the data set compiled 
by the Peace Research Institutes in Uppsala and Oslo, you fi nd that, in a panel of 
country-years since 1950, about 10 percent of those observations are classifi ed as 
associated with civil war. Repression, on the other hand, is one-sided violence— 
typically, various infringements on political rights that governments engage in to 
raise their probability of staying in power. A very drastic measure of repression 
would be purges: the elimination by killing or imprisoning of political opponents. 
In the data set compiled by Arthur Banks, about 8 percent of the country-years since 
about 1950 are associated with such repression. However, if you include milder 
forms of repression, as documented by Amnesty International or the U.S. State 
Department, the incidence is much higher.
Figure 7 illustrates two main patterns in the data. On the left, it shows the preva-
lence of these two forms of internal violence over time, measured on the horizontal 
axes. On the vertical axes, we fi nd the share of countries that are involved in civil 
war or in repression in each year from 1950. Clearly, there is a lot of time variation, 
and to some degree these two pictures look like mirror images. When civil war is on 
the rise, repression is on the fall. It is only after 1990 that the world unambiguously 
becomes a better place, in the sense that both forms of violence are down. The right 
part of the fi gure shows the prevalence of violence by country. For each country, we 
compute the share of years in which it is involved in civil war or repression, then plot 
these shares against (the log of) GDP per capita on the horizontal axis. Clearly, civil 
war is predominantly a phenomenon among the poorest countries, while repression 
tends to set in mostly at middle income levels. Across both time and countries, there 
is a sense of substitutability between these two forms of violence.
Political science has dealt with the determinants of violence for many years; 
only recently have economists become involved. Some theory in the literature 
applies to civil confl ict, but I would say that in general it has little role for insti-
tutions, including state capacities. There are also large empirical literatures on 
civil war and repression, but they have relatively weak connections to theory, so 
it’s a bit diffi cult to interpret the results. (Of course there are exceptions to this 
quick and self-serving literature review; one is the work by Jim Fearon that you 
will hear about in the next session.) However, this empirical work tends to take 
income as given, even though it is very likely that both violence and income have 
similar determinants. Think about the literatures on the resource curse: one about 
income, the other about civil war. Also, the literatures on civil war and repression 
are largely separate, even though both forms of violence seemingly refl ect the fact 
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that institutions are not capable of resolving confl icts of interest in society in a 
peaceful way.
Tim Besley and I have tried to think about a theoretical framework to address 
these issues. Our approach has been to build a framework to analyze political 
 violence and then to embed it in the earlier framework for state capacities. Our 
theoretical approach to political violence is pretty simple. There can be investments 
in violence by both incumbent and opposition groups. Both groups face a trade-
off when they invest in violence. On the one hand, you incur some costs by hiring 
soldiers at going wages; on the other hand, you raise the probability of controlling 
policy and redistributing in your own group’s favor. 
What are the main drivers of confl ict in this simple framework? When do we 
observe violence, and of what type? Our theory identifi es three possible regimes: 
peace, repression, and civil war. Under peace, no group invests in violence. This 
regime will be seen when real wages are high, aid or resource rents are low, pub-
lic goods are valuable, or political institutions are cohesive. It is too expensive to 
arm, there is not enough redistribution to fi ght over, or the winner’s share isn’t 
much larger because it is constrained by political institutions. The next outcome 
is  repression—the incumbent, but not the opposition, takes to violence. Here real 
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wages are lower, aid or resource rents are higher, public goods are less valuable, 
or there is less protection of minority interests. And fi nally there is civil war, when 
there is more at stake or fi ghting is cheap, so both the incumbent and the opposition 
groups resort to violence. 
Thus, we fi nd that the roots of repression and civil war are largely common, a 
prediction supported by our empirical work. How are the drivers of confl ict related 
to the drivers of legal and fi scal capacity? Figure 8 illustrates our approach and an 
interesting result. Essentially, the factors we identifi ed as crucial for the motivation to 
invest in the state are the same ones that drive the likelihood of repression and civil 
war. But there is an important difference: All the factors that increase the motivation 
to invest in the state diminish the incidence of repression and civil war. Conversely, 
when conditions are not conducive to investments in the state, they are conducive to 
investments in violence. 
Putting the Pieces Together 
What happens if we put the two frameworks together and simultaneously consider 
investments in state capacity and political violence? We predicted that we would see 
a negative correlation between state capacities and political violence for two reasons. 
On the one hand, as we have seen, low state capacities and political violence have 
similar basic determinants. On the other hand, if there is a high degree of political 
violence, this tends to raise political instability and further diminish the motivation 
to build strong state institutions, at least in redistributive or weak states.
Figure 9 shows the situation refl ected in the data. The top two graphs reproduce 
fi gure 5, with its positive correlations between the incidence of external war and fi s-
cal and legal capacity. The bottom two graphs show the partial correlations between 
the incidence of civil war and fi scal and legal capacity, which are computed in an 
analogous way. These correlations are negative rather than positive. Of course, there 
is no claim of causality here: The whole point of the earlier analysis is that these 
outcomes are jointly determined.
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What do we learn from putting the pieces together? Earlier I posed three ques-
tions. (1) What drives the building of different state capacities, and why do these 
capacities move together? I have suggested some determinants of investments in the 
state—such as common interests and cohesive political institutions—and I have sug-
gested that different state capacities tend to be complements. (2) What forces drives 
political violence? I have suggested that the determinants coincide with those driving 
state capacity investments, although with an opposite sign. (3) What drives the clus-
tering among institutions, income, and violence? According to our simple analysis, 
one driver is the joint determinants of state capacity and violence. In addition, we 
have two-way feedbacks between income and state capacity and between income and 
political violence. 
The full analysis is illustrated in fi gure 10, which shows the common drivers of the 
two forms of state capacity and the two forms of violence, as well as the feedbacks 
via income. The chart suggests why we might observe snowballing processes with 
virtuous or vicious circles—producing clusters of strong states in strong economies 
and nonviolent societies, and clusters of weak states in weak economies and violent 
societies. 
Are there are any lessons here for foreign intervention and development assis-
tance? I have described very early and ongoing work, so there are no rough and ready 
policy conclusions, but we are approaching a comprehensive way of thinking about 
various forms of development assistance in different types of states. Let me give six 
examples. The main lesson we will learn is a very conditional one: The effect of the 
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intervention depends crucially on both the type of intervention and the kind of state 
where it is made.
First, consider conventional development support in the form of cash aid to the 
government. If this is done in a common-interest state that is cash-constrained, it is 
very likely to help raise state building and improve policy and welfare. On the other 
hand, if the state is redistributive or weak, we will see little effect on state building 
and improvement in policy, and we may see a higher risk of repression or civil war 
because of the higher stakes of larger budgets.
The second kind of support is infrastructure or project assistance. This looks a bit 
more promising through the lens of our framework. In a best-case scenario, where 
such interventions raise local incomes, they can work like investments in productive 
state capacity, strengthening the motivation to build the state and lessening the risk 
of violence.
The third type of intervention, which is quite common, is military assistance to 
the government. According to our simple framework, this is like giving an additional 
advantage to the government, which can use the government budget to fi nance the 
army, while the rebels have to raise their own funds. With a higher return on the 
incumbent group’s investment in violence, we would likely observe a larger range of 
outcomes with government repression, unless we happen to be in a common-interest 
state that does not have the propensity to violence in the fi rst place.
A fourth intervention type is a post-confl ict settlement. In our framework, this 
works a bit like cohesive political institutions; that is, it protects the minority and 
cuts the gains to the winner of a confl ict. This would be the case if (a) we are in a 
confl ict-prone, redistributive, or weak state; and (b) such a post-confl ict settlement is 
credibly expected. If those conditions hold (which is a big “if”), the expectation of a 
post-confl ict settlement might reduce the risk of confl ict and investments in violence, 
and thereby strengthen the motivation for state building. 
A fi fth kind of intervention is direct assistance in capacity building, as many aid 
agencies are doing with various initiatives. According to our analysis, this inter-
vention type might be quite helpful in common-interest states that already make 
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investments in the state, but it is probably not sustainable in the weak states where 
it is most needed.
Finally, we can think about various forms of conditionality; for example, con-
ditioning assistance on free multiparty elections. In our framework, this approach 
might increase political instability, at least from the viewpoint of the incumbent 
group. Therefore, it could raise the risk of repression and weaken state building, 
unless electoral reform is combined with other political reforms toward stronger 
constraints on executives. 
I have described some very humble fi rst steps. Many things remain to be done. 
For example, we should integrate other types of state capacity, such as the abil-
ity to provide basic health care and education. This would permit further insights 
into the clustering of state institutions. As another example, so far we have taken 
political institutions as given, but in the long run nothing is given and everything is 
endogenous. It is thus essential to study motives for political reforms. When do we 
see movement toward more accountability or better representation? When are such 
reforms introduced? Are they a quid pro quo for signifi cant expansion of taxation, 
as some important political science literature suggests? If so, this would suggest addi-
tional complementarities between state capacity and political institutions. 
It is our hope that giving economists some new analytical tools will help them 
wrap their minds around the crucial concepts of state capacity and political violence, 
and their role in development. We hope that our framework will also help members 
of the development community think about assistance to weak or fragile states.
Note
 1. Torsten Persson’s website is www.iies.su.se/~perssont, and Tim Besley’s website is www
.econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/index_own.html
Reference
Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Cambridge, 
MA: B. Blackwell.
Personal Histories and Poverty Traps
PARTHA DASGUPTA
The persistence of poverty in a world that has otherwise and elsewhere enjoyed enor-
mous income growth since World War II remains a puzzle. It wasn’t absurd to imag-
ine, as many development economists did in the 1980s, that growth in income in poor 
economies would trickle down to lift even the poorest out of the mire, but it  hasn’t 
happened. Today, the World Bank estimates that more than 1.3 billion people live on 
less than $1.25 a day, the Bank’s rough-and-ready measure of absolute poverty.
Motivation
In speaking of an “economy,” I cast a wide net. The economy could be a village, a 
district, a province, a nation, or even the whole world. A household could be poor 
in a village that is otherwise prosperous, just as a village could be poor even if the 
country is not, or a country could be languishing with a per capita income of 800 
international dollars in a world where more than a billion people enjoy an average 
income of over 35,000 international dollars. It is frequently argued that in such a 
situation outside help is needed if the poor are to lift themselves out of poverty. 
Others question this argument. But all would seem to agree that the form any such 
help should take can be determined only when the unit to be assisted is identifi ed 
(a household or an village or entire country) and the pathways by which lives get 
shaped are well understood.
When development economists talk of poverty, they have absolute poverty in 
mind (the 1.3 billion mentioned above). But social scientists in Europe and the 
United States also worry about poverty in their lands. Because context matters, 
social activists are quick to point out that poverty means different things to different 
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 people—that poverty is multidimensional. But if there is something common in a 
wide-ranging notion, it is not senseless to use one name for it.
The question is whether there is something of signifi cance in common. One feature 
that could be thought to be common is persistence. That absolute poverty persists 
along family lines in rural communities in poor countries is not a controversial claim, 
even though few longitudinal studies among urban populations prove the claim. 
Some studies suggest that even in high-income countries poverty is inherited, in that 
people don’t move in and out of poverty periodically (Creedy and Kalb 2006). But 
I have been unable to fi nd reliable work covering a wide range of places that has 
determined whether there are lock-in effects, in the sense that the poor on average 
remain poor and do not enjoy periodic spells of prosperity and the well-off on aver-
age remain well-off and do not periodically become poor.
It is the job of theorists to predict what the data would reveal if someone were to 
look for them. Over the years, I have tried to understand the twin presence of poverty 
and wealth in poor countries by studying a variety of metabolic and socioecological 
pathways that would lead to persistent poverty (Dasgupta 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003, 
2009). The processes giving rise to those pathways operate at different speeds and at 
various, often overlapping, spatial scales. And they are highly nonlinear, involving 
positive feedback. In some cases, the positive feedback is a refl ection of fi xed costs. 
For example, the maintenance energy in human metabolic processes is substantial 
(see below), as are the overhead labor hours in running a household in a world where 
water cannot be obtained by turning on a tap, where energy is not available at the 
fl ick of a switch, and where cooking is a vertically integrated activity. The common 
feature in all these processes is that the innumerable class of inputs required daily by 
humans are complements of one another. My theme here is the role those comple-
mentarities play in dividing populations. The theory I sketch shows why we should 
expect deep poverty to have a strong tendency to persist across generations.
I am concerned with the absolute poverty experienced by what is commonly 
referred to as the “bottom billion.” Along the way, I shall connect with recent fi nd-
ings by James Heckman and his colleagues on the complementarities that divide 
 populations even in wealthy societies (e.g., Cunha and Heckman 2007; Cunha, 
Heckman, and Schennach 2010).
Framing Poverty
In studying absolute poverty, it is necessary to go beyond income to the access people 
have to basic amenities. When you do that, you discover that in low-income coun-
tries only 68 percent of people have access to clean water and 39 percent to sanita-
tion facilities; the corresponding fi gures for high-income countries are 99 percent for 
both (table 1). Such amenities are the universal determinants of human well-being. 
If instead you were to study fi gures for the constituents of well-being, you would 
discover that in low-income countries 28 percent of children under fi ve years old are 
wasted and 44 percent are stunted. The corresponding fi gures in even upper-middle-
income countries are 4 percent and 14 percent, respectively (table 2).
PERSONAL HISTORIES AND POVERTY TRAPS   |    105
TABLE 1. Access to Clean Water and Sanitation, 2006
Access
Clean water (%) Sanitation (%)
Low-income countries 67 39
South Asia 87 33
(India) 89 28
Sub-Saharan Africa 58 31
China 88 65
High-income countries 99 99
World 86 60
Source: World Bank 2010, table 2.18.
TABLE 2. Prevalence of Child Undernutrition, 2000–08
Percentage of children under 5
Wasted Stunted
Low birth
weight (≤ 2.5 kg)
Low-income countries  28  44  15
South Asia  41  47  27
(India)  44  48  28
Sub-Saharan Africa  25  43  14
China  7  22  2
United States  1.3  4  8
World  23  35  15
Source: World Bank 2010, table 2.20.
These numbers tally with general impressions. The geographic distribution of 
absolute poverty makes for curious viewing of the world’s map, as does the char-
acter of that poverty. Globally, the proportion of those who are underweight at 
birth is 14 percent, which is about the same as the fi gure for low-income countries. 
The corresponding fi gure in the United States, 8 percent, looks disquietingly high 
(table 2). In numbers, the bulk of the world’s poor, when identifi ed in terms of 
income, are still found in China and South Asia: 47 percent of children in South 
Asia are stunted and 27 percent are underweight at birth, whereas the correspond-
ing  fi gures in Sub-Saharan Africa are 43 percent and 14 percent, respectively (table 
2). And yet, the proportion of people without access to clean water in South Asia 
is 33 percent, whereas the corresponding fi gure in Sub-Saharan Africa is 31 percent 
(table 1). I do not have a satisfactory understanding of some of the puzzling differ-
ences in the statistics, but elsewhere I have sought a partial explanation in terms 
of differences in the socioecological environments in South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Dasgupta 1993, 2000, 2003).
In the world of the poor, fertility is high. The total fertility rate (TFR) in low-
income countries is 4.2, compared with a world average of 2.5 (table 3).1 Being in 
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excess of 2.1, the global TFR is still above the long-term replacement level. In South 
Asia, the TFR has fallen to 2.9, but in Sub-Saharan Africa it is a high 5.1, with a 
number of countries experiencing TFRs around 7. To see how great the cost of high 
TFRs is for women, consider that in Africa a successful birth involves at least two 
years of pregnancy and breastfeeding. In a country where the TFR is, say 7, about 
half of a woman’s reproductive years would be spent either carrying a child in her 
womb or breastfeeding it. And we have not allowed for unsuccessful pregnancies. In 
those circumstances, employment outside the home is not an option.
An absence of reproductive health facilities in poor countries has meant that 
maternal mortality rates are high. In several poor countries, maternal mortality is 
the largest single cause of death among women in their reproductive years, and 
nutritional anemia plays a central role. In Sub-Saharan Africa, one woman dies for 
every 110 births. In contrast, the maternal mortality rate in Europe is one death per 
20,000 births (table 3).
Contemporary data from more than 180 countries indicate that gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita is negatively correlated with TFR (Schultz 2006). Much 
has been made of that in the demographic literature and by the media. The problem 
is that the relationship is a correlation, nothing more. It is no good using the correla-
tion to recommend that countries should raise incomes if they wish to reduce fertil-
ity; the underlying reasons why household incomes are very low could also be the 
factors that encourage high fertility rates. Income and fertility are both endogenous 
variables.
Description
Although absolute poverty is usually defi ned as a state of affairs in which a person 
has very little income, a large contemporary literature has arrived at the following 
conclusion: “In the world of the poor, people don’t enjoy food security, are stunted 
and wasted, don’t live long, can’t read or write, don’t have access to easy credit, 
are unable to save much, aren’t empowered, can’t insure themselves well against 
crop failure or household calamity, don’t trade with the rest of the world, live in 
unhealthy surroundings, are poorly governed, and experience high birth rates.”2
We should add that the poor often reside in fragile ecosystems (Millennium Eco-
system Assessment 2003). Even absolute poverty is multidimensional.
TABLE 3. Maternal Burden 2008
Total
fertility rate
Maternal mortality 
(per 100,000)
Low-income countries  4.0  790
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.1  900
South Asia  2.9  500
China  8  45
High-income countries  1.8  10
Source: World Bank 2010, table 2.19.
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We will call the passage above description. Although we can all agree on it, it 
offers little guidance for action. It doesn’t say what is a cause and what is an effect; 
it doesn’t distinguish between proximate and deep causes; it doesn’t say what is a 
variable and what is a parameter in the environment in which the poor reside; and 
it doesn’t say whether variables can be interpreted in samples to move together over 
time (time series data) or across parameter values at a point in time (cross-sectional 
data). Above all, the passage doesn’t help us identify the pathways that lead to a state 
of affairs where description holds.
Analysis
Description suggests that poverty and riches have multiple causes; however, the 
temptation to seek monocausal explanations for the twin presence of poverty and 
wealth in our world is so powerful that even development experts haven’t always 
been able to overcome it. But mutual causation has implications for interpreting 
data. Of course, people’s lives are subject to many processes. One category—creating 
metabolic pathways—works at the level of the individual person. The pathways are 
based on physiological links connecting (1) undernourishment and a person’s vulner-
ability to infectious diseases, (2) nutritional status and physical and mental develop-
ment among children, and (3) nutritional status and work capacity among adults.
Another class of processes, operating at a spatially localized level, is site-specifi c. 
It involves a combination of ecological and socioeconomic pathways, giving rise to 
reproductive and environmental externalities. These processes are infl uenced by the 
local ecology. The theory based on them acknowledges that the economic options 
open to a poor community in, say, the African savannahs are different from those 
available to people in the Gangetic plains of India. Although policies and institutions 
shape the forces people face, the local ecology also shapes them.
Among ecological and socioeconomic processes, some involve positive feedback 
among poverty, population growth, and degradation of the local natural resource 
base. But poverty, population growth, and environmental degradation are not the 
prior causes of each other; over time, each infl uences and is infl uenced by the oth-
ers. The two broad categories of positive feedback are able to coexist in a society 
because, except under conditions of extreme nutritional stress, nutritional status 
doesn’t much affect fecundity.3
Those who are caught in poverty traps don’t necessarily spiral down further. For 
most of them, there is little room below to fall into—many are already undernour-
ished and susceptible to diseases. Modern nutrition science has shown that relatively 
low mortality rates can coexist with a high incidence of undernutrition and morbid-
ity. To be sure, many people die from causes traceable directly to their poverty. But 
large numbers continue to live under nutritional and environmental stress. Moreo-
ver, people tend not to accept adverse circumstances lying down. So it is reasonable 
to assume that they try their best to improve their lot. In some situations, human 
responses to stress lead to successful outcomes. However, because I am talking 
about poverty traps, I will identify conditions under which the coping mechanisms 
people adopt are not enough to lift them out of the mire. Turner and Ali (1996), for 
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 example, have illustrated the possibility by showing that in the face of population 
pressure in Bangladesh, small landholders have periodically adopted new ways of 
doing things to intensify agricultural production. The authors have shown, however, 
that this has resulted in an imperceptible improvement in the standard of living and 
a worsening of the ownership of land, the latter probably owing to the prevalence 
of distress sales. These are the kinds of fi ndings that the perspective I explore here 
anticipated and was designed to meet.
Externalities associated with people’s coping strategies can amount to signifi cant 
differences between private and social returns to various economic activities. Where 
reproductive behavior is pro-natalist, the private returns of having large numbers 
of children are high in contrast to the social returns. Similarly, where communities 
degrade their natural resource base, collective endeavors to maintain the base are 
unable to withstand the pressure of private malfeasance. And so on.
Complementarities
In a wide range of cases, the complementarities among the drivers of metabolic and 
socioecological pathways manifest themselves as fi xed costs. When an individual 
maintains nutritional balance, somewhere in the region of 60 percent to 75 percent 
of his or her energy intake is spent on maintenance, which is a fi xed cost of being 
alive. The remainder is used for work and discretionary activities.4 Nutritionists refer 
to those metabolic fi xed costs as “maintenance costs” and sometimes as “resting 
metabolic rates.” About a third of maintenance costs can be traced to the energy 
expenditure associated with the innumerable brain activities that are synchronized 
in ways complex adaptive systems generally organize themselves. Those activities 
are complementary to one another—destroy key steps of a neural pathway, and the 
brain’s overall performance worsens discretely.
Complementarities have been much studied in education. It is common today to 
say that it’s not much use providing classrooms for children if there are no teachers 
to teach them; or that it’s no good providing classrooms and teachers if children 
come to school hungry and are unable to concentrate; or that it’s not much use 
providing classrooms and teachers and free school meals if the children have been 
damaged by iodine defi ciency during infancy. The return on investment in each of 
those factors would be low if any of the other factors were in short supply. It’s easy 
to recognize complementarities in the case of classrooms and teachers, because both 
must be available at the same time. It’s less easy to recognize complementarities 
when they operate sequentially, stretching back to the distant past of a person’s life. 
Complementarities across time give rise to irreversibilities in human development.
Another implication of complementarities is that in the world of the poor, each 
item in description reinforces the others, implying that productivity in labor effort, 
ideas, capital, land, and natural resources is low and remains low. The lives of the 
poor are fi lled with problems every day. On the fl ip side, the same factors give rise 
to virtuous feedback, meaning that the rich suffer from no such deprivation. People 
in the rich world face what today are called “challenges.” An implication of the 
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 complementarities and the positive feedback they give rise to is that in the world 
of the rich, productivity in labor effort, ideas, capital, land, and natural resources 
is high and continually increasing. Success in meeting each challenge reinforces the 
prospects of success in meeting additional challenges.
So, the processes that shape our lives harbor multiple stability regimes. Some dis-
play progress even as others do not. The presence of multiple stability regimes means 
that in certain regions of the space of personal characteristics, the processes violate 
the principle of horizontal equity, so that very similar persons diverge cumulatively 
to face very different life chances. Horizontal inequity is a manifestation of a divided 
society, and poverty traps are an extreme form of horizontal inequity. (See the appen-
dix for a stylized example.)
Of the many complementary factors that shape our lives, I want to focus on one 
broad class that illustrates the stranglehold a person’s early life can have on his or her 
ability to function satisfactorily in later years. Those processes range from malnutri-
tion and infectious disease at the very earliest stages of life to the nonacquisition of 
socioeconomic competencies in early childhood. I work backward from adulthood 
through childhood to the prenatal stage of life, and from there to the mother’s status. 
I need to retrace people’s lives because if, say, you place a malnourished person next 
to a healthy person, they won’t look similar at all. You would then ask, where is the 
horizontal inequity that supposedly characterizes poverty traps? The point in trac-
ing a person back to the distant past, one that includes the person’s mother’s status 
before conception and perhaps even before that, is to show how small shocks could 
have had marked cumulative effects in the person’s subsequent development. That 
is the sense in which two very similar individuals can face very different life experi-
ences. Complementarities are the cause of societal breaks.
Adult Health and Productivity
By undernourishment, I mean a combination of inadequate nutritional intake and 
exposure to a disease environment. Stunting is a refl ection of long-term undernour-
ishment, while wasting is a manifestation of short-term undernourishment. Each 
 signifi cantly limits the capacity for physical work, where strength and endurance 
are needed.
When nutritionists talk of physical work capacity (Collins and Roberts 1988; 
Ferro-Luzzi 1985; Pollitt and Amante 1984), they mean the maximum power (i.e., 
maximum work per unit of time) someone is capable of offering. Laboratory meth-
ods for estimating maximum power include having a person run on a treadmill and 
pedal a bicycle ergometer. The most compelling index of a person’s physical work 
capacity is maximal oxygen uptake, usually denoted by the ungainly expression O2 
max. It is the highest rate of oxygen uptake a person is capable of attaining while 
engaged in physical work at sea level. Maximal oxygen uptake depends on the body’s 
capacity for a linked series of oxygen transfers (diffusion through tissues, circulation 
of hemoglobin, pulmonary ventilation). It measures cardiorespiratory fi tness—the 
higher the value, the greater the body’s capacity to convert energy in the tissues into 
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work (Åstrand and Rodahl 1986). That capacity depends on the metabolically active 
tissue mass, which is nearly the same as muscle cell mass (sometimes called the cell 
residue). Clinical tests suggest that O2 max per unit of muscle cell mass is approxi-
mately constant across well-nourished and marginally undernourished people (Viteri 
1971). Even among undernourished persons, the difference is not thought to be 
great. In one set of studies, more than 80 percent of the difference in O2 max between 
mildly and severely malnourished people was traced to differences in their muscle cell 
mass (Barac-Nieto et al. 1980). It is therefore useful to have a measure of O2 max per 
unit of muscle cell mass. A rough approximation of this is provided by the maximal 
aerobic power, which is O2 max per unit of body weight. As muscle cell mass and 
lean body mass are related, we do not lose much by not being particular as to which 
of the two we identify as the chief determinant of O2 max.5
We are, however, trying to identify the determinants of physical work capacity. A 
person must enjoy good current nutritional status in order to perform well at strenu-
ous physical work, but that isn’t suffi cient, because one can be healthy but stunted. 
Of a pair of people with the same body mass index (BMI), the taller person typically 
possesses greater muscle cell mass; so the O2 max is higher. Broadly speaking, taller 
and heavier (but nonobese) people have greater physical work capacity. O2 max also 
depends on the level of habitual physical activity (training, in sports parlance), but I 
ignore this factor here.6 Maximal oxygen uptake depends as well on the concentra-
tion of hemoglobin in the blood. I also ignore that in what follows.7 O2 max is usu-
ally expressed in liters per minute (l/min). To obtain a sense of orders of magnitude, 
note that 6 l/min is about as high as this measure can be, while 2 l/min and below 
are the numbers observed among chronically malnourished people.
O2 max measures the maximum volume of oxygen the body is capable of trans-
ferring per minute. Except for very short bursts, this maximum cannot be reached. 
The highest level of oxygen transfer a person can sustain over an extended period of 
eight hours or so is of the order of 35 percent to 40 percent of the O2 max. There 
is a relationship between the rate at which a person works (expressed as a fraction 
of his O2 max) and his endurance in maintaining that rate of work. The negative-
exponential function has been found to be a good approximation, even among 
undernourished subjects (Åstrand and Rodahl 1986); so, writing the duration of 
work by T, we have
 percentage of O2 max = exp(–bT). (1)
In equation (1), b (> 0) is a constant. Barac-Nieto and colleagues (1980) have 
found b not to be signifi cantly different among people suffering from degrees of mal-
nourishment ranging from mild to severe. The endurance time for 80 percent of O2 
max in their sample was, on average, 97 minutes, with a coeffi cient of variation of 12 
percent. This means that b = 0.0023/min. The suggestion is not that this is a human 
constant; nor is it claimed that the energy cost of a task does not vary with the rate at 
which it is performed. All the formula means is that, as a very rough approximation, 
we can distinguish people’s capacity for physical activities in terms of their physical 
work capacity, which I defi ne below.
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Let P denote physical work capacity, and V the maximal oxygen uptake (O2 
max). From equation (1) we conclude that
 P = KVexp(–bT), (2)
where K is a positive constant. The total quantity of work a rested individual is 
 capable of performing is then PT = KVTexp(–bT), which attains its maximum value 
at T = 1/b. I conclude that if we are interested in aggregate work, the duration of 
work should be 1/b. If b = 0.0023/min, 1/b = 7.2 hours. I do not know whether, 
among healthy people in western industrialized countries, a seven-hour day has been 
arrived at from such a consideration as this.
For strenuous work, those with a low O2 max need to be close to their physi-
cal work capacity. That means their hearts must beat at a fast rate. They are then 
overtaxed and incapable of maintaining the pace of work for long. This is refl ected 
in equation (2). Consider as an example the well-known series of studies by G. B. 
Spurr and his colleagues on chronically malnourished adult males and nutrition-
ally normal control subjects among sugarcane cutters, loaders, and agricultural 
workers in Colombia (Spurr 1990). Nutritional status was assessed on the basis 
of, among other things, weight-for-height, skinfold thicknesses, total body hemo-
globin, and daily creatinine excretion. Roughly speaking, the fi rst three indexes 
refl ect current nutritional status, while the fourth picks up nutritional history to 
an extent (e.g., taller people have greater muscle cell mass). A stepwise multiple 
regression analysis with the data revealed that O2 max is positively related to 
weight-for-height, total hemoglobin count, and daily creatinine excretion; it is 
negatively related to skinfold thicknesses. The chronically undernourished subjects 
ranged from mild to intermediate to severe. Approximate values of their O2 max 
were, respectively, 2.1 l/min, 1.7 l/min, and 1.0 l/min. The average O2 max of the 
nutritionally normal sugarcane cutters was 2.6 l/min. This is about as clear as any 
evidence we can hope to fi nd for the thesis that undernourished people suffer from 
depressed levels of O2 max.
Consider an activity whose oxygen cost is 0.84 l/min. The nutritionally normal 
group could sustain it at 0.32 of O2 max, whereas the remaining three groups would 
have to sustain it at 40 percent, 50 percent, and 80 percent, respectively, of their O2 
max. At those rates, the nutritionally normal group could work for 8 hours, and the 
three malnourished groups for 6.5 hours, 5 hours, and 1.5 hours, respectively.
All this bears on physical work capacity and endurance, not physical productiv-
ity, although one would expect that they are closely related for unskilled manual 
work. And they are. For tasks such as sugarcane cutting, loading and unloading, and 
picking coffee, it is possible to measure physical productivity directly in terms of 
the amount done. Indeed, payment for such work is often at a piece rate. A wide 
body of evidence links nutritional status to productivity in these occupations. In their 
work on Colombian sugarcane cutters and loaders, Spurr and his colleagues (Spurr 
1990) found height, weight, and lean body mass (roughly, O2 max) to be signifi cant 
 determinants of productivity measured by daily tonnage of sugarcane delivered. Meas-
uring productivity (W) in units of tons per day, O2 max (as before, V) in liters per 
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minute, and height (H) in cms., and denoting the percentage of body weight in fat 
by F, their most-preferred specifi cation was:
 W = 0.81 V – 0.14 F + 0.03 H – 1.962. (3)
In related work, Immink and colleagues (1984) found stature (and thus lean body 
mass and O2 max) to be positively correlated with the quantity of coffee beans 
picked per day, the amount of sugarcane cut and loaded, and the time it took to 
weed a given area.
I turn now to economic investigations. In their study of a sample of both men and 
women workers in urban Brazil, Thomas and Strauss (1997) reported that height 
has a strong positive effect on market wages. That is consistent with the fi ndings of 
Immink and colleagues (1984) and Spurr (1990), because wages would be expected 
to bear a positive association with productivity. The relationship between height and 
productivity is signifi cant because height is not a variable for an adult, so there is 
less ambiguity about the direction of causality. However, investigators have usually 
studied the links between current nutritional status and productivity. In a sample of 
factory workers producing detonator fuses in India, Satyanarayana and colleagues 
(1977) found weight-for-height to be the signifi cant determinant of productivity. 
Deolalikar (1988) found strong effects of weight-for-height on both productivity and 
wages among agricultural workers in South India. The elasticity of farm output with 
respect to weight-for-height was estimated to be approximately 2, and the elastic-
ity of wages in the region was 0.3–0.7, where the lower value refl ects the effect in 
peak seasons and the higher value in slack seasons, when the tasks are different. In a 
study of farm workers in Sierra Leone, Strauss (1986) found that energy intake has 
a positive effect on productivity up to about 5,200 kcal per day. He also found that 
a worker who consumed 5,200 kcal per day was twice as productive as one who 
consumed 1,500 kcal per day. Strauss did not report on differences in nutritional 
status among workers. But if we assume that the workers were in energy balance, we 
could interpret differences in daily intake as mirroring a combination of differences 
in nutritional status and the energy expended in the tasks that were accomplished. 
Thomas and Strauss (1998) found that BMI is positively correlated with wages 
among Brazilian laborers.
I noted earlier that the energy required for maintaining human life is substantial 
and that only 25 percent to 40 percent of a person’s daily energy intake is spent 
on discretionary activities—work and leisure. Maintenance costs (resting metabolic 
rates) are higher for taller people of equal BMI. That is the cost side of healthy per-
sons. On the other hand, they are more productive. It can be shown that because 
maintenance costs are substantial, markets aren’t able to easily eliminate undernu-
trition, because the undernourished are at a severe disadvantage in their ability to 
obtain their daily requirements. Since their capacity to work is impaired, they are 
unable to offer the quality of work necessary to obtain the food they need to improve 
their nutritional status. Maintenance costs imply that it isn’t possible for everyone 
in an economy that in the aggregate is poor to attain reasonable nutritional status. 
Thus, over time, undernourishment can be both a cause and a consequence of falling 
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into a poverty trap (Dasgupta and Ray 1986). Moreover, because undernourish-
ment displays hysteresis (there is a further positive feedback between nutrition and 
infection), Dasgupta and Ray’s analysis implies that we should expect poverty to be 
dynastic. The theory is that once a household falls into a poverty trap, it is hard for 
descendants to emerge from it.
Childhood Experiences
One way a person can economize on energy expenditure is by reducing physical 
activities. Mild to moderately wasted preschool children under free-living conditions 
have been observed to spend more time in sedentary and light activities than their 
healthy counterparts. They have been found to rest longer and to play more often 
in a horizontal position. A Jamaican study found stunted children in the age group 
12–24 months to be signifi cantly less active than their nonstunted counterparts. The 
energy saved was comparable to the energy cost of growth at that age. At an extreme, 
when we observe little children in poor countries lying expressionless on roadsides 
and not even brushing the fl ies off their faces, we can infer that they are conserv-
ing energy. Among preschool children, the fi rst line of defense against low energy 
intake would appear to be reduced physical activity. Such behavioral adaptation 
is not learned; humans are wired that way. Little children by the wayside no more 
consciously husband their precarious hold on energy than bicyclists solve differential 
equations to maintain balance.
Chavez and Martinez (1979, 1984) reported that among infants from poor 
households in rural Mexico, differences in activity levels were marked from about 
six months of age between those who received nutritional supplements and the 
control group. Supplemented children made more contact with the ground, slept 
less during the day, spent more time outdoors, and began playing almost six 
months earlier. The thesis here is that low nutrition intake depresses activity and 
isolates the infant or child from contact with the environment and from sources 
of stimuli of vital importance to both cognitive and motor development. It is sig-
nifi cant that the control group in the Chavez-Martinez study was only moderately 
undernourished.
Motor development is the process by which a child acquires basic movement 
patterns and skills, such as walking, running, jumping, hopping, throwing, kick-
ing, and holding something. In normal circumstances, children develop these 
fundamental motor patterns by the age of six or seven years. It is through such 
movement patterns and skills that many childhood experiences, especially learning 
and interpersonal relationships, are mediated (Grantham-McGregor 1990). During 
infancy and early childhood, interactions between the mother and child are of 
critical importance in this development. This is where the cost of anemia and low 
energy intake on the part of mothers makes itself felt. Since housework and pro-
duction activities are mandatory, reducing discretionary and child-rearing activities 
offers the mother a way of maintaining her energy balance. To be sure, societies 
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 differ in the way people other than the mother are involved in a child’s upbringing, 
but in all societies the mother is an important fi gure in a child’s cognitive and motor 
development.
Long-term malnutrition among infants is especially associated with cognitive 
development. Dietary defi ciencies of iron and iodine in the fi rst two years of life 
are known to create problems that cannot be reversed by adequate diet in later 
years (Benton 2010). Under conditions of severe undernourishment (marasmus or 
marasmic kwashiorkor), both motor development and cognitive development are 
hampered in infants. Severe malnutrition affects development of the brain, which 
experiences rapid growth starting at around 10 weeks of pregnancy and continuing 
in spurts to about three or four years of age (Benton 2010). Fetal iodine defi ciency is 
well known to damage the central nervous system. Equilibrium reactions (“righting 
refl exes”) are functions of the cerebellum and play an important role in the develop-
ment of motor control. Some of the damage is extremely diffi cult to reverse and may 
indeed be irreversible (Kar, Rao, and Chandramouli 2008; Walker 2005). For exam-
ple, even after six months of nutritional rehabilitation of infants hospitalized for 
severe malnutrition, Colombo and Lopez (1980) observed no recovery in their motor 
development (see also Celedon and de Andraca 1979). It is possible that anatomical 
changes that have been observed are retardation rather than permanent injury, but 
this is not known with any certainty.8
Among schoolchildren, matters are somewhat different. Peer pressure tends to 
counter the instinct for reducing physical activities, especially among boys. But even 
for school-aged children, reduced activity is a line of defense. Studies indicate that in 
school-aged children the low energy expenditure associated with nutritional defi ciency 
can be traced to low body weight; their basal metabolic rates are low. In addition, the 
development of lean body mass among undernourished children is retarded, which 
has a detrimental effect on their capacity to work as adults. Marginally malnourished 
boys don’t appear to experience lesser muscle function. Their low capacity for work 
is due to the fact that their lean body mass is low.
On a wider front, malnutrition and infection have been found to have a pro-
nounced detrimental effect among schoolchildren on such cognitive processes as 
attention and concentration. Much evidence exists showing that children who suf-
fer from nutritional defi ciencies and infections perform poorly in aptitude tests. In 
extreme cases, nutritional defi ciencies affect the central nervous system (Levitsky and 
Strupp 1995). In less extreme cases, the matter isn’t one of brain function; frequent 
absence and attrition affect learning as well (Bhargava 1994; Pollitt, 1990).
Intertemporal complementarities also exist along nonmetabolic pathways. In a 
wide-ranging study, Cunha and Heckman (2007) developed a theoretical framework 
to accommodate the fact that ability gaps between individuals and across socioeco-
nomic groups appear at an early age for both cognitive and noncognitive skills. 
Studies have shown that enhancements of family environments improve the early 
development of cognitive as well as socioemotional competencies among children 
(e.g., perseverance, confi dence, motivation, self-control). These competencies are 
retarded in adolescence if they are not acquired in early childhood (see Cunha, 
Heckman, and Schennach 2010, and the references there).
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Prenatal Experiences
The nature versus nurture or genes versus environment controversy has been rec-
ognized as meaningless (Bateson and Martin 1999; Ehrlich 2000). Many important 
changes to gene expression occur during the fi rst weeks of pregnancy. The DNA 
experiences epigenetic changes in the fi rst week in particular. These changes deter-
mine the pattern of gene expression that not only controls the next stage of the 
fetus’s development but also many of the person’s attributes throughout life. The 
mother’s long-term nutritional status determines how she mobilizes nutrients to 
support fetal development. So the experiences that shape an adult start before birth 
and perhaps even before the mother’s birth. In pioneering work, David Barker and 
colleagues (Barker et al. 1989a, 1989b, 2002) found that rates of ischemic heart 
disease in England and Wales were more closely related to mortality conditions that 
prevailed when heart patients were born than to recent conditions. The hypothesis 
is that maternal conditions in the prenatal period have an important impact on the 
emergence of later cardiovascular disease.
What are the signatures of prenatal experiences? Although it would be astonishing 
if a single scalar index at birth could summarize prenatal experiences, a substantial 
body of work has shown that birth weight is a reasonable indicator of prenatal condi-
tions.9 In addition, studies that were based not only on birth weight confi rm that food 
deprivation in the womb affects adult metabolism and cardiovascular health; in fact, 
it has been found to have adverse effects even on age-associated declines in  cognitive 
functions.10
What mechanisms would determine the association between prenatal conditions 
and the cardiovascular-metabolic cluster of chronic diseases? Barker and colleagues 
(2002) suggested that insuffi cient energy during fetal development triggers biased 
apportioning of the available energy to brain development. Maternal stress may be 
communicated to the fetus via alterations of placental blood fl ow and changes in 
energy available for fetal growth, compromising the development of other organs, 
including kidneys, pancreas, and adipose tissue. For example, small babies have 
fewer nephrons in their kidneys, fewer beta cells in their pancreases, and lower fat 
cell numbers than their peers who are larger at birth. However, many of the del-
eterious adult outcomes of small birth size appear to be related to altered insulin 
sensitivity and activity of the hypothalmic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. Both these 
systems are important modulators of energy metabolism. A good deal of attention 
has been paid in recent years to pathways that involve the extent to which insulin 
sensitivity and the reactivity of the HPA axis are established in utero; the potential 
for maternal nutritional status to affect those aspects of metabolic physiology; and 
the cellular mechanisms by which the effects are mediated (Ellison 2010). Between 
24 and 42 weeks of gestation, the developing brain is particularly vulnerable to 
nutritional defi ciency, owing to the rapid development of vital neurological pro-
cesses, including synapse formation. And yet, at that time, the developing brain also 
demonstrates its greatest degree of plasticity (Georgieff 2007).
What accounts for that aspect of fetal development? One possibility is that begin-
ning as early as the fi rst weeks after conception and continuing into early infancy, the 
116    |    PARTHA DASGUPTA
fetus reads key features of its environment and prepares to adapt to an external world 
that can vary dramatically in its level of safety, self-suffi ciency, and danger. When 
early experiences prepare a developing child for conditions involving high levels of 
stress or instability, the body’s systems retain that initial programming and put the 
stress response system on a quick response and high alert status. Under those circum-
stances, the price of short-term survival could be longer-term health. This is called the 
“fetal programming hypothesis,” and it has generated much interest in phenotypic 
plasticity and the mechanisms that govern it.11
Gluckman, Hanson, and Spenser (2005) have proposed that the apparent paradox 
of adaptive developmental processes yielding pathological results can be resolved if (1) 
the adaptive processes are aimed at adjusting the organism’s physiology to a predicted 
postnatal environment, and (2) there is a mismatch between the predicted and actual 
postnatal environment. The hypothesis is that the fetus can sense the environment 
into which it can expect to be born from maternal signals. The availability of food is 
one such signal; maternal stress refl ected in hormonal changes is another; and fl uid 
 deprivation and oxygen availability are others. The authors’ point is that there are 
selection advantages in trying to match the physiology we develop in our plastic phase 
of development to the environment we may inhabit. This can lead to  paradoxical 
responses, as when a fetus that is “expecting” a strongly constrained environment 
enters a world where food is abundant. Obesity and the onset of type-2 diabetes are 
familiar phenomena today. In a wide-ranging work, Gluckman and Hanson (2006) 
call the maladaptive response mismatch, a kind of programming that explains why 
diets rich in protein and calories have been known to have adverse effects among 
children of low birth weight. The authors suggest that conditions in utero may refl ect 
not merely maternal conditions at the time but also the mother’s sensitivity to those 
 conditions. For example, the energy available to the fetus is affected by maternal 
undernutrition and the sensitivity of the mother’s own physiology to variation in the 
energy available to her. Maternal sensitivity to energy availability, in turn, may be 
partly a consequence of the conditions she faced in utero, which in turn would depend 
on her mother’s sensitivity to energy availability, and so on.12
Much medical research on prenatal development has been conducted on sub-
jects in high-income countries. There, the issue isn’t usually a question of maternal 
energy defi ciency. Stress, anxiety, or depression during pregnancy have been linked 
to lower birth weight and subsequently even to psychopathology (Fumagalli et al. 
2007). Maternal stress has been found to be associated with increased basal HPA-
axis activity in the offspring at different ages, including six months, fi ve years, and 
ten years. Increased activation of the HPA axis causes the adrenal gland to produce 
 glucocorticoids. These are important for normal brain maturation, but elevated 
levels impair brain development and functioning. Some of these conditions are 
reversible, and the effects of prenatal stress are often moderated by the quality of 
postnatal care; others are not (Cottrell and Seckl 2009). Chronic exposure to stress 
 hormones—whether it occurs during the prenatal period or in infancy, childhood, 
 adolescence, adulthood, or old age—has an impact on brain structures involved 
in  cognition and mental health (Evans and Schamberg 2009; Lupien et al. 2009; 
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Rice et al. 2010). The fact that there are many pathways to low birth weight perhaps 
explains why the incidence of low birth weight remains high in rich countries (table 2).
Morals
What morals do we take away from this account? The following seem to be worth 
commending:
1. The high maintenance costs of good physical and emotional health underlie the 
existence of poverty traps.
2. From (1) it follows that in low-income countries, absolute poverty is both a cause 
and a consequence of unequal distributions of assets.
3. High maintenance costs are manifestations of complementarities among the 
inputs that humans need for survival. Maintenance costs are higher among people 
who are fortunate enough to fl ourish.
4. The acquisition of human capital is continuous and cumulative. Formally speak-
ing, investments in human capital are complementary over time. Complementari-
ties across time give rise to irreversibilities in human development. Nutritional 
insults at the earliest stages of life have a marked effect on a person’s subsequent 
ability to acquire human capital. If governments and international organizations 
believe human capital formation is important, they should treat all periods of a 
person’s life with respect.
5. From (4) we can conclude that personal history has a long reach, affecting not 
only the person in question but also any descendants.
These observations bring us back to the point with which I began: that a person’s 
current productivity is a function of the person’s nutritional and morbidity history. 
A reasonable index of a person’s productivity over time would be the present- 
discounted sum of the person’s output of work. The reckoning should start from the 
earliest stages of the person’s life. The computation is no doubt very, very hard, but 
there is no escaping it.
Much international attention has been given to saving lives in times of collective 
crisis in poor countries. This is as it should be. International agencies have also paid 
attention to keeping children alive in normal times through public health measures, 
such as family planning counseling, immunization, and oral rehydration. This too is 
as it should be. The fact that many poor countries fail to do either does not mean that 
the problems are especially hard to solve. In fact, they are among the easier social 
problems—they can be addressed without any major modifi cations to the prevailing 
resource allocation mechanism. The much harder problem for intellectual design, 
political commitment, and administration is to ensure that those who are conceived 
have a chance for a healthy life. This is a problem whose solution brings no easily 
visible benefi t. But the stunting of both cognitive and motor capacity is a prime hidden 
cost of energy defi ciency and anemia among children and, one step removed, among 
mothers. It affects learning and skill formation, and thus future productivity. The 
price is paid in later years, but it is paid.
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FIGURE 1. Nutrition-Based Poverty Trap
R(H)
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Source: Derived by author.
Appendix: Poverty Traps and Horizontal Inequity
Poverty traps are a sharper notion than horizontal inequity. To illustrate the differ-
ences at the nutrition-productivity interface, we consider a stylized example.
Denote time by t (≥ 0). The present is t = 0. Consider someone whose nutritional 
status at t is a scalar, H(t). Let J(H,q) be a person’s income, where q is a (scalar) 
parameter refl ecting the person’s socioecological environment. We suppose that 
dJ(H,q)/dH > 0 and that J shifts vertically upward with increases in q. Let R(H) 
denote the person’s nutrition requirement (expressed in units of income). We assume 
dR(H)/dH > 0, to refl ect the fact that a person’s resting metabolic rate increases with 
body size. A person’s health, when viewed as a stock, is assumed to obey the deter-
ministic differential equation,
 dH(t)/dt = J(H(t),q) – R(H(t)), H3 > H(t) > H1,
and if, for any t*, H(t*) = H1 (resp. H3), then H(t) = H1 (resp. H3) for all t ≥ t*. H1 
and H3 are absorbing states.
Because the resting metabolic rate is positive, R(H1) > 0 and J(H,q) = 0 in the 
neighborhood of H1. In fi gure 1, J(H,q) and R(H) have been so drawn that they 
intersect once, at H2. The system defi ned by (A1) has three equilibria: H1, H2, and 
H3. Among them, H2 is unstable, whereas H1 and H3 are stable. Someone whose 
PERSONAL HISTORIES AND POVERTY TRAPS   |    119
initial health status H(0) is even slightly in excess of H2 would enjoy improve-
ment in health status, while someone for whom H(0) is even slightly less than 
H2 would be trapped in a deteriorating situation. It follows that there could be 
people in the neighborhood of H(0) who are similar but who face widely differing 
fortunes. The example exposes the limitations of studies that view the quality of 
life at a single point in time. Similar people wouldn’t remain similar if they were 
to experience widely different life histories. The principle of horizontal equity could 
not be applied to them at later times. This is one reason why the principle, as tra-
ditionally formulated, has little ethical bite. When assessing an economy, the lives 
of its citizens should be viewed as a whole, not studied at a frozen moment in time.
What might q refl ect? It could refl ect factors that are exogenous to the economy, 
such as rainfall, as well as factors that are exogenous to the person but endogenous 
in the economy, such as the effectiveness of property rights, the extent to which 
government and communities have in place effective support systems, the degree to 
which markets are open to the person, and the person’s nonlabor assets, including 
education. And we can add the extent to which the person has reasons to trust others 
and to which others trust the person.
If public policies improve q, J would move up vertically. If the schedule were to 
rise suffi ciently high (q = q*), it would not intersect R(H), and H3 would become 
the sole (stable) equilibrium point of the system defi ned in (A1). Welfare support 
(be it communitarian or state-based) and income guarantees would be another set 
of mechanisms by which J(H,q) could be lifted. These are among the various path-
ways by which nutrition-based poverty traps have been eliminated in a number of 
countries.
Notes
 1. TFR is the number of live births a woman would expect to give if she were to live through 
her childbearing years and to bear children at each age in accordance with the prevailing 
age-specifi c fertility rate. If TFR were 2.1 or thereabouts, population would stabilize in 
the long run.
 2. See, for example, Sen (1999); Narayan et al. (2000); Banerjee, Benabou, and Mookherjee 
(2006); Banerjee and Dufl o (2007); and—since its inception in 1990—every annual edition 
of the United Nations Human Development Report.
 3. For a more detailed account, see Dasgupta (2000).
 4. See WHO (1985) for estimates of mean protein-energy requirements among the genders, 
occupations, and age groups.
 5. The mass of muscle tissue and muscle constitutes about 40 percent of body weight and 
50 percent of lean body mass.
 6. Unskilled laborers in poor countries are often slight and weak, but they are never out of 
shape; sedentary workers are often out of shape.
 7. A classic article on iron-defi ciency anemia and its effect on physical work capacity is Basta 
et al. (1979).
 8. The study of the effect of malnutrition on mental development is fraught with diffi culties 
of interpretation. On this, see the chapter by S. M. Grantham-McGregor in Waterlow 
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(1992). For wide-ranging reviews of the consequences of chronic energy defi ciency, see 
Schurch and Scrimshaw (1987).
 9. For more on the fact that birth weight does not capture many salient aspects of the fetal 
experience and can in certain ways even mislead, see the summary in Schulz (2010). Elli-
son (2010) provides an excellent overview of the literature.
 10. Bateson and Martin (1999) offer an excellent general account. For studies of the conse-
quences for fetal development of the Dutch Hunger Winter (1944-1945), see Roseboom, 
de Rooij, and Painter (2006) and Rooij et al. (2010).
 11. See the excellent review by Shonkoff, Boyce, and McEwen (2009). They note that the 
 origins of many adult diseases can be found adversities in the early years of life, which 
establish “biological memories” that weaken physiological systems and produce latent 
vulnerabilities to problems that emerge well into later adult years.
 12. The question whether fetal programming is adaptive remains controversial. Some see these 
effects as disruptions of optimal development with permanent consequences-developmental 
pathologies that may be more frequent in novel evolutionary environments (Barker 1994; 
Barker et al. 2002).
References
Åstrand, P. O., and K. Rodahl. 1986. Textbook of Work Physiology. New York: McGraw Hill.
Banerjee, A. V., R. Benabou, and D. Mookherjee, eds. 2006. Understanding Poverty. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Banerjee, A., and E. Dufl o. 2007. “The Economic Lives of the Poor.” Journal of Economic 
 Perspectives 21(1): 141–168.
Barac-Nieto, M., G. B. Spurr, H. W. Dahners, and M. G. Maksud. 1980. “Aerobic Work 
Capacity and Endurance During Nutrition Repletion of Severely Undernourished Men.” 
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 33(11): 2268–2275.
Barker, D. J. P. 1994. Mothers, Babies, and Disease in Later Life. London: BMJ Publishing.
Barker, D. J. P., C. Osmond, J. Golding, D. Kuh, and M. E. Wadsworth. 1989a. “Growth in 
utero, Blood Pressure in Childhood and Adult Life, and Mortality from Cardiovascular 
Disease.” British Medical Journal 298: 564–567.
Barker, D. J., J. G. Eriksson, T. Forsen, and C. Osmond. 2002. “Fetal Origins of Adult Dis-
ease: Strength of Effects and Biological Basis.” International Journal of Epidemiology 31: 
1235–1239.
Barker, D. J. P., B. D. Winter, C. Osmond, B. Margetts, and S. J. Simmonds. 1989b. “Weight 
in Infancy and Death from Ischaemic Heart Diseases.” Lancet 2 (86663): 381–383.
Basta, S., S. Soekirman, D. Karyadi, and N. S. Scrimshaw. 1979. “Iron Defi ciency Anemia 
and the Productivity of Adult Males in Indonesia.” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 
32(4): 916–925.
Bateson, P., and P. Martin. 1999. Design for a Life: How Behaviour Develops. London: 
Jonathan Cape.
Benton, D. 2010. “The Infl uence of Dietary Status on the Cognitive Performance of Children.” 
Molecular Nutrition and Food Research 54(4): 457–470.
Bhargava, A. 1994. “Modelling the Health of Fillipino Children.” Journal of the Royal 
 Statistical Society A 157: 417–432.
PERSONAL HISTORIES AND POVERTY TRAPS   |    121
Celedon, J. M., and I. de Andraca. 1979. “Psychomotor Development during Treatment of 
Severely Marasmic Infants.” Early Human Development 3: 267–75.
Chavez, A., and C. Martinez. 1979. “Consequences of Insuffi cient Nutrition in Child Char-
acter and Behaviour.” In Malnutrition, Environment and Behaviour, ed. D. A. Levitsky. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
———. 1984. “Behavioural Measurements of Activity in Children and Their Relation to Food 
Intake in a Poor Community.” In Energy Intake and Activity, ed. E. Pollitt and P. Amante. 
New York: Alan R. Liss.
Collins, K. J., and D. F. Roberts, eds. 1988. Capacity for Work in the Tropics. Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press.
Colombo, M., and I. Lopez. 1980. “Evolution of Psychomotor Development in Severely Under-
nourished Infants Submitted to an Integral Rehabilitation.” Pediatrics Research 14 (1): 
abstracts.
Cottrell, E. C., and J. R. Seckl. 2009. “Prenatal Stress, Glucocorticoids and the Programming 
of Adult Disease.” Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 3. Open access.
Creedy, J., and G. Kalb, eds. 2006. Research on Economic Inequality, Vol. 13: Dynamics of 
Inequality and Poverty. London: Emerald Publishing.
Cunha, F., and J. Heckman. 2007. “The Technology of Skill Formation.” American Economic 
Review (Papers & Proceedings) 97: 31–47.
Cunha, F., J. Heckman, and S. Schennach. 2010. “Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and 
Noncognitive Skill Formation.” Econometrica 78 (3): 883–931.
Dasgupta, P. 1993. An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1997. “Nutritional Status, the Capacity for Work and Poverty Traps.” Journal of 
Econometrics 77 (1): 5–38.
———. 2000. “Reproductive Externalities and Fertility Behaviour.” European Economic 
Review (Papers & Proceedings) 44 (4–6): 619–44.
———. 2003. “Population, Poverty, and the Natural Environment.” In Handbook of Envi-
ronmental Economics, Vol. I, ed. K.-G. Mäler and J. Vincent, 191–247. Amsterdam: 
North Holland.
———. 2009. “Poverty Traps: Exploring the Complexity of Causation.” In The Poorest 
and the Hungry: Assessments, Analyses, and Actions, ed. J. von Braun, R. Vargas Hill, 
and R. Pandya-Lorch, 129–46. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research 
Institute.
Dasgupta, P., and D. Ray. 1986. “Inequality as a Determinant of Malnutrition and Unemploy-
ment, 1: Theory.” Economic Journal 96 (4): 1011–34.
Deolalikar, A. B. 1988. “Nutrition and Labour Productivity in Agriculture: Estimates for 
Rural South India.” Review of Economics and Statistics 70: 406–13.
Ehrlich, P. R. 2000. Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect. Washington, 
DC: Island Press.
Ellison, P. 2010. “Fetal Programming and Fetal Psychology.” Infant and Child Development 
19 (1): 6–20.
Evans, G. W., and M. A. Schamberg. 2009. “Childhood Poverty, Chronic Stress, and Adult 
Working Memory.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 10 (16): 6545–549.
Ferro-Luzzi, A. 1985. “Work Capacity and Productivity in Long-Term Adaptation to Low 
Energy Intakes.” In Nutritional Adaptation in Man, ed. K. Blaxter and W. C. Waterlow. 
London: John Libbey.
122    |    PARTHA DASGUPTA
Fumagalli, F., R. Molteni, G. Racagni, and M. A. Riva. 2007. “Stress During Development: 
Impact on Neuroplasticity and Relevance to Psychopathology.” Progress in Neurobiology 
81: 197–217.
Georgieff, M. K. 2007. “Nutrition and the Developing Brain: Nutrient Priorities and Measure-
ment.” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 85 (Supplement): 614S–620S.
Gluckman, P., and M. Hanson. 2006. Mismatch: Why Our World No Longer Fits Our Bod-
ies. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gluckman, P. D., M. A. Hanson, and H. G. Spenser. 2005. “Predictive Adaptive Responses 
and Human Evolution.” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 20: 527–533.
Grantham-McGregor, S.M. 1990. “The Relationship between Undernutrition, Activity Lev-
els and Development in Young Children.” In Activity, Energy Expenditure and Energy 
Requirements in Young Children, ed. B. Schurch and N.S. Scrimshaw. Lausanne: Nestle 
Foundation.
Immink, M. D. C. et al. 1984. “Microeconomic Consequences in Energy Defi ciency in Rural 
Populations in Developing Countries.” In Energy Intake and Activity, ed. E. Pollit and 
P. Amante. New York: Alan R. Liss.
Kar, B. R., S. L. Rao, and B. A. Chandramouli. 2008. “Cognitive Development in Children 
with Chronic Protein Energy Malnutrition.” Behavioral and Brain Functions 4, article 31. 
Open access.
Levitsky, D. A., and B. J. Strupp. 1995. “Malnutrition and the Brain: Changing Concepts, 
Changing Concerns.” Journal of Nutrition 125(8): S2212–S2220.
Lupien, S. J., B. S. McEwen, M. R. Gunnar, and C. Heim. 2009. “Effects of Stress Through-
out the Lifespan on the Brain, Behaviour and Cognition.” Nature Reviews/Neuroscience 
10(6): 434–445.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 2003. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being. Washington, 
DC: Island Press.
Narayan, D., with R. Patel, K. Schafft, A. Rademacher, and S. Koch-Schulte. 2000. Voices of 
the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pollitt, E. 1990. Malnutrition and Infection in the Classroom. Paris: UNESCO.
Pollitt, E., and P. Amante. 1984. Energy Intake and Activity. New York: Alan R. Liss.
Rice, F., G. T. Harold, J. Boivin, M. van den Bree, D. F. Hay, and A. Thapar. 2010. “The Links 
Between Prenatal Stress and Offspring Development and Psychopathology: Disentangling 
Environmental and Inherited Infl uences.” Psychological Medicine 40(2): 335–345.
Rooij, S. R. de, H. Wouters, J. E. Yonker, R. C. Painter, and T. J. Roseboom. 2010. “Prenatal 
Undernutrition and Cognitive Function in Late Adulthood.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 107(39): 16881–16886.
Roseboom, T., S. R. de Rooij, and R. Painter. 2006. “The Dutch Famine and Its Long-Term 
Consequences for Adult Health.” Early Human Development 82: 485–491.
Satyanarayana, K., A. N. Naidu, B. Chatterjee, and N. Rao. 1977. “Body Size and Work 
 Output.” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 30(3): 322–325.
Schultz, T. P. 2006. “Fertility and Income.” In Understanding Poverty, ed. A. V. Banerjee, 
R. Benabou, and D. Mookherjee. New York: Oxford University Press.
Schulz, L.C. 2010. “The Dutch Hunger Winter and the Developmental Origins of Health and 
Disease.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107(39): 16757–16758.
Schurch, B., and N. S. Scrimshaw, eds. 1987. Chronic Energy Deficiency: Consequences and 
Related Issues. Lausanne: Nestlé Foundation.
Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
PERSONAL HISTORIES AND POVERTY TRAPS   |    123
Shonkoff, J. P., W. T. Boyce, and B. S. McEwen. 2009. “Neuroscience, Molecular Biology, 
and Childhood Roots of Health Disparities: Building a New Framework for Health Pro-
motion and Disease Prevention. Journal of the American Medical Association 301(21): 
2252–2259.
Spurr, G. B. 1990. “The Impact of Chronic Undernutrition on Physical Work Capacity and 
Daily Energy Expenditure.” In Diet and Disease in Traditional and Developing Countries, 
ed. G. A. Harrison and J. C. Waterlow. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Strauss, J. 1986. “Does Better Nutrition Raise Farm Productivity?” Journal of Political 
Economy 94: 297–320.
Strauss, J., and D. Thomas. 1998. “Health, Nutrition and Economic Development.” Journal 
of Economic Literature 36(2): 766–817.
Thomas, D., and J. Strauss. 1997. “Health and Wages: Evidence on Men and Women in 
Urban Brazil.” Journal of Econometrics 77(1): 159–185.
Turner, B. L., and A. M. S. Ali. 1996. “Induced Intensifi cation: Agricultural Change in Bang-
ladesh with Implications for Malthus and Boserup.” Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 93: 14984–14991.
Viteri, F. E. 1971. “Considerations on the Effects of Nutrition on the Body Composition and 
Physical Work Capacity of Young Guatemalan Adults.” In Amino Acid Fortification of 
Protein Foods, ed. N. S. Scrimshaw and A. M. Altshull. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Walker, C.-D. 2005. “Nutritional Aspects Modulating Brain Development and the Responses 
to Stress in Early Neonatal Life.” Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological 
Psychiatry 29: 1249–1263.
Waterlow, J. C., with contributions by A. M. Tomkins and S. M. Grantham-McGregor. 1992. 
Protein Energy Malnutrition. Sevenoaks, England: Edward Arnold.
World Bank. 2010. World Development Indicators. Washington DC: World Bank.
World Health Organization (WHO). 1985. Energy and Protein Requirements. WHO Techni-
cal Report Series 724, Geneva, Switzerland.

Environmental Commons and 
the Green Economy

Voluntary Pledges and Green 
Growth in the Post-Copenhagen 
Climate
THOMAS STERNER
A number of features set climate change apart from most environmental problems: 
It spans several generations, forcing us to think in new ways about intergenerational 
fairness. More important, it involves a delicate problem of coordination among 
countries on a global scale. As long as it is very profi table to use fossil fuels, policy 
coordination must include all major economies. The costs are high enough to make 
it important to choose policy instruments that encourage effi ciency in abatement. 
Ultimately, this means striving toward a single market for carbon. The importance of 
getting near-universal adherence to a treaty makes fairness and procedure important, 
but we know how diffi cult it is to build a truly global agreement. “Green growth” 
is promoted as an alternative path. This is clearly the goal, but it is no magic bullet, 
and it will require clear and stern policy instruments, because economic growth will 
boost the demand for energy, and coal is typically the cheapest source. In this paper 
I discuss some necessary ingredients for a long-run global climate strategy; in conclu-
sion, I address the short-run issue of which policies to pursue in the meantime. As 
we wait for the fi nal (and maybe elusive) worldwide treaty, we must have a policy 
that makes sense and is not only compatible with but, we hope, will facilitate the 
development of this worldwide agreement.
Ecosystem Threats to Growth?
Ample evidence exists that climate change presents a dire threat, particularly to 
many tropical countries, through sea-level rise, increased storm frequency, increased 
temperature, and decreased rainfall in areas where conditions for agriculture and 
even survival are already stretched to the maximum. Glacial melting is another grave 
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threat. As glaciers melt, they may change patterns of river fl ow, which can affect 
very densely populated areas, with tens and even hundreds of millions of inhabitants. 
For thorough documentation, see the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) 4th Assessment Report (IPCC 2007) or the World Bank World Development 
Report 2010 (World Bank 2010) and the studies cited therein. 
Most developing countries are deeply concerned about climate change, but they 
also fi rmly believe that mitigation should start with the rich countries that bear the 
largest part of the historical responsibility for emissions. This position has led some to 
believe, erroneously, that developing countries are uninterested in the issues of global 
change. Their views on the distribution of burden should not be mistaken for views 
on climate. For instance, the suggestion that all countries should reduce their emis-
sions by similar percentages clearly favors countries that have large emissions today. 
If developing countries reject this principle, it does not necessarily have anything to do 
with a lack of interest in climate damages. In 2009, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of 
Ethiopia spoke on behalf of many African nations when he demanded that the industri-
alized countries that were responsible for most of the historical emissions—countries 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom—should compensate developing 
nations for the damage they caused in recent decades to the earth’s climate.1 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) (MA) analyzes a series of addi-
tional and often interrelated threats. Finding #1 in the MA synthesis says “Over the 
past 50 years, humans have changed ecosystems more rapidly and extensively than in 
any comparable period in human history, largely to meet rapidly growing demands 
for food, fresh water, timber, fi ber, and fuel.” According to the MA, more land was 
converted to cropland in the 30 years after 1950 than in the 150 years between 
1700 and 1850. In the past two decades, human activities have dominated the 
geobiochemical processes of Earth; we dominate many of the processes of pho-
tosynthesis; and we have destroyed 20 percent of the world’s coral reefs and 35 
percent of its mangrove area. The MA goes on to say that although these changes 
have contributed to net gains in welfare, they have also implied degradation of 
many ecosystem services, increasing risks of nonlinear changes and the exacerba-
tion of poverty for some groups of people. 
The past two decades have witnessed an enormous transformation of the world 
economy, implying that hundreds of millions of people, particularly in Asia, have 
left the ranks of the most destitute. This inspires considerable optimism in other 
countries where poverty is still rampant. It would be a historic tragedy if environ-
mental and resource restrictions stifl ed this process. However, some environmental 
problems—notably climate change—defi nitely could be costly enough to halt eco-
nomic progress unless they are managed wisely.
In some cases, solutions to several problems may coincide. For example, the same 
processes might contribute to declining fi sh or forest stocks and declining biodi-
versity, so policy measures could be designed to address both problems. However, 
this is not always the case. Sometimes a technique that would appear to help solve 
one problem may exacerbate others; thus, the multitude of restrictions suggested by 
the MA may combine to be a bigger problem than they appear separately. Several 
alternative energy supply technologies are relevant for the climate area.2 It may be 
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ineffective to grow biomass on a large scale and with inappropriate conversion tech-
nologies. In addition to massive releases of climate gases in the forest-clearing phase, 
this practice may threaten biodiversity and use land that may be needed for food. 
Global Coordination Required
One crucial feature of climate change is that policy must be global because the 
pollutant is global. Policies that are followed only in some countries will tend to 
create various forms of “carbon leakage.” Policy makers and industries worry 
about pollution havens and the detrimental effects of environmental regulations 
on competitiveness; however, not much empirical evidence exists that stricter envi-
ronmental legislation has induced industry to migrate. In fact, the environmental 
regulations governing conventional pollutants have, so far, caused only moderate 
costs to industry compared with drastic cuts in fossil fuel use. But the shadow 
prices needed to reduce carbon emissions by 50 to 80 percent—and eventually to 
eliminate them—will be high. If a company could avoid these costs by relocating, 
it would enjoy a signifi cant competitive advantage. 
General equilibrium effects are also a concern, as tougher climate policies in some 
countries will tend to depress the price of fossil fuels and encourage fossil use in other 
countries. But the main effect is one of pure arithmetic: If a coalition of countries 
were to combat climate change (even if this coalition were large and taxed fossil fuel 
heavily3), there would be a risk of signifi cant rebound by developments in the rest 
of the world economy. If, say, countries representing 80 percent of world emissions 
were to succeed in reducing their emissions by 50 percent, the effect could still be 
undone by the actions of the remaining 20 percent of world emitters. 
Let us suppose that the smaller “fringe” group experienced economic growth of a 
few percentage points at the same time world coal and oil prices were falling because 
of increasing taxation in the climate coalition countries. It would be reasonable to 
surmise that their use of these commodities (and thus their emissions) would grow at 
a rate of, say, 6 percent per year. This is less than half the corresponding growth rate 
of Chinese emissions after 2001. Their emissions would grow so much by 2050 that, 
in spite of the 50 percent reduction by the main emitters, global emissions would still 
more than double, and the share of the main emitters would dwindle from 80 to 
16 percent (see hypothetical values in table 1).
A smaller fringe group or shorter period would have much less drastic effects, but 
even if we started with a coalition representing 80 percent of emissions (a broad and 
ambitious coalition that would be diffi cult to assemble), developments in the fringe 
group would be apparent within a decade or two.4 
TABLE 1. Hypothetical Emissions
Today 2050
Main emitters  80  40
Fringe group  20  205
Total  100  245
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Long-Run Consequences
Let us also briefl y deal with the temporal dimension. Anthropogenic emissions are 
now of such a scale that they have a very big effect on natural processes that have 
periodicity of tens of thousands of years. Scandinavia was covered by a few kilom-
eters of ice during the last ice age, and land is still rising faster than the sea level in 
this part of the world, owing to the “rebound effect.” (The weight of the ice masses 
had compressed the land, and it is bouncing back.) By human standards, this move-
ment is so slow that the word “bouncing” seems strange, but it gives some feeling for 
the time dimension involved. Another example involves the residence time of gases 
in the atmosphere, which varies in complex ways depending on the gases, their con-
centration, and other factors. In the case of carbon dioxide, a signifi cant percentage 
(roughly a quarter) remains for many centuries. The warming also takes many years 
(decades and centuries) to reach equilibrium, largely owing to the thermal inertia of 
the oceans. In the historic record for the past half-million years, the carbon content 
of the atmosphere has oscillated very slowly between 200 and 280 parts per million 
(ppm). Such a cycle—between two ice periods—would take roughly 100,000 years. 
Now we are emitting carbon at such a rate that it adds 2 ppm per year (and accel-
erating), meaning that the corresponding change in carbon concentration takes only 
a few decades.
Changes in the composition of the atmosphere are causing an increase in the aver-
age temperature on Earth, although the processes are delayed and gradual.5 This 
increase will have ecosystem effects as local weather, climate zones, wind and rainfall 
patterns—and thus agro-economic zones—transition. 
We are holding the World Bank ABCDE conference in Stockholm. A generation 
ago, people skied here in the winter. Now, electricity for the snow cannons is the 
biggest cost for ski resorts, and they even make artifi cial snow in Piteå on the Arctic 
Circle. Snow cover is receding toward the poles and mountains, and the Arctic will 
soon be ice-free in summer.6 The change is more visible in the far north because 
temperature variations are magnifi ed there and because, with even a temperature 
rise of 2 degrees Celsius, ice and snow are replaced by bare ground. However, very 
dramatic effects are expected in many places on Earth. Some areas that are already 
hot and arid (for instance, in Africa) may suffer only moderate increases in tempera-
ture or decreases in rainfall, but they are already so close to the threshold for what is 
bearable for humans or feasible for agriculture that the effects may be catastrophic. 
In the major fl ood plains, such as those in Asia, enormous civilizations exist on 
giant rivers, such as the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. These population centers 
rely on predictable water fl ow, but water fl ow in these rivers is partly regulated 
by glaciers that are now fast receding. Irregular water fl ow implies longer periods 
of drought and increased severity of fl oods, both of which can be lethal threats in 
densely farmed areas. Likewise, sea level rise and increased storm damage can hit 
large, heavily populated areas such as Bangladesh and Bengal in India. 
We expect the most dramatic human welfare costs to occur in developing coun-
tries, because the people in these countries have less access to skills, resources, and 
technology for self-protection. To give just one example, climate and other changes 
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have combined to cause dramatic northward migration of ticks that carry Lyme 
disease and other infections. This situation would be serious but manageable in a 
country with public health care and good vaccinations. The effect would be much 
worse in a low-income country. 
It should be clear that we must measure the scale of these effects not in years or 
decades but in centuries and millennia. Even a human generation is short by com-
parison. This is signifi cant when we turn, as we must, to the issue of intertemporal 
welfare comparisons. The bottom line for a proactive climate policy is the idea that 
our generation should make some sacrifi ces for the benefi t of future generations. In 
this perspective, we need to ask ourselves not only what we wish to do for our chil-
dren but, more poignantly, for our great-great-grandchildren. The distance in time 
reduces personal contact and emotional engagement. The issues are also blurred by 
the limits to our understanding and imagination concerning future technologies and 
needs, and what will ultimately be perceived as costs and benefi ts in the future. 
In the Stern Review (Stern 2006), the biggest source of uncertainty about the 
“cost” of climate change was the discount rate. We do not know future growth rates 
or the future distribution of income. We have diffi culty valuing the welfare effects 
today of changes in income that will occur in the distant future. Stern uses a discount 
rate of 1.4 percent per year, which has been criticized as too low. If we are valuing 
a cost 200 years away, the difference between using 1.4 percent and 3 percent per 
year is the difference between 1 billion and 23 billion. Three percent (and even much 
higher) is defi nitely a more common discount rate, as in the construction of power 
plants or roads, but these are not calculations for which we regularly consider many 
centuries. Some have argued that certain considerations favor low discount fac-
tors. One such consideration is that the composition of the economy must change. 
Growth is the force that underlies discounting. If we have growth for hundreds 
of years, we will become so much richer that it is hard to conceive and, indeed, 
misleading, because the growth would have to be accompanied by huge structural 
changes. Three percent growth for 200 years implies that we would become 370 
times richer, but it cannot be that we would use 370 times more steel or meat, and 
we certainly cannot permit 370 times the emissions of climate gases. Thus, relative 
prices must change to modify the sectoral composition of the economy. This is akin 
to using a lower discount rate in the slow-growth sector (Hoel and Sterner 2007, 
Sterner and Persson 2008).
Cost Effi ciency in Climate Policy: The Need 
for a Unique Price of Carbon 
An effective climate policy will be expensive. This does not mean it will be pro-
hibitively expensive or that we should not undertake this cost. On the contrary, 
the argument is that damages from climate change are likely to be much more 
costly than abatement and that it therefore makes sense to invest in avoiding them.7 
Those who oppose mitigation sometimes paint a bleak picture, in which people in 
developed countries are deprived of modern comforts and developing countries are 
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deprived of their prospects for economic growth if we tax fossil fuels. This is wildly 
exaggerated. The integrated assessment models used to illustrate the costs and ben-
efi ts typically assume not only continued welfare but continued growth in welfare, 
even under stringent climate abatement policies. A typical integrated assessment 
model might conclude that the world economy would grow by 2.9 percent with 
abatement compared with 3 percent in a hypothetical “business as usual” scenario 
that neglects climate damages. Although this comparison is grossly inappropriate, 
precisely because the damages are unaccounted, it is worth noting that even then, 
world income is assumed to increase. However, instead of taking, say, 100 years 
for income to increase tenfold, it would take 102 years (Azar and Schneider 2002). 
Still, we agree that the costs involved are sizable and thus effi ciency in climate policy 
design itself is an important goal. 
One of the basic rules of instrument design is that effi ciency requires the use of 
market-based instruments (MBIs) that will ultimately give a simple, single price sig-
nal for all countries and sectors (Tirole 2009). This is particularly true if the costs 
of abatement are heterogeneous. In this case, the cost of abatement, for instance, in 
avoided deforestation in one country may be very different from the cost of abate-
ment in the forestry or transport or industrial sectors of another country. If there is 
such a difference, the use of MBIs can save a large share of the total costs by allowing 
for fl exibility in deciding where abatement will be undertaken. The more pronounced 
the heterogeneity of the costs, the bigger the savings in using MBIs and thus the more 
important is the predominance of a single carbon price throughout the world (Sterner 
2003). The most signifi cant emission reductions may come from technologies yet to 
be developed. Another very important property of a clear price signal is that it will 
help incentivize research and development into new technologies, which is funda-
mental for dynamic effi ciency.
It is important to ascertain how heterogeneous abatement costs are. In the mean-
time, it is reasonable to assume they are quite heterogeneous, because emissions ema-
nate from a wide variety of processes, economic sectors, techniques, and countries. 
Notice that the broader the defi nition of the instruments used, the better. If all gases, 
sectors, and countries are included and if both avoided emissions and captured and 
stored gases are allowed, a larger number of potential abatement solutions compete. 
The bottom line is, as usual, that the cheapest solutions are implemented fi rst and 
costs are saved by avoiding unnecessarily expensive abatement options. Unfortu-
nately, counterarguments can be made against integrating all sectors in one policy 
instrument. Different rice cultivation methods, for instance, cause widely varying 
methane emissions. Modifying rice cultivation is probably a cheap way to reduce 
radiative forcing. However, the uncertainties involved and the degree of complica-
tion in monitoring and verifi cation probably make it impractical to include this at 
present in a carbon trading scheme.
This leads to the next major concern, which is fairness. Suppose it were more 
“effi cient” in the sense just described (lower costs per ton of carbon avoided) to close 
down the production of bricks somewhere in a small town in Africa or India than 
to persuade a rich person to drive his SUV less. This example may sound exotic, but 
it captures the very essence of the issue. We need to ask ourselves whether such an 
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exchange can ever be fair or ethically justifi ed. A simple fi rst answer is that it could 
be fair and ethically acceptable if it happens through a voluntary exchange in which 
the users or producers of the bricks are more than suffi ciently compensated by the 
SUV driver. The beauty of MBIs is that, in principle, they can achieve such exchanges 
effi ciently and fairly, with limited transaction costs. However, this would require 
one policy instrument or scheme broad enough to encompass both the brickmaker 
and the SUV driver. Designing this type of instrument raises tricky issues about the 
allocation of rights and about fairness, to which we turn in the next section.8 
A Fair Share
There is general recognition that a climate treaty must have broad coverage. This 
does not necessarily imply that each country must be represented in a UN-style nego-
tiation, given the extreme variation in country size. It does imply that we must pull in 
larger countries, even in the developing world, which requires deep consideration 
of fairness and equity issues (Aldy and Stavins 2010). Those who take a particular 
interest in the welfare of the poor should see the opportunity in these facts. Low-
income countries that aspire to catch up economically with the rest of the world are 
understandably apprehensive about emission ceilings. They see them as potential 
impediments on the road to progress. 
Given the historical weight of colonialism, as well as the more recent history 
of broken commitments by the wealthy countries (for instance, to reach certain 
percentages in development cooperation assistance), it is natural for develop-
ing countries to be wary. Specifi cally in the climate area, it is also clear that an 
overwhelmingly large share of historically accumulated emissions come from the 
countries that are now rich. It is these accumulated emissions that have put us in the 
predicament we are in. They will cause enormous costs to a number of developing 
countries. In fact, this effect may already have started: Climate change is a likely 
factor in regional droughts and desertifi cation, although we cannot yet prove that 
with certainty, particularly for any given incidence of drought. Still, one can make 
a strong argument that the rich countries should be prepared to pay some form of 
indemnity or help pay for adaptation. And responsibility does not end there. Except 
in a very small number of nations, emissions are still rising. In spite of all the discus-
sions since 1992, the rich world not only continues to emit greenhouse gases, but 
emits more of them. 
Developing countries are wise to be wary. They are confronted with a new and 
complicated set of issues in which the rich countries appear to be in a considerable 
hurry to coerce them into binding agreements that might limit their future prosperity. 
Naturally, they hesitate. A good rule for diffi cult negotiations is to show that you 
have all the time in the world and are not interested in a quick deal. Pure arithmetic 
also implies that risks are greater for fast-growing low-income countries than for 
slow-growing rich ones. 
Even if it were possible to predict whether a country’s economy would grow and 
by how much, it would still be risky to commit to a given emission reduction or 
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emission level, because the commitment implies a cost of unknown size and, there-
fore, an unknown risk. However, if you do not know whether your economy will 
grow zero percent or 1 percent, 3 percent, or 10–12 percent, the uncertainty is much 
greater. The difference over a 50-year period between 2.5 percent and 1 percent 
growth is a factor of 2. Between 5 percent and 10 percent, the difference is 10-fold 
in gross domestic product—and with constant energy intensities, that means 10 times 
the energy demand. On top of all this, low-income countries are probably less able 
to adapt, because they lack the technology and infrastructure fl exibility to allow for 
the kind of rapid adaptation to new relative prices. 
A worldwide agreement for emission reductions would essentially be the same 
thing as an agreement on emissions. Considering that emission reductions will be 
expensive, these emissions will be very valuable, and we will need to develop an 
allocation mechanism. A number of such principles are possible and have been 
proposed, but I will limit the discussion here to two: grandfathering and equal per 
capita allocation. These mechanisms appear to best exemplify the confl ict of interest 
between rich and poor countries. 
Grandfathering 
Grandfathering, as applied to greenhouse gas emissions, means that future emission 
allowances for any agent should be a proportion of past emissions. This approach 
heavily favors countries with historically high emissions and penalizes low-emitting 
countries. The United States emits fi ve to six tons of greenhouse gases per capita. 
Western European countries typically emit a couple of tons per capita (measured as 
tons of the element carbon per year), while poor countries, such as India and most 
countries in Africa, emit only a few hundred kilos. When we speak of grandfathered 
rights, we also use the term prior appropriation. Perhaps the best-known historical 
application of prior appropriation is in the water use laws in the western United 
States, where usage rights and priorities are granted on the basis of when a person 
fi rst put the water to benefi cial use. Under this system, “once a priority user, always 
a priority user,” often to the detriment of those downstream. The most common 
form of prior appropriation in the climate debate is equal percentage reductions 
(EPRs). In fact, this is the foundation for much of the Kyoto Protocol and even for 
more recent climate negotiations. On the surface, EPR might seem to be a fair and 
“natural” principle in the same sense as a fl at tax rate. If we examine it, however, we 
fi nd signifi cant inequities in this approach.
Under EPR, those who emit more do, in fact, have to abate more (in tons), but 
they also get to use more of the resource. If a rich country today uses 10 times as 
much carbon as a poor country and both are forced to reduce by x percent, the 
inequity will be exactly conserved. The rich country will always get 10 times more 
of the resource than the poor country will get. The Kyoto Protocol was essentially 
the result of negotiations that took grandfathering—and EPRs in particular—as their 
starting point. In reality, the reductions were not equal, but the inequalities did noth-
ing to even out carbon intensities—on the contrary. Australia, with high emission 
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intensity, was allowed an increase of 8 percent, while Canada and Japan were 
required to reduce by 6 percent, and the United States would have reduced by 
7 percent and Europe by 8 percent.9 The European Union got the biggest reductions, 
not because it had high emission intensity but simply because the EU was keen on 
pushing through the deal. Developing and intermediate countries were exempted 
from numerical emission targets as a result of their appeal to a concept of fairness 
based on equity. Although I sympathize with the position of the developing  countries, 
I prefer to argue for a (very) high allocation than for these countries, having no ceiling 
at all. It is unacceptable, as a matter of principle in the long run, for them to have no 
ceiling at all since they then have no incentives to conserve. 
Equal Per Capita Allocation
Countries that see grandfathering as an unfair principle often appeal to one of 
several other principles. These may include such factors as endowment and need. 
Countries that happen to have large hydropower resources or gas resources will fi nd 
it easier to emit less CO2 than those whose only endowment is coal. Those with a 
very cold climate may argue that they need energy for heating. We will not delve 
too much into this line of reasoning, partly because it quickly becomes overly com-
plex. For now, it is enough to say that if we accept the argument that cold weather 
warrants high energy use and carbon emissions, similar arguments can be made for 
countries that are so hot they need air conditioning or countries that happen to have 
bauxite mines and aluminum industries.
A more tractable and common principle is that of equal per capita allocation. In its 
simplest form, this means that each person in a jurisdiction receives one equal unit of 
benefi t. “One person, one vote” is an excellent illustration of this concept; it is an idea 
that underlies many democratic principles. The one child per couple policy in China 
is another example of equal per capita allocation. Perhaps the best illustration for our 
purposes is the way oil revenues are allocated in Alaska. Twenty-fi ve percent of Alaskan 
state oil revenues are paid into a fund, and the dividends are distributed on an equal 
per capita basis to all state residents. The remaining 75 percent of the funds are used 
to fi nance the state budget. Obviously, these funds also benefi t the citizens of Alaska, 
although in ways that are less direct and apparent. I use the Alaska example because 
Alaskan oil was found fairly recently, and this approach might serve as a model for 
how to distribute an unexpected windfall profi t. Specifi cally because of its democratic 
nature, however, this approach appeals much more to poor countries than to rich ones.
Comparing Allocation Mechanisms
Both grandfathering and per capita allocation have logical and intellectual appeal. 
Both are ubiquitous and can—and will—be defended passionately in a very wide 
variety of countries and socioeconomic or political contexts. Proponents of grandfa-
thering may say it has the appeal of having already been tested in important permit 
trading schemes (such as sulfur trading in the United States), and, of course, it was a 
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key component of the Kyoto Protocol. It seemed to be taken for granted as countries 
compared their percentage reduction offers in the run-up to Copenhagen. On the 
other hand, equal per capita allocation also has a considerable pedigree.
In our context, grandfathering benefi ts countries with large emissions or fossil fuel 
use and equal per capita allocation benefi ts low-income countries that use little fossil 
fuel. Table 2 shows the percentage share of global carbon emissions from fossil fuel 
and population for a number of countries. I have not grouped the countries by any 
conventional categories but rather for the purpose of this discussion.
The United States has 20 percent of world emissions but less than 5 percent of 
world population. Fossil-based carbon emissions per capita are 5.2 tons of carbon 
(tC/cap), four times higher than in China (1.3 tC/cap) and roughly twice as high as 
in Germany, the United Kingdom, or Japan (2.6, 2.7, and 2.8, respectively). If emis-
sion allowances were allocated by grandfathering, the United States would receive 
20 percent of the global total; on a per capita basis, it would receive only 5 percent. 
We can also consider the domestic consequences in the United States if the whole 
world were to reduce emissions by 50 percent. With grandfathering, the U.S. alloca-
tion would be reduced by 50 percent, whereas with equal per capita allocation, its 
share would be reduced by almost 90 percent. 
Any effi cient and rational scheme would allow trading, so actual emissions do 
not necessarily need to be reduced so much—we are speaking here of allocations. 
The point is that the allocations would generate very substantial fl ows of revenue. 
The consequences for India would be generally the opposite of those for the United 
States. With a per capita allocation, India would get a share equal to its popula-
tion share (17 percent); with grandfathering, it would receive only 5 percent. If the 
whole world reduced emissions by half, the Indian allocation would still increase 
TABLE 2. Shares in Global Emissions of CO2 and World Population for 
Some Countries
Country % emissions % population
China 22 20
USA 20 5
EU 14 7
India 5 17
Japan 4 2
Other majora 9 6
Former Soviet Unionb 9 4
Oil exportersc 11 10
Other countries 7 30
Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center of the U.S. Department of Energy.
Note: CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuel only. Numbers do not total 100 due to rounding.
a. Canada; South Africa; Korea, Rep.; Australia, Brazil. 
b. Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Armenia, 
Georgia, Moldova, Mongolia. 
c. OPEC, Mexico, Malasia, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, Yemen, Brunei.
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signifi cantly if allocations were based on per capita equity. Just for India, the dif-
ference between grandfathering and per capita allocation would be 12 percentage 
points. If we considered one day limiting fossil carbon emissions to 4 billion metric 
tons (Gt) globally, the difference would be 0.5 Gt of carbon. This is almost 2 Gt 
of CO2, and if the price of CO2 were US$50–$100 per ton, it would be US$100–
US$200 million per year.
Enclosure is a term used when a natural resource that is held in common or by 
no one is turned into private or state property. The term was coined in England, 
where common property or unclaimed land was literally open, and hedges sur-
rounded private property. Hedges are cheap and self-perpetuating fences, and they 
characterize the British countryside, so one often has the feeling of driving through 
a green corridor. The 17th and 18th centuries were heavily marked by struggles 
originating in the enclosure of the commons. In the United States, the great move 
west was similarly one giant creation of personal property. The atmosphere is
perhaps the biggest enclosure ever. In fact, it requires a huge stretch of the imagina-
tion to use the word “enclosure” for the atmosphere, because, of course, we cannot 
enclose it in a physical sense. However, what truly matters is not the physical but 
the legal and ethical. Enclosure has come to be synonymous with the creation or 
appropriation of property or property rights, often, but not necessarily, by private 
interests. Using the word helps us see the historic dimensions and analogies in 
terms of increased effi ciency but concomitant equity problems. If emissions were 
limited to something like 15 Gt of CO2 per year, and each ton had a shadow 
value of US$100, the annual rental value would be over a thousand billion US$. 
Naturally, it matters to India whether it receives 5 percent or 17 percent of such 
property. The values are bigger than anything that is likely to be paid as a result 
of climate negotiations. 
If we view the opportunity of using the atmosphere to dispose of carbon dioxide 
and other climate gases as a natural resource, this resource becomes very valuable 
and will probably be regulated someday. Its value is so large that it will presumably 
take decades to agree on how to apportion rights to it. We can look to the partial 
enclosure of ocean resources as an illustration. The League of Nations fi rst called for 
this in 1930 but could reach no agreement. In 1945, the United States unilaterally 
appropriated its continental shelf, and other countries soon followed suit. Formal 
negotiations took place in the United Nations between 1973 and 1982, fi nally 
resulting in the treaty known as the Law of the Sea, which entered into force in 
1994, 64 years after the effort began. If it takes 30 years to negotiate the enclosure 
of the atmosphere, we could have a viable, all-inclusive, and binding agreement by 
the mid-2020s. This may be an optimistic scenario, but it gives a perspective on the 
current negotiations, to which we will return later. 
Dealing with Countries That Do Not (Currently) Want a Climate Deal
In spite of the somewhat sobering time perspective and the large resource rents at 
stake, a case can be made for cautious optimism. This issue is clearly not as easy as 
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the phase-out of ozone-depleting substances in the Montreal Protocol, which con-
cerned a rather small number of countries and producers, and minor rents. Indeed, 
it may be much bigger and more complicated than the enclosure of the seas. Still, 
it need not be as complicated as global nuclear disarmament, the land confl icts of 
the Middle East, or the rights of immigrants from low-income countries in rich 
countries such as the United States and the European Union. Seen in the context of 
long-run economic growth, the costs are, though large, quite manageable.10
We have entered a phase in which powerful countries are struggling to avoid carry-
ing an unduly large share of the total burden. This struggle could continue for another 
decade and has the potential to get acrimonious, but many of the major economic 
powers have made serious efforts in the climate area and signifi cant pledges in the 
Copenhagen Accord, even with limited incentives to do so. These countries include 
China, India, the European Union, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and some regional powers such as South Africa, the Republic of Korea, and 
Brazil. They may ultimately want to commit to some form of climate policy, par-
ticularly if stronger evidence emerges that the climate is changing. However, we can 
expect a tough battle concerning the fairness of shares. Both Kyoto and the Copenha-
gen Accord are part of this historic bargaining process. 
These countries are a manageably small group of 11 major players (counting the 
European Union as one) that together account for just short of 75 percent of cur-
rent global emissions. We are still very far from any agreement among them, but 
to avoid surprises as the negotiations progress, consider what would happen if only 
these countries agreed. Unfortunately, it is likely that the oil-exporting countries at 
least would represent a serious policy challenge. Climate policy would cause major 
economic loss in these countries. The costs would depend somewhat on the type 
of policy, but a tax in the consuming countries would signifi cantly cut the large 
oil rents that have provided the economic backbone of oil-producing countries for 
decades. It is not diffi cult to imagine scenarios in which these exporting countries 
are economically ruined. Something similar might apply to fossil fuel exporters. 
Because the carbon content of the various fossil fuels varies signifi cantly, correct 
carbon pricing would hit the exporters of coal, heavy tar sands, oil shale deposits, 
and the like much harder than it would the owners of conventional oilfi elds. Gas 
exporters would actually benefi t in comparison. 
The OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries have been 
skeptical of climate change and tend to believe it is at least exaggerated to enable the 
OECD (Organisation for Co-operation and Development) countries to appropriate 
some of the oil rent. We can see many examples of this attitude in the OPEC Bul-
letin and similar publications. According to Forbes, “Saudi King Abdullah, whose 
country holds the world’s largest oil reserves, vowed to continue to provide enough 
supplies, but called on leading consumer states to cut taxes on petroleum products” 
(Forbes 2005). These countries have argued that they should be compensated for 
climate policies that might reduce their income.11 In fact, article 4.8 of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and articles 2.3 
and 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol state that they should be compensated for lost 
export revenues. 
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Table 2 includes OPEC and a number of major oil exporters that together account 
for 11 percent of carbon emissions worldwide and have a combined population of 
10 percent. The former Soviet Union group also has vast fossil resources that are 
exported; they account for another 9 percent of global emissions, with an even lower 
percentage of global population (4 percent). 
I return here to the earlier discussion of the importance of a very high coverage of 
countries in any global agreement. If the emissions from a group of countries currently 
represent a 20 percent share and those emissions continue to grow at, say, 5 percent 
or more, it will create a very serious threat to a climate agreement, even if, say, 70–80 
percent of current emissions were covered or even reduced. Wei and colleagues (2010) 
analyze this situation as a dynamic strategic game; they note this possibility and dem-
onstrate that it would be in the strategic interest of the fossil fuel-exporting countries 
to subsidize domestic consumption more if the “climate-conscious” importers tax it 
more.12 Subsidizing domestic consumption in oil-exporting countries has a series of 
short-run advantages for the local policy maker. It helps keep up demand and use the 
production volumes produced; it generates some revenue (though less than interna-
tional sales); it may attract some energy-intensive industries; and it helps distribute 
the rent locally (within the oil countries themselves). Finally, it will tend to weaken 
the effect of the climate tax that is hurting the economy of the exporters. 
The domestic market in OPEC countries is already considerable—accounting 
for around 20 percent of OPEC’s oil extraction—and the share is growing (Gately 
2007). Net exports of some oil producers, such as Mexico, have fallen drastically 
because the domestic market grew so fast, largely because of the low domestic price. 
Virtually all developing-country fossil exporters have very heavily subsidized fuels on 
their domestic markets.13 
Some say that a good short-term strategy is to remove irrational subsidies to fos-
sil use. That is no doubt true in principle, but these subsidies are not only protected 
by strong lobbies, they may even have some rational basis in the struggle over rents 
between producers and consumers. In view of the large damages faced by many 
low-income countries with no culpability for the current climate problems, some 
people may fi nd the notion that producers of oil or other fossil fuels should be com-
pensated for climate policy to be atrocious.14 However, the right to compensation 
is mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol and, considering the power the oil countries 
wield, it might be worth considering smart ways of unlocking collaboration rather 
than pursuing policies that could evoke stubborn responses such as local subsidies. 
One direction to explore is to involve oil-producing nations in the development of 
new solar alternatives. They have energy know-how and infrastructure for storage, 
handling, and so forth, and might be interested in collaborating on projects such as 
producing liquid fuels based on solar energy. 
Technology Policy 
Traditional analysis of climate economics assumes that the main market failure is 
the existence of external effects (such as carbon emissions) or unmanaged common 
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property resources (in this case, the atmosphere). However, an additional market 
failure is very important: that of research and development (R&D) and the tenure 
security of intellectual property. Considering the gravity of climate change, strong 
incentives are needed for R&D to solve the problem.15 There are numerous pos-
sible solutions, although none is perfect. One possibility is to drastically increase 
public funding for such R&D. Again, there is a problem of common actions for the 
countries involved, but an international treaty to stimulate R&D in new, climate-
friendly technologies is likely to be much easier to implement than a treaty that aims 
to reduce fossil fuel use. 
A research agreement is, however, far from enough. In the absence of a strong 
price signal, there is the risk that research will not be targeted to produce practical 
results for current or expected price levels. For this, we will need technology studies 
to demonstrate real-world actions that small industries can take to compete and sur-
vive. In the case of the energy sector, advantages to scale are very prominent, as are 
“learning by doing” and technical progress. A combination of these factors can cre-
ate situations in which the barriers to commercialization are very high. Of course, 
policies such as feed-in tariffs or subsidies to production can be more effective than 
research grants. On the other hand, this approach presents a considerable challenge 
to policy makers, because we know that it is dangerous to pick winners and that 
subsidies can easily become self-perpetuating. The problems are compounded by 
the fact that the energy sector is characterized by agents with market power and the 
power to lobby. 
The Copenhagen Accord
International policy making is much like domestic policy making except that an 
agreement among states, such as a climate treaty, must respect the sovereignty of 
the nation-states. There are, of course, limits to sovereignty and inequities in power. 
Smaller nations and nations with few resources can more easily be “persuaded” or 
coerced, but, on the whole, treaties cannot be designed just to tell countries what to 
do. They must make it compatible with national interest to join a treaty and com-
ply with its provisions. Barrett (2010) says Kyoto provides insuffi cient incentives 
to countries to either participate or comply. Perhaps a more optimistic approach 
would be to form a portfolio of international treaties that together address various 
issues related to climate change. Treaties could deal with certain gases, for example, 
or technology, or adaptation, or international agreements for certain sectors of the 
economy (Barrett 2010; Stigson 2010). 
The Copenhagen Accord appears to have suffered particularly from the high 
expectations that preceded it—a number of politicians and negotiators used the term 
“disappointment.” However, it was neither a dramatic failure nor a great success but 
just another step on the rather long and arduous road. In interpreting the situation, it 
helps to keep in perspective the unusual characteristics that apply to climate change. 
Enclosure of the global atmosphere is a complicated process involving directly asym-
metric costs and benefi ts to many generations of countries that are worlds apart in 
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their economic and political conditions. The stakes are high, the uncertainties are 
many, and the number of confl icting perspectives concerning what would be fair 
and what actually needs to be done is daunting. Negotiations will take many years, 
not months, so it was utterly unrealistic to hope for a fi nished, binding agreement 
in Copenhagen. 
Before we get to a binding agreement (if we ever do), we can expect many rounds 
of negotiation. Before we can negotiate any specifi c provisions or criteria, we will 
fi rst have to hammer out the baselines and principles for the negotiations. In this 
light, the Copenhagen Accord is perhaps not so bad.16 Some see it as a good start-
ing point, although others are frustrated and note that the negotiations did not start 
in 2009 but in the 1990s. Kyoto was supposed to be the starting point, and some 
nations were aspiring for a second, more ambitious step now. Instead, we again 
have an agreement based on voluntary participation, and we all know that volun-
tary mechanisms are not ideal ways to provide public goods. A decisive element that 
would have been desirable was the notion of making the deal “binding” and the 
reductions of each country contingent on participation and ambitious reductions by 
other countries. This is the characteristic of the public good. Why make a big pledge 
of X if you can get away with a small pledge of x? The only reason would be if your 
own big and costly contribution were matched by equally big contributions from 
the other participants, so that the overall, collectively produced public good (in this 
case, climate stability) would be suffi ciently large. Before Copenhagen, the European 
Union promised 20 percent if other countries did nothing and 30 percent if other 
countries were ambitious, but this seems to be the only example of this kind of con-
tingent strategy. Had world political leaders been driven by a desire for maximum 
collective reductions in greenhouse gases, we would surely have seen more of such 
tactical bids.
On the other hand, the Copenhagen Accord is more ambitious in one truly 
decisive aspect: It undertakes to include at least the inner circle of major emitters, 
including not just the European Union, Japan, and other Kyoto members but also 
the United States, China, and India. This means that the parties to the Copenhagen 
Accord are so much more diverse in emission intensity and economic welfare that 
allocation and fairness become an order of magnitude more complex than in Kyoto. 
Maybe this was one of the reasons we did not get binding numerical targets. 
By April 13, the Copenhagen Accord had been signed by 76 countries representing 
over 80 percent of world emissions. These pledges can be broadly classifi ed into three 
categories: (1) reductions compared with 1990 (including, as for the United States, 
reductions compared with 2005 or base years that can easily be translated into 
reductions compared with 1990); (2) pledges to limit increases in carbon emissions 
below a certain fi gure; and (3) reductions in emission intensity. The fi rst category 
includes the United States, the European Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, 
Australia, Ukraine, and some smaller countries, mainly formerly Soviet countries. 
Table 3 shows only countries with an emission share of more than 1 percent of the 
world total. These countries are, on the whole, slow-growing rich countries. The 
table also includes former Soviet countries that lost such a large share of industry 
after 1990 that they have an expected surplus of rights, even with big reductions. 
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The second category of countries includes fast-growing middle-income countries 
such as Brazil, Mexico, Korea, South Africa, and Indonesia. Their pledges range from 
a few percent for Brazil to 64 percent for Korea. Finally, we have India and China, 
which have the highest and perhaps most uncertain growth rates and which have 
chosen to formulate their pledges in terms of emission intensities. On the one hand, 
this approach alleviates the uncertainty for the country of unknown but potentially 
high growth rates; on the other hand, it makes it possible for a country to be seen 
as collaborative, while enabling it to defend its perceived right to a higher allocation 
per capita in the long run. Finally, many countries have made no numerical pledge at 
all or have not even joined. This includes most signifi cant OPEC countries and most 
low-income developing countries.
It is impossible to state that a certain emission target for a group of countries for 
the year 2020 is or is not compatible with any particular long-term climate goal, 
say, for the year 2100. The ultimate concentrations and temperature response 
will depend not only on the inherently uncertain climate sensitivity parameters 
but also on what paths are followed after the year 2020. Chalmers provides an 
interactive online climate calculator (www.chalmers.se/ee/ccc2) the reader can use 
to test how various emission pathways for Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries 
will affect atmospheric concentration and temperature. If we assume that the fi rst 
reductions are the most diffi cult because they imply a break with a trend, even 
TABLE 3. Copenhagen Accord Pledges: Reductions, Ceilings on Increase, and 
Reduced Intensities
     Reduction Limited 
 Share of   by 2020  increase by  Reduction by
 world’s total CO2 G tons compared with  2020 compared  2020 in 
Country GHGsa (%) per capita 1990 (%) with 1990 (%) intensity (%)
China 16.64 4.7  40 to 45
United States 15.78 19.0 4 
European Union 11.69 10.0 20 to 30  
Brazil 6.60 15.3  Increase <2 to 6
Indonesia 4.73 9.3  Increase <22
Russian Fed. 4.64 14.0 15 to 25 
India 4.32 1.7   20 to 25
Japan 3.14 10.6 25 
Canada 1.86 24.9  Increase <2,5
Mexico 1.58 6.6  Increase <20
Korea, Rep. 1.30 11.8  Increase <64
Australia 1.30 27.4 –4 to 24 
Ukraine 1.14 10.5 20 
South Africa 0.98 9.0  Increase <48
Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) of the U.S. Department of Energy.
Note: GHG = greenhouse gas.
a. CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuel only. 
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small reductions now are a major achievement and will be followed by bigger 
reductions later. In that case, the accord’s pledges could be seen as promising. On 
the other hand, if we assume (as we usually do) that marginal abatement costs 
are rising, the fi rst reductions are the cheap and easy ones. From that perspective, 
the pledges do not look very impressive. Many observers take this approach and 
consider that we are far from being on a path to limit temperature rise to 2 degrees 
(Levin and Bradley 2010; Rogelj et al. 2010; Stigson 2010; UNEP 2010), despite 
the fact that this goal is mentioned or “reaffi rmed” in the text of the accord. 
Rogelj and colleagues call the pledges “paltry” and say they may even lock the 
world into paths leading to more than 3 degrees of warming. They note that a 
2 degree limit with the Copenhagen Accord as a starting point would require very 
dramatic cuts between 2020 and 2050, and they lament the fact that ambitious 
goals for 2050 were dropped from the accord at the very last moment. One might 
doubt the operative importance of goals for 2050, but just as temperature goals 
are important, visions of how to reach them are crucial. The advantage of discuss-
ing a vision for 2050 was also that fairness issues would seem more tractable in 
the long run (Guesnerie and Sterner 2009). 
If the Copenhagen Accord was, indeed, a failure, there are many reasons for 
it and much blame. Some blame the UN procedure for being slow and bureau-
cratic; some countries and even individuals have been given a large share of 
the blame. We will not pursue this tack, although these factors were no doubt 
present and important. Rather, we will look at the broad perspective: Serious 
abatement works most effectively when property rights are fully allocated; that is, 
when an economic incentive exists for each agent who will otherwise pay the full 
cost of emissions. The details of that allocation are so valuable that the fi ght will 
continue for some time. Optimistically, we might envision successive waves of 
more and more serious abatement between 2020 and 2060, and a historical view 
of the years from 2000 to 2025 as a period when the world took stock of the issue 
and the options, and when property rights were defi ned, either through negotia-
tion or confl ict. 
It is interesting to look at the structure of the Copenhagen Accord from the view-
point of a strategic game. We do not normally expect the voluntary provision of 
public goods to give good results. Why would the pledges of individual  countries—
each on its own—contribute very much to a global public good? Why not a free 
ride? In this light, one would expect countries to volunteer almost nothing. In fact, 
the incentives might be worse than that because of the way people think about 
grandfathering. We could reason as follows: 
• If the United States got away with not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and now has 
2005 as a baseline when the European Union and the other Kyoto countries have 
1990 as their baseline; and
• if the pledges now are voluntary but will become almost mandatory around 2020 
or 2025; then
• why make an ambitious pledge now? For 2012–2020, why not make a really loose 
pledge to get a good baseline for, say, 2025–2035? 
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There are defi nite signs that this has occurred. Rogelj and colleagues (2010) note 
that the Chinese target of reducing emission intensity by 40–45 percent is considered 
less ambitious by far than China’s actual fi ve-year plans and current investment plans 
for the energy sector. China’s carbon emissions grew by 3 percent per year between 
1990 and 2001; the growth rate then jumped to 13 percent per year between 2001 
and 2006. It is complicated to judge Chinese emissions, and observers have cited 
poor accounting as an obstacle to trading. However, a good time to conduct a very 
detailed inventory of carbon emissions is just before you enter into negotiations with 
a counterpart that believes strongly in grandfathering. 
It is cheap, however, to be overly critical of the Copenhagen Accord on this point. 
The slow, bureaucratic UN process was not delivering a binding accord. There is a 
defi nite need for a global agreement that includes many diverse countries and begins 
to deal with issues such as monitoring, reporting, and verifi cation. Baselines must be 
established somehow, and there might be an incentive to underreport. Possibly this 
is counteracted by the strategic use of grandfathering, which creates an incentive to 
exaggerate emissions. We need to balance incentive compatibility and fairness issues. 
There are few alternatives that are not subject to the kind of strategic bias mentioned 
above. In Copenhagen, it could perhaps be claimed that the strategic incentive for 
free riding was somewhat balanced by some feeling of honor and some element of 
prestige for countries that took on serious commitments. 
Domestic opinion is also very important, and we have been studying opinions 
in China, the United States, and Sweden in a unique survey (Carlsson et al. 2010). 
We fi nd that a large majority in all three countries believe that the mean global 
temperature has increased over the past 100 years and that humans are responsible 
for the increase. (A somewhat smaller share of Americans believe these statements 
compared with Chinese and Swedes.) When we measure willingness to pay as a 
share of household income, it is the same for the Americans and Chinese but higher 
for the Swedes. 
Green Growth 
We are in a special period in history. The enclosure of the atmosphere is such a large 
creation of property and such a shift in developmental paradigm that it will take time 
to accomplish. One main obstacle is agreeing how to share costs. To overcome that 
obstacle, we must address certain dilemmas that affect the range of available policy 
options. Only when we have solved these issues can an international agreement be 
put in place. 
• We are in a considerable hurry to start reducing emissions, but a global treaty 
implies large transfers of wealth and complex fairness issues that will take 
a long time to resolve, and their size hinges partly on the availability of new 
technologies.
• A global treaty would be easier to achieve if a suffi cient number of clean tech-
nologies were available. However, there is no strong incentive to develop such 
VOLUNTARY PLEDGES AND GREEN GROWTH   |    145
technologies before we have affi rmed property rights or put a price signal in place, 
as would be the case under a binding global treaty.
• To demonstrate that reductions are possible, someone must go fi rst. However, 
with the prevalence of grandfathering, proactive behavior not only goes unre-
warded, it may actually be punished.
We need to discuss alternative paths. We need a policy that will make it easier to 
fulfi ll future national goals for any given country and that makes a global agreement 
more likely. This is where green growth comes in. Green growth is attractive to some 
businesses, to some trade unions, to some researchers, and to some environmental-
ists. Politically, people seem to accept stimuli for green cars and green fuels more 
easily than they accept higher fuel taxes, although the latter are likely to be consider-
ably more effi cient in reducing carbon emissions. Developing countries are attracted 
by the idea of green growth, particularly in the past few years—it fi ts nicely into the 
rather dismal state of the business cycle, after the demise of several banks and the 
near-demise of entire countries, such as Iceland and Greece. The strong threat of a 
slowdown in global growth makes the lure of green growth all the more attractive. 
The question is, what makes this a sustainable strategy?
Many environmentalists who believe costs for abatement are small compared with 
potential damages have been severely frustrated by the diffi culty of reaching agree-
ments. Some of them suggest we abandon the whole discourse on burden sharing 
and instead frame the issue positively and optimistically as “competing to be fi rst 
into the solar age.”
Even prominent heads of state have been enthused. In November 2008, UN Sec-
retary General Ban Ki-moon, together with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
of Indonesia and prime ministers Donald F. Tusk of Poland and Fogh Rasmussen of 
Denmark, wrote an article for the International Herald Tribune entitled “Crisis Is 
Opportunity.” They argue as follows: 
We do not need to await the arrival of new technologies, nor need we worry exces-
sively about the costs of taking action. Studies show that the United States could cut 
carbon emissions signifi cantly at low or near-zero cost, using existing know-how. For 
evidence, consider how Denmark has invested heavily in green growth. Since 1980, 
GDP increased 78 percent with only minimal increases in energy consumption. For busi-
nesses, such savings translate into profi ts. Poland has cut emissions by a third over the 
past 17 years, even as its economy boomed. Today, for example, European companies 
in the green tech sector enjoy substantial “fi rst mover” advantages, accounting for one 
third of the world’s burgeoning market in environmental technologies. 
With the right policies and fi nancial incentives—within a global framework—we can 
steer economic growth in a low-carbon direction. With the right policies and the right 
incentives, we can be sure that developed and developing countries alike contribute to 
the cause of fi ghting global warming, each in their own way and without compromising 
every nation’s right to development and the economic well-being of its citizens.
They go on to say that most forward-looking CEOs know this and, therefore, 
demand clear and consistent policies on climate change. Turning to the business 
sector, one of the most infl uential organizations is the World Business Council on 
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Sustainable Development (WBCSD). The title of its latest annual report is The 
Green Race Is On. The president’s message begins this way: 
We hoped the December climate talks in Copenhagen would deliver a clear new frame-
work to manage climate change. [They] did not. But, the year did deliver a new sense of 
the reality and urgency of the energy and climate agenda. Business leaders realized that 
they must help lead society toward solutions, stepping into political and diplomatic arenas 
previously alien to them . . . . At the same time, the Council’s own Vision 2050 Project 
began to document the spectacular breadth of business opportunity inherent in pathways 
toward sustainability.
The message is that the Green Race is on among countries to transform to low- 
carbon economies and to become the leading suppliers of resource-effi cient technolo-
gies and solutions. The countries that want to win must transform their home  markets 
to build competencies and scale and thereby gain comparative advantage. The report 
conveys a sense of urgency and the risk of missing vital opportunities. Japan is 
portrayed as a leader in energy-effi cient solutions because it correctly understood 
the opportunity provided by the energy crises of the 1970s. The European Union is 
considered the leader today, with a market share of 40 percent in green technolo-
gies and plans for a 300 percent increase in R&D for green technologies. Even so, 
there is concern that the European Union is not building its domestic green market 
fast enough. The Obama administration is portrayed as mobilizing U.S. innovation 
capacity to make the country a world leader in green technologies. Jeffrey Immelt, 
CEO of General Electric, is quoted as saying, “Let’s not take this growth industry 
and give it to every other country in the world but the U.S.” (Scientific American, 
March 3, 201017). The WBCSD, however, considers that China may emerge as the 
winner because it has focused its next fi ve-year plan very strategically toward these 
goals. And India is portrayed as a key supplier of low-cost solutions in response to 
domestic demand from its large and poor population.
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has launched the Green 
Economy Initiative, which provides advisory services to help governments and cor-
porations.18 It recommends stimulus to green industries, such as renewable energy, 
improved and ecologically sustainable housing, and transport solutions. 
These developments are encouraging and tempting for environmentalists and 
politicians alike, but we wonder whether this growth will be green enough. And, 
specifi cally, what policies make growth sustainable? A simple answer is that the 
increase in effi ciency—in the use of ecologically sensitive inputs or waste  products—
must be more rapid than the increase in output. More miles driven by more cars 
can be sustainable only if the average emissions per mile go down faster than the 
miles go up.
This can be illustrated with the transport sector, which has many hundreds of 
studies on vehicle fuel demand (Dahl and Sterner 1991a, 1991b; Goodwin, Dargay 
and Hanly 2004; Graham and Gleister 2002, 2004; Hanly, Dargay, and Goodwin 
2002). To simplify, we can say that the fuel demand function is surprisingly constant 
and can be approximated by the function:
G = YaPb
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Fuel demand has an income elasticity of a, which is roughly equal to unity, and a 
price elasticity of b, which roughly equals –0.7. This means that a 10 percent increase 
in income will inspire consumers, if they have the liberty afforded by democracy and 
market economics to choose to increase their spending on fuel by around 10 percent. 
In rapidly growing middle-income countries, the elasticity is sometimes above 1.0. 
The price elasticity is usually around –0.7, but this is a long-run equilibrium value. 
It does not mean that consumption will drop like a stone by 7 percent if the price 
goes up by 10 percent. Instead, it means that after a full set of adaptations has taken 
place, in the long run, the fuel demand will be 7 percent lower than it would have 
been otherwise. In the short-run perspective of a year, the fuel demand will only drop 
by maybe 1 or 2 percent, and even this will not be visible if there is, say, a 5 percent 
growth rate. The observer will simply see an increase of 4 percent, which for the 
econometrician comes “instead of” the expected 5 percent. 
Now we are equipped to answer the grand question of how we can make growth 
sustainable. Suppose we want to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide by 2 percent at 
the same time we increase income by 4 percent per year. To do that, we would need 
tougher policies to compensate for the effects of growth. With constant taxes, even if 
they are high, emissions from the transport sector will increase 4 percent per annum. 
To combine growth in income and a fall in emissions, we need to have the price rise 
by 9 percent per year. This is a very strong policy instrument—it means prices double 
every eight years. Eventually, prices become so high that the elasticities are unlikely 
to be constant over such a broad range of data. One may eventually fi nd that all 
kinds of alternatives are profi table, such as public transport and solar-powered cars. 
But that is the purpose of the exercise and, in principle, the elasticities sum up all 
these reactions. 
For other sectors—such as residential and commercial buildings, industry, and so 
forth—similar mechanisms are at play, but the elasticities will be different; in some 
cases it may be more diffi cult to replace fossil fuels, in which case elasticities will be 
lower. Other sectors may experience rapid energy-saving technical progress or ready 
substitutes, so that elasticities are higher. They are not very likely to be much higher 
than –0.7, so overall fossil prices would need to rise by at least 10 percent per year 
to make economic growth of 4 percent feasible. The mechanism we have discussed 
here is the demand-side mechanism. Eventually, energy prices will be so high that 
fossil-free alternatives can compete and the price of energy does not need to rise. 
Higher fuel prices are not very popular and tend to be attacked with whatever 
argument is at hand. It is sometimes said that higher fuel prices are infl ationary. For 
an importing country, a price shock in imported fuel will have at least some tempo-
rary infl ationary effect. However, an environmental tax reform in which fuel is taxed 
higher while some other factor is taxed less should not be infl ationary. Budget defi cits 
are also infl ationary; if a fuel tax were to be used to eliminate a budget defi cit, that 
would not have to be infl ationary either. 
Another often used argument is that fuel taxes hurt the poor. Some recent research 
on this subject suggests that in the very richest countries there could be a slight regres-
sivity of the fuel tax itself, although the overall regressivity of a tax reform depends 
on how the revenue is used. It is possible to make an increased fuel tax reform very 
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progressive. Most important, it is found that fuel taxes themselves are quite progres-
sive in low-income countries (Sterner 2011). 
Fuel taxes are only one example, albeit an important one. The real cost of the 
most effi cient policy instrument—higher fuel taxes—is very limited. However, fuel 
taxes are not popular and are perceived as costly or diffi cult. Maybe if politicians 
were somehow obliged to raise fuel taxes (e.g., through an international agreement), 
people would eventually discover that the costs are not really so high. Ironically, 
other instruments—such as banning cars over a certain age or mandating new 
green cars that run on alternative fuels—are sometimes perceived as easier to 
implement. Again, there are political economy reasons for this; for instance, the car 
industry may be very positive about this type of instrument. One still needs to be 
a little wary in the balance between these instruments, because the green car type 
of policy is much more expensive in relation to gains in abatement, at least in the 
short run. If we want a growing economy that is truly green, we must encourage 
truly green technologies. 
Discussion
It is clear that the costs of abatement are suffi ciently high that we need to think of 
effi ciency, and this implies both a unique price of carbon and a global agreement 
with close to total participation. Global participation requires dealing with ethi-
cal issues of fairness and distribution. These arguments can be used by those who 
are skeptical about climate action. They point to the diffi culty of negotiating a big 
global deal. It is particularly hard if no positive and functioning examples of abate-
ment or low-carbon growth exist. So we risk being caught in a Catch-22 dilemma: 
no local action before a global deal and no global deal because it is too complicated 
and there are no examples to follow. A unique price of carbon and a global agree-
ment that is fair and effi cient are clearly diffi cult to attain in the short run. 
It is important to understand that this is a very long-run process and that different 
arguments apply to different stages in that process. Climate change will dominate 
discourse throughout this century. In the year 2040, we may be discussing how to 
deal with the next step because the actions after 2030 were not suffi cient. We are 
still at the beginning, and many of the issues we are discussing are just fi rst steps. 
The importance of cost-effi ciency, a global treaty, and a unique price of carbon are 
topics for the later stages in climate negotiations, when we face the most diffi cult and 
expensive reductions in carbon intensity.
Costs are big, but not so big that we should do nothing. The costs of inaction 
in the form of damages are likely to be much bigger. Through successful policy, 
the costs would actually never be visible, because most of the “costs” are, in fact, 
minute modifi cations to long-run growth rates. Green tax reform does imply some 
loss in consumer surplus, but this is hardly noticeable to the individual—the main 
problems are political acceptability and the damage that can be done by lobbyists. 
Most of the costs of abatement will come later. In the immediate future, marginal 
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costs of abatement will be low, hence the argument that we need global coordina-
tion. A unique global price of carbon is not quite so important in the fi rst years. 
During this period, we should not judge abatement actions primarily by whether they 
are cost-effi cient but by whether they lead the overall process of bargaining and nego-
tiation forward. A good example is demonstrations of new technology that are likely 
to be copied or that can be used to argue for the feasibility of more stringent targets. 
Even though the costs are small compared with the potential damage—and very 
small compared with the expected growth in the economy—they are sizable enough 
to require attention to cost-effi ciency, particularly in the future, when the tougher 
reductions are undertaken. It will take time before we have a unique price of carbon 
in the world, because it is tied in with the diffi cult questions of who appropriates 
the rent and how the burdens are split. In the meantime, we must live with an array 
of prices or shadow prices and gradually work toward unifying them as property 
rights become defi ned. We must still reduce emissions, both to reduce pressure on 
the atmosphere and—perhaps most important—to learn. Today we are taking the 
fi rst steps, such as experiments with green cars in the European Union and the United 
States, and clean development mechanism projects. Critics call these actions “sym-
bolic.” They are symbolic, but they are also learning experiences. Green growth is 
no panacea. It will require policy instruments, and in the long run it will not replace 
international treaties. But it is a start, and perhaps it can help facilitate those treaties 
by providing good examples of new technology. 
Notes
 1. See, for instance, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/nov/28/africa-
climate-change or http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agSY4t 
VL.oOw. Similar views are expressed by Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, http://www 
.afrik.com/article17747.html. For additional quotes from heads of state, see http://www
.unep.org/climateneutral/Resources/Quotes/tabid/362/Default.aspx, http://allafrica.com/ 
stories/201009201379.html, http://www.ethjournal.com/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=2155:ethiopia-pushes-for-more-financing-to-mitigate-and-adopt-
climate-change&catid=13:headlines&Itemid=19,Brazil, http://beta.worldbank.org/news/ 
low-carbon-growth-brazil, and http://www.hindustantimes.com/Copenhagen-accord-
not-legally-binding-Basic-countries/Article1-501441.aspx. 
 2. Nuclear energy is essentially carbon free but presents some special problems, especially in 
an era of terrorism.
 3. I use “taxed” for simplicity, but the effect would be the same with any other regulations, 
such as permits that raise the effective cost of using fossil fuel.
 4. If the United States, China, the European Union, India, Japan, and other major countries 
representing up to 80 percent of emissions agreed, they could begin to exercise very strong 
formal and informal pressure on other countries. 
 5. The increasing carbon content will also have other effects; for example, increased acidifi -
cation of the oceans will have important biological effects, such as changes in an organ-
ism’s ability to grow a shell using calcium.
 6. Ironically, this will probably lead to a new wave of oil drilling there, as if we had not 
learned anything.
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 7. Uncertainty regarding costs complicates the matter. There is, for instance, a low but still 
positive probability of truly catastrophic damage. Assuming some form of aversion to risk 
(and maybe to ambiguity), we are not only willing to pay to avoid the expected damages 
but also willing to pay a form of insurance premium to avoid even a small risk of very 
large damages.
 8. Note that this initial allocation of rights is intended to make an instrument politically fair 
and acceptable. It should not infl uence where abatement is carried out; that should be 
decided by a comparison of marginal abatement costs. 
 9. The EU’s internal burden-sharing agreement was more radical in its departure from pure 
grandfathering, because the EU total of minus 8 percent still allowed some countries—
such as Portugal, Greece, and Spain—very substantial increases (27, 25, and 15 percent, 
respectively), while other countries took correspondingly larger cuts (Denmark and 
Germany each had cuts of 21 percent). This burden-sharing agreement was heavily infl u-
enced by such unique factors as German reunifi cation and other internal EU politics.
 10. According to the Stern Review (2006), the costs are on the order of 1 percent of GDP. In 
the context of decades of growth at a few percent per year, this is quite small. 
 11. See, for instance, http://fi ndarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4182/is_20000920/ai_n10140573. 
Obviously, not all oil countries agree.
 12. See Liski and Tahvonen (2004) for a similar analysis. Persson and colleagues (2007) offer 
an alternative view in which oil producers end up gaining from carbon taxation because 
the differences in carbon content of coal and oil imply that carbon taxation hurts coal 
much more than oil. See also Larsen and Shah (1992) for real data on fuel subsidies.
 13. In December 2007, when international bulk prices for gasoline in Rotterdam were 105 
U.S. cents per gallon, the retail consumer prices in some oil-producing countries were as 
follows: Iran 18.4; Libya, 19.8; Kuwait 41.9; Qatar 32.8; and Saudi Arabia 22.2.
 14. In reality, the relations between oil producers and consumers are much more complicated. 
The former are cartels, as, to some extent, are the companies that produce and sell oil. 
They depend heavily on savings and military alliances with the United States, and their 
reaction to taxation is very complex. For example, their demand will shrink in response 
to falling oil prices, and this would counteract the effect they have by subsidizing domestic 
consumption. 
 15. An attribute of this problem is that potential solutions can be as different as carbon cap-
ture and storage, CCS, fusion, hybrid rice, the social engineering needed to make domestic 
fuel taxation politically acceptable, or the fertilization of the seas with iron shavings.
 16. An experienced senior negotiator, Ambassador Bo Kjellén, commented that people tend 
to exaggerate. When negotiations appear to be going well, victory is proclaimed, but—as 
he pointed out—the results are often not quite as good as claimed. Often, victory has 
been achieved at the expense of hiding away some troubling details, which tend to come 
back and haunt implementation in future rounds of negotiation. On the other hand, when 
negotiations are said to have collapsed, it is also the case that much can be salvaged and 
the situation may not be as bad as it seems. 
 17. http://www.scientifi camerican.com/article.cfm?id=arpa-e-keep-us-lead-in-clean-energy-
revolution. 
 18. http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy. 
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World Economic Crises: Commodity 
Prices and Environmental Scarcity 
as Missing Links
RAMÓN LÓPEZ
Two new structural factors affected the emergence and unusual depth of the fi nan-
cial crisis and world recession of 2008–09: (1) the emergence of highly populated 
countries—most prominently China and India, awakening from centuries of eco-
nomic lethargy—as engines of world growth and massive providers of industrial 
goods; and (2) the increasing scarcity of certain natural resources that, for the fi rst 
time in history, is beginning to be reckoned with in rich and poor countries. These 
structural changes have signifi cantly tightened the links between world growth and 
commodity prices—growth has become more commodity-intensive, and the world 
commodity supply curve is becoming less elastic. 
In this paper I focus on the likely effect of the fi nancial crisis on the commodity 
supply fl exibility in the developing world, the main provider of such goods. The 
impact of the world economic crisis is likely to exacerbate environmental scarcities in 
the developing world and may force further tightening of environmental policies over 
the long run in response to such degradation. This, in turn, may make the commodity 
supply curve even steeper in the future, thus reinforcing the sensitivity of commodity 
prices to world economic growth. 
Given the great heterogeneity of developing countries in many respects, the effects 
of the crisis are likely to vary dramatically across countries and across different types 
of environmental resources. Naturally it is impossible to capture in one initial review 
even a small fraction of the variety of potential effects of the crisis on developing 
countries. This paper uses a taxonomical approach based on a number of key distin-
guishing conditions—policies, natural resources, and other country characteristics—
that suggest potentially testable hypotheses about the direction and likely gravity of 
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the environmental effects of the crisis under a limited number of possible situations. 
Because it is too early to have empirical evidence about the impact of the most recent 
crisis, we refer to two previous crisis episodes—the 1995 Mexican peso crisis and 
the 1997–99 Asian crisis—as empirical references. I focus mainly on the potential 
effects on pollution, deforestation, and the extraction of natural resources, especially 
in fragile environments. 
New Economic Order and the Great Recession
I fi rst provide a retrospective analysis of the changing nature of the interdependences 
between rich (“the North”) and poor countries (“the South”) and then show how 
resource and environmental scarcity is a natural outcome of the patterns of growth 
arising from such interdependences. 
Economic Growth in the North
For much of the 20th century, persistent economic growth was the privilege of an 
exclusive club comprising no more than a fi fth of the world population, the currently 
rich countries or the North. As the North grew richer, it experienced continuous 
structural change, leading to an increasing “dematerialization” of its production 
(López and Stocking 2009). The structure of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 
North became increasingly focused on services and, in general, on activities that 
depend on human capital and technology, while the resource-based and most manu-
facturing sectors gradually shrank as a share of total output. Figures 1 and 1A show 
the intensity of this process over the past half-century in the United States as refl ected 
by the persistent decline of the shares of commodity and manufacturing output in 
total GDP. Production of manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fi shing, and mining 
have dramatically reduced their combined participation in GDP from more than 
40 percent in the early 1950s to less than 20 percent in the early 2000s, while the 
share of nonmaterial output (i.e., services) has increased from 50 percent to more 
than 70 percent over the same period. 
Figure 1 illustrates the great contrast between the sharp dematerialization of pro-
duction and the increasing materialization of consumption as shown by the continu-
ous reduction of the share of services in household expenditures. In fact, the share of 
services in total consumer expenditures declined from about 30 percent to 25 percent 
over the past three decades. While some shifting in the structure of consumer demand 
away from certain commodities (such as food products) into services did take place, 
American consumers continued to expand their demands for industrial goods, espe-
cially durables, at a pace that often exceeded the growth of per capita income. 
The slow but persistent increase of the share of material-based consumption in the 
advanced countries is dramatically illustrated and in part explained by the evolution 
of certain important material components of consumption, including average per 
capita house size and number of vehicles, as well as by the generation of household 
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waste over time in the United States. As Figure 1B shows, over the past half-century, 
the average house size more than tripled, from 290 square feet per capita in the 
1950s to almost 1,000 square feet in the early 2000s; the number of passenger vehi-
cles increased from 3.2 to almost 8.5 vehicles for every 10 persons over the same 
period, while the average daily volume of municipal waste generation increased from 
2.6 to 4.5 pounds per person. These statistics are highly indicative of the heavy biases 
of consumption toward material goods over what could be regarded as less tangible 
and less material-intensive forms of consumption, such as culture, education, leisure, 
and other services. 
The sharp divergence between structural change in domestic production and in 
consumption has meant that the North has become increasingly reliant on the rest of 
the world (the South) as a supplier of primary commodities and, especially over the 
past three decades, of manufacturing goods as well (Ghertner and Fripp 2007). In 
fact, an examination of the evolution of trade fl ows clearly shows a rapid increase of 
net imports of primary products and industrial goods over time, which is consistent 
with the fact that consumption became ever-more reliant on material goods at the 
same time as production became increasingly less material. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate 
FIGURE 1.
Services As Percentage of U.S. GDP and Average Share of Household Expenditures 
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this for the United States. Figure 2 shows the signifi cant rise in imports of industrial 
goods in total U.S. imports. Figure 3 shows the large increases in the imports of 
manufacturing and industrial goods as a proportion of U.S. output. This is also true 
for most other commodities, including metals (Figure 3A). As these fi gures show, the 
increase in imports of industrial and commodity goods has been particularly steep 
over the past two decades.
Has the North Become Cleaner?
The large and increasing gap between the ever-more material-intensive consumption 
and decreasing material content of production has meant that the advanced countries 
have not become environmentally cleaner but simply better at dumping their pollution 
into the rest of the world. Nothing illustrates this phenomenon better than an analysis 
of the embodied pollutant emissions of international trade. A recent study by Weber 
and Matthews (2007) estimated the net pollutant balance of U.S. international trade 
for three major pollutants—sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NOx), and carbon 
dioxide (CO2)—over the period 1997 to 2004. The fi ndings are startling: While the 
export content of the three pollutants remained practically constant over the period, 
the import content of all three increased dramatically. The SO2 net import content 
doubled in just seven years between 1997 and 2004; NOx increased by about 120 
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
FIGURE 1A.
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FIGURE 1B.
Evolution of Selected Material Components of U.S. Household Consumption and 
Consumer Waste Generation
Sources: For house size: median and average square feet of fl oor area in new one-family houses completed by loca-
tion (medians and averages computed from unrounded fi gures) and U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports. 
From Statistical Abstract of the United States 2008; http://www.sofl o.fau.edu/report/NAHBhousingfactsMarch
2006.pdf; http://www.nahb.org/fi leUpload_details.aspx?contentID=80051.
For number of vehicles: U.S. Department of Energy, Fact #577: June 29, 2009, changes in vehicles per capita 
around the world.
For daily per capita waste generation: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Municipal Solid Waste Generation, 
Recycling, and Disposal in the United States: Facts and Figures for 2008
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percent and the net import content of CO2 more than doubled over the same period, 
from 600 to 1,300 million tons. In other words, the net trade balance of pollutants 
doubled or more than doubled for all gases in just seven years.
These increases are massive relative to total world emissions. For example, the 
CO2 net trade increases of 700 million tons represented about 2.5 percent of total 
annual world emissions in 2007. The study also shows that most of the imbalance 
that emerges mainly from the large asymmetry between progressively less material-
intensive production and more material-intensive consumption in the United States is 
increasingly supplied by China, Mexico, India, and other developing countries. That 
is, the United States is not becoming cleaner; it is becoming more effective in dump-
ing pollution elsewhere, especially in the developing countries. 
This massive dumping of pollution into the rest of the world through trade is 
true not only for the United States. A study by Helm, Smale, and Phillips (2007) 
provides data for the greenhouse gases (GHGs) associated with imports and exports 
of the United Kingdom over the 1992–2006 period. The authors show a pattern of 
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FIGURE 2.
Share of Industrial Imports over Total Imports in the United States
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Categories include fuel and lubricants, paper and paper-based stocks, materials associated with nondurables, 
selected building materials, unfi nished and fi nished metals associated with durables, and nonmetals associated with 
durables.
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FIGURE 3.
Industrial and Manufacturing Imports over GDP in the United States
Source: Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott 2001, http://www.internationaldata.org.
Note: Categories include mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, chemicals and related products, manufac-
tured goods, machinery and transport equipment, and other miscellaneous manufactured articles.
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trade balance emissions similar to that of the United States. While the GHG con-
tent of U.K. exports increased moderately—from about 150 million tons of CO2-
equivalent emissions per annum in the early 1990s to about 260 million tons per 
year in 2006 the GHG content of U.K. imports more than tripled over the same 
period, from 300 to 950 million tons of CO2-equivalent emissions. So the trade 
gap of CO2 emissions increased from 150 to 700 million tons per annum over the 
period or almost 400 percent (fi gure 4). As with the United States, the additional 
net demand for CO2 emissions is mostly supplied by China, India, and a few other 
developing countries.
The importance of international trade of emissions is obvious if one compares 
territorial emissions with total residents’ emissions, the latter measuring both territo-
rial and foreign emissions necessary to meet the net import demand from the United 
Kingdom. Figure 4A shows that the U.K. residents increased world GHG emissions 
over the period 1992–2003 because the increases of their net imports of carbon more 
than offset the reduction of territorial emissions. If one considered only territorial 
emissions, one would conclude that the United Kingdom has decreased its carbon 
emissions by 15 percent; but this conclusion is reversed if we consider all emissions 
FIGURE 3A.
Metal Imports As a Proportion of U.S. Domestic Production
Source: U.S. Geological Survey.
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FIGURE 4.
Greenhouse Gases Associated with U.K. Imports and Exports, 1992–2006
Source: Helm, Smale, and Phillips 2007.
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Greenhouse Gas Emissions on a Consumption Basis for the United Kingdom, 1990–
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caused by residents. Including the world emissions generated by U.K. residents 
through net imports, the country increased carbon emissions by almost 20 percent 
over the two decades.1 
Economic Growth in the South
While the South was at times able to exhibit some modest growth, until the past three 
or four decades, most of these countries could not sustain such growth for prolonged 
periods and thus became mainly passive suppliers of primary commodities to the 
North. As the North increased its net demand for commodities, the South was an 
effective supplier. The South seemed to have almost boundless natural resources and 
imposed practically no effective environmental regulations limiting the heavy envi-
ronmental damages entailed by their exploitation; this, combined with a slow expan-
sion of its own domestic demand for commodities as a consequence of its relative 
stagnation, enabled the North to enjoy stable and low commodity prices (fi gure 5).
From colonial times, the North had established effi cient commodity-producing 
enclaves in the South, keeping the markets in the North as their almost exclusive 
goal (de Janvry 1975). The increasing demand for commodities from the North was 
matched by the continuous exploration and new Northern investments in the expan-
sion of these enclave economies in the South. In a context of resource abundance and 
no effective regulations limiting the environmental damages from resource extraction 
in the South, combined with continuous Northern investments in resource extraction 
FIGURE 5.
Real Commodity Price Trends: Producer Price Index, All Commodities
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in the South, the supply curve of commodities was essentially fl at for a long time 
(López and Stocking 2009). That is, the world commodity supply exhibited almost 
infi nite price elasticity. This meant that the North could grow for many decades with 
the luxury of constant and even at times declining commodity prices, despite the fact 
that its consumption patterns were heavily dependent on material goods rather than 
services, which ultimately implied a high if indirect commodity component.
As has been well documented by several studies, the commodity production 
enclaves established in the South by Northern investments spilled over very little into 
the rest of the economies in the South, which meant that they played little role in 
promoting economic growth in the South (de Janvry 1975; Prebisch 1959; Weiskoff 
and Wolff 1977). The South remained essentially stagnant, thus exerting little pres-
sure on commodity demand, which facilitated the stability of prices. This process 
continued well into the second half of the 20th century (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001; Khor 2000; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000). 
The little giants. Things started to change in the 1970s with the emergence of 
a few countries in the South, mainly in Southeast Asia, that were able to grow 
rapidly for prolonged periods by relying on an export-oriented strategy. This was 
possible because of the increasing net demand for material goods in the advanced 
countries caused by the patterns of production and consumption prevailing in those 
economies.
The emergence of these “little giants” of manufacturing exports was both a conse-
quence and a cause of the changes in the structures of production and consumption 
of the North. The North continued to deepen its relative specialization in clean, non-
material outputs, increasingly relying on the old South and on newly industrialized 
countries (NICs) as steady suppliers of primary commodities and industrial goods, 
respectively, to satisfy its ever-increasing consumer demand for material goods. 
While the NICs were able to grow very rapidly through a phenomenal increase in 
manufacturing exports to the North, their populations were too small to have an 
effect on the world demand for primary commodities, including energy, metals, and 
food commodities. Thus, the expansion of the NICs did not mean greater demand 
pressures on commodity prices, which remained essentially stable (see fi gure 5). 
By the late 1980s, the world had achieved a remarkable equilibrium. The 
North and a few NICs were able to grow fast—the North on the basis of clean, 
service-oriented production that greatly facilitated its environmentally “sustainable” 
development at low cost, and the NICs by supplying the North with an increasing 
percentage of its growing industrial demands at low market prices, albeit at great 
domestic environmental costs. Meanwhile, the still languishing old South supplied 
raw materials, also at low prices but at the cost of a continuous erosion of natural 
resources and the environment.2 
The real giants. The 1990s brought even more dramatic change. The emergence 
of the new industrial giants (NIGs)—China, India, and a few other large, initially 
poor countries that were able to grow at remarkably fast rates—was in part a 
consequence of drastic policy reforms in these countries. The new policies included 
WORLD ECONOMIC CRISES   |    163
pro-market reforms, privatization of state enterprises, export promotion through 
exchange rate policies and other incentives, and weak enforcement of environmental 
regulations, which meant the ability to grow with few environmental constraints. 
The success of these new policies was ensured by the rapidly growing consumer 
demands of the North for industrial goods and the slower expansion of its supply 
of material goods. 
The NIGs were as effective as the NICs at supplying industrial goods but on 
a much greater scale. Like the NICs, they experienced more than two decades of 
unprecedented economic growth, fueled by industrial exports. Both the NICs and the 
NIGs based their development on the rapid expansion of industrial exports, made 
possible by undervalued exchange rates.3 This, in turn, meant an enormous accumu-
lation of foreign exchange, which was recycled into the North, especially the United 
States and parts of Europe, creating large current account defi cits.4 The fi nancial 
resources fl owing into the North made possible low interest rates and easy credit. In 
addition, the fl ow of capital into the North from both the NIGs and oil exporters 
contributed to a continuous appreciation of equities and real estate, which prolonged 
the economic boom and the fi nancial bubble. This, in turn, fed a massive appetite 
in the North for more industrial imports from the emerging and prosperous NIGs. 
Again, a remarkable and seemingly self-sustained equilibrium was created: The 
NIGs’ massive fi nancial assets, created by their industrial export success, fed the 
Northern boom, which, in turn, fueled the continuous expansion of the NIGs. The real 
annual GDP growth rates of China and India over the past three decades have been 
consistently above 8 percent, more than three times the growth rates in the advanced 
economies (table 1). More important, the NIGs became large contributors to world 
economic growth, adding an estimated US$350 billion to the annual growth of the 
world in the early 2000s. That is more than a third of the total annual growth of 
the world in those years, which is estimated at about $1.1 trillion. Table 2 shows 
that the participation of China and India, at about $200 billion, constituted almost 
TABLE 1. Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
China and India
Advanced 
economies Rest of the world World
1961–2007  6.8  3.4  2.7  3.4
1961–1990  5.6  4.2  2.7  3.9
1991–2009  8.4  2.5  3.3  2.9
1961–1969  3.9  5.4  5.3  5.3
1970–1979  4.4  4.0  3.1  3.8
1980–1989  8.2  3.3  2.5  3.2
1990–1999  8.9  2.5  2.6  2.8
2000–2007  9.2  2.3  4.4  3.1
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. Advanced Economy List: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, SAR, China, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Rep. Netherlands, New Zealand,  Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, China, 
United Kingdom, United States.
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TABLE 2. Annual Change in World Real GDP (US$ millions as of 2000)
Decade China and India
Advanced 
economies Rest of the world World
1961–1969  5,154  366,333  120,100  491,587
1970–1979  12,198  514,740  47,150  574,088
1980–1989  36,740  472,160  94,735  603,635
1990–1999  86,310  519,200  116,040  721,550
2000–2007  201,375  618,875  274,525  1,094,775
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. Advanced Economy List: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, SAR, China, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Rep. Netherlands, New Zealand,  Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, China, 
United Kingdom, United States.
20 percent of total annual growth in the world in the 2000–07 period, compared 
with only about 5 percent in the 1980s. 
Environmental and Commodity Scarcity 
The North-NIG boom equilibrium of the 1990s and early 2000s was different in one 
important way from the North-NIC equilibrium of the previous decades. The NIGs 
represent almost 50 percent of humanity, compared with the NICs, which repre-
sent 5 percent at most. Thus, the emergence of the NIGs brought about a dramatic 
expansion of the growth club, and a large segment of the South became an important 
and rapidly growing user of energy and primary commodities. Persistent economic 
growth was no longer exclusive to a small portion of humankind; for the fi rst time in 
history, growth is benefi ting more than two-thirds of the world population. 
The startling and persistent growth of the NIGs brought about not only a drastic 
increase in the supply of industrial goods but also a dramatic increase in net NIG 
demands for energy, food, and other raw materials. At fi rst, because the NIGs started 
from very low levels of consumption, their increased demand for these commodities 
had little consequence for world markets. However, after a decade or so of 8 percent 
to 10 percent growth rates, the enormous population size of the NIGs, combined 
with their rising incomes, caused their demand for commodities to increase to a siz-
able portion of total world demand. Figures 6 through 8 show the rapid increase in 
China’s and India’s level of consumption and their share of total world consumption 
of energy and certain other commodities over the past two decades. In fact, by 2006 
their combined share of the world’s total energy consumption had reached almost 
20 percent and of agricultural commodities such as wheat, more than 25 percent. 
Figure 9 shows the increase in their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions over the past 
25 years, which reached 25 percent of the world’s total in 2006.
By the early 2000s, the NIG share of world commodity demand had become 
suffi ciently large that it started having an effect on market prices. Fast NIG growth 
led to a run-up on commodities, with consequent drastic price increases. Continued 
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FIGURE 6.
China and India Energy Consumption and Share of World Consumption
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics.
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FIGURE 7.
China and India Petroleum Consumption and Share of World Consumption
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rapid economic growth in the NIGs, triggered by the North’s insatiable demand for 
material goods, helped precipitate the drastic increases in oil and other commodity 
prices that began in 2002. 
Resource Scarcity
The increased connection between commodity demand and economic growth after 
the incorporation of the NIGs into the growth club has happened at a time when 
natural resources in the South are becoming less abundant and the severe environ-
mental consequences of the frenetic expansion of natural resource extraction and use 
are beginning to be taken seriously in the South. Even if the underground availability 
of many raw materials may still be plentiful, there are growing signs that their supply 
must rely on increasingly expensive sources. Resource extraction and use have led 
to massive environmental costs affecting crucial ecosystems, including water quality, 
forests, and many other at-risk environments.5
Under increasing pressure from international nongovernmental organizations and 
parts of domestic civil society—including organizations in the communities suffering 
FIGURE 8.
China and India Wheat Consumption and Share of World Consumption
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the environmental costs of resource extraction—developing-country governments 
are at last beginning to take some of these costs into consideration. More countries 
are enforcing at least some modest environmental regulations affecting the use of 
ecosystems that tend to be destroyed by the spillover effects of resource extraction. 
These restrictions ultimately make the extraction of commodities more costly, even 
where the resource is still plentiful. 
Thus, perhaps for the fi rst time in modern history, the long-run supply curve of 
resource commodities has become price-inelastic. This phenomenon, in conjunction 
with the increased commodity demand associated with world economic growth, 
explains the unusual response of commodity prices to fast world growth observed 
throughout the 2000s.
The effect of world economic growth on commodity demand is likely to be asso-
ciated with the emergence of the NIGs for at least two reasons. First, the volume of 
new world output produced each year has increased dramatically compared with 
earlier periods, when growth was mainly restricted to a small portion of the world 
population. Second, because the NIGs are still much poorer than the advanced 
economies, their production structures are more material-dependent than those in 
FIGURE 9.
China and India Carbon Dioxide Emissions
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the advanced countries.6 They are at an earlier phase of development in which GDP 
mostly refl ects material- and energy-intensive outputs. Thus, the volume of world 
output growth has become bigger and more commodity- and energy-intensive than 
in previous decades. The consequence of this has been that the commodity demand 
curve is shifting upward more rapidly at a time when world commodity supply has 
become less price-elastic. World economic growth and commodity prices are more 
intimately related than ever. Below I offer empirical evidence about this new phe-
nomenon that has arisen, especially over the past decade.
The extraordinarily fast growth of the NIGs has been a key factor in making 
world economic growth much more environmentally demanding. But the expansion 
of the giants is merely a proximate cause of this increased environmental demand. 
The reason the NIGs can grow at an almost aberrant speed lies in the equally aber-
rant expansion of material consumption in the North. 
Increasing Links between Growth and Commodity Price
As shown in fi gure 10, the boom times of the 2002–07 period were associated with 
very rapid increases in the prices of almost all commodities, including agriculture, 
FIGURE 10.
Prices of Primary Commodities in the 21st Century
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oil, and minerals. While commodity price upturns of similar magnitudes have taken 
place in earlier eras, this is probably the fi rst time in recent history that the increases 
were not associated with exogenous shocks such as war, cartelization, or politi-
cal confl ict. These increases appear to be purely endogenous, associated with the 
increased demand for commodities caused by fast world growth. This is consistent 
with the idea that world growth has recently become more dependent on commodi-
ties and that the world commodity supply has become less price-elastic.
The high degree of connection between commodity prices and economic growth in 
recent years is further confi rmed by an in-depth look at the growth and commodity 
price data. Figure 11 shows the quarterly co-evolution of U.S. per capita GDP and 
world oil prices between the fi rst quarter of 2000 and fi rst quarter of 2010: the real 
price of oil moves in parallel with the evolution of U.S. per capita GDP. Both meas-
ures continuously and rapidly expanded between the last quarter of 2001 and the last 
quarter of 2007. The economic collapse between the fi rst quarter of 2008 and the 
fi rst quarter of 2009 was associated with an almost equal collapse of oil prices, and 
the economic recovery since the second quarter of 2009 has been concomitant with a 
vigorous recovery of oil prices.7 The variations in world oil prices have been closely 
associated with similar trends in practically all other primary commodity prices, and 
the changes in U.S. GDP are closely correlated with world GDP changes. Thus, we 
have a dramatic positive correlation between world GDP growth and the prices of 
most primary commodities over the decade. The estimated correlation coeffi cient is 
0.87 and highly signifi cant; it is the highest of any 10-year period since 1952. 
FIGURE 11.
Real Quarterly Oil Prices (Defl ated by U.S. CPI) and Real Quarterly U.S. GDP 
per Capita, 2000–10
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Implications for Sustained Economic Growth
This closed link between economic growth and commodity prices is a new phe-
nomenon that might mark a new structural condition with dramatic implications 
regarding the capacity of the world to support steady rates of economic growth in 
the future. Sustaining economic growth with rising commodity prices is diffi cult for 
several reasons. The reason I emphasize here is the connection between rising com-
modity prices and infl ation.
Although the infl ationary pressures of rising commodity prices may be small, even 
negligible, in the context of much slack affecting capital utilization (as has been the 
case in the past few quarters), this ceases to be the case when the slack subsides as 
economic growth continues. Once capacity utilization rises, the economy becomes 
increasingly susceptible to cost pressures from rising commodity prices—this occurred 
in the period from 2003 through 2008 (fi gure 5A).8 Increasing cost pressures com-
ing from the commodity component of the consumer price index (CPI)—which has 
a low direct weight but high indirect weight as a consequence of the dependence of 
consumer expenditures on material goods—eventually threaten the so-called core 
infl ation targets. At this point, central banks are forced to intervene, leading to tight 
monetary policies and high interest rates.
In fact, core infl ation started to increase by 2005, which eventually prompted the 
Federal Reserve to tighten monetary policy by raising the effective federal fund rate 
from 1 percent in early 2004 to more than 5 percent by mid-2007. In economies 
affected by extremely high levels of both private and public debt (as is the case 
of most advanced economies), even a modest increase in interest rates is likely to 
have a dramatic effect on fi scal defi cits and household expenditures, which forces 
a deceleration of economic growth or even negative growth rates.9 Much has been 
made of the idea that modern economies are less dependent on energy and other pri-
mary commodities than in the past. As a consequence, macroeconomists have been 
quick to dismiss any signifi cant connection between infl ation and commodity prices. 
However, while commodity prices have a low cost effect on the productive sector 
of advanced economies because of the increasing dematerialization of GDP, this is 
not the case for consumption. As noted earlier, consumers in rich countries have 
not embarked on a dematerializing of their consumption patterns in any signifi cant 
way. Primary commodities are behind any material goods consumed, which implies 
that the dependence of consumption expenditures on commodities is still very high 
once we account for both the direct and indirect effects of commodity prices. This is 
refl ected in consumer price indexes once commodity price changes make their way 
into the prices of the large material component of the consumer budget. 
Can Technical Change Save the Day?
The increasing scarcity of natural resources could be partially offset by the devel-
opment of resource-saving technologies. New technologies could soften the tight 
connection between world economic growth and commodity prices. Paradoxically, 
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 sustained high and, for a period, increasing energy and other commodity prices are 
needed as a key incentive for technical change to be oriented toward the generation 
of such technologies. The low and stable commodity prices prevailing over most of 
the 20th century directed research and development to produce new technologies 
that were generally capital- and energy-intensive as well as labor-saving. These new 
technologies were mostly intensive users of the cheapest factors of production: the 
environment and natural resources.10 While some internalization of the true cost of 
the environment was implemented in the North, environmental compliance costs are 
extremely low, even in the wealthiest countries, and the low real prices of commodi-
ties during the 20th century reduced incentives to produce technologies that were not 
commodity-intensive. 
The connection between commodity prices and the direction of technological 
change implies a classic coordination problem: Reducing the dependence of eco-
nomic growth on natural resources and commodities requires high and temporarily 
increasing commodity prices as a signal to the private sector to invest more in the 
generation of resource- and environment-saving new technologies. However, increas-
ing commodity prices make the world economies more vulnerable to infl ation by 
causing greater cost pressures that central banks must combat via tighter monetary 
policies to prevent infl ation. To prevent the increasing commodity prices from spill-
ing over into generalized price increases, the monetary authority may face more pres-
sures to raise interest rates in boom periods than when commodity prices were not 
very responsive to world growth. Interest rates jump when higher commodity prices 
threaten low infl ation targets, and this reduces economic growth. Given the current 
strong connection between growth and commodity prices, the latter fall quite rapidly 
when world growth decelerates.
Thus, allowing commodity prices to increase to the extent needed to reduce the 
long-run dependence of world growth on commodities through the development 
of new resource-saving technologies would trigger infl ation in the context of an 
accommodative monetary policy. This is unacceptable for the North, so monetary 
policy is used to counter the threat of infl ation.11 In principle this would not affect 
the relative price of commodities while arresting infl ationary pressures; however, 
because of the extreme dependence of growth on easy credit, the tightening of money 
rapidly affects consumption, which in turn leads to slower or even negative growth. 
This in turn prevents commodity prices from remaining high and cancels the long-
run incentives to generate commodity-saving technical change. 
The Crisis and the Developing Countries
The impact of the crisis on the developing countries is likely to depend on certain 
key factors that will determine the intensity of the recession as well as the social and 
environmental effects. These factors are macroeconomic policies during the boom 
times before the crisis, the stringency of environmental regulatory regimes, domestic 
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policies in response to the crisis, and country characteristics associated with factor 
endowments, population density, and poverty levels.
Macroeconomic Policies Before and After the Crisis
Most economic crises emerge after periods of fast economic growth. The current 
crisis is no exception, as most developing countries enjoyed several years of rapid 
growth, triggered in part by a great expansion of commodity exports. In addition, 
some countries—especially middle-income countries and the NIGs—greatly benefi ted 
from the rapid expansion of manufacturing exports. Also, part of the South was able 
to attract unprecedented levels of both fi nancial and nonfi nancial foreign investment. 
The export boom combined with capital infl ows generated foreign exchange, which 
in many cases made the availability of foreign exchange nonbinding as a constraint 
to economic activity. The boom also contributed to rapid increases in tax revenues, 
which gave governments fl exibility on the expenditure side. In most cases, the com-
bination of export expansion, foreign capital infl ows, and rapidly increasing fi scal 
expenditures led to high rates of economic growth. 
Public savings. The extent to which a country was able to speed up growth dur-
ing boom times depended not only on the positioning of the country to benefi t from 
world expansion (e.g., types of export goods, attractiveness to foreign investors) but 
also on certain key policies. Among them, one is particularly important: the extent to 
which the government saved. Some countries were able to increase growth and even 
reduce poverty in the short run by spending most or all of the additional revenues on 
a myriad of programs and creating new social programs, many of which were poorly 
designed. In several cases, the government overshot expenditures by using the boom 
times as an opportunity to rapidly increase public debt.12 
Other countries, knowing that the boom would eventually subside, adopted a 
more cautious approach: They saved a signifi cant part of the increased revenues by 
paying off existing public debt, increasing foreign exchange reserves, and, in some 
cases, establishing sovereign investment funds. The accumulation of public savings 
during the boom times better positioned these countries to use countercyclical policies 
to face the subsequent crisis than those that did not save or even increased net public 
debt. They were able to implement fi scal stimulus policies like the United States, but 
they fi nanced them not by increasing public debt (as in the United States) but by their 
own accumulated savings. Among countries that were able to increase public savings 
most during the boom times were Chile, Mexico, China, and the Republic of Korea. 
Countries that save during boom times may be able to increase social benefi ts 
and implement countercyclical pro-employment expenditure policies during a crisis. 
They can allow themselves to use temporary defi cit-fi nanced fi scal policy to stimulate 
the economy. In contrast, countries that did not save (e.g., Greece) might be forced 
to use pro-cyclical policies, which often means cutting social services and reducing 
other expenditures. These countries become dependent on support from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), which often imposes restrictive policies that may be 
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 inconsistent with fi scal stimulus. The unemployment and poverty effects are likely to 
be magnifi ed in these countries and mitigated in countries that save. 
A crisis can have various effects on the poor and on natural resources, espe-
cially those that are open access or semi-open access, such as many tropical forests. 
Increased unemployment and poverty often lead to even greater pressures on such 
resources by subsistence producers, as these resources are the ultimate welfare refuge 
for the poor. In addition, governments that failed to save during the expansive phase 
may be forced to promote the commercial exploitation of natural resources—often 
at great environmental cost—in a desperate effort to reduce the impact of the crisis. 
Thus, the pressures on natural resources are likely to be more limited among coun-
tries that saved in boom times and can apply fi scal stimulus than among those that 
saved little.13 
Exchange rates. A common effect of crises—especially in countries caught in a 
vulnerable position owing to their past policies—is that currencies are signifi cantly 
devalued. Because most natural-resource-intensive products are tradable, exchange 
rate devaluation often induces an expansion of commodity exports that in turn causes 
more pressure on natural resources. It is hard to separate the effect of exchange rate 
devaluation from other factors that tend to change simultaneously with the exchange 
rate; thus, it is diffi cult to ascertain causality between exchange rate changes and 
natural resources. Several studies have documented a consistent correlation between 
exchange rate devaluation and increased pressure on natural resources. Kaimowitz, 
Thiele, and Pacheco (1999) show that in Bolivia episodes of exchange rate devalu-
ation were linked to increased timber exports, putting additional strain on natural 
forests. Similarly, Sunderlin and colleagues (2000) show that exchange rate devalu-
ation in Cameroon coincided with periods of increased pressure on forests. In most 
cases, exchange rate devaluation primarily mitigates declining world export prices, 
so the net effect on domestic commodity prices—the key factor affecting resource 
exploitation—is ambiguous.
Budget choices. It has been argued that the crisis presents an opportunity for 
modifying fi scal budget policies in a way that could be benefi cial for the environment 
(Barbier 2009). There are two related issues to consider in this respect. 
1. Environmentally perverse subsidies: Fuel, pesticide, water, and fertilizer sub-
sidies, as well as a plethora of other expenditures, often constitute a heavy fi scal 
burden in developing countries. According to a recent study, annual fossil fuel sub-
sidies in 20 developing countries reached US$220 billion, about 1.5 percent of GDP 
and more than 5 percent of total government expenditures (UNEP 2008). The fi scal 
burden of environmentally perverse subsidies in many countries may become even 
heavier in times of fi nancial crises. This could, in principle, motivate their reduction 
or elimination, leading to important environmental improvement and a relief of the 
tight fi scal conditions. One could speculate that the incentives to remove environ-
mentally perverse subsidies are even larger in countries that have failed to save dur-
ing boom times and hence face worse fi scal conditions during the crisis. In contrast, 
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countries that have saved typically do not face a fi scal situation dire enough to justify 
the removal of such subsidies. But even in countries that suffer great losses of fi scal 
revenues and have no savings, vested political interests may be too powerful to allow 
the government to effectively cut costly and environmentally perverse subsidies. 
The evidence regarding the 1997 Asian crisis—the only one for which studies exist 
that include details of environmental subsidy expenditures—shows that most coun-
tries did not reduce perverse subsidies (Vincent et al. 2002; World Bank 1999). In 
Indonesia, for example, subsidies to gasoline more than doubled between the second 
quarter of 1997 and the last quarter of 1998, and total real budgetary outlays for 
input subsidies—including fertilizers and fuels—increased more than fourfold during 
the period (fi gures 12 and 13). While Indonesia might be aberrant in this respect, 
it appears that few countries in Asia signifi cantly reduced subsidies during the cri-
sis. Because the current crisis may be deeper and have greater fi scal impacts than 
previous crises, emphasis on subsidy removal (rather than merely on general fi scal 
restraint) by international fi nancial institutions could be more effective. 
2. Budgets and green fiscal stimulus: For the reasons discussed earlier, overall 
government expenditures are likely to be drastically reduced in crisis times, at least 
among countries that had overexpansive fi scal policies during the boom times. 
Budget choices are also likely to be affected. Governments tend to cut “discretionary 
expenditures” (i.e., those not protected by major interest lobbies), and environmen-
tal protection expenditures often fall into this category. Figure 14 and table 3 show 
a signifi cant reduction in environmental expenditures in Indonesia after the Asian 
 crisis. A study of the fi scal effects of the crisis in four countries (Malaysia, Korea, 
Thailand, and Indonesia) shows that environmental expenditures as a share of total 
government spending fell signifi cantly in all but Malaysia, which retained the same 
FIGURE 12.
Gasoline Subsidies in Indonesia
Source: World Bank 1999.
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low share (see table 4). Thus, the effect of the crisis on environmental protection 
expenditures was magnifi ed by a reallocation of fi scal spending.
In previous crises, a precondition for IMF support to developing countries has 
been the reduction of fi scal defi cits (IMF 2007). Countries that did not save enough 
to implement countercyclical fi scal policies with their own resources were not able 
to do so. In the past, most developing countries have been unable to introduce sig-
nifi cant countercyclical fi scal policies and have cut environmental protection budgets 
(Vincent et al. 2002). Without such policy changes, most of the countries that did 
not save enough in the boom times (the majority) may not be able to access capital 
markets to fi nance fi scal stimulus of any signifi cant magnitude.
Countries that can fi nance their own fi scal stimulus may be able to include a 
green component, although most of them seem to have priorities other than the 
environment at this point. An additional issue is whether green expenditures can 
compete with other public expenditures, such as infrastructure and other traditional 
programs, to create jobs.14 Another issue is whether green expenditures can generate 
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FIGURE 13.
Comparison of Government Spending on Environment and Input Subsidies 
in Indonesia
Source: Vincent et al. 2002.
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FIGURE 14.
Government Spending in Indonesia
Source: Vincent et al. 2002.
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TABLE 3. Government Spending on Environmental Activities in Indonesia
Expenditures on Environmental Activities in the Routine Budgets of the Industrial Zone and 
Environment Division, the Mining Inspectorate and the Environmental Agencies in Sector 10 
(Rp million, constant 1993/94 prices)
Fiscal year
Industrial zone and 
environment divisiona Mining inspectoratea
Environmental 
agencies, sector 10b
1994/95  858  457  3,330
1995/96  666  364  3,630
1996/97  704  415  5,406
1997/98  606  271  4,630
1998/99  163  56  4,167
Source: Vincent et al. 2002.
Note: a. Planned expenditures.
b. Actual expenditures.
a suffi ciently powerful political and ideological constituency. When it comes to fi scal 
stimulus, traditional programs emphasizing infrastructure have powerful ideological 
support.15
A recent study by Khatiwada (2009) looked at the composition of the stimulus 
spending packages in 10 advanced countries and 12 developing countries. Among 
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the developing countries, only China, Malaysia, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Korea, 
Thailand, and the Philippines implemented signifi cant fi scal stimulus rescue packages 
of more than 2 percent of GDP. These are generally the countries that had accumu-
lated enough of a fi scal surplus to fi nance signifi cant rescue packages. China, which 
saved the most during the years before the crisis, was able to develop the largest fi scal 
stimulus package in the world: more than 13 percent of GDP (more than twice the 
size of the U.S. stimulus as a proportion of GDP). 
An important fi nding is that the share of new social spending and tax cuts in the 
total fi scal stimulus in the developing countries was only 9.8 percent—much lower 
than the 45 percent among the advanced economies (Khatiwada 2009). In contrast, 
the stimulus aimed at particular sectors or fi rms was 43.5 percent in the developing 
countries, a much higher share than the 37 percent in the advanced countries studied. 
Most of these incentives were subsidies benefi ting industrial sector fi rms, many of 
which are linked to the extraction or heavy consumption of natural resources. So 
while these subsidies are not directly environmentally perverse, they can be environ-
mentally detrimental, especially given weak property rights and weak enforcement 
of environmental regulations.
In some countries the stimulus package includes an increase of subsidies that can 
be considered environmentally perverse. In Mexico, for example, about 15 percent 
of the total stimulus money was directed to increasing subsidies for gasoline and 
other fuels. In Indonesia a signifi cant part of the stimulus was devoted to fi nancing 
voluntary transmigration programs from Java into areas less affected by unemploy-
ment, roughly corresponding to frontier areas. Migration into these areas is likely 
to increase deforestation. Of all the developing countries, only China includes an 
important component explicitly directed to environmental protection but, as Strand 
TABLE 4. Environmental Expenditures in Asian Countries
Environmental Expenditures in Asian Countries Affected by the Financial Crisisa
Share of Government 
Expenditure (%) Share of GDP (%)
Indonesia
1997  0.163  0.030
1998  0.079  0.017
Malaysia
1997  0.067  0.015
1998  0.070  0.016
Thailand
1997  1.19  0.22
1998  0.98  0.18
Korea, Rep.
1997  1.56  0.27
1998  1.38  0.29
Source: Vincent et al. 2002.
a. defi nition of year varies across countries.
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and Toman (2010) point out, the effectiveness of these expenditures appears quite 
limited. 
This analysis has two implications. First, signifi cant fi scal stimulus programs 
among developing countries exist mainly in countries that were able to fi nance such 
programs with their own resources: China, Malaysia, Mexico, Chile, and a few 
others. But fi scal stimulus is not necessarily accompanied by green stimulus, and it 
appears that some countries have expanded subsidies that are deemed environmen-
tally perverse.
Regulatory Frameworks for Natural Resources and the Environment
Among developing countries, signifi cant disparities exist in the scope of the regula-
tory framework and the extent to which it is enforced. A key issue is that countries 
with more effective environmental and natural resource regulations are able to 
impose binding constraints on pollution levels and natural resource degradation 
in normal circumstances, while countries without such effective regulation cannot 
impose binding constraints. 
The pollution implications of the crisis can be opposite in the two cases. With more 
binding pollution constraints, a possible response to the crisis is de facto relaxation 
of enforcement as a means to reduce costs for fi rms and mitigate the employment 
effects of the crisis. In that case we would see two opposite effects: (1) the contracting 
output scale effect that reduces pollution and (2) the pollution intensity effect (i.e., the 
level of pollution per unit of output or consumption) that increases it.16 The net effect 
is ambiguous, but it may be positive, despite the decline in economic activity and 
employment. In contrast, in countries without strongly binding pollution constraints, 
air and water pollution are likely to decline with economic activity, because the scale 
effect may not be countered by a pollution intensity effect from changing regulatory 
constraints. In this case, we have the scale effect of the crisis but not the pollution 
intensity effect. 
Thus we have the following hypothesis: Crises can worsen pollution in countries 
that have more binding regulatory frameworks if the constraints are weakened, while 
they tend to reduce pollution in countries with a weak regulatory framework. A simi-
lar hypothesis can apply to natural resources, where the role of regulation is to limit 
overexploitation through, for example, open access to forests for timber harvesting. 
Empirical scrutiny of these hypotheses is complicated by the fact that countries rarely 
announce that they are relaxing environmental and natural resource constraints as 
a crisis response. Moreover, for local air pollution in particular, impacts occur as a 
result of changes in the composition of output and fuel use as well as via macroeco-
nomic channels. The next three sections consider evidence bearing on these hypoth-
eses, drawing on the experiences of the 1997 Asia-originated crisis and the 1995 
Mexico-originated crisis. The goal is not to establish or refute the hypotheses but 
rather to provide enough evidence to underscore the importance of further study. 
Pressures on forests and other natural resources. Forest and related ecosystems 
are affected by two forces that are likely to behave in opposite ways during a crisis. 
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The fi rst force is pressure from the poor and from subsistence producers. Forests are 
generally the last social protection against poverty. An increase in poverty may mean 
more deforestation and more forest burning. The second force is pressure from com-
mercial interests. Forest clearing by large commercial interests linked to agriculture, 
mining, or energy is likely to decline as the crisis reduces commodity prices and 
diminishes the rate of return for such operations. 
While the net effect of the crisis on deforestation may be ambiguous, we can 
distinguish conditions under which the two factors are made weaker or stronger. 
The larger and poorer the country’s population, the more likely subsistence forces of 
deforestation will dominate the for-profi t motives; that is, the more likely the crisis 
will worsen deforestation and increase resource degradation. Studies using remote 
sensing and survey forest data have found that increasing poverty, especially in a con-
text of high population density, intensifi es forest pressures and increases deforestation 
(Barbier 2004; Deininger and Minten 2002). Similarly, a study by Kerr and others 
(2004) found that in Costa Rica poorer areas are cleared more rapidly than richer 
areas, suggesting that poverty increases deforestation. Also, Son (2003) shows that 
poverty is a cause of deforestation in Vietnam. 
Middle-income countries with low population density. In countries where 
population density and poverty are low, the commercial interest effect may domi-
nate. In middle-income countries, for example, it appears that crises in the past have 
reduced commercial resource extraction activities as well as agricultural expansion. 
A study by López and Galinato (2005) found that deforestation in Brazil (a middle-
income country with relatively low population density and moderate poverty levels) 
falls signifi cantly during economic slowdowns. The main reason is the contraction of 
commercial agriculture often associated with declining commodity prices. 
Two main forces may reduce the impact of the crisis on the profi tability of domes-
tic resource extraction activities: (1) exchange rate devaluation and (2) government 
subsidies. Developing-country currencies may suffer signifi cant devaluations in a 
crisis. Since most primary commodities are tradable, currency devaluation is an 
incentive to expand resource extraction, especially by commercial interests. How-
ever, because international commodity prices fall during a crisis as a consequence of 
reduced demand for commodities from the developed world, the net effect on domes-
tic commodity prices is ambiguous. The World Bank (1999) cites a vast literature 
showing that currency devaluation can increase deforestation and environmentally 
damaging resource extraction.17 However, its analysis of the 1997 Asian crisis also 
shows that the net effect in some countries was to negatively affect the profi tability 
of logging and other commercial resource-extracting activities.
The reduction in the profi tability of resource-extracting activities and the conse-
quent amelioration of pressure on forests from commercial interests can be reversed 
by government subsidies and other distortive policies that compensate commercial 
or for-profi t natural resource enterprises for the fall in commodity prices. Ironically, 
these undesirable government subsidies may be more feasible in cases where govern-
ments have been able to save during boom times, as they will have more fi nancial 
resources to implement such policies. 
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Exchange rate devaluation and government subsidies that encourage resource-
extraction activities may at least partially mitigate the effect of the crisis on defor-
estation, but these factors are rarely large enough to fully reverse the decrease in 
extractive commercial activities caused by economic slowdowns (López and Galinato 
2005). The net effect of the crisis is likely to reduce deforestation and forest carbon 
emissions during times of crisis in middle-income countries with lower population 
densities, such as Peru, Brazil, and Chile. Brazil appears to have a pro-cyclical pat-
tern of deforestation: The high-growth periods of 1977–88 and 1993–94 coincide 
with high forest losses, while deforestation has slowed during severe economic crises 
(Wunder 2005). One reason for the reduction in deforestation during economic cri-
ses is that public projects such as road building and dam construction are postponed 
and agricultural subsidies reduced as a consequence of the fi scal squeeze. This may be 
a typical pattern in middle-income developing countries where most of the resource 
degradation is associated with commercial exploitation and only a small part is due 
to subsistence activities by the poor.
Poor countries with high population density. Among the Asian countries on 
which we have focused, according to Chen and Ravallion (2010), poverty (pov-
erty line: US$1.25 per day) affects a large portion of the population: India (44% 
of the rural population), China (26%), Indonesia (24%), the Philippines (23%), 
and Vietnam (21%). Some of these countries also have a very high population 
density, especially India (305 per square km), the Philippines (224), and Vietnam 
(219). One would think that in countries that combine high poverty levels with 
dense populations, the crisis could trigger signifi cant additional pressures from 
subsistence households on rural natural resources, including forest habitats. 
Unfortunately, few aggregate studies on deforestation in Asia are based on real 
data; the commonly used data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization are mostly based on interpolations. The case studies below sup-
port the hypothesis that forest pressures increase during crises in poor, highly 
populated countries. 
Most empirical studies have concluded that the Asian crisis led to a drastic fall 
in economic activity in the urban economy, which has been partly compensated 
by increased activity in rural areas. This is a spontaneous response by those who 
become unemployed in urban areas and return to rural areas, where they can sub-
sist as self-employed or temporary workers living with their extended families. It 
is also a response to government policies that encourage greater access to natural 
resources—including forest activities, mining, and fi shing—during times of crisis. 
For example, the share of the primary sectors in total GDP signifi cantly increased 
during the crisis in Indonesia, from 25 percent to 31 percent. 
Indonesia is the most studied case and the country in which the impact of the crisis 
was strongest. According to Aswicahyono, Bird, and Hill (2009), Indonesia suffered 
a 13 percent fall in GDP in 1998, by far the largest decrease among the four East 
Asian countries directly affected by the crisis. The focus on Indonesia is also conveni-
ent because the magnitude of the current crisis is such that its impact on developing 
countries is likely to be greater than that of any previous crisis in modern times since 
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the Great Depression. The impact of this crisis on the developing world is likely to be 
as bad as or perhaps even worse than Indonesia in 1998. For this reason, an analysis 
of the Indonesian experience might be relevant to evaluate the possible future effect 
of the current crisis on poor developing countries. 
Dauvergne (1999) concludes that the 1997 crisis in Indonesia caused a large 
expansion of agriculture, associated with a signifi cant increase in part-time agricul-
tural workers. The same is true for mining; in 1997, the stock of existing contracts 
awarded by the government to mine gold, diamonds, coal, and nickel increased by 
25 percent. The government also promoted the commercial fi shing industry, and 
illegal fi shing by poor households increased dramatically. Dauvergne documented 
that wildlife conservation suffered dramatically as a consequence of increased ille-
gal hunting. Sunderlin and colleagues (2001) found that the crisis caused a large 
increase in forest clearing by commercial interests to expand exports of rubber and 
other tree crops. They also found a notable increase in forest clearing by smallhold-
ers. Pagiola (2001) reaches similar though more nuanced conclusions: Deforestation 
did not increase homogeneously in all regions in Indonesia, and in fact may have 
fallen in some areas during the crisis. Gaveau and colleagues (2009) use detailed 
survey data to show that the 1997–98 crisis caused a signifi cant reversal in law 
enforcement efforts in the area studied (Bukit Barisan Selatan). The authors show 
how the weakening of environmental law enforcement in conjunction with increases 
in real domestic commodity prices caused signifi cant losses of protected forests and 
biodiversity. 
In Indonesia, the crisis appears to have caused a massive expansion of deforesta-
tion and resource extraction. Possible causes of this strong effect is that Indonesia, at 
the epicenter of the crisis, was affected by a particularly large devaluation of its cur-
rency (table 5), which allowed commercial resource-extractive activities to increase 
their relative profi tability and increased pressures on forested areas by the large seg-
ment of the population that became subsistence producers. 
The magnitude of the devaluation was such that it apparently offset the fall of 
international commodity prices, leading to an increase in domestic commodity prices 
and hence in the profi tability of commodity resource extraction. The effects of the 
crisis on resource extraction in other Asian countries were not as severe (World Bank 
1999). Pagiola (2001) found that pressure on forests did not signifi cantly increase in 
TABLE 5. Asian Financial Crisis Currency Depreciation
Asian Crisis - Forex Markets vs. US$
Country Depreciation Period
Indonesia  –84% July 97 to July 98
Thailand  –53% July 97 to July 98
Korea, Rep.  –51% July 97 to July 98
Malaysia  –47% July 97 to July 98
Philippines  –40% July 97 to July 98
Source: World Bank Crisis Talk, http://crisistalk.worldbank.org/2008/10/
currency-deprec.html.
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Thailand or the Philippines; however, the overall effect of the crisis on the Philippines 
was relatively mild (Datt and Hoogeveen 2003), so the fi nding that forest pressures 
did not increase might simply be due to the fact that the quantitative impact on for-
ests was harder to identify. 
In addition to world commodity prices and exchange rate devaluation, other 
factors affected the impact of the crisis on natural resources. A crucial factor is the 
public expenditure response. A study by Vincent and others (2002) showed that the 
1997–98 crisis resulted in drastic cuts in environmental protection expenditures in 
all East Asian countries, with the single exception of Malaysia. Kittiprapas (2002) 
reports deep cuts in both social services and environmental protection in Thailand. 
In general, the cuts were much deeper in rural environmental expenditures than in 
urban ones. This means that the impact of the crisis was stronger for the mostly rural 
natural resources than for urban pollutants, not only because of the reverse migra-
tion tendencies mentioned earlier but because environmental enforcement may have 
weakened more in rural than urban areas. 
Global pollutants: greenhouse gases. Currently, emissions of CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases are not subject to regulation in developing countries. Consistent 
with the hypothesis presented above, these emissions are likely to fall with the reduc-
tion of economic activity caused by economic crises, although under some conditions 
it is possible that a recession may induce changes in emissions owing to shifts in the 
composition of fuel consumption if the crisis changes relative fuel prices.18 However, 
in countries with open-access or semi-open-access forests, the crisis may trigger 
increased deforestation and forest burning, which are likely to increase nonindustrial 
carbon emissions. This mixed pattern of infl uences is refl ected in the data.
Impacts on local air and water pollution. Table 6, reproduced from Esty and 
Porter (2001), is an index of environmental regulatory strength for 71 countries, of 
which about 50 are developing countries. The index is based on data for the late 
1990s and is thus relevant for the time frame we are considering. The developing 
countries exhibit very large disparities in environmental regulatory effectiveness. 
For example, Uruguay is much closer to Japan than to the Philippines or the 
Dominican Republic in this respect. Among the countries we analyze below, Chile 
and Uruguay—and, to a lesser extent, Brazil—have the highest environmental effec-
tiveness among developing countries; Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and China have 
intermediate effectiveness; and Mexico, Argentina, India, the Philippines, República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela, Indonesia, and Paraguay are among those with the least 
effective environmental regulations. Note that while most of the highest ranked 
countries are also high-income countries, the ranking is not completely driven by per 
capita income, especially among developing countries. In fact, countries with similar 
per capita incomes (e.g., Uruguay, Malaysia, and Argentina) are ranked very differ-
ently in terms of environmental regulations.
The hypothesis is corroborated by some small case studies for water pollutants. 
For Indonesia, Afsah (1999) showed that while output of a large number of surveyed 
industrial plants declined by 18 percent during the 1997–98 crisis, water pollution 
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TABLE 6. Environmental Regulatory Regime Index by Country, Absolute Ranking
Environmental Regulatory Regime Index
Rank Country Score
1 Finland 2.303
2 Sweden 1.772
3 Singapore 1.771
4 Netherlands 1.747
5 Austria 1.641
6 Switzerland 1.631
7 Germany 1.522
8 France 1.464
9 Denmark 1.384
10 Iceland 1.354
11 New Zealand 1.299
12 Canada 1.297
13 United Kingdom 1.185
14 United States 1.184
15 Belgium 1.159
16 Australia 1.083
17 Japan 1.057
18 Norway 1.045
19 Ireland 0.546
20 Italy 0.498
21 Spain 0.437
22 Estonia 0.296
23 Hungary 0.283
24 Slovenia 0.209
25 Chile 0.177
26 Czech Republic 0.073
27 Uruguay 0.059
28 Israel 0.021
29 Poland 0.005
30 Jordan 0.002
31 Portugal –0.028
32 South Africa –0.029
33 Latvia –0.036
34 Jamaica –0.037
35 Brazil –0.077
36 Costa Rica –0.078
Rank Country Score
37 Korea, Rep. –0.121
38 Malaysia –0.127
39 Lithuania –0.146
40 Slovak Republic –0.177
41 Egypt, Arab Rep. –0.224
42 Panama –0.242
43 Mauritius –0.290
44 China –0.348
45 Thailand –0.389
46 Colombia –0.416
47 Bulgaria –0.584
48 Mexico –0.602
49 Greece –0.619
50 Peru –0.722
51 Argentina –0.732
52 Zimbabwe –0.732
53 Bolivia –0.743
54 Indonesia –0.758
55 India –0.759
56 Vietnam –0.770
57 Russian Federation –0.895
58 Sri Lanka –0.936
59 Philippines –1.014
60 Dominican Republic –1.014
61 Venezuela, RB –1.079
62 Nicaragua –1.164
63 El Salvador –1.215
64 Romania –1.268
65 Ukraine –1.297
66 Honduras –1.300
67 Nigeria –1.314
68 Bangladesh –1.331
69 Guatemala –1.532
70 Ecuador –1.616
71 Paraguay –1.743
Source: Esty and Porter 2001.
from organic waste in industrial effl uents as measured by the biochemical oxygen 
demand increased by 15 percent. Afsah documents how environmental inspections 
declined during the crisis, which reduced abatement efforts by industrial plants. 
 Similarly, Caffera (2005) documents that the political will to enforce environmen-
tal regulations in Uruguay in the aftermath of the Mexican peso crisis was low. In 
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fact, during the 1997–99 period, the reported violation rate was consistently above 
40 percent, and the number of fi nes imposed was extraordinarily low. In China, 
fi rms facing fi nancial diffi culties have greater bargaining power with regulators and 
pay smaller environmental fees (Dasgupta et al. 2003). A study by Dauvergne (1999) 
shows a signifi cant weakening of environmental enforcement in periods of slow 
growth in several East Asian countries. 
Air pollution effects of the crisis. Air pollution concentration levels among 
countries vary signifi cantly once we account for a per capita income norm. Table 7, 
also taken from Esty and Porter (2001), provides measures of the difference of SO2 
concentration between the actual and expected levels obtained using predictions 
based on regressing SO2 concentrations on per capita GDP for a large sample of 
developing and advanced countries.19 Table 7 shows areawide variation in this 
index as well. For example, India has concentrations below the per capita GDP 
norm, while China has concentrations well above the norm. Among the upper-
middle-income countries, Chile has pollution levels below the norm, while Mexico 
and Brazil greatly exceed the norm. It is not clear whether the quality of the envi-
ronmental regulatory framework explains the deviations from the norm, as there are 
other potentially important explanatory factors. For example, signifi cant differences 
in the speed of economic growth may explain why China is above the norm while 
India is below it, although China is ranked higher in the regulatory quality index. 
Over the 1990s, China grew almost twice as fast as India. It is likely that countries 
that grow very fast face serious diffi culties in controlling pollution, even if their 
regulatory framework is adequate. 
In our sample of Latin American countries, those with the most effective environ-
mental regulations—Chile, Uruguay, and, to some extent, Brazil—appear to have 
increased SO2 emissions after the 1995 Mexican peso crisis. Their emissions contin-
ued to increase all the way into 1999, when the Asian crisis had subsided. Figure 15 
shows the annual SO2 emissions for these countries. Before the Mexican peso crisis, 
Chile had experienced negative rates of emission growth for almost fi ve years, despite 
rapid economic growth, which indicates that its SO2 controls were effective. How-
ever, starting in 1995 and continuing through 1999, emissions increased at a relatively 
fast pace. In 2000, once the effects of the two crises had passed, emissions began to 
decrease again. Emissions in Uruguay and Brazil followed a similar path. 
Thus, the cases of Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil fi t our hypothesis for countries that 
have effective regulations. During the crisis, the regulations are relaxed, possibly as 
a deliberate effort to mitigate unemployment. In these cases the pollution intensity 
effect may dominate the potential output scale effects of the crisis. The patterns of 
pollution growth in Paraguay and Argentina (countries with the least effective envi-
ronmental regulation in the region) are quite different. In these countries the crises 
do not seem to have prompted signifi cant increases in emissions. 
The data for emissions in Asia show that SO2 concentrations fell signifi cantly in 
most countries of the region, especially in 1998 and 1999, when the crisis had its 
full impact (fi gures 16 and 17). Given the magnitude of the crisis in most of these 
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High-Income Countries (≥$23,000)
Rank Country Residual
1 Finland –11.07
2 Sweden –10.89
3 Iceland –7.81
4 Norway –7.16
5 Denmark –7.02
6 Netherlands –4.97
7 Germany –2.60
8 France –2.12
9 Switzerland –1.85
10 Australia –1.70
11 Austria –1.31
12 Italy –0.97
13 Canada –0.75
14 Ireland 3.67
15 United States 5.09
16 United Kingdom 5.37
17 Belgium 6.91
18 Japan 9.49
Middle-Income Countries ($6,500–$23,000)
Rank Country Residual
1 Lithuania –34.29
2 Latvia –31.41
3 Argentina –26.04
4 New Zealand –15.54
5 Portugal –12.63
6 Malaysia –11.88
7 South Africa –9.52
8 Spain –8.72
9 Slovak Republic –6.21
10 Chile –2.89
11 Czech Republic 2.07
12 Singapore 3.26
13 Costa Rica 7.03
14 Hungary 10.30
15 Greece 11.60
16 Poland 22.43
17 Korea, Rep. 30.98
18 Brazil 40.29
19 Mexico 41.61
20 Russian Federation 63.80
Low-Income Countries (≤$6,500)
Rank Country Residual
1 Ecuador –28.49
2 Romania –28.10
3 Thailand –26.69
4 India –26.49
5 Philippines –12.81
6 Venezuela, RB –6.84
7 Bulgaria 11.99
8 Egypt, Arab Rep. 21.64
9 China 51.25
* Not all data were available for all countries.
TABLE 7. Difference in Urban SO2 Concentration between Actual and Expected 
 Levels, Given per Capita GDP
Source: Esty and Porter 2001.
countries, it is possible that any potential pollution intensity effect in countries that 
had binding environmental regulations was dominated by a strong output contrac-
tion effect. In Korea, however, pollution concentrations continuously declined over 
the 1990s, and the effect of the crisis was a temporary interruption of the declining 
trend. This small and temporary change in trend in Korea contrasts with the more 
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precipitous and longer-lasting reductions of pollution in most of the other Asian 
countries that generally had weaker environmental regulation. According to table 6, 
Korea had one of the highest ranking among Asian countries in the sample with 
respect to environmental regulatory effectiveness. One explanation would be that the 
output effect dominated in other countries, while in Korea there may have been an 
effect from less vigorous implementation of environmental standards.
FIGURE 15.
SO2 Emissions, Latin America
Source: Stern 2005, http://www.sterndavidi.com/datasite.html. 
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Case studies and aggregate data suggest that one response to an economic crisis 
is to reduce environmental enforcement when such regulations are initially binding. 
Where this occurs, it could be a deliberate decision by governments aimed at mitigat-
ing the effects of the crisis on production and employment. However, it could also 
be that environmental budgets are cut during crises as part of a general reduction in 
discretionary government expenditures to offset shortfalls in public revenues. More 
research is needed to identify the strength of different explanations for the patterns 
observed. This is especially true in the area of local air pollutants. Some evidence 
seems to support our hypothesis for SO2, but other explanations might be identifi ed 
based on changes in patterns of output and energy use before and during the crises 
that are not driven by environmental regulatory practices.
Conclusion
Growing environmental scarcity is not an entirely new phenomenon, despite the fact 
that commodity prices only recently have started to refl ect it. In part because com-
modity prices have not historically refl ected environmental scarcity, ominous signs of 
it have been systematically and happily ignored by policy makers for several decades. 
During the 20th century the world supply of energy, agricultural goods, metals, and 
other primary commodities was amazingly responsive to rising commodity demand, 
but the supply of these commodities has been increasingly reliant on more and more 
fragile ecosystems. With some important exceptions, the key underlying scarcity 
was not the exhaustion of raw materials underground but the increasing damage to 
ever-more-fragile ecosystems, overuse and contamination of water resources, loss of 
FIGURE 16. 
SO2 Emissions, China and India
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FIGURE 17.
SO2 Emissions, East Asia
Source: Stern 2005, http://www.sterndavidi.com/datasite.html. 
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biodiversity, and the large emissions of climate change gases generated by the conver-
sion of natural ecosystems to agriculture, petroleum exploitation, logging, mining, 
and other resource-extractive uses. Commodity supply appeared until recently to 
have been almost infi nitely elastic, because these ever-increasing environmental costs 
have been ignored by producers, especially, but not only, in developing countries. 
The growing scarcity is fi nally beginning to be at least partially addressed, precisely 
at the time when world economic growth has become more commodity-intensive as a 
consequence of the awakening of the sleeping giant countries to the growth process 
and the increasing materialization of consumption in advanced economies. The com-
modity supply curve has become steeper, and demand shifts upward more rapidly 
with economic growth. The result is obvious: Unlike the past, when growth was the 
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privilege of a small and exclusive club, current rapid growth in the world leads to 
increasing commodity prices. And increasing commodity prices are not consistent 
with price stability, which forces monetary tightening when energy and other com-
modity prices rise in response to growth. This situation tends to suffocate world 
economic growth, making the world more prone to crisis. 
The analysis of the natural environments in the South has shown that the impact 
of the 2008–09 crisis is likely to degrade environmental resources even more dra-
matically as a consequence of the efforts by some developing countries to mitigate the 
economic and social consequences of the crisis. This may exacerbate the underlying 
long-term environmental resource scarcity in the South and may further compromise 
the South’s ability to respond to a growing demand for commodities when economic 
growth resumes. The environmental destruction the crisis might create in parts of 
the South could increase the damages so extensively that, once normal times return, 
governments will have even greater diffi culty ignoring demands to implement seri-
ous environmental policies and will have to consider some further restrictions on 
resource extraction. All this may make the commodity supply curve even steeper in 
the future, which in turn may exacerbate the economic growth–commodity prices 
links over the medium term. 
A key implication of this analysis is that sustaining positive rates of economic 
growth over the long run is likely to become more diffi cult in the future. The irony 
is that this is in part the result of the fact that economic growth has become more 
inclusive—potentially accessible for the fi rst time in history to the majority of the 
world population. Sustaining such inclusive growth may require signifi cant changes 
in the patterns of growth, especially in the advanced countries. The increasing dema-
terialization of production in the advanced economies will have to be matched by a 
similar dematerialization of their consumption expenditures.
We must remove the incentives to continuous expansion of the consumption of 
material goods, which is often supported by public policies that discriminate in favor 
of such consumption patterns (e.g., reduced taxes and more lenient environmental 
regulations benefi ting huge sport utility vehicles and certain tax policies that encour-
age ever-increasing house size). A carbon tax and other consumption taxes that 
focus on material goods but exclude services would be steps in the right direction. A 
dematerialization of public expenditures by increasing the provision of public social 
goods—including education, health, environmental protection, crime prevention, 
science, and the arts—and a concomitant reduction in the government’s provision 
of material goods (which are often a vehicle to subsidize the wealthier segments of 
society) would not only induce a lower material component of the aggregate demand 
but would also increase social equity. 
Notes
 1. The analysis of pollution content of international trade in the United States and United 
Kingdom reveals in all its depth the fallacy of the so-called environmental Kuznets 
curve analyses, which have purported to show that after becoming dirtier for an income 
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range, increasingly richer countries become environmentally cleaner. The problem is 
that the empirical studies “showing” this inverted U-shaped relation between wealth 
and pollution use only data on territorial emissions within the borders of the countries 
and exclude residents’ emissions taking place elsewhere, where international trade is the 
key vehicle. 
 2. Interestingly, the North started a dramatic reversal of its territorial environmental degra-
dation by the mid-1970s, which coincided with the emergence of the NICs as suppliers of 
dirty industrial goods at low costs. This process also coincides with the implementation 
of modern environmental regulation in the North. Perhaps increasingly stringent envi-
ronmental regulation in the North was made politically acceptable precisely because of 
the rise of foreign suppliers of dirty industrial goods. López (2008) offers some evidence 
showing that one of the reasons the North has been able to enforce signifi cant environ-
mental regulation at a very low cost (estimated at less than 2 percent of GDP) is the emer-
gence of the NICs and, later, other big industrial suppliers, which allowed the North to 
rapidly shift its production away from dirty industrial goods. This view is consistent with 
the econometric evidence provided by Levinson and Taylor (2008). 
 3. According to Rodrik (2007), not only have China and India had undervalued exchange 
rates over the past two decades, but the degree of undervaluation has consistently 
increased over the period. Most of the NICs also based their industrial export take-off 
on undervalued exchange rates, although, unlike the NIGs, some of them have recently 
allowed their real exchange rate to become less undervalued and even at times overvalued. 
 4. Germany and Japan—themselves large exporters of technologically sophisticated goods 
and services—were the exception. The large current account defi cits that developed in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and several other countries in the developed world did 
not happen in Japan and Germany. 
 5. With some important exceptions, the limits to the supply of primary commodities are 
not so much the scarcity of in-ground raw materials but rather the large and increasing 
environmental costs that their production entails (Simpson, Toman, and Ayres 2005). 
Resource extraction greatly affects water quality (mining, oil extraction), soils, and 
forests (e.g., mountaintop removal for coal extraction). For example, the United States 
could dramatically increase its oil production at the cost of unacceptable further envi-
ronmental destruction by expanding offshore or Alaskan production. The enthusiasm 
of the “drill, baby, drill” advocates in the United States, which even affected the Obama 
administration, has cooled a bit since the massive disaster caused by offshore drilling in 
the Gulf of Mexico. Oil spills in developing countries such as Nigeria reached almost 
legendary status in the 1980s, with some estimates suggesting one Exxon Valdéz-type 
disaster every year. 
 6. In China, for example, the service sector represents less than 30 percent of GDP (Farrell 
and Grant 2005). Production was thus about 70 percent geared to energy-intensive and 
commodity-intensive industrial goods and other material goods. 
 7. It is remarkable that primary commodity prices so closely follow economic growth even 
over intervals as short as quarters. This suggests that traders have already incorporated 
a close growth-commodity price link into their expectations. As soon as the quarterly 
growth rates are announced, commodity prices are adjusted accordingly, without waiting 
for the actual demand effect to materialize. 
 8.  In fact, the economy becomes vulnerable to any cost pressures, including labor costs. But 
the commodity cost push is more interesting and important because commodity prices 
tend, as we showed above, to respond rapidly to expanded growth, while wages respond 
mainly when there is full or nearly full employment. It is well known that full employ-
ment tends to be reached only after protracted periods of fast economic growth. In this 
new environment, commodity price cost pressures tend to manifest themselves well before 
wage cost pressures arise. 
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 9. See López (2010) for a thorough study of the conditions that have led most advanced 
economies to these levels of debt. This study shows how the unprecedented concentration 
of wealth occurring over the past few decades is largely responsible for equally unprec-
edented levels of household debt-to-income ratios. 
 10. Partha Dasgupta has eloquently described the situation in which market prices do not 
refl ect the growing scarcity of the environment and new technologies are thus likely to be 
rapacious in their use of natural resources (Dasgupta 2005). 
 11. The recent low interest rates are feasible in part as a consequence of the world crisis 
that reduced world output for several quarters and thus induced lower commodity 
prices. 
 12. Some of these countries also wasted the additional revenues through increased ineffi -
ciency, corruption, and satisfying political clienteles. 
 13. Extreme opposite examples in Latin America are Chile and República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela. Chile’s net public liquid assets increased dramatically during the boom times. 
Net government foreign assets (foreign reserves plus sovereign fund holdings minus 
public debt) increased from less than 2 percent of GDP in 2000 to more than 30  percent 
by early 2009 (Chile, Central Bank). This increase was made possible primarily by the 
extraordinarily high prices of copper, Chile’s main export commodity. In contrast, 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela saved little of the large oil revenues it enjoyed over 
several years, despite receiving three times more revenues than Chile during the 2000–06 
period. By 2006 the fi nancial position of the Venezuelan public sector was quite precari-
ous, with net foreign public asset holdings equivalent to a negligible fraction of GDP 
(Venezuela, Central Bank).
 14. A recent paper by Strand and Toman (2010) indicates that the near-term employment 
effects of many green investment programs are limited, especially those in renewable 
energy and energy-effi cient heavy infrastructure, which are fairly capital-intensive. 
 15. Japan in the 1990s is a dramatic example of a massive, single-minded, and ineffective 
expansion of fi scal expenditures in infrastructure as a means to mitigate what has become 
a chronic crisis. 
 16. The potential also exists for changes in the composition of GDP caused by both the crisis 
and the relaxation of pollution controls. 
 17. Arcand, Guillaumont, and Jeanneney-Guillaumont (2008) econometrically corroborate 
this fi nding using a pooled sample of 101 countries over a 25-year period. Wunder (2005) 
also fi nds that real exchange rate devaluation signifi cantly increases deforestation by pro-
moting timber exports. 
 18. For example, if coal becomes cheaper relative to oil, the reduction of economic activity 
could be accompanied by an increase in carbon emissions, because burning coal is gener-
ally much dirtier than burning oil. 
 19. We use SO2 as a key indicator of air pollution because it is a pollutant for which data 
are available in many countries. It is better measured than other pollutants, although the 
data often refl ect estimates based on emissions factors per unit of production rather than 
physical measurements.
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The central problem facing global society today is how to achieve a sustainable 
future (see Clark and Levin 2010). The Brundtland Commission, set up by the 
United Nations in 1983, was established to address “the accelerating deteriora-
tion of the human environment and natural resources and the consequences of that 
deterioration for economic and social development. . . . Believing that sustainable 
development, which implies meeting the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, should become a central 
guiding principle of the United Nations” (UN 1987).
Sterner writes that there is “no alternative to sustainability.” Can we grow eco-
nomically without compromising the options future generations have for enjoying 
the same quality of life as we do? (See Arrow et al. 2004.) The UN resolution notes 
“in view of the global character of major environmental problems, the common 
interest of all countries to pursue policies aimed at sustainable and environmentally 
sound development.” Is sustainability, so defi ned, an achievable goal?
Climate change and other anthropogenic infl uences threaten the goal of sus-
tainability and raise challenges, both scientifi c and political. The puzzle is that on 
many core environmental issues scientifi c consensus is strong, yet adequate action 
to address these issues has been lacking. Why? Much is still unknown scientifi -
cally, and much is unknowable. However, the primary limitations to implement-
ing solutions to these problems are not scientifi c; in many cases, such as climate 
change, the science is clear and so are the steps that should be taken. The limita-
tions involve the willingness of people and governments to accept the science and 
make the commitments to the public good that are essential to deal with the great 
challenges. The solutions to local resource management often require local coop-
eration (Ostrom 1990); how can we extend that cooperation to larger scales, to 
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address global environmental challenges? Ostrom (2010) argues that externalities 
occur at local, regional, and interregional levels, so solving climate change issues 
will require actions at multiple levels. Studying how cooperation can be fostered at 
diverse scales is an essential step toward reducing the threat of global warming. It is 
all well and good to advocate for “green growth,” but as López (2010) points out, 
this requires cooperation that is vulnerable to cheating, as in all classic confl icts 
involving the commons.
The central issues, then, are issues of behavior and culture. How do we address 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity? How do we deal with public goods 
and common pool resources? How do we achieve cooperation in these contexts, and 
what are the roles of customs, norms, and institutions? If we need new institutions, 
how should they be designed? Market-based mechanisms will ultimately be needed, 
but conventional markets have failed to contain environmental damage because they 
do not adequately incorporate social costs (see Arrow 1963).
Many of the central ethical issues in sustainability involve discounting of one sort 
or another. Individuals and societies discount the future and similarly discount the 
interests of others. This raises questions of intergenerational and intragenerational 
equity (Solow 1991). How much should we leave to future generations? How should 
we discount the future (Weitzman 1998)? Indeed, much of the debate about the con-
clusions of the landmark 2006 Review on the Economic Impacts of Climate Change, 
led by Sir Nicholas Stern for the U.K. government, hinges on the choice of discount 
rate, or even whether a constant discount rate is appropriate (Arrow 2007; Dasgupta 
2006; Nordhaus 2007; Tol and Yohe 2006; Weitzman 2007). 
Intergenerational equity is only half the problem; we also need to address intra-
generational equity and ask what accounts for the inequity in the distribution of 
wealth and why that inequity is increasing at multiple levels of aggregation. 
Intergenerational Equity
In terms of the decisions a person must make in determining the temporal pattern 
of consumption of wealth, intergenerational equity has three dimensions: (1) How 
should one balance consumption and savings over my own lifetime? (2) How should 
one modify that calculation to account for one’s offspring? (3) How should one 
regard others’ offspring? Each dimension has its own discount rate (or suite of dis-
count rates, given that different people’s welfare will be discounted differently), and 
the general problem of allocation of resources must balance them all. The situation is 
basically no different when raised to the level of nations, just more complicated. The 
issue of other peoples’ offspring is confounded with that of intragenerational equity 
(discussed in the next section).
The primary allocation problem is straightforward. One has a given wealth and 
a stream of expected income, and one must determine an optimal consumption path 
to maximize discounted future utility. This is the standard approach to intertempo-
ral decision making and should take into account one’s survival demographics and 
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those of one’s spouse. This is an inadequate solution, however, because we care for 
the welfare of our children as well, so the discounted future utility must be replaced 
by a total welfare function that combines one’s own utility with the utility of heirs, 
discounted by a factor that represents the relative value of the heir’s utility to the 
decision maker (Becker 1976). Because different individuals have different numbers 
of children the optimal allocation leads to a distribution of wealth in which inequity 
grows over time (Arrow and Levin 2009). Only the beginnings of such a theory 
exist at the level of individual decisions, and extensions to the level of societies are 
even less developed. Indeed, because of the diffi culty in determining optimality, the 
optimization problem in such formulations is sometimes replaced by one that simply 
seeks sustainability (Arrow et al. 2004).
Intragenerational Equity
As nations become wealthier, measures of pollution and environmental degrada-
tion typically increase along with income and industrial production, but only up 
to a point, beyond which environmental quality begins to improve (Grossman and 
Krueger 1995; World Bank 1992). The shape of this relationship has been termed an 
“environmental Kuznets curve” because of its similarity to the relationship between 
income and inequality described by Kuznets (1955). The improvement in environmen-
tal quality at high levels of income might refl ect increasing investment in environmen-
tal measures as well as simply a natural transition to less polluting activities such as 
banking, but it might also represent the ability of richer countries to export pollution 
by shifting industrial production to less developed nations (Arrow et al. 1995).
Alan Turing (1952), better known perhaps for his work in other fi elds, created 
a highly infl uential model of embryogenesis in which the differential diffusion rates 
of two chemical species, one an activator and the other an inhibitor, could lead to 
endogenous pattern formation, stable over time, in which the distributions of acti-
vator and inhibitor are nonuniform over space. In this situation, the production of 
industrial goods may be thought of as the activator, stimulating economic growth 
and pollution alike, while pollution plays the role of inhibitor. A Turing-like model 
based on these assumptions could give rise to and sustain an inequitable distribution 
of wealth and environmental quality in which there is a net fl ow of goods from poor 
to rich and, effectively, a net fl ow of the factors that drive pollution from rich to 
poor. But, as López (2010) points out, such an equilibrium can break down endog-
enously as new industrial giants such as China develop economically or exogenously 
as the result of global fi nancial shocks like the one we have just experienced. The 
equilibrium in the simple model presented above breaks down because of changes 
in other, hidden variables.
As in intergenerational equity, a literature is developing on intragenerational 
equity; in particular, on how people deal with public goods and common pool 
resources (Dixit 2009; Ostrom 1990). However, we desperately need ways to extend 
that thinking to the level of international relations.
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Cooperation and the Need for New Institutions
We live in a global commons in which individual agents act largely in their own 
self-interest and social costs are not adequately incorporated. This situation is 
exaggerated when the individual agents are nations and is the primary reason why 
an international consensus on climate change and other core environmental issues 
is so diffi cult to achieve. The task before us is to create global cooperation of a 
magnitude equal to the great challenge we face in achieving a sustainable future. 
Cooperation is relatively easily achieved in small groups held together by repeated 
interactions (Ostrom 1990). Building on the foundation provided by such small-
group structures, larger societies have arisen, held together by shared customs and 
norms, and ultimately by the development of laws and institutions. To reach beyond 
these societies to meet the global challenges, we are likely to need new compacts and 
institutions that are polycentric (Ostrom 2010), deriving robustness from strong 
partnerships among smaller sets of nations. Sustained robustness in these institu-
tions will require an adaptive capacity that fl ows from fl exibility in the face of new 
information. It is not clear that we can succeed in this endeavor, but it is clear that 
we cannot afford to fail.
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Postcrisis Debates on 
 Development Strategy

Does a Leapfrogging Growth 
Strategy Raise the Growth Rate? 
Some International Evidence
ZHI WANG, SHANG-JIN WEI, AND ANNA WONG
All countries want to grow fast on a sustained basis. In East Asia, many economies 
excel in this area. Following the example of Japan after World War II, the “four lit-
tle dragons”— the Republic of Korea; Singapore; Taiwan, China; and Hong Kong 
SAR, China—are familiar success stories. Other economies in the region—including 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia—quickly followed, achieving higher growth rates 
than most other developing countries that had a comparable level of development in the 
1960s. Since 2000, China, India, and Vietnam are the new growth miracles, achieving 
the same high growth rates as their neighbors for two to three decades in a row.1 Natu-
rally, this record invites admiration and scrutiny. What is the Asian growth model? 
Is it something that can be transplanted to Latin America, Africa, or elsewhere, with 
the same magical effect?
The triggers for growth records in these economies are complex, but at the risk 
of oversimplifi cation, we suggest that two aspects of their growth model merit 
particular attention. First, almost all fast-growing emerging market economies 
since the 1970s have embraced trade openness. Trade barriers are taken down or 
progressively reduced, either at the start of the growth process or shortly thereafter. 
Trade liberalization does not have to take the narrow form of reducing tariff rates 
on imported goods, although that is often part of the process. It can take the form 
of demonopolizing and delicensing. The right to import and export used to be con-
centrated in a small number of fi rms by government regulations; trade liberalization 
broadens the set of fi rms that can directly participate in international trade. Even 
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holding tariff rates constant, such democratization of trading rights can dramati-
cally increase a country’s trade openness. This was a signifi cant part of the Chinese 
trade liberalization in the 1980s. Trade liberalization can also come in conjunction 
with reducing entry barriers or offering incentives for foreign fi rms to jump-start 
the domestic export industry. This may be particularly important for countries that 
have been isolated from the world market for a while. The Asian model is some-
times called an “outward-oriented strategy.” This is not very accurate, since many 
Asian economies do not simultaneously embrace capital account openness, at least 
not to the same extent, in the areas of cross-border portfolio equity and portfolio 
debt fl ows. 
The second aspect of the growth model is the use of government policies to pro-
mote high-tech and domestic value-added industries, presumably beyond what the 
economies would naturally develop if left to their own devices. This aspect can be 
labeled as a leapfrogging strategy. China, Singapore, and Malaysia all have various 
aggressive policies to promote certain high value-added sectors. Other countries in 
the region do not wish to fall behind. For example, the Philippine National Informa-
tion Technology Council announced in 1997, “Within the fi rst decade of the 21st 
century, the Philippines will be a knowledge center in the Asia Pacifi c region: the 
leader in IT education, in IT-assisted training, and in the application of information 
and knowledge to business, professional services, and the arts.”2
Are these two aspects responsible for growth? The fi rst—trade openness—has 
been subjected to extensive and intensive scholarly scrutiny. While there is notable 
skepticism (Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000), most economists agree that trade openness 
does seem to help promote economic growth. Following and extending the work 
by Frankel and Romer (1999), Feyrer (2009) pays attention to sorting out causal-
ity from correlation and shows that greater trade openness causally leads to a rise 
in income. Using changes in infant mortality and life expectancy as an alternative 
measure of well-being, Wei and Wu (2004) present evidence that trade openness 
helps improve social welfare by reducing infant mortality and raising life expectancy 
beyond increasing per capita income. On the basis of an overwhelming amount of 
evidence, we lean strongly toward the belief that trade openness has played a key role 
in the success stories in Asia and indeed in most high and sustained growth episodes 
in the world. 
How about the second aspect of the growth model? Has a leapfrogging strategy 
played a key role? In comparison with the trade openness issue, far less scholarly 
work exists on the effectiveness of leapfrogging. In theory, if the production of 
sophisticated goods generates positive externalities via learning by doing, there 
generally would be an underinvestment among private economic agents relative 
to the socially optimal level. A leapfrogging strategy—a government-led industrial 
policy that tilts resource allocation to technologically sophisticated industries—
could correct this market failure. The natural inference from this argument is that 
a country might benefi t more from exporting sophisticated products than from 
exporting unsophisticated and low domestic value-added products, even if its 
 current comparative advantage lies in producing the latter type of goods. Recent 
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academic studies have reported evidence supporting such a comparative advantage 
defying development strategy.
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) suggest that some export goods have 
higher spillover effects than others. They develop a measure of export sophistication 
and fi nd a positive relationship between their measure and the country’s subsequent 
economic growth rate. However, there is no shortage of skepticism toward the leap-
frogging growth strategy. On the one hand, one might question the size of any such 
market failure in the real world. On the other hand, one might wonder whether a 
“government failure” if it were to pursue a leapfrogging strategy could overwhelm 
whatever benefi ts a country might derive from correcting the market failure. In a series 
of papers, including Lin (2009), World Bank chief economist Justin Lin advocates 
strongly for development strategies that follow a country’s comparative advantage 
and against what he calls “comparative advantage defying strategies,” which include 
a leapfrogging industrial policy. At the same time, Lin (2010) is open to the idea of a 
government role in helping private fi rms fi nd “latent comparative advantage.”3
In this paper, we test the validity of the leapfrogging hypothesis with fresh evi-
dence from a cross-country data set. One bottleneck in testing this hypothesis is to 
identify which countries (regions) engage in such a growth strategy. We employ four 
different measures, including a new indicator based on the proportion of identifi able 
high-tech products in a country’s exports. 
Overall, it is diffi cult to fi nd strong and robust evidence that a leapfrogging strat-
egy contributes to a higher growth rate. In other words, the empirical investigation 
does not support the contention that a government intervention aimed at raising a 
country’s technological sophistication beyond what is expected of its level of devel-
opment produces a better growth result on a sustained basis. 
Important caveats for our approach should be borne in mind when interpreting 
the results. Our measures of a country’s leapfrogging strategy are based on its export 
data. To the extent that a country’s export structure may not accurately capture 
its production structure, we may have missed some true leapfrogging strategies. In 
addition, the effi cacy of a leapfrogging strategy could be more subtle than what we 
test. For example, it is conceptually possible that only when several policy instru-
ments are implemented as a package can the positive effect of a leapfrogging strategy 
be detected. Because of these qualifi cations, we view this paper as a stepping-stone 
toward a more comprehensive examination of the leapfrogging strategy.
Statistical Specifi cation and Leapfrogging Measurement
A key to this exercise is to assess whether a country pursues a leapfrogging strategy 
and, if so, the degree of leapfrogging. Ideally, we would compare a country’s actual 
production structure with what would have been predicted on the basis of its factor 
endowment. This approach holds two challenges. First, data on production structure 
by an internationally comparable classifi cation are not available for most countries, 
especially developing countries, for which evaluating the effi cacy of a leapfrogging 
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strategy is most pertinent. Second, even when internationally comparable production 
data are available, one gets only a relatively coarse classifi cation, with fewer than 
100 sectors. Many differences in economic structure do not reveal themselves at 
such an aggregate level. For example, many countries have electronics industries, but 
different types of electronic products may have very different levels of skill content. 
We address these challenges by looking at trade data instead. Generally speaking, a 
country’s export structure closely resembles its production structure. Trade data are 
available for a much larger set of economies (more than 250 in the World Integrated 
Trade Solution [WITS] database). The most detailed and still internationally com-
parable level (6-digit Harmonized System[HS]) includes more than 5,000 products a 
country can export or import. To control for the “normal” amount of sophistication 
based on a country’s factor endowment, we include a country’s income and educa-
tion levels as controls in a growth regression framework.
In the rest of the section, we fi rst review two existing measures of export sophis-
tication in the literature and propose two additional measures that may address 
some shortcomings of the existing measures. We then describe the data that we use 
to implement the measures. Finally, we conduct some simple “smell checks” to see 
how well these measures capture the countries that are commonly reported as having 
a leapfrogging industrial policy. 
Regression Specifi cation
We consider a growth regression specifi cation of the following type:
 LnGDPcit + k − LnGDPcit = α0 + α1LnGDPcit + α2ExpSophisit + XitΓ + ωit  (1)
The left-hand variable measures the growth rate for country i from year t to year 
t + k. In most cases, we examine the growth performance for a country from 1992 to 
2003. LnGDPcit denotes the natural log of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
for country i in year t, ExpSophisit denotes the level of economic sophistication 
measured using trade data, and Xit is a vector of other control variables. Coeffi cient 
α2 measures the impact of leapfrogging policies.
Measures of Industrial Sophistication Based on Export Data
While it is diffi cult to directly measure a country’s industrial sophistication, in 
part because the standard industrial classifi cation is too coarse for this purpose, 
the literature has considered proxies based on the data on a country’s export bun-
dles. The idea is that, leaving aside nontradable goods, the structure of the export 
bundle should mimic that of production. One measure is the level of income 
implied in the export bundle, introduced in Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik 
(2007). This measure builds on the concept that the degree of sophistication in 
a country’s exports can be inferred by the income level of each good’s exporter. 
The second measure is the export dissimilarity index (EDI) introduced by Schott 
(2008) and adopted by Wang and Wei (2010), which gauges the distance between 
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a country’s export structure and that of high-income economies such as Japan, 
the United States, and the European Union (EU15). Both measures assume that 
higher-income countries, on average, produce more sophisticated products. One 
can avoid making this arbitrary assumption and focus on the degree of techno-
logical sophistication of the product itself by using a classifi cation of high-tech 
advanced technology products (ATPs) from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United States.
Income Implied in a Country’s Export Bundle (EXPY)
This indicator of export sophistication is a measure of the typical income associ-
ated with a country’s export basket. For every good, one can compute the “typical 
income” (PRODY) of the countries that export the good, or the weighted average 
of the income levels across the exporters of this good, with weights proportional 
to the value of the exports by countries. For any given exporter, one can look at 
its export basket and compute the weighted average of the typical income levels 
across all products in the basket, with the weights proportional to the value of each 
good in the basket. The key underlying assumption here is that advanced countries 
produce more sophisticated goods and poorer countries produce less sophisticated 
goods.
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where sik is the share of country k’s exports in product i,Yk is country k’s per capita 
GDP.
This index has two major advantages. First, it does not require one to tediously 
sift through and classify goods as sophisticated goods or high-tech products. Second, 
it can be computed easily with data in trade fl ows and per capita GDP. But it also 
has several weaknesses. First, the key assumption underlying PRODY—that more 
advanced countries produce sophisticated goods—may not be true. Advanced coun-
tries often produce a larger set of goods than poor countries. Furthermore, larger 
countries produce a larger set of goods than smaller countries. This suggests that 
the PRODY index may overweight advanced and large countries. Second, the index 
may conceal diversity in the quality and type of goods in fi ner details within a prod-
uct category. Third, the index fails to capture processing trade, in which a country 
imports sophisticated product parts to produce the fi nal sophisticated product. This 
is the case in China, where a signifi cant share of sophisticated exports is based on 
processing trade. We have constructed the following index in hopes of avoiding some 
of the pitfalls of the EXPY index.
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Unit-Value-Adjusted Implied Income (Modifi ed EXPY)
In this modifi ed version of the EXPY index, we discount the PRODY of each good by 
the ratio of the unit value of the exporter to the mean unit value of the same goods 
in the G-3 countries (the United States, Japan, and the European Union): 
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The modifi ed EXPY is computed similarly to the original EXPY index in equa-
tion (3). 
The motivation for this modifi cation is our belief that the unit value data add an 
additional layer of differentiation among goods of a different quality or variety. This 
approach takes account of the diversity within the 6-digit HS category. The assump-
tion behind this modifi cation is that unit value is a proxy for quality, and the G-3 
countries export higher-quality goods.
Since we only have unit value of products at the 6-digit HS level around the world 
for 2005, we apply the same unit value discount factor to the PRODY during our 
whole sample period. 
Distance to the Export Bundle by High-Income Countries
We defi ne an index for a lack of sophistication by the dissimilarity between the 
structure of a country’s or city’s exports and that of the G-3 economies or the export 
dissimilarity index (EDI), as:
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where sirt is the share of HS product i at the 6-digit level in a country’s or city’s 
exports at year t, and si t
ref
,  is the share of HS product i in the 6-digit level exports of the 
G-3 countries. The greater the value of the index, the more dissimilar the compared 
export structures. If the two export structures were identical, the value of the index 
would be zero; if the two export structures had no overlap, the value of the index 
would be 200. We regard an export structure as more sophisticated if the index takes 
a smaller value. Alternatively, one could use the similarity index proposed by Finger 
and Kreinin (1979) and used by Schott (2008) (except for the scale):
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This index is bounded by zero and 100. If a country’s or city’s export structure 
had no overlap with that of the G-3 countries, ESI would be zero; if the two export 
structures had a perfect overlap, the index would take the value of 100. It can be 
verifi ed that there is a one-to-one linear mapping between ESI and EDI:
 
ESI
EDI
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−200
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Share of Advanced Technology Products in Total Exports
Besides the measures already in the literature, we propose a new measure of the share 
of advanced technology products in a country’s export bundle that does not require 
assuming that richer countries automatically export more sophisticated products:
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where EXPit
ATP is exports of ATP of country i at time t, EXPit
TOT is total exports of 
country i at time t. This measure of export sophistication requires us to specifi cally 
defi ne “high-tech exports”; thus, it sacrifi ces EXPY’s simplicity. 
To compute this measure, one needs an expert defi nition of which product is high-
tech. Two lists of expert defi nitions are well respected. One, developed by the U.S. 
Census Bureau, identifi ed about 700 product categories as ATPs from about 20,000 
10-digit HS codes used by the United States. The other, developed by the OECD, 
identifi ed 195 high-tech product categories from 5-digit Standard International 
Trade Classifi cation (SITC) codes. Because the HS classifi cation is more detailed and 
comparable across countries at the 6-digit level, we concord both lists into 6-digit 
HS product categories. We convert the OECD product list to 328 6-digit HS codes 
on the basis of concordance between SITC (rev3) and HS (2002) published by the 
United Nations Statistical Division. 
To condense the U.S. Census ATP list from the 10-digit HS to the 6-digit HS, we 
fi rst calculate the ATP value share in both U.S. imports from the world at the HS-6 
level based on U.S. trade statistics in 2006, bearing in mind that within each HS-6 
heading, some of the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS)–10 lines are consid-
ered to be ATPs and others are not. We choose two separate cutoff points. For a 
narrow ATP defi nition, we select the 6-digit HS categories in which the ATP share is 
100 percent in total U.S. imports from the world according to the Census ATP list, 
which results in 92 HS-6 lines. For a wider ATP defi nition, we select the 6-digit HS 
categories in which the ATP share is at least 25 percent in total U.S. imports from 
the world, which results in 157 HS-6 lines. We use the 6-digit HS code in which all 
products are in the Census ATP list and also in the OECD high-tech product list as 
our narrow defi nition of ATP. For a wider ATP defi nition, we deem an HS-6 line 
as ATP if it is in the OECD high-tech product list or at least 25 percent of its value 
is ATP products in U.S. imports from the world according to the Census ATP list. 
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The recent literature documents signifi cant variations within the same product. 
Although both developed and developing countries may export products under 
the same 6-digit HS code, their unit value usually varies signifi cantly, largely 
refl ecting the difference in quality between the exports. To allow for the pos-
sibility that a very large difference in unit values may signal different products 
misclassifi ed in the same 6-digit category, we take unit value for all products from 
Japan, EU15, and the United States (G-3 for short) in our narrow ATP defi ni-
tion as reference; any products with a unit value below the G-3 unit value minus 
5 times standard deviation will not be counted as ATP. This provides our third 
defi nition of ATP. 
Data and Basic Facts
The EXPY measure requires data on trade fl ow and per capita GDP. We com-
puted EXPY for both a short and a long sample. For the short sample, dating 
from 1992 to 2006, the data on country exports come from the United Nations 
COMTRADE database, downloaded from the World Integrated Trade Solution 
(WITS). The data from 1992 to 2006 are at the 6-digit HS (1988/1992 version), 
covering 5,016 product categories and 167 countries. For the long sample, dating 
from 1962 to 2000, the trade fl ow data are taken from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER)-UN data compiled by Feenstra and colleagues (2005), 
which can be downloaded from the NBER website. The data are at 4-digit SITC 
(rev 2), covering 700 to more than 1,000 product categories and 72 countries. The 
per capita GDP data on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis are taken from the 
Penn World Table.
The modifi ed EXPY measure also requires data on unit value. These data are 
obtained from Ferrantino, Feinberg, and Deason (2008), who obtained them from 
the UN COMTRADE database. The data are for the year 2005 only and are cleaned 
of products that do not have well-defi ned quantity units, have inconsistent reporting, 
have small value, or have unit value belonging to a 2.5 percent tail of the distribution 
of the product’s unit values. In total, the resulting unit value data set covers 3,628 
6-digit HS subheadings.
The other two export sophistication indexes—EDI and ATP share (narrow, broad)—
are computed excluding HS chapters 1–27 (agricultural and mineral  products), as well 
as raw materials and their simple transformations (mostly at the 4-digit level) in other 
HS chapters. A list of excluded products is reported in appendix table 1. Each coun-
try’s ATP export share is computed by the country’s ATP exports divided by its total 
manufacturing exports. Our sample of countries is listed in appendix table 2. 
The other explanatory variables included in the growth regressions are human 
capital, per capita GDP, and institutional quality. The human capital variable in 
the cross-country regressions uses the average school year in the Barro-Lee educa-
tion database. Per capita GDP is on a PPP basis and is taken from the Penn World 
Table. The institutional quality variable is proxied by the government effective-
ness index downloaded from the World Bank and Transparency International 
websites.4 
DOES A LEAPFROGGING GROWTH STRATEGY RAISE THE GROWTH RATE?   |    211
Do Leapfroggers Grow Faster? An Examination of 
Cross-Country Evidence
We now formally examine if a leapfrogging growth strategy produces a faster rate of 
economic growth in a robust and reliable way.
The Elusive Growth Effect of a Leapfrogging Strategy
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) provide the most recent and best known 
paper to offer an empirical foundation for the proposition that a leapfrogging strategy 
as measured by a country’s export sophistication delivers a faster economic growth 
rate. We begin our statistical analysis by taking a careful look at their specifi cations, 
with a view to checking the robustness of their conclusion. In particular, we follow 
their econometric strategy, regressing the economic growth rate across countries on 
a leapfrogging measure and other control variables that are typically included in 
empirical growth papers. After replicating their regressions with EXPY as the leap-
frogging proxy, we use the alternative measures discussed above: modifi ed EXP, 
the EDI indicator, and the ATP shares. 
Table 1 shows our replication of the Hausmann and colleagues cross-section 
regressions for the short sample of 1992–2003 (corresponding to their table 8). The 
controls include human capital and a measure of institutional quality. Since the 
source of their rule of law index is not clearly stated, we use four other well-known 
institutional variables: corruption, government effectiveness, regulation quality, and 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) score. In the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, 
the coeffi cients on the fi rst three institution measures are signifi cant; in particular, 
the coeffi cient on regulation quality (0.013) is close to Hausmann and colleagues’ 
coeffi cient on their rule of law index (0.011). Columns 1, 2, 7, and 8 in table 1 can 
be compared with the corresponding regression in Hausmann and colleagues’ table 
8; the coeffi cients on the initial per capita GDP and human capital variables are 
basically the same as theirs. While the coeffi cients on log initial EXPY have different 
magnitudes than Hausmann and colleagues’ results for the same sample period of 
1992–2003, they are all statistically signifi cant (though not as strong, depending on 
the institutional variable) and are positive, like theirs. A possible explanation for 
the difference in the size of the coeffi cients is that trade data for the countries in the 
1992–2003 sample have been revised. The bottom line from this replication exercise 
is that the Hausmann and colleagues results can be replicated. 
In the next step, we replaced the EXPY variable with alternative measures of 
export sophistication—modifi ed EXPY, EDI, and the ATP shares—and reestimated 
the regressions. The results for each of these variables are displayed in tables 2–5. 
In table 2, the coeffi cient on the modifi ed EXPY is statistically insignifi cant in all but 
the fi rst specifi cation with only human capital as control, even as the direction of the 
coeffi cients and signifi cance on initial per capita GDP, human capital, and institu-
tional variables remains the same as in table 1. This remains true whether EDI or the 
broad defi nition of ATP is used as the export sophistication measure, as shown in 
tables 3 and 4. However, the coeffi cient on the ATP share using a more stringent 
TABLE 1. Cross-National Growth Regressions Using EXPY as Proposed by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 1992–2003
Dependent variable: growth rate of per capita GDP over 1992–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV
Log initial GDP/cap  –0.011  –0.02  –0.025  –0.026  –0.03  –0.023  –0.009  –0.017  –0.025  –0.025  –0.024  –0.02
 [0.005]*  [0.007]**  [0.007]**  [0.006]**  [0.007]**  [0.007]**  [0.006]  [0.011]  [0.012]*  [0.010]*  [0.011]*  [0.012]
Log initial EXPY  0.036  0.029  0.025  0.019  0.03  0.027  0.031  0.023  0.023  0.016  0.025  0.023
 [0.011]**  [0.011]*  [0.010]*  [0.010]  [0.010]**  [0.011]*  [0.014]*  [0.015]  [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.013]  [0.014]
Log human capital  0.033  0.028  0.026  0.021  0.029  0.03  0.029  0.024  0.016  0.029
 [0.012]*  [0.012]*  [0.010]*  [0.010]*  [0.013]*  [0.017]  [0.015]*  [0.012]*  [0.012]  [0.016]
Corruption  0.008  0.008
 [0.003]*  [0.004]
Government effectiveness  0.013  0.013
 [0.003]**  [0.004]**
Regulation quality  0.021  0.018
 [0.005]**  [0.006]**
Cpi score  0.002  0.001
 [0.001]  [0.002]
Constant  –0.193  –0.114  –0.023  0.041  –0.029  –0.066  –0.168  –0.079  –0.014  0.054  –0.019  –0.057
 [0.066]**  [0.072]  [0.065]  [0.074]  [0.061]  [0.070]  [0.078]*  [0.080]  [0.064]  [0.069]  [0.062]  [0.072]
Observations  52  42  42  42  42  42  52  42  42  42  42  42
R-squared  0.24  0.35  0.41  0.5  0.53  0.38
Hansen J  0.93  1.69  1.61  0.82  0.35  1.95
Chi-sq p-value              0.33  0.19  0.2  0.36  0.56  0.16
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; instruments for IV regressions are log(population) and log(land).
 * signifi cant at 5%. 
** signifi cant at 1%.
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TABLE 2. Alternative Measure of Export Sophistication — Unit-Value-Adjusted Implied Income in the Export Bundle: 
Modifi ed EXPY, 1992–2003
Dependent variable: growth rate of per capita GDP over 1992–2003  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV
Log initial GDP/cap  –0.004  –0.016  –0.02  –0.023  –0.022  –0.018  –0.005  –0.017  –0.032  –0.034  –0.031  –0.022
 [0.004]  [0.006]*  [0.006]**  [0.006]**  [0.007]**  [0.006]**  [0.005]  [0.011]  [0.017]  [0.012]**  [0.013]*  [0.016]
Log initial modifi ed EXPY  0.011  0.009  0.004  –0.001  0.004  0.006  0.012  0.01  0.006  –0.001  0.005  0.008
 [0.004]**  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.006]  [0.004]**  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]
Log human capital  0.033  0.03  0.027  0.025  0.031  0.035  0.041  0.038  0.033  0.035
 [0.014]*  [0.013]*  [0.011]*  [0.012]  [0.014]*  [0.023]  [0.024]  [0.016]*  [0.018]  [0.024]
Corruption  0.009  0.013
 [0.003]*  [0.009]
Government effectiveness  0.016  0.021
 [0.004]**  [0.007]**
Regulation quality  0.019  0.024
 [0.007]*  [0.010]*
Cpi score  0.002  0.002
 [0.002]  [0.003]
Constant  –0.024  0.037  0.123  0.195  0.144  0.077  –0.023  0.038  0.188  0.264  0.193  0.085
 [0.029]  [0.043]  [0.052]*  [0.061]**  [0.052]**  [0.050]  [0.029]  [0.048]  [0.125]  [0.103]*  [0.086]*  [0.089]
Observations  52  42  42  42  42  42  52  42  42  42  42  42
R-squared  0.17  0.28  0.34  0.45  0.4  0.3
Hansen J  0.11  1.05  1.22  0.66  0.13  1.49
Chi-sq p-value              0.74  0.31  0.27  0.42  0.72  0.22
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; instruments for IV regressions are log(population) and log(land).
 * signifi cant at 5%. 
** signifi cant at 1%.21
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TABLE 3. Cross-National Growth Regressions with ATP Share (Narrow Defi nition), 1992–2003 
 Dependent variable: growth rate of per capita GDP over 1992–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV
log initial GDP/cap  –0.002  –0.015  –0.021  –0.023  –0.022  –0.019  –0.008  –0.017  –0.033  –0.026  –0.03  –0.026
 [0.003]  [0.006]*  [0.007]**  [0.007]**  [0.007]**  [0.007]*  [0.006]  [0.015]  [0.019]  [0.014]  [0.020]  [0.020]
initial ATP share (narrow)  0.087  0.076  0.069  0.049  0.056  0.07  0.112  0.083  0.077  0.05  0.055  0.081
 [0.026]**  [0.027]**  [0.024]**  [0.027]  [0.023]*  [0.025]**  [0.034]**  [0.030]**  [0.022]**  [0.025]*  [0.022]*  [0.024]**
log human capital  0.036  0.03  0.027  0.026  0.031  0.041  0.042  0.03  0.035  0.039
 [0.014]*  [0.013]*  [0.011]*  [0.013]  [0.014]*  [0.032]  [0.023]  [0.018]  [0.023]  [0.026]
corruption  0.009  0.015
 [0.003]**  [0.009]
government effectiveness  0.014  0.015
 [0.004]**  [0.008]*
regulation quality  0.018  0.024
 [0.006]**  [0.015]
cpi score  0.003  0.004
 [0.002]  [0.004]
Constant  0.054  0.098  0.164  0.181  0.172  0.129  0.105  0.112  0.241  0.198  0.225  0.173
 [0.030]  [0.036]**  [0.045]**  [0.043]**  [0.042]**  [0.044]**  [0.056]  [0.071]  [0.119]*  [0.088]*  [0.124]  [0.111]
Observations  52  42  42  42  42  42  52  42  42  42  42  42
R-squared  0.13  0.32  0.41  0.49  0.44  0.36
Hansen J  0  0.59  0.16  0.02  0.07  0.72
Chi-sq p-value              0.97  0.44  0.69  0.88  0.78  0.4
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; instruments for IV regressions are log(population) and log(land).
 * signifi cant at 5%. 
** signifi cant at 1%.
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TABLE 4. Cross-National Growth Regressions with ATP Share (Broad) as a Measure of Sophistication, 1992–2003 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita over 1992–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV
log initial GDP/cap  –0.002  –0.014  –0.021  –0.023  –0.023  –0.019  –0.007  –0.018  –0.033  –0.028  –0.03  –0.027
 [0.004]  [0.006]*  [0.007]**  [0.006]**  [0.007]**  [0.007]*  [0.006]  [0.014]  [0.017]  [0.013]*  [0.017]  [0.018]
initial ATP share (broad)  0.056  0.041  0.035  0.019  0.031  0.036  0.074  0.049  0.046  0.022  0.034  0.048
 [0.022]*  [0.026]  [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.020]  [0.024]  [0.028]**  [0.028]  [0.020]*  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.022]*
log human capital  0.036  0.029  0.027  0.025  0.031  0.044  0.041  0.031  0.032  0.039
 [0.014]*  [0.013]*  [0.011]*  [0.013]  [0.014]*  [0.030]  [0.023]  [0.018]  [0.021]  [0.026]
corruption  0.01  0.015
 [0.003]**  [0.008]
government effectiveness  0.015  0.017
 [0.004]**  [0.007]*
regulation quality  0.019  0.024
 [0.006]**  [0.012]
cpi score  0.003  0.004
 [0.002]  [0.003]
Constant  0.055  0.097  0.164  0.183  0.178  0.129  0.094  0.118  0.244  0.212  0.222  0.18
 [0.032]  [0.036]*  [0.045]**  [0.041]**  [0.043]**  [0.044]**  [0.049]  [0.067]  [0.108]*  [0.082]**  [0.104]*  [0.101]
Observations  52  42  42  42  42  42  52  42  42  42  42  42
R-squared  0.09  0.26  0.36  0.46  0.41  0.31
Hansen J  0.03  1.2  0.48  0.23  0.01  1.34
Chi-sq p-value              0.85  0.27  0.49  0.63  0.91  0.25
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; instruments for IV regressions are log(population) and log(land).
 * signifi cant at 5%. 
** signifi cant at 1%.
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TABLE 5. Cross-National Growth Regressions with EDI as a Measure of Leapfrogging, 1992–2003
Dependent variable: growth rate of per capita GDP over 1992–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV
log initial GDP/cap  –0.005  –0.017  –0.024  –0.026  –0.025  –0.021  –0.007  –0.02  –0.035  –0.034  –0.03  –0.031
 [0.004]  [0.007]*  [0.007]**  [0.006]**  [0.007]**  [0.007]**  [0.004]  [0.008]*  [0.010]**  [0.008]**  [0.011]**  [0.009]**
log initial EDI  –0.025  –0.011  –0.001  0.008  –0.007  –0.002  –0.029  –0.012  –0.011  0.002  –0.01  –0.011
 [0.012]*  [0.014]  [0.012]  [0.010]  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.015]*  [0.017]  [0.014]  [0.011]  [0.015]  [0.015]
log human capital  0.038  0.029  0.027  0.026  0.03  0.044  0.043  0.036  0.031  0.044
 [0.014]**  [0.013]*  [0.011]*  [0.013]*  [0.014]*  [0.019]*  [0.017]*  [0.014]*  [0.016]  [0.018]*
corruption  0.012  0.016
 [0.004]**  [0.005]**
government effectiveness  0.018  0.021
 [0.004]**  [0.005]**
regulation quality  0.019  0.023
 [0.007]**  [0.010]*
cpi score  0.004  0.005
 [0.002]*  [0.002]*
Constant  0.213  0.174  0.195  0.165  0.233  0.162  0.248  0.197  0.318  0.246  0.286  0.264
 [0.081]*  [0.104]  [0.095]*  [0.083]  [0.108]*  [0.097]  [0.103]*  [0.122]  [0.114]**  [0.085]**  [0.130]*  [0.111]*
Observations  52  41  41  41  41  41  52  41  41  41  41  41
R-squared  0.09  0.23  0.37  0.48  0.36  0.31
Hansen J  0.97  1.36  1.26  0.39  0.15  2.08
Chi-sq p-value              0.33  0.24  0.26  0.53  0.7  0.15
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; instruments for IV regressions are log(population) and log(land).
 * signifi cant at 5%. 
** signifi cant at 1%.
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colleagues’ measure of sophistication by taking into account possible differences in 
unit values when computing the implied income in an export bundle makes the 
positive association disappear. It may be too early to conclude that pursuing a 
leapfrogging strategy will raise a country’s growth rate.
Does Growth in Sophistication Lead to Growth in Income? 
The level of a country’s export sophistication may not capture policy incentives or 
other government actions. If a country pursues an education policy that generates 
an unusually large pool of scientists and engineers, its level of export sophistication 
may surpass what can be predicted solely on the basis of its income or endowment. 
A useful alternative empirical strategy is to look at the growth of a country’s export 
sophistication. Holding the initial levels of export sophistication constant, would 
countries that have an unusually fast increase in sophistication also have an unusu-
ally high rate of economic growth?
In table 6, we rank the 49 countries in our sample by descending order on the 
pace of the growth of their export sophistication. As an intuitive “smell test,” we pay 
particular attention to where Ireland and China fi t, as both countries are often cited 
as examples of extensive government programs to promote industrial transformation 
toward high-tech industries. All fi ve measures are able to capture China as having 
experienced a high level of change in its export sophistication. But only the modi-
fi ed EXPY variable is able to capture both China and Ireland as having undergone 
a signifi cant change in export sophistication during the period. This strengthens our 
confi dence in the relative adequacy of the modifi ed EXPY against the original EXPY 
in capturing leapfrogging in industrial structure.
Table 7 shows the regression results with this specifi cation for all fi ve export 
sophistication measures and their changes over the 1992–2003 period. The initial 
GDP level, human capital, and institutional variables all have the correct signs. None 
of the export sophistication growth variables enter signifi cantly into the regression. 
But the most conspicuous fi nding is connected to the initial export sophistication 
measures: all but the EXPY variable are insignifi cant with this specifi cation. In con-
trast to the previous specifi cation, the ATP share is no longer signifi cant either. This 
again shows that when export sophistication is constructed in alternative ways, it no 
longer indicates a signifi cant impact on growth. These results cast doubt on the view 
that leapfrogging leads to higher growth. 
Panel Regressions with Instrumental Variables
The cross-section regressions assume that productivity growth is the same for 
all countries except for differences in the leapfrog policies. As an extension that 
relaxes this assumption, we turn to a panel analysis with separate country fi xed 
effects. New challenges emerge with the panel analysis: One has to deal with 
TABLE 6. Ranking Growth in Export Sophistication, 1992–2003 
Ranking Country EXPY Country
Modifi ed 
EXPY Country
ATP 
(narrow) Country
ATP 
(broad) Country EDI
 1 Hungary  3.14 Ireland  5.54 Malaysia  1.50 Malaysia  2.01 Australia  –2.32
 2 Bangladesh  3.12 Hungary  4.44 Iceland  1.41 Hungary  1.93 Korea, Rep.  –1.70
 3 Kenya  3.05 Madagascar  4.38 China  1.20 China  1.88 Oman  –1.56
 4 Madagascar  2.78 Kenya  3.55 Singapore  1.09 Finland  1.31 Hungary  –1.50
 5 Korea, Rep.  2.10 Ecuador  3.41 Netherlands  0.88 Singapore  1.10 Mexico  –1.46
 6 Thailand  2.07 Indonesia  3.22 Hungary  0.56 Korea, Rep.  1.09 Kenya  –1.45
 7 China  2.03 South Africa  3.12 Indonesia  0.50 Iceland  1.08 Greece  –1.42
 8 Trinidad and Tobago 1.96 Bangladesh  3.04 Thailand  0.49 Netherlands  1.04 Thailand  –1.40
 9 Paraguay  1.89 Singapore  3.01 Korea, Rep.  0.40 Indonesia  0.95 Indonesia  –1.38
10 Singapore  1.83 China  2.98 Mexico  0.33 Mexico  0.93 Turkey  –1.35
11 Turkey  1.82 Brunei  2.98 Portugal  0.33 Thailand  0.70 Portugal  –1.28
12 Colombia  1.50 Turkey  2.91 St. Lucia  0.20 Greece  0.64 Ecuador  –1.09
13 Iceland  1.40 Malaysia  2.87 Tunisia  0.16 Croatia  0.61 China  –1.02
14 Malaysia  1.37 Thailand  2.61 Switzerland  0.15 Switzerland  0.59 India  –1.00
15 Cyprus  1.30 Korea, Rep.  2.29 Australia  0.15 Brazil  0.54 Spain  –0.98
16 Bolivia  1.24 Greece  2.05 Finland  0.15 Denmark  0.49 Saudi Arabia  –0.96
17 Portugal  1.24 Portugal  1.96 Bolivia  0.13 Portugal  0.45 Malaysia  –0.79
18 Croatia  1.16 Cyprus  1.94 Sweden  0.13 St. Lucia  0.42 Colombia  –0.73
19 Greece  1.15 Colombia  1.78 Greece  0.11 Australia  0.39 Sweden  –0.63
20 Finland  1.12 Tunisia  1.75 Kenya  0.09 New Zealand  0.39 Denmark  –0.59
21 India  1.08 Croatia  1.70 Croatia  0.09 Paraguay  0.30 Paraguay  –0.55
22 Ecuador  1.01 Mexico  1.67 India  0.08 Tunisia  0.26 New Zealand  –0.54
23 Mexico  0.99 Iceland  1.41 New Zealand  0.08 Sweden  0.24 Romania  –0.51
2
1
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24 Indonesia  0.90 Sri Lanka  1.35 Denmark  0.07 Romania  0.21 Iceland  –0.50
25 Sri Lanka  0.86 New Zealand  1.24 Cyprus  0.05 Kenya  0.20 St. Lucia  –0.48
26 South Africa  0.86 St. Lucia  1.15 Romania  0.05 India  0.15 Brazil  –0.46
27 Switzerland  0.65 Australia  1.06 Algeria  0.04 Bolivia  0.14 Cyprus  –0.46
28 Australia  0.63 India  1.06 Saudi Arabia  0.03 Algeria  0.14 Japan  –0.43
29 New Zealand  0.54 Netherlands  1.04 Paraguay  0.03 Saudi Arabia  0.10 Tunisia  –0.42
30 Oman  0.52 Switzerland  0.98 Ecuador  0.03 Turkey  0.08 South Africa  –0.40
31 Ireland  0.31 Finland  0.93 Peru  0.01 Chile  0.05 Croatia  –0.39
32 Brazil  0.27 Denmark  0.91 Chile  0.01 Spain  0.03 Sri Lanka  –0.37
33 Tunisia  0.27 Bolivia  0.88 Turkey  0.01 Peru  0.02 Canada  –0.36
34 Denmark  0.27 Paraguay  0.80 Bangladesh  0.00 Japan  0.02 Peru  –0.31
35 Japan  0.25 Spain  0.67 South Africa  0.00 Bangladesh  0.01 Singapore  –0.25
36 Sweden  0.25 Peru  0.66 Belize  0.00 Belize  0.01 Bolivia  –0.22
37 Netherlands  0.20 Brazil  0.24 Trinidad and Tobago 0.00 Trinidad and Tobago 0.00 Algeria  –0.07
38 St. Lucia  0.20 Japan  0.24 Brunei  0.00 Canada  0.00 Brunei  –0.01
39 Spain  0.20 Sweden  0.17 Jamaica  0.00 Brunei  0.00 Bangladesh  –0.01
40 Canada  0.17 Algeria  0.11 Spain  –0.01 Jamaica  –0.01 Netherlands  0.00
41 Chile  0.07 Chile  0.09 Japan  –0.01 Ecuador  –0.02 Chile  0.00
42 Algeria  0.01 Macao  –0.22 Colombia  –0.02 Madagascar  –0.02 Switzerland  0.01
43 Brunei  –0.03 Canada  –0.37 Madagascar  –0.02 Sri Lanka  –0.03 Belize  0.02
44 Saudi Arabia  –0.07 Belize  –0.42 Brazil  –0.03 Cyprus  –0.05 Trinidad and Tobago 0.04
45 Jamaica  –0.25 Saudi Arabia  –0.50 Sri Lanka  –0.04 Colombia  –0.05 Finland  0.11
46 Macao  –0.40 Oman  –0.51 Macao  –0.06 Ireland  –0.08 Madagascar  0.14
47 Romania  –0.68 Romania  –0.91 Ireland  –0.15 South Africa  –0.10 Jamaica  0.16
48 Peru  –0.84 Trinidad and Tobago –2.74 Canada  –0.24 Macao  –0.13 Ireland  0.34
49 Belize  –1.09 Jamaica  –3.17 Oman  –0.25 Oman  –0.23 Macao  0.48
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; instruments for IV regressions are log(population) and log(land).
 * signifi cant at 5%. 
** signifi cant at 1%.21
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defi nition is positively signifi cant across all specifi cations. We will show in the next 
section that even this result is not robust.
To summarize, the positive association between a country’s export sophistica-
tion and economic growth rate is not a strong and robust pattern of the data. In 
particular, alternative measures of export sophistication often produce statistically 
insignifi cant coeffi cients. For example, a reasonable adjustment to Hausmann and 
TABLE 7. Cross-National Growth Regressions, with Growth in Export Sophistication 
As Key Regressor 
Dependent variable: growth in real per capita GDP, 1992–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log initial per capita GDP  –0.028  –0.02  –0.02  –0.02  –0.02
 [0.005]**  [0.005]**  [0.005]**  [0.005]**  [0.005]**
human capital  0.016  0.021  0.022  0.019  0.023
 [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.010]*  [0.010]  [0.011]
regulation quality  0.018  0.015  0.015  0.016  0.018
 [0.006]**  [0.007]*  [0.006]*  [0.006]*  [0.007]*
log initial EXPY  0.032
 [0.009]**
growth in log EXPY  0.252
 [0.240]
log initial modifi ed EXPY  0.005
 [0.005]
growth in log modifi ed EXPY  0.081
 [0.153]
initial ATP share (narrow)  0.04
 [0.031]
growth in ATP share (narrow)  0.891
 [0.567]
initial ATP share (broad)  0.026
 [0.023]
growth in ATP share (broad)  0.731
 [0.388]
initial log EDI  –0.001
 [0.015]
growth in log EDI  –0.003
 [0.407]
Constant  –0.06  0.12  0.16  0.162  0.17
 [0.070]  [0.052]*  [0.033]**  [0.033]**  [0.095]
Observations  41  41  41  41  39
R-squared  0.51  0.36  0.44  0.43  0.33
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets.
* signifi cant at 5%. 
** signifi cant at 1%.
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shorter time intervals and must have instrumental variables that have meaningful 
time-series variations. 
We do not have clever instrumental variables. For lack of better ones, we experi-
ment with the idea that the professional background and educational preparedness of 
a political leader may affect his or her choice of economic strategy and are therefore 
candidates for instrumental variables. The idea is imported from Dreher and col-
leagues (2009). After constructing a database of profession and education for more 
than 500 political leaders from 73 countries for the period 1970–2002, we found 
that pro-market reforms are more likely to be proposed and implemented by lead-
ers who are former entrepreneurs or scientists. Educational background sometimes 
has an infl uence, but the effect is not robust. We follow the approach of Dreher and 
colleagues and, in fact, borrow their data set. One set of dummies codifi es the educa-
tional background for chief executives: law, economics, politics, natural science, and 
other. Another set of dummies codifi es the professions of chief executives before they 
took offi ce: entrepreneur, white collar, blue collar, union executive, science, econom-
ics, law, military, politician, and other. We use this set of variables as instruments 
for export sophistication.
These instruments are not ideal. In the fi rst-stage regressions (not reported), we 
cannot confi rm the fi ndings by Dreher and colleagues (2009) that former entre-
preneurs or former scientists-turned-politicians do things differently in the context 
of a leapfrogging strategy. However, there is some evidence that leaders who are 
former blue collar workers or former labor union executives are more likely to 
pursue a leapfrogging strategy (when leapfrogging is measured by the criterion of 
EDI). There is also some evidence that lifetime politicians are more likely to pursue 
a leapfrogging strategy. 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausmann chi-square test fails to reject the null that the OLS and 
the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates are different (with a p-value of 0.50). This 
might imply that there is no signifi cant endogeneity issue in the current context, and 
that an IV approach is not necessary. On the other hand, the F statistics (for the null 
that all regressors are jointly zero) is only 3.08. So we cannot rule out the possibility 
that these leader background variables are weak instruments. 
For what it is worth, table 8 shows the second-stage growth regression results for 
the long sample of 1970–2000, using EXPY and EDI as measures of export sophisti-
cation. Unfortunately, we cannot use the ATP shares, as they are not available for early 
years. Panel A shows the results using EXPY as export sophistication. To compare 
with the analysis in Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007), our sample starts a few 
years later (as opposed to their 1962–2000). Our OLS estimation closely replicates 
their estimates: the coeffi cient on initial GDP per capita is negative and signifi cant 
at –0.001, the coeffi cient on initial EXPY is positive and signifi cant at 0.02, and the 
coeffi cient on human capital is positive and signifi cant at 0.01. In the fi xed effects 
and IV specifi cations, neither of the coeffi cients on initial EXPY is signifi cant, despite 
the improved Hansen-J statistics given our set of instruments. The R-squared of our 
regression for the OLS case is more than twice as large as theirs, despite the simi-
larities in the estimates. Panel B shows the results for the same regression, replacing 
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EXPY with EDI. None of the export sophistication variables are signifi cant, while the 
initial per capita GDP and human capital variables are both signifi cant. We conclude 
that in the panel regressions, no strong and robust support exists for the notion that 
a leapfrogging strategy promotes growth (subject to the caveat that we may not have 
found powerful instruments).
TABLE 8. Long Sample, Panel Regressions with Fixed Effects
A. EXPY
5-year panels
(1) (2) (3)
 OLS  FE  IV
log initial GDP/cap  –0.0103  –0.0479  –0.0113
 [0.0027]**  [0.0060]**  [0.0104]
log initial EXPY  0.0208  0.0027  0.0223
 [0.0055]**  [0.0091]  [0.0423]
log human capital  0.0116  –0.0102  0.0088
 [0.0027]**  [0.0065]  [0.0078]
Constant  –0.059  0.3688  –0.0573
 [0.0379]  [0.0788]**  [0.3033]
Observations  640  640  369
R-squared  0.39  0.47
First-stage F stat  1.35
Hansen J-statistics (p-value)      0.186
B. EDI
5-year panels    
(1) (2) (3)
 OLS  FE  IV
log initial GDP/cap  –0.0065  –0.0517  –0.0097
 [0.0026]*  [0.0062]**  [0.0054]
log initial EDI  –0.0117  0.004  –0.0271
 [0.0071]  [0.0191]  [0.0180]
log human capital  0.0128  –0.0256  0.0081
 [0.0030]**  [0.0079]**  [0.0041]*
Constant  0.1555  0.4266  0.2709
 [0.0473]**  [0.1136]**  [0.1222]*
Observations  475  475  314
R-squared  0.43  0.59
First-stage F stat  3.08
Hansen J-statistics (p-value)      0.089
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; the instruments are professions and educational back-
ground of political leaders from Dreher and others 2009.
 * signifi cant at 5%. 
** signifi cant at 1%.
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Conclusion
Transforming an economy’s economic structure ahead of its income level toward 
higher domestic value added and more sophisticated sectors is desirable in the 
abstract. Many governments have pursued policies to bring about such a transforma-
tion. There are examples of success—government policies that result in the expansion 
of a certain industry. However, any such policy promotion takes resources away 
from other industries, especially those that are consistent with the country’s factor 
endowment and level of development. On balance, the effect is conceptually less 
clear. Given the popularity of leapfrogging strategies, it is important to evaluate 
empirically whether they work. Unfortunately, evaluation is diffi cult, because it is 
not straightforward to quantify the degree of leapfrogging an economy may exhibit. 
Typical data on production structures are not suffi ciently refi ned, and most relevant 
policies are not easily quantifi able or comparable across countries.
One way to gauge the degree of leapfrogging is by inferring from a country’s 
detailed export data. We pursue this strategy by developing a number of different 
ways to measure leapfrogging from revealed sophistication in a country’s exports, 
while recognizing that any particular measure may have both advantages and short-
comings. It should be noted here that none of the measures is perfect. For example, 
the presence of processing trade—use of imported inputs in the production for 
exports—could introduce a bias in all such measures. Processing trade has a signifi -
cant presence in some countries. For example, Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) 
estimated that the actual domestic value added is only about 50 percent of China’s 
gross exports.
After a battery of analyses, a succinct summary of the fi ndings is a lack of strong 
and robust support for the notion that a leapfrogging industrial policy can reliably 
raise economic growth. Again, there are individual success stories, but there are also 
failures. If leapfrogging is a policy gamble, no systematic evidence suggests that the 
odds are favorable.
We conclude by noting again two distinct aspects of a growth model that embraces 
the world market. The fi rst aspect is export orientation—an investment environment 
with few policy impediments to fi rms participating in international trade. While we 
do not reproduce the vast quantity of analysis on this, we do not doubt its valid-
ity. The second aspect is leapfrogging—the use of policy instruments to engineer a 
faster industrial transformation than what may emerge naturally on the basis of an 
economy’s stage of development and factor endowment. We cast some doubt on how 
effective such a strategy is empirically. 
Important follow-up research remains to be done. First, part of the leapfrog-
ging strategy works on the “import side,” which our empirical strategy does not 
fully capture; for example, the use of tariff and other policies to reduce imports of 
high-tech or high value-added products to give domestically produced substitutes 
some space. One can imagine how such a strategy could backfi re, but a systematic 
examination of the data would be useful. Second, while a leapfrogging strategy 
might not work in general, moderate and subtle versions of the strategy exist that 
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aim not to defy comparative advantage generally but to explore latent comparative 
advantage—the economic structure a country would have evolved into naturally 
in the next stage. Is a pattern of latent comparative advantage identifi able and 
explorable on a systematic basis? We leave these topics for future research.
APPENDIX TABLE 1. HS Products Excluded from Export Data
HS Code Description HS Code Description
01–24 Agricultural products 25–27 Mineral products
4103 Other raw hides and skins (fresh, o  8002 Tin waste and scrap.
4104 Tanned or crust hides and skins of  8101 Tungsten (wolfram) and articles the
4105 Tanned or crust skins of sheep or l  8102 Molybdenum and articles thereof, in
4106 Tanned or crust hides and skins of  8103 Tantalum and articles thereof, incl
4402 Wood charcoal (including shell or n  8104 Magnesium and articles thereof, inc
4403 Wood in the rough, whether or not s  8105 Cobalt mattes and other intermediate
7201 Pig iron and spiegeleisen in pigs,  8106 Bismuth and articles thereof, inclu
7202 Ferro-alloys.  8107 Cadmium and articles thereof, inclu
7204 Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting  8108 Titanium and articles thereof, incl
7404 Copper waste and scrap.  8109 Zirconium and articles thereof, inc
7501 Nickel mattes, nickel oxide sinters  8110 Antimony and articles thereof, incl
7502 Unwrought nickel.  8111 Manganese and articles thereof, inc
7503 Nickel waste and scrap.  8112 Beryllium, chromium, germanium, van
7601 Unwrought aluminum.  8113 Cermets and articles thereof, inclu
7602 Aluminum waste and scrap.  9701 Paintings, drawings and pastels, ex
7801 Unwrought lead.  9702 Original engravings, prints and lit
7802 Lead waste and scrap.  9703 Original sculptures and statuary, i
7901 Unwrought zinc.  9704 Postage or revenue stamps, stamp-po
7902 Zinc waste and scrap.  9705 Collections and collectors’ pieces
8001 Unwrought tin.  9706 Antiques of an age exceeding one 
hundred years
530521 Coconut, abaca (Manila hemp or Musa  811252 Beryllium, chromium, germanium, van
APPENDIX TABLE 2. Countries (165) Included in the Sample Used in Cross-Country Regression
Code
Reporting country/
economy
# Year 
reported Code
Reporting country/
economy
# Year 
reported Code Reporting country
# Year 
reported
ABW Aruba  5 GBR United Kingdom  14 NCL New Caledonia  8
AIA Anguilla  6 GEO Georgia  11 NER Niger  11
ALB Albania  11 GHA Ghana  10 NGA Nigeria  8
AND Andorra  12 GIN Guinea  8 NIC Nicaragua  14
ARG Argentina  14 GMB Gambia, The  12 NLD Netherlands  15
ARM Armenia  9 GRC Greece  15 NOR Norway  14
AUS Australia  15 GRD Grenada  14 NPL Nepal  5
AUT Austria  13 GRL Greenland  13 NZL New Zealand  15
AZE Azerbaijan  11 GTM Guatemala  14 OMN Oman  15
BDI Burundi  14 GUY Guyana  10 PAK Pakistan  4
BEL Belgium  8 HKG Hong Kong SAR, China  14 PAN Panama  12
BEN Benin  8 HND Honduras  13 PER Peru  14
BFA Burkina Faso  10 HRV Croatia  15 PHL Philippines  11
BGD Bangladesh  12 HTI Haiti  6 PNG Papua New Guinea  6
BGR Bulgaria  11 HUN Hungary  15 POL Poland  13
BHR Bahrain  7 IDN Indonesia  15 PRT Portugal  15
BHS Bahamas, The  6 IND India  15 PRY Paraguay  15
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina  4 IRL Ireland  15 PYF French Polynesia  11
BLR Belarus  9 IRN Iran, Islamic Rep.  10 QAT Qatar  7
BLZ Belize  15 ISL Iceland  15 ROM Romania  15
BOL Bolivia  15 ISR Israel  12 RUS Russian Federation  11
BRA Brazil  15 ITA Italy  13 RWA Rwanda  10
BRB Barbados  10 JAM Jamaica  13 SAU Saudi Arabia  14
BRN Brunei  9 JOR Jordan  12 SDN Sudan  12
BTN Bhutan  4 JPN Japan  15 SEN Senegal  11
BWA Botswana  7 KAZ Kazakhstan  7 SER Yugoslavia  11
CAF Central African Republic  13 KEN Kenya  11 SGP Singapore  15
CAN Canada  15 KGZ Kyrgyz Republic  9 SLV El Salvador  13
(continued)
2
2
5
CHE Switzerland  15 KHM Cambodia  5 STP São Tomé and Principe  8
CHL Chile  15 KIR Kiribati  6 SUR Suriname  6
CHN China  15 KNA St. Kitts and Nevis  13 SVK Slovak Republic  13
CIV Côte d’Ivoire  12 KOR Korea, Rep.  15 SVN Slovenia  13
CMR Cameroon  10 LBN Lebanon  8 SWE Sweden  15
COK Cook Islands  4 LCA St. Lucia  15 SWZ Swaziland  6
COL Colombia  15 LKA Sri Lanka  9 SYC Seychelles  11
COM Comoros  10 LSO Lesotho  5 SYR Syrian Arab Republic  6
CPV Cape Verde  10 LTU Lithuania  13 TCA Turks and Caicos Island  6
CRI Costa Rica  13 LUX Luxembourg  8 TGO Togo  12
CUB Cuba  8 LVA Latvia  13 THA Thailand  15
CYP Cyprus  15 MAC Macao  14 TTO Trinidad and Tobago  15
CZE Czech Republic  14 MAR Morocco  14 TUN Tunisia  15
DEU Germany  15 MDA Moldova  11 TUR Turkey  15
DMA Dominica  13 MDG Madagascar  15 TWN Taiwan, China  10
DNK Denmark  15 MDV Maldives  12 TZA Tanzania  10
DZA Algeria  15 MEX Mexico  15 UGA Uganda  13
ECU Ecuador  15 MKD Macedonia, FYR  13 UKR Ukraine  11
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep.  13 MLI Mali  11 URY Uruguay  13
ESP Spain  15 MLT Malta  13 USA United States  15
EST Estonia  12 MNG Mongolia  11 VCT St. Vincent and the 
Grena dines
 14
ETH Ethiopia (excludes Eritrea)  11 MOZ Mozambique  7 VEN Venezuela, RB  13
FIN Finland  15 MSR Montserrat  8 VNM Vietnam  6
FJI Fiji  6 MUS Mauritius  14 WSM Samoa  5
FRA France  13 MWI Malawi  13 ZAF South Africa  15
FRO Faeroe Islands  11 MYS Malaysia  15 ZMB Zambia  12
GAB Gabon  13 NAM Namibia  7 ZWE Zimbabwe  6
APPENDIX TABLE 2. (Continued )
Code
Reporting country/
economy
# Year 
reported Code
Reporting country/
economy
# Year 
reported Code Reporting country
# Year 
reported
2
2
6
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Notes
 1. Myanmar (Burma) has also consistently reported double-digit real gross domestic prod-
uct growth rates every year since 2001, but international fi nancial institutions and other 
observers are somewhat skeptical about the reliability of the statistics. Chinese offi cial 
growth rates are also sometimes challenged for their veracity, although most scholars, 
economists of major international investment banks, and international fi nancial institu-
tions take the view that the offi cially released fi gures are reliable. Or, if there is a bias, the 
bias could be either positive or negative.
 2. Republic of the Philippines National Information Technology Council, “I.T. Action 
Agenda for the 21st Century,” October 1997, http://www.neda.gov.ph/IT21/default.htm.
 3. See Harrison and RodrÌguez-Clare (2010) for an excellent review of potential justifi ca-
tions and pitfalls for industrial policies in developing countries.
 4. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/ and http://ww1.transparency.org/
surveys/index.html#cpi.
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Comment on “Does a Leapfrogging 
Growth Strategy Raise the Growth 
Rate?” by Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei, 
and Anna Wong
FRANJO ŠTIBLAR
The global fi nancial crisis has consequences for the role of government in the econ-
omy. A neoclassical concept was prevalent in theory and practice during the past few 
 decades—of government intervention as a “grabbing hand” rather than a welcome 
“helping hand.” This view was embodied in the Washington Consensus, which pro-
moted rapid privatization, market liberalization, and fi scal discipline. The neoliberal 
concepts that caused the global fi nancial crisis excluded government almost entirely. 
In the wake of the crisis, government’s role is being reaffi rmed in economic theory, 
economic policy, economic/fi nancial system building, and development models.
This discussion deals with the role of government in development.
• Adam Smith explicitly mentioned the role of government in creating an adequate 
infrastructure for successful market development, but neoliberals ignored this 
view because it did not fi t well with their doctrine only of l’état gendarme. Neo-
liberals also ignored the moral sentiments in Smith’s doctrine in their model of 
homo oeconomicus (rational economic man) as representative agent.
• What Justin Lin (2009) calls the “old structural economics” took into account 
the role of the state in active industrial policy as a way to accelerate growth; for 
example, in relaxing binding constraints in the fast follower strategy pursued in 
the East Asian model.
• The neoclassicists (neoliberals) denied any active role for state intervention in 
development.
• The “new structural economics” as presented by Justin Lin (2009) recognizes the 
role of the state but in a different form. The state should help provide infrastruc-
ture (both hard and soft) appropriate to the level of development in industrial 
structure, which in turn depends on the level of development of factor endow-
ments, which change and improve over time. 
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In the wake of the global fi nancial crisis, economic strategies are changing, and 
the government’s role in development models is moving away from the laissez-faire 
approach of neoliberals. However, differences exist as development economists and 
practitioners attempt to defi ne appropriate government intervention. 
The old structural economics prefers an active role for government (an active 
industrial policy) and advocates a fast follower strategy (FFS), or leapfrogging strat-
egy, or a technology leverage competitive strategy (which opponents call “competi-
tive advantage defying strategy”). The new structural economics (Lin 2009) prefers a 
more passive role for government—improving endowments to pursue a comparative 
advantage facilitating strategy. Proponents speak of latent comparative advantages 
(which opponents call “the fundamental view”).
Factor
Endowments
Industrial
Structure
Infrastructure
Government
GDP
Growth
New
 Stru
ctur
al E
con
omi
cs
Fast Follower Strategy
To decide between the two strategies, the critical question is what is more crucial 
for economic growth: the potentially positive effect of direct government interven-
tion toward a more technologically sophisticated production structure or the poten-
tially negative effect of such intervention in defying a comparative advantage strategy 
based on the availability of factor endowments? 
This contribution focuses on empirical testing of both theories as they were 
presented at the 2010 ABCDE conference in Stockholm. In “Does a Leapfrogging 
Growth Strategy Raise Growth Rate?” Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei, and Anna Wong 
tested the active development strategy. Parallel Session 4 on “Binding Constraints on 
Sustainable Growth and How to Loosen Them” included four papers with empiri-
cal evidence in favor of an active development policy. Both views discuss the Asian 
development model, sometimes regarded as a miracle. It is interesting to observe that 
this model contains some elements of the well-known Yugoslav development model 
of the 1960–80 period.
This comment proceeds with a discussion of both theories and their implications, fol-
lowed by an overview of results from empirical testing and an evaluation of their rele-
vance. After some brief conclusions, the comment ends with an extension of the current 
discussion in development economics into the wider framework of global rethinking of 
the role of government and economics in the aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis.
Theory
The theoretical framework consists of presenting determinants of economic growth 
and two strategies of development strategies.
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Determinants of Economic Growth
Different authors perceive different determinants of economic growth as relevant 
(see Lin 2009, chapter 5). Some see differences in physical capital, human capi-
tal, and productivity as most important. Others cite luck, geography, institutions, 
 culture, and social capital. Rodrigues and Rodrik (2000) emphasize geography, 
institutions, and integration (trade). Bajt and Sˇtiblar (2004) list fi ve production 
factors—labor, capital, entrepreneurship, technology inventions, and natural 
resources—as well as population and technological progress as crucial determinants 
of potential economic growth. 
Lin (2009) concludes that the most important factors are ideas, dominant social 
thought, government policies, and political leaders to implement them. He analyzes 
the role of development strategies in the transition from a socialist to a capitalist 
economy. His starting position is that continuous technological innovation and 
upgrading of industrial structure and corresponding institutional changes are driving 
forces of long-term economic growth in modern times. According to Lin, economic 
performance in developing countries depends largely on government strategy. If gov-
ernment plays a facilitating role, enabling fi rms to exploit the economy’s comparative 
advantages, the economy will develop successfully.
Wang, Wei, and Wong analyze two determinants of economic growth related 
to global markets: openness to trade and trade liberalization. With regard to trade, 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) reject the assertion that lower trade barriers lead to 
faster growth. Most of the research in the literature was focused on export and 
growth, not trade policies and growth.
New Structural Economics
The new structural economics is based on comparative advantage facilitating 
strategy.
Comparative advantage facilitating strategy. Lin (2009) develops the theory 
of new structural economics based on a comparative advantage facilitating (CAF) 
strategy. Government should upgrade the endowment structure before upgrading 
industry and technology. In his 2010 working paper, Lin presented the basic ele-
ments of the new structural economics:
• The economy’s structure of factor endowments evolves during various stages 
of development. Different industrial structures are defi ned in earlier stages and 
require corresponding hard and soft infrastructure. 
• A continuum exists in development rather than a sharp division between rich and 
poor.
• The market is an effective mechanism for resource allocation, but government 
industrial upgrading and improvements of hard and soft infrastructure are 
needed. Government needs to intervene to facilitate both, as it has externalities to 
fi rms’ transaction costs.
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According to Lin, factor endowment defi nes industrial structure, which needs to 
be supported by adequate infrastructure. Lin tested fi ve hypotheses in favor of the 
new structural economics (2009, chapter 6):
1. Less developed countries that pursue comparative advantage defying (CAD) 
strategies will require various government interventions and distortions in their 
economies.
2. Overextended CAD strategies will lead to poor economic performance.
3. These countries will have volatile economies.
4. They will have less equitable income distribution.
5. Countries in transition will perform better if high-technology industries are sup-
ported using the fast follower strategy. This will facilitate the development of 
formerly suppressed labor-intensive industries.
Critique of the comparative advantage facilitating strategy. According to 
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007), the “fundamentalist” view of the world is 
that the endowments of production factors, along with the overall quality of insti-
tutions, determine the relative costs and the patterns of specialization. Attempts to 
reshape the production structure beyond the boundaries based on fundamentals will 
fail and hamper economic performance, in the opinion of new structuralists. But 
the authors assert that idiosyncratic elements in specialization should be taken into 
account. Specializing in some products rather than others will bring higher growth. 
Therefore, government policy has a potentially important positive role to play in 
reshaping the production structure, if it is appropriately targeted on the market fail-
ure in question. Specialization patterns are not entirely predictable. Countries that 
specialize in the types of goods that rich countries export are likely to grow faster. 
According to Hausmann and colleagues (2007), cost-discovery externalities 
play a role in restricting entrepreneurship in new activities—where it matters most. 
Countries that export goods associated with higher productivity levels grow more 
rapidly, even after controlling for initial income per capita and time-invariant coun-
try statistics, such as population and area.
Growth is the result of transferring resources from lower to higher productivity 
activities identifi ed by the entrepreneurial cost-discovery process. Demand for these 
goods in world markets is elastic, and companies in developing countries need to 
take advantage of this elasticity. Fostering an environment that promotes entre-
preneurship and investment in new activities is critical to economic convergence. 
Such activities generate information spillovers for emulators. The requisite is to 
subsidize initial entrants in new activities.
In illustrating the use of the CAF strategy, the argument is that even in China, 
which claims to adopt CAF in practice, world equilibrium prices did not prevail, 
because government interventions have kept them artifi cially below the equilibrium 
market level owing to pressure on endowments alone. Social and environmental 
externalities are not fully internalized; therefore, factor prices remain below equi-
librium level. 
COMMENT ON THE PRESENTATION BY WANG, WEI,  AND WONG   |    233
Leapfrogging
Leapfrogging is also called fast follower strategy (FFS). It means using policies to 
guide the industrial structural transformation to promote high-tech and high domes-
tic value added (VA) ahead of a country’s relatively abundant endowments. If the 
production of sophisticated goods generates positive externalities via learning by 
doing, there would be an underinvestment among private economic agents relative to 
the socially optimal level. Leapfrogging is government-led industrial policy that tilts 
resource allocation to technologically sophisticated industries and that can correct 
market failure. A country may benefi t more from exporting sophisticated products 
with high domestic VA even if the current comparative advantage is to produce less 
sophisticated goods. For opponents, this is a comparative advantage defying devel-
opment strategy; for proponents of fast follower strategy, it is a technology leverage 
competitive strategy. 
According to Mathews (2010), FFSs are employed by countries that are ready to 
upgrade their industries and enter new industries. FFS works because globalization 
makes technologies more accessible through technology leverage, enabling countries 
to leverage their competitive advantage by purchasing equipment, licensing technol-
ogy, contracting within global value chains, pursuing the time-honored route of 
skilled labor transfer (through inward foreign direct investment and migration of 
skilled labor), and pirating technology. Thus, they get around the binding constraint 
of technology access.
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) suggest that some export goods have 
higher spillover effects than others. They develop a measure of export sophistica-
tion and fi nd a positive relation to economic growth rate. The authors developed 
a model of “cost discovery.” When cost discovery generates knowledge spillovers, 
specialization patterns become partly indeterminate and the mix of goods a country 
produces may have important implications for economic growth. The returns of pio-
neer investors’ costs of discovery become socialized, while losses remain private. This 
knowledge externality implies that investment levels in cost discovery are suboptimal 
unless industry or government fi nds some way to internalize the externality. The 
more entrepreneurs that can be stimulated to engage in cost discovery in the mod-
ern sectors, the closer the economy can get to its productivity frontier. The authors 
focus on the spillover in cost information and are interested in the economic growth 
implications of different specialization patterns. 
The Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik framework suggests a different binding con-
straint (sophistication of production industrial structure) on entrepreneurship than is 
considered in the literature of economic development: credit constraints, institutional 
weaknesses, and barriers to competition and entry. 
Their strategy suggests more broadly that the type of goods in which a country 
specializes has important implications for its subsequent economic performance. The 
economy is better off producing goods that richer countries export (in a world with 
homogeneous goods, the problem is growth of output, not income). According to the 
standard model, pushing specialization up in the production scale would be bad for an 
economy’s health, distorting production and creating effi ciency losses. The authors’ 
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alternative interpretation is that a country’s fundamentals generally allow it to pro-
duce more sophisticated goods than it currently produces. Countries can get stuck 
with lower income goods because entrepreneurship in cost discovery entails important 
externalities. If countries are able to overcome these externalities through policies that 
entice entrepreneurs into new activities, they can reap benefi ts in higher growth. 
Mathews (2010) lists nine characteristics of the fast follower strategy:
1. It thrives in industries with growth potential, dominant technology, and mass 
production.
2. It favors capital-intensive industries in which leapfrogging captures latecomer 
advantages.
3.  It strategizes around industrial dynamics, such as life cycles and pro-cyclicality.
4. It secures access to dominant technology, using links to leverage technology.
5. It covers the value chain quickly, building a cluster of complementary fi rms to 
 promote diffusion of capabilities. 
6. It seeks out emerging niche markets to avoid being stuck in a given technology or 
sector.
7. It promotes the domestic market as a platform for expansion.
8. It moves rapidly from imitation to innovation.
9. It repeats the process sequentially, in one industry after another, using character-
istic institutional patterns of national economic learning.
To succeed, FFS needs the following conditions:
• Access to technology.
• Technology that moves relatively fast (but not too fast) through successive prod-
uct or process cycles.
• The rise of global value chains as settings within which the fast follower can secure 
contracts for manufacturing or global value chains in services.
If these conditions hold for an industry, it is ripe for FFS. To succeed, it will need 
prior capabilities in mass production, fi nancing, and technology leverage.
Critique of leapfrogging strategy. According to Lin (2009), the FFS/CAD leads 
to distortions in the form of ineffi cient resource allocation, suppressed working ini-
tiatives, rampant rent-seeking behavior, deteriorating income distribution, and poor 
economic performance. More haste, less speed increases the gap between developed 
and developing countries. Governments in most developing countries attempt to 
promote industries that go against their comparative advantages by creating various 
kinds of distortion to protect nonviable fi rms in priority industries (the so-called 
standard approach). In countries in transition, governments fail to recognize the 
original intention of many distortions. They attempt to eliminate those distortions 
without addressing fi rms’ viability problem, causing economic performance to 
deteriorate in the transition process. On the other hand, governments in successful 
countries in transition adopt a pragmatic, dual-track approach: they encourage fi rms 
to enter sectors that were suppressed previously and give necessary support to fi rms 
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in priority industries before viability issues emerge. China and Vietnam adopted such 
a gradual, dual-track approach. 
Wang, Wei, and Wong (2010) assert that FFSs cause market failure and govern-
ment failure. They believe that it is desirable to transform a country’s economic 
structure ahead of its income level toward higher domestic VA and more sophis-
ticated sectors. But any such policy promotion takes resources away from other 
industries, especially those consistent with the country’s factor endowment and level 
of development.
On balance, the effect is conceptually less clear. The problem is to quantify the 
degree of leapfrogging an economy can support. However, data on production 
structure are not refi ned enough, and most relevant policies are not easily quantifi -
able or comparable across countries. One way to measure leapfrogging is to use 
export data.
Results of Empirical Tests
Several empirical test were made for both strategies, leapfrogging and comparative 
advantage facilitating strategy.
Testing of the Leapfrogging Strategy 
Both critics and proponents have tested the leapfrogging strategy. We examine the 
critics’ tests fi rst.
Testing by critics. Wang, Wei, and Wong test the validity of the leapfrogging 
hypothesis with fresh evidence from a cross-country data set. They conclude that 
there is no strong and robust evidence that a leapfrogging strategy contributes 
to a higher growth rate. Leapfrogging can be measured, ideally, by comparing a 
country’s actual production structure with what has been predicted on the basis of 
its factor endowments. However, data are not available or are relatively coarse, so 
differences in economic structure do not reveal themselves enough on the aggregate 
level. Therefore, export structure is used as an approximation of industrial struc-
ture. To control for a normal amount of sophistication based on factor endow-
ments, a country’s income and education level are included as controls.
Wang, Wei, and Wong use four indicators in their analysis:
1.  EXPY (a country’s export bundle) based on PRODY (income content of products, 
as used by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik): level of income implied in the export 
bundle.
2. An export dissimilarity index (EDI) that measures the distance of a country’s 
export structure from that of the high-income G-3 countries: Japan, the United 
States, and the EU15. An alternative is the export similarity index (ESI).
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3. A modifi ed EXPY to measure quality discounts the PRODY of each good by the 
ratio of the unit value of the exporter to the mean unit value of the same goods 
produced by the G-3.
4. The share of ATP (advanced technology products) in exports, narrow and broad. 
Assumptions were that for the fi rst three measures, the higher-income countries 
export more sophisticated products; the fourth measure is based on the degree of 
sophistication of the product itself.
Wang, Wei, and Wong assumed export structure to be the crucial explanatory 
variable for economic growth.
• EXPY requires data on trade fl ow and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
• Modifi ed EXPY also requires data on unit value.
• EDI and ATP share use of harmonized system classifi cation.
Other explanatory variables in the analysis include these:
• Human capital, measured by average years of schooling.
• GDP per capita, from the Penn World Tables.
• Institutional quality proxied by the government effectiveness index (World Bank); 
rule of law index (Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik 2007); various indicators of 
corruption; regulation quality; and the consumer price index score.
The authors followed a four-step estimation process:
1. The Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik specifi cation was repeated. If the initial 
EXPY was statistically signifi cant and positive but a different value resulted 
(perhaps due to the updated sample), the authors concluded that it could be 
replicated. 
2. Three other export sophistication variables were included. They have the right 
direction, but were statistically not signifi cant.
3. An alternative hypothesis was tested—whether growth instead of level of sophisti-
cation leads to growth in income. The authors rejected this hypothesis on the basis 
of empirical evidence.
4. Panel regressions were performed with instrumental variables.
In a panel analysis, preparedness of the political leader was used as an instru-
mental variable for export sophistication. Neither EXPY or EDI was found to be 
signifi cant. Thus, the authors rejected the leapfrogging hypothesis.
Testing by proponents. The application of the FFS is discussed in three papers 
related to the role of big business, successive upgrading and industry entry, and 
absorptive capacities, and in an overview paper by Mathews (2010).
• Keun Lee, Young-Yoon Part, and Elias Sanidas (2010) identify big business versus 
the share of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as binding constraints for middle- 
and high-income countries. They identify the positive role of big business, not the 
SMEs, in promoting economic growth for upper-middle- and high-income countries. 
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As the number of the largest companies in each country increases over time, the 
growth in real GDP increases and becomes more stable.
The merits of big business are in scale and scope economies, meaning that
lower costs → higher effi ciency → higher growth
 The authors draw the following policy implication regarding big business: middle-
income countries that are latecomers should promote business groups as a useful 
vehicle to overcome business constraints on economic growth, as the Republic of 
Korea has done with Chaebols. 
   In the globalization process, a “big business revolution” is taking place with 
respect to networking and exports. Problems with testing the role of big business 
are lack of a common internationally comparable indicator of big business and 
endogeneity, or two-way causality. In testing the big business role in leapfrog-
ging. Lee, Part, and Sanidas used data on the Global Fortune 500 and Business 
Weekly 1000. Econometric analysis consisted of pooled ordinary least squares, 
fi xed-effect panel data, and two-stage residuals. Dependent variables were con-
stant GDP per capita growth and variance of GDP per capita. Independent vari-
ables were as follows:
 ° Control variables: economy size, population growth, investment, human capital
 ° Crucial variable: number of big fi rms in the country
 ° Additional variable: share of SME employment
   Lee and colleagues concluded that big fi rms have a signifi cant positive effect 
on growth, with and without the United States and Japan included in the sample. 
The elasticity of the big business explanatory variable is 0.67 percent. The SME 
variable is not signifi cant if it is included simultaneously with the big business 
variable, and the number of big fi rms is negatively associated with the higher 
variability of GDP per capita. Rich countries tend to have a larger number of big 
businesses than predicted by their size. Among developing countries, this holds 
only for China and Korea.
• Keun Lee and John Mathews (2010) discuss the role of successive upgrading and 
industry entry for sustained catch-up, using the experience of fi rms in Korea and 
Taiwan, China. They ask three questions:
 ° On the country level, why has success been an exception to date?
 °  On the fi rm level, how can successful latecomer fi rms be generated and sus-
tained?
 °  On both levels, how can innovative fi rms be generated to provide a solid basis 
for sustained national-level catch-up?
   The authors tested the proposition that successful catch-up requires continuous 
upgrading in the same industry, as well as successive entries in new and promising 
industries over the course of industrial development. Otherwise, constant global 
relocation of productive activities by the multinational companies to new sites 
with lower wages makes current activities lower VA.
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   The authors fi nd that latecomer fi rms are using diverse channels of knowledge 
access and learning, joint ventures, co-development with foreign specialized research 
and development (R&D) fi rms, individual scientists, reverse brain drains, overseas 
R&D outposts, strategic alliances, and international mergers and acquisitions. 
• Moon Young Chung and Keun Lee (2010) study the link between foreign technol-
ogy acquisition and indigenous R&D in Korea from 1970 to 1996. In upgrading 
in the same industry, fi rms acquire design capability for product differentiation 
and innovation. 
   In Korea, support for upgrading came from cross-subsidizing R&D money 
among affi liates and through R&D consortiums with a government research insti-
tute. There was no formal transfer from incumbent fi rms, but leading fi rms hired 
or scouted engineers from each other.
   In Taiwan, China, there was more reliance on government, which developed 
parts and components and transferred the technology to private fi rms to produce 
them. Firms were more interdependent, with the forerunners relying on explicit 
technology transfer from Japan or from their own industry institutes.
   The study fi nds the missing link between the role of external knowledge infl ow 
and in-house R&D: a series of learning processes ranging from acquisition of 
know-how, to know-how combined with patent licensing, to patents.
   Only after a fi rm has accumulated experience using imported know-how, 
continuously investing and gradually adopting a more capital-intensive produc-
tion process, do gains in productivity come as the result of capital accumulation. 
Patent rights and know-how interact with accumulated learning experience to 
improve innovative capabilities and productivity.
   Patent rights show a positive effect only if the fi rm has built suffi cient absorptive 
capacity. Firms with preexisting absorptive capacity show signifi cant improve-
ment in innovative capabilities and productivity as the result of R&D activities.
   Absorptive capacity is formed through the process of implementing, adapting, 
assimilating, and reorganizing foreign technology. Capacities formed at the ear-
lier stages enable fi rms to be more effective and effi cient in integrating advanced 
technology, whether imported or invented. It is the learning efforts of indigenous 
fi rms that make foreign knowledge infl ow valuable and in-house R&D feasible. 
The innovative capability and the productivity gain in a latecomer fi rm do not 
come from single foreign technology acquisition but from a series of acquisitions, 
beginning with simple operational skills and advancing to product/process design 
technology protected by patents.
***
All fast follower and leapfrogging strategies have certain common characteristics:
• Upgrading: There is a radical separation from the past, backed by decisive invest-
ments in the form of public-private collaboration and interfi rm risk sharing. For 
catch-up to occur, fi rms must be able to rapidly absorb new technology.
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• Entries into new industries in the latecomer economies are made by the same fi rms 
(groups) that have accumulated certain absorption and execution capacities. In 
rich countries, entry is by new fi rms. 
• Industry downturns and paradigm changes often serve as windows of opportunity 
for latecomers. Timing is critical for optimal entry.
• Entry modes for latecomers are often determined by gaining access to foreign 
knowledge. They are not a matter of choice, as in the developed world, but of 
historical circumstance.
Testing of Comparative Advantage Strategy
In applying the comparative advantage facilitating (CAF) strategy to China, Justin 
Lin (2009) showed its advantages. According to this strategy, the developing country 
government that plays the role of a facilitating state needs to proceed carefully. On 
one hand, it needs to build up and maintain competitive market institutions so that 
relative factor prices refl ect changes in the relative abundance of factor endowments 
in the economy and guide enterprises to make appropriate choices. On the other 
hand, government needs to actively collect and disseminate information about new 
technologies and industries; promulgate industrial policy; coordinate the enterprises’ 
investments; compensate for externalities; and strengthen legal, fi nancial, and social 
institutions to facilitate the ability of enterprises to upgrade industry and technology. 
Conclusions
The overall problems in the methodology of empirical testing growth strategies are 
as follows:
• The choice of proper indicator: the choice of proper observables for unobservable 
concepts as growth determinants
• The problem of using proper econometric methods:
 °  Cross-country estimations; proper control variables for differences in country 
characteristics
 ° Endogeneity—two-way causality and how to eliminate it
 ° Choice of the proper instrument for Instrumental Variable estimation
Regarding fast forward and leapfrogging strategies, problems include the following:
• Extreme changes in exchange rates during the observation period
• Number of countries limited by the Global Fortune 500 and Business Week 1000 
lists
The leapfrogging test study does not fi nd strong and robust support for the 
leapfrogging hypothesis. The questionable assumption is that of one-to-one cor-
respondence between the structure of exports and the structure of production, 
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especially in larger, relatively less open economies, in which most of the produc-
tion goes to the domestic market and exports are not a priority. 
There are also problems with cross-country estimation of growth models, missing 
factors, and binding constraints. Another issue is the construction of variables of 
the technological content of exports. Measures of technical sophistication of export 
products can be direct and indirect.
In their study, Wang, Wei, and Wong rejected the leapfrogging hypothesis, but 
they were able to replicate Hausmann and colleagues’ estimation results, fi nding a 
signifi cant but weaker positive effect.
In promoting the FFS description of the East Asian development model, several 
authors, including Lee and Mathews (2010), obtained signifi cant positive results for 
the effect of active policy factors such as advanced technology products, the presence 
of big business, and the role of upgrading industries.
The critical fact is that there is no one-to-one correspondence among the following 
elements in a causal chain:
EXPORT STRUCTURE → INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE → GROWTH → WELFARE  
                   (size, openness)                 (other growth factors)   (Y distribution)
Extensions and Wider Implications
Advocates of the new structural economics assert that it is not based on neoclas-
sical theory. Lin (2010) provides seven insights citing differences between the two 
in areas such as fi scal and monetary policy, trade, the fi nancial sector, and foreign 
direct investment. In general, Lin supports the role of government, but he is not a 
neoclassicist. He advocates a gradual approach to transition; Washington Consensus 
neoliberals (neoclassicists) favor shock therapy.
What is lacking in this approach (and in the Wang, Wei, and Wong paper) is 
consideration of the changing conditions and framework caused by the global 
fi nancial crisis, started in 2008, as evidenced by the steeper drop in trade than 
in economic growth and the decline of imbalances. The crisis resulted from the 
improper dominance of the neoclassical approach of neoliberal economics in the 
creation of the economic (and especially the fi nancial) system and the application 
of economic policies. The reality of the crisis invalidated some proposed economic 
laws of liberal economics, notably the hypothesis of ultra-rationality, as refl ected in 
theories about homo oeconomicus, perfect competition, and representative agent. 
In development theory, one should take that failure into account and not base it 
explicitly on neoclassical foundations, as if nothing had happened. The current 
crisis was caused by a neoliberal, neoclassical approach, and solutions are based 
on Keynesian types of intervention. This should be recognized in economic growth 
theory too. 
The fact is that active industrial policy is practiced around the world, including in 
China and the United States. The new structural economics opposes industrial policy 
and supports only adjustments to hard and soft infrastructure, which is defi ned by 
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the development of factor endowments (following comparative advantage theory, 
in the case of exports). In contrast, the fast follower strategy focuses on relaxing 
binding constraints through active industrial policy for a specifi c country or level of 
development. Leapfrogging is FFS in the industrialization of developing countries, 
leading to technology leverage competitive advantages.
Preservation of comparative advantages means leaving the developing countries 
in their underdeveloped and dependent role in the world, and maintaining industrial 
countries in the lead forever. The argument that the comparative advantage of a 
developing country (workforce, natural resources) should determine its industrial 
structure—which means producing less sophisticated products with lower VA and 
more labor-intensive and natural-resource-intensive products—leaves them lagging 
behind developed countries forever. It is an illusion to think that a developing coun-
try can catch up by accumulating capital in the initial period, then using it later to 
support more capital-intensive production with higher value added.1 
This strategy has a fundamental shortcoming. The missing fact in the argument 
is that the industrial countries are not willing to wait (stagnate) in the process of 
capital accumulation to be bypassed by developing countries. They accumulate and 
invest capital themselves, and because of their higher development level and more 
sophisticated production, they accumulate more capital than developing countries, 
so the gap between industrial and developing countries continues to widen rather 
than diminish. Without an active industrial policy, developing countries are bound 
to remain less developed in the long run by this comparative advantage facilitating 
(CAF) strategy. They will continue to be exploited by industrial countries. 
The CAF strategy has three main arguments:
1. Government, through its intervention, distorts relative factor prices. But is not 
China (the main proponent and executor of the CAF strategy) doing exactly that 
regarding prices of labor, capital, environmental pollution, entrepreneurship, and 
natural resources—depressing them under market equilibrium level and leaving 
social and environmental externalities and world markets noninternalized?
2. Government should build markets as its major role in development. But certain 
preconditions to building markets need to be met. First, the rule of law should 
be established and fully operational; otherwise, “crooks” will misuse the market 
structure for their personal interest rather than the collective national interest. 
Second, market building is not enough if there are no conditions to establish 
perfect competition. Market failures exist, such as hereditary and acquired advan-
tages and an unequal starting position in the system, which can lead to socially 
unfair—that is, suboptimal—market results; for example, the rich getting richer 
at the expense of the poor, as in the past 30 to 40 years of neoliberal policies and 
prevailing social thought, as indicated by increased income and wealth disparity 
measured by the Gini index. Government intervention is needed to correct market 
failures. Government cannot remain passive, as the CAF strategy would promote 
to a certain extent.
3. In his historic overview, Lin (2009) includes all Asian development success stories 
in one bundle—the Asian development model. But they are not all of the same 
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nature; for instance, it would be a mistake to lump together the strategies pursued 
by Japan and China. 
***
Recently, after the major collapse of the world economy was narrowly averted by 
the massive and unprecedented fi scal and monetary stimulus, neoliberals are return-
ing to “business as usual.” They act as if no fi nancial crisis occurred and no crucial 
government intervention was necessary to prevent the collapse of the system. This is 
happening in economic policy, in the treatment of the fi nancial system, in defi ning 
the role of economics as a science, and in long-term economic development theory. 
Ideological blindness and a lack of self-criticism are apparent. 
Economic theory is valid only as long as its scientifi c laws are repeatedly proven 
in real-life economies. The Washington Consensus approach was soundly rebuked 
with respect to short-term economic policy—and the Keynesian approach was reaf-
fi rmed—by the fi nancial crisis and the need to solve it by stimulus. With respect to 
long-term economic development, the success of industrial policy in producing the 
East Asian development model (“the miracle”) calls into question the neoliberal 
laissez-faire approach and the use of a passive comparative advantage strategy. The 
East Asian countries used an active FFS to loosen constraints on growth.
The role of government in development can also be seen in a wider context. While 
solving general problems such as AIDS, ecological damage, starvation, and water 
shortages can be postponed, fi nancial intervention and solutions to banking crises 
were immediately undertaken by all countries, regardless of ideological differences, 
to shore up trust in the markets. According to Žižek (2010), global capitalism has 
four antagonisms:
1. Ecological catastrophe
2. Incompatibility of private and intellectual property
3. Social and ethical consequences of new scientifi c technologies in biogenetics
4. New forms of apartheid
The fi rst three work against the “common”:
• Common culture (language, education, public infrastructure)
• Common outer nature (ecology)
• Common internal nature (biogenetic inheritance of humanity)
The fourth concerns the antagonism between included and excluded people—
which is not a question of survival but of justice. Active government policies are 
required, at the very least, to mitigate the emerging confl ict between included and 
excluded people in the world.
Note
 1. This argument resembles Karl Marx’s advocacy, in his famous tables, of faster develop-
ment of production of the means of production than consumer goods as growth strategy. 
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Because of a confl ict of growth between investors and the population at large, this strategy 
led to the defeat of socialist economic systems (Bajt and Štiblar 2004).
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The Political Economy of 
Fragile States

State Fragility, Governance 
 Indicators, and the Risk of Civil 
 Confl ict 
JAMES D. FEARON
The term “fragile state” may be the most successful and infl uential development 
policy euphemism of the past 10 years. It has been embraced as an important opera-
tional concept by the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s Development Assistance Committee, the United Kingdom’s Depart-
ment for International Development, and the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment, among many other government and nongovernment donor agencies. 
“Fragile state” is a delicate way of saying that a country has weak or dysfunc-
tional institutions or is poorly governed. The term is also used to suggest the possibil-
ity or actuality of signifi cant political violence—something that, for many years, aid 
agencies viewed as none of their business.1 Fragile states are thought to be at risk of 
becoming “failed” or “collapsed,” with terrible consequences for economic welfare 
and development. 
Implicit in the concept of fragile states is a theory of economic development that 
has become increasingly infl uential, after years of project and program lending that 
has often had disappointing results. The theory is that economic growth requires, 
above all, good policies and capable government institutions to implement them. 
Violent confl ict may be caused by bad policies and institutions and may in turn cause 
bad policies, the destruction of institutions, and more poverty. Fragile states are 
thought to be at risk of being stuck in a “confl ict trap” (Collier et al. 2003). One of 
the central questions for development aid is whether aid can do anything to improve 
policies and institutions in a fragile state and, if so, what kind of aid. Indeed, another 
dimension of the term “fragility” suggests something that needs to be taken care of, 
for example, by providing more aid. But one could argue—and some have—that 
there is little point in providing aid if a government is riddled with corruption and 
led by elites who are not much interested in development. 
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At a conceptual level, the idea of a fragile state remains murky. What exactly are 
“weak institutions” and how do we recognize and measure them? But despite the 
conceptual or theoretical vagueness, aid agencies have managed to produce opera-
tional criteria for identifying fragility. In most cases, states are considered fragile if 
they score below a threshold value on governance indicators that are produced by 
expert ratings. For example, the World Bank designates a state as fragile if its aggre-
gate score falls in the bottom 40 percent of the Bank’s Country Policy and Institu-
tional Assessment (CPIA), a set of governance indicators based on annual surveys 
completed by Bank offi cials working in particular regions and countries.2 
There is almost no research on the question of whether these expert-based govern-
ance indicators actually forecast a country’s performance over the next 5 or 10 years. 
If aid allocation and style decisions are going to be conditioned to a signifi cant degree 
on these indicators, we might like to know whether perceptions-based measures of 
somewhat unclear concepts actually are picking up anything relevant to performance 
and outcomes. For example, is it true that fragile states as designated by governance 
indicators are at greater risk of violent confl ict? 
In this paper, I consider whether low values on governance indicators such as 
the CPIA index, the World Governance Indicators (WGI; Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2009), and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) predict an 
elevated risk of civil violence in subsequent years. The existence of a bivariate rela-
tionship would not be surprising, as it is well known that governance indicators of 
all sorts are strongly related to per capita income levels and well documented that 
civil war is much more common in poor countries. What is less obvious is whether, 
controlling for a country’s level of economic development, expert-based perceptions 
of the quality of governance have value for forecasting subsequent confl ict experience. 
I fi nd that they do. A country that was judged in one year to have worse govern-
ance than expected given its income level has a signifi cantly greater risk of civil war 
outbreak in the next 5 to 10 years. This is true for all three sets of governance indi-
cators considered here, and it does not matter much which indicator one chooses— 
“government effectiveness” (WGI), “investment profi le” (ICRG), “corruption,” and 
“rule of law” all work. Results are weakest for the Bank’s CPIA indicator. 
These results may also have relevance for current debates on the causes of civil 
war. Are the poorest countries more likely to have a civil war because of direct 
labor market effects that make joining an armed group relatively attractive in a poor 
country? Or does low income proxy for weak governance, which raises civil war 
risk either because more people are frustrated and unhappy with the lack of services 
or because the state’s weak administrative and coercive capabilities create better 
opportunities for rebel groups? I fi nd that when one controls for governance quality, 
level of income has little or no predictive power for civil war onset. But when one 
controls for income, measures of governance quality do predict future confl ict experi-
ence. These fi ndings support the idea of low income as proxy for poor governance, 
although I will discuss a few other studies that can be interpreted as fi nding evidence 
of a direct causal effect from low income to confl ict risk. 
In terms of policy implications, the results lend support to the view that aid in 
confl ict-affected countries must do more than try to raise incomes through project 
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lending. If capable government is the root of the problem of confl ict and develop-
ment is more than a poverty trap, interventions may require an integrated approach 
that draws from the UN’s peace-building and state-building experience and other 
peacekeeping operations. 
In the next section, I briefl y review some of relevant literature on causes and cor-
relates of civil war, focusing on the question of how to interpret the robust fi nding 
that low income associates with much higher risk of violent confl ict. In the following 
section, I introduce the three sets of governance indicators and consider how they are 
related to each other and how they vary across countries. I also discuss challenges to 
drawing inferences about the causal effect of “good governance” or “good institu-
tions” using these expert-perceptions-based measures. I then examine the relation-
ship between governance indicators and confl ict onset, and offer conclusions. 
Correlates and Causes of Civil War 
Since the end of the Cold War, a moderately large literature has developed that uses 
cross-national data to study the correlates of large-scale civil violence, usually for 
the 65 years since the end of World War II. The typical design is an annual panel 
for roughly 160 countries (microstates are often omitted for lack of data or other 
reasons) with 35 to 45 observations per country. Researchers have formulated the 
dependent variable in several ways, considering (1) onset, or the start of episodes of 
violent confl ict; (2) duration, or the length of confl icts conditional on one occurring; 
and (3) confl ict incidence, which is a mixture of onset and duration.3 I will focus on 
confl ict onset. 
The following are some of the more interesting and relatively robust results from 
the literature on onset. For the period since World War II (or since the early 1960s), 
the countries most prone to major civil war have been distinguished by low income, 
large populations, mountainous terrain, and possibly by oil production, a high share 
of politically excluded ethnic minorities, and (perhaps) greater gender inequality. 
Recent independence and recent changes in degree of democracy augur a higher risk 
of major confl ict onset in the next few years. For all confl icts, including low-intensity 
conflicts, these same factors are statistically associated with confl ict outbreak, as 
are higher levels of ethnic fractionalization. Factors that show no very consistent 
relationship with a propensity for violent civil confl ict include income inequality (as 
measured by Gini coeffi cients) and level of democracy, although there is some indica-
tion that countries with anocracy (partial democracy) are at greater risk.4 
For the most part, these fi ndings from cross-national statistical models should 
be viewed as more descriptive than structural or causal. They have been of great 
value for making clear which political, economic, and demographic factors are 
associated with higher civil war propensity in the past 60 years; which factors are 
not; and which are associated with onset when you control for other factors. But 
for many covariates found to be statistically and substantively signifi cant in these 
models, the argument for interpreting the estimated coeffi cients as causal effects 
is speculative. Most of the factors mentioned above—such as income, ethnic 
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diversity, and mountainous terrain—vary little or not at all over time within coun-
tries. This means that many of the results are based on comparisons in rates of 
confl ict outbreak across countries, and we may have substantial reason to worry 
that the observed associations are spurious correlations rather than estimates of 
causal effects. It could be, for example, that low income does not directly cause 
higher confl ict risk but happens to be correlated with some third, unmeasured fac-
tor that does cause confl ict. In some cases, it could be that the mere expectation 
of confl ict for unmeasured reasons infl uences one of our presumed causal factors, 
such as income or perceived ethnic diversity, again leading to spurious correla-
tions. So caution is necessary in interpreting cross-national patterns. 
For the several factors that vary a lot over time within countries—such as recent 
independence or change in governing arrangements—we can ask whether change in 
the factor is reliably followed by a higher risk of confl ict outbreak (this is called a 
fi xed-effects analysis). Recent independence, a change in governing arrangements, 
and the onset of partial democracy all tend to predict the outbreak of confl ict and so 
may have a stronger claim on being (or marking) causal effects. 
In the literature up to this point, opportunities for natural experiments to allow 
cleaner identifi cation of causal effects have been rare. Miguel, Satyanath, and 
 Sergenti (2004) cleverly used exogenous variation in rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa to 
estimate the effect of changes in income on civil confl ict propensity; but Bruckner and 
Ciccone (2010b) examined the same data and reached a quite different conclusion. 
A few papers use variation in international commodity prices in a similar fashion 
(Besley and Persson 2009; Bruckner and Ciccone 2010a). But even these papers are 
of limited value for understanding why an effect is observed (e.g., what is the causal 
mechanism connecting changes in income to civil war propensity) and thus whether 
and how it might generalize. Thus, arguments about causes of civil confl ict have 
generally taken the form of attempts to pose a theoretical framework or interpreta-
tion that has the potential to make sense of the complicated pattern of associations 
observed in the cross-national data. 
In early versions of their infl uential paper “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” 
Collier and Hoeffl er (2004) compared the strong association they found between 
civil war onset and measures of dependence on primary commodity exports and low 
education levels with the weak association of onset with measures of ethnic diversity, 
income inequality, and democracy. They argued that this fi nding suggested that rebel 
groups are primarily motivated by opportunities for profi t rather than by a desire to 
right perceived wrongs. They suggested that aspiring “grievance-based” rebellions 
might face a more severe collective action problem than would “greed-based” or 
“loot-seeking” rebellions. In this initial formulation, the implicit assumption was 
that the causes of civil war would be located in the motivations of rebel groups. 
Later versions of the paper converged (at least on this point) with the interpreta-
tion in Fearon and Laitin (2003), who wrote, “Surely ethnic antagonisms, nationalist 
sentiments, and grievances often motivate rebels and their supporters. But such broad 
factors are too common to distinguish the cases where civil war breaks out” (p. 76). 
The idea is that grievances that could potentially motivate a rebellion are regrettably 
common (and reasonable) in much of the world, so that more of the explanation for 
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cross-national variation in civil war propensities is likely to be found in variation in 
factors that affect the viability of or opportunity for rebellion. 
Very few civil wars since 1945 have been, or have emerged out of, popular revolu-
tions characterized by mass protests and mass action—the French Revolution model. 
Instead, the vast majority of violent civil confl icts in this period have been fought as 
guerrilla wars or militia-based confl icts, typically by small rebel groups that often 
number in the hundreds, especially in their early years. Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
suggested that “because insurgency can be successfully practiced by small numbers 
of rebels under the right conditions, civil war may require only a small number with 
intense grievances to get going” (p. 76). 
The prevalence of small-scale guerrilla or militia-based wars does not rule out the 
possibility that variation in the level of broad social grievances across countries could 
be an important explanation for civil war risk. In principle, it could be that social 
support from many sympathetic people is necessary for a small rebel band to oper-
ate successfully. However, if this is the case, it seems to apply mainly to rebellions in 
countries where the central state is relatively capable. Where states are less capable, 
rebel groups often seem able to operate without broad or deep social support, or 
they can coerce it.5 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) give mainly “opportunity” interpretations for the pat-
terns of correlation summarized above. For example, when a colony gains indepen-
dence, its central government receives a negative shock to its capability to deter 
and fi ght rebels, if and when the colonial army leaves. Likewise, political instabil-
ity may signal weakness at the center, as may anocracy (Hegre et al. 2001). Large 
populations are thought to make rebellion generally more feasible by making the 
governance problem harder for the center; it is harder to develop reliable chains of 
principals and agents to monitor what is going on at the local level. (India is much 
harder to govern than, say, Mauritius.) Rough terrain is thought to be associated 
with better opportunities for rebel groups to hide and less historical development of 
central administrative structures throughout a region. 
Along similar lines, Collier and Hoeffl er (2004) found strong results for a variable 
measuring the share of primary commodity exports in gross domestic product (GDP). 
In the 2004 version, they interpreted this as an indicator of greater fi nancing oppor-
tunities for would-be rebel groups, principally through extortion of producers. They 
also found some evidence that having a large minority diaspora in the United States 
is associated with greater likelihood of war renewal, which they interpret as evidence 
that diaspora funding provides opportunities for rebel groups to return to war. 
As noted above, lower per capita income is strongly related to a higher propensity 
to have civil wars and confl icts across countries, although there is not much evi-
dence that economic growth or decline within countries over time strongly predicts 
change in confl ict risk. This is perhaps the most robust pattern emerging from the 
cross-national statistical literature (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Two main causal 
interpretations of the pattern have been advanced. Collier and Hoeffl er (2004) 
stressed a labor market explanation: low income, they hypothesize, means lots of 
underemployed youth who fi nd the opportunity costs of joining a rebel band to be 
small. Fearon and Laitin (2003), by contrast, stressed a state capabilities explanation. 
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In this view, per capita income is largely a proxy for state administrative, military, 
and police competence, and thus the ability to deter or defeat nascent insurgencies.6 
The state capabilities explanation is arguably more consistent with the lack of a 
robust within-country relationship between income and civil war: One would not 
expect a lockstep relationship between state capabilities and income, whereas short-
run income changes should affect labor market conditions. The labor market expla-
nation might be more consistent with Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), who 
found that exogenous variation in rainfall is related to civil war onset in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. They argue that a direct causal effect of income on civil war propensity can 
be identifi ed using the variation in income related to variation in rainfall, on the 
assumption that the only way rainfall variation affects civil war propensity is through 
income. As they note, it is possible that heavy rainfall might provide a negative shock 
to state capabilities by making roads less passable. But it is perhaps more likely that 
the effects would go through labor market channels. 
A major barrier to assessing the relative importance of state capabilities versus 
labor market explanations has been the absence of good direct measures of state 
capabilities. One cannot simply use the size of a state’s military or police force, for 
example, as these are endogenous to confl ict. Iceland may have a very small army 
and police force, but the state’s competence is such that if faced with a potential 
insurgent threat, it could probably scale up quickly and perform effectively. 
Below I pit several expert-perceptions-based measures of state capacities or gov-
ernance against income in models of civil confl ict onset. These measures are far from 
perfect, but they appear to be the best available. Moreover, they are increasingly 
used by donors to make aid allocation decisions, so it is of independent interest to 
see whether they have diagnostic value. 
Governance Indicators
This section introduces the three sets of governance indicators to be used in the 
analysis, and discusses potential threats to causal inference when using these indica-
tors as explanatory variables for confl ict risk. 
The ICRG series, which starts in 1984, is produced and sold by Political Risk 
Services; the variables are derived from expert surveys of business and political con-
ditions in about 140 countries. The WGI project began in the 1990s at the World 
Bank. Kaufmann and Kraay assembled a large set of expert-based governance rat-
ings produced each year by think tanks, academic research groups, nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and businesses, and divided them 
into sets that they say correspond to six dimensions of governance: government 
effectiveness, voice, political instability, rule of law, corruption, and regulatory qual-
ity.7 They used techniques akin to factor analysis to extract a common dimension in 
each area. This has yielded a panel for 212 countries and territories for 1996 to the 
present (not including 1997, 1999, and 2001). 
Each year since 1977, World Bank staff have coded Bank client countries on 16 
or more dimensions concerning the quality of policies and institutions. These codings 
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are then aggregated to a summary measure called the Country Policy and Institu-
tional Assessment, which is used for various purposes, including decisions about aid 
allocation. The aggregate index ranges from 1 to 6, with higher scores indicating 
a better policy and governance environment from the Bank’s perspective. Unfortu-
nately, the CPIA index is produced only for aid recipient countries, so we have nearly 
complete series for only 85 countries. 
To my knowledge, this paper is the fi rst to exploit these data for an analysis of 
civil war onset. An earlier version for the ICRG data, for 1982 only, has been used 
as a measure of governance or good institutions in a number of studies of the deter-
minants of economic growth, including infl uential papers by Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson (2001); Knack and Keefer (1995); and Mauro (1995). But the longer 
time series employed here appear not to have been used even in that much larger 
literature on growth.
Measurement and Inferential Issues Raised by 
Expert-Based Governance Measures 
Whether we seek to explain growth or civil war onset, expert-survey-based measures 
of good institutions and good governance face a number of problems. First, it is not 
completely clear what the expert ratings are measuring. This is partly due to lack of 
clarity about what we are trying to measure. Just what are “good governance” and 
“good institutions”? Many people have strong intuitions here, having experienced 
the relative effi ciency, competence, and corruption of public services and offi cials 
in various countries. In theoretical terms, the tradition associated with North and 
Thomas (1973) identifi es good institutions as formal and informal political institu-
tions that render unlikely the expropriation of private wealth and investments by 
political elites. In work on state capabilities and civil war, the focus tends to be on 
the effi ciency and competence of the police, armed forces, and judiciary (rule of law, 
in part). 
But the competence of public management, expropriation risk and contract 
enforcement, and rule of law are not easily observed and measured. Ideally, we 
would like to have objective indicators for these constructs, but even if we did, 
concepts such as effi ciency, competence, and expropriation risk seem to be latent 
variables that would have to be inferred from diverse observations of different things. 
This fact makes expert surveys a natural approach for measuring the quality of 
governance and good institutions, but it also makes it hard to know exactly what the 
experts are doing. For example, are they really making judgments about the quality 
of governance and particular institutions, or are they answering the general question 
“How do you think things are going these days in country X (perhaps implicitly 
compared with other countries in the same region)?” Answers to the latter might 
partly measure quality of governance or institutions but could also include consid-
erations that we would not associate conceptually with governance and institutions. 
In sum, there are reasons to be concerned about both the validity and reliability of 
the expert-survey-based measures of governance, but it is not obvious what a better 
approach would be.8 
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The second major problem in trying to use governance indicators to assess the 
causes of economic growth or civil war onset is endogeneity. If an indicator is well 
correlated with contemporaneous growth or civil war onset, we cannot infer causal-
ity, because it could be that the observation of growth is leading the experts to think 
that governance is good or that the observation of civil war leads them to infer that 
governance or institutions are bad.
When one has only a single observation of governance quality for a set of coun-
tries and a single observation of level or growth of income or confl ict performance, 
the only feasible solution is to fi nd an instrument for governance—an exogenous 
variable that affects growth or confl ict only through its effect on governance. Such 
variables are very hard to fi nd, and the exclusion restriction is not testable.9
With data from time t on governance and from time t +1 on growth or confl ict, we 
can ask whether the former predicts the latter, controlling for other possible deter-
minants of growth or confl ict. An important advantage of this design is that it can-
not be that observation of the outcome (growth or confl ict in time t +1) caused the 
experts to code better governance or institutions in time t, because the outcome had 
not yet happened when they made those judgments. So, if we have enough years of 
data on governance and growth or confl ict, we can ask whether expert assessments 
of governance actually predict subsequent confl ict or growth experience. 
If the answer is yes, this still does not settle the question of causality—it could be 
that omitted variables are causing both expert assessments of quality of governance 
at time t and confl ict or growth performance subsequently. In particular, as we will 
see below, all the WGI and ICRG indicators are highly correlated with per capita 
income. This is as it should be, if it is true that income is a proxy for state capabili-
ties and that good governance and good institutions cause economic growth over 
the long term. But it raises the question of how to separate out the causal impact of 
governance on confl ict or growth versus that of other determinants of high income. 
The approach we take is to control for prior income levels, thus asking about the 
relationship between what we might call “surprisingly good governance” and civil 
war onset. A country has surprisingly good governance when experts gave it high 
ratings compared with other countries at the same level of per capita income. The 
attempt to identify the causal impact of governance quality on confl ict then comes 
from seeing whether surprisingly good or bad governance in one period predicts 
subsequent confl ict onset. The strategy will be effective to the extent that whatever 
determines surprisingly good or bad governance in one period infl uences subsequent 
 confl ict risk primarily through governance and institutions rather than via some 
other path. 
With the ICRG and CPIA indicators, we have long enough time series and enough 
variation over time within countries to go a step further. We can consider models 
with country fi xed effects, thus controlling for all manner of unobserved time- 
invariant country characteristics. 
The core strategy here is potentially subject to the concerns that normally arise 
for “policy regressions,” in which the researcher tries to infer something about the 
causal effect of a policy choice by measuring different policies across cases and put-
ting them on the right-hand side in a regression model (Rodrik 2005). Surprisingly 
STATE FRAGILITY, GOVERNANCE INDICATORS, RISK OF CIVIL CONFLICT   |    255
good  governance (SGG) is at least partly a policy choice by a leadership or political 
regime. We will underestimate the positive impact of good governance if leaders 
tend to choose better governance when, for other unmeasured reasons, they expect 
that the risk of civil confl ict is high. In that case, SGG will be partly correlated with 
unobserved factors that favor confl ict, so that our estimates of the pacifying effects of 
SGG will be biased downward. On the other hand, what if leaders are better able to 
implement SGG in country years when, for reasons completely unrelated to govern-
ance, confl ict is unlikely? To this extent, we would tend to overestimate the causal 
impact of good governance on confl ict risk. I fi nd it diffi cult to think of plausible 
examples—perhaps certain cultural trends arise wholly independent of governance 
but can enable better governance, and these directly determine civil war propensity. 
However, in principle the risk is there. 
The effi cacy of the approach depends on what explains variation in SGG. If, or to 
the extent that, leaders and state bureaucracies “get their acts together” for reasons 
that are largely independent of other, independent causes of civil strife, the results 
below suggest that good governance and institutions are important factors in reduc-
ing a country’s confl ict risk. For instance, governance and institutions may improve 
when an old leader dies and the new one is more capable or is politically situated so 
that he or she can implement better policies and develop better institutions. Or gov-
ernance may be fairly steady, but income varies owing to international shocks and 
other vagaries of economic growth, in which case SGG will appropriately estimate a 
causal effect. I fi nd these possibilities more plausible than alternative arguments that 
imply that this approach leads to overestimation of the governance effect, but more 
work is obviously needed on the determinants of surprisingly good governance. 
The issues raised so far bear on the question of what can be inferred about a causal 
relationship between governance quality and subsequent confl ict risk. If a causal rela-
tionship exists, questions remain about the nature of the mechanism. For assessing the 
state capabilities and labor market interpretations discussed earlier, it is  important 
to determine whether governance and institutions affect confl ict directly (e.g., by 
lowering the military prospects of a viable rebel organization) or indirectly (e.g., 
by improving the economy and thus affecting the labor supply for would-be rebels). 
A blunt way to address this issue is by controlling for current economic growth; in 
effect, to compare countries that have similar levels of previous income and similar 
current growth performance but different previous quality of governance. Adding 
current growth has little impact on the estimates for the governance measures in any 
of the models.10
WGI, ICRG, and CPIA Governance Indicators 
The WGI project produces indicators for six dimensions of governance: government 
effectiveness, voice and accountability, political instability, rule of law, corruption, and 
regulatory quality. ICRG produces a large set of indicators that have varied somewhat 
over the years. In this paper I consider four ICRG indicators that have the longest 
history and correspond most closely to the WGI categories: investment profi le, cor-
ruption, rule of law (or law and order), and bureaucratic quality. The correspondence 
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with the WGI indicators is clear except for investment profi le. ICRG intends this 
measure as a general indicator of business climate and political risks to business in 
a country year. It is the successor of the “expropriation risk” and “observance of 
contracts” variables from the 1982 ICRG data used in a number of growth studies. 
Because they are derived from a factor-analysis-like technique, the WGI indicators 
all have mean zero and standard deviation of 1, with higher values indicating better-
quality governance on that dimension.11 For ICRG, corruption and rule of law are 
on a l-to-6 scale. Investment profi le ranges from 1 to 12, and bureaucratic quality 
from 1 to 4. Higher values are better. 
The World Bank’s CPIA indicator ranges from 1 to 6, with higher values indicat-
ing better governance. The scale is an average of a large number of components, 
which since 1997 have been grouped into four equally weighted clusters: economic 
management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion/equity, and public sec-
tor management and institutions. 
For our purposes, a major liability of the CPIA index is that it is coded only for 
countries that receive International Development Association loans, and that coun-
tries can “graduate from” or enter this category depending on their economic and 
government performance. As a result, the CPIA sample is truncated by including 
relatively poor countries, and there is a built-in selection bias that works against 
identifying the impact of governance on confl ict (or growth) outcomes. Namely, 
countries that perform well are more likely to exit the CPIA sample, and countries 
that perform poorly may enter it. 
Table 1 shows correlations among the different ICRG and WGI governance 
indicators and (the log of) per capita income. Note the generally high correlations 
between income and the governance measures, and the strong associations among 
the governance measures.12 There is not much indication that correlations across the 
TABLE 1. Income and Governance Indicator Correlations 
mcome
WGI ICRG
ge voice pol. stab. corr. rol reg. qual. ip corr. rol bq
govt eff.  79
voice  58  75
pol. stab.  67  79  71
corruption  74  94  72  77
rule of law  77  95  79  83  94
reg. qual.  75  94  79  75  88  91
inv. prof.  72  82  73  73  79  83  88
corruption  61  85  74  67  88  84  78  65
rule of law  69  73  50  72  75  78  66  61  65
bur. qual.  77  89  77  66  82  85  83  72  76  63
CPIA  51  78  58  47  62  67  82  73  51  39  62
Note: The fi rst six row entries are for the WGI indicators “government effectiveness” (“ge”), “voice,” “political stabil-
ity,” “rule of law” (“rol”), and “regulatory quality.” The next four are the ICRG indicators “investment profi le” (“ip”), 
“corruption,” “law and order” (“rol”), and “bureaucratic quality” (“bq”). The last row is the CPIA aggregate indicator.
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TABLE 2. Correlation between WGI and ICRG, Netting Out Income 
ICRG
WGI
ge voice pol. stab. rol corruption reg. qual.
ip  38  36  33  40  35  47
corruption  60  51  41  61  66  52
rol  42  14  42  55  46  33
bq  67  54  27  58  53  57
CPIA  61  41  24  51  47  64
Note: The row entries are the ICRG indicators “investment profi le” (ip), “corruption,” “rule of law” (rol), and “bureau-
cratic quality” (bq), followed by the CPIA indicator. The columns are the WGI indicators as described in the notes 
to table 1.
ICRG and WGI indicators are higher within the same dimension—for example, rule 
of law—in the two different data sets. 
Table 2 shows the correlations among the residuals of the WGI, ICRG, and CPIA 
indicators after regressing each of them on log per capita income. They remain 
substantial, which is encouraging—it suggests that raters’ perceptions of quality 
of  governance or institutions are not completely determined by level of economic 
development. Instead, there appears to be some level of agreement about surprisingly 
good or bad governance. However, there is not much indication that agreement is 
markedly higher within categories (e.g., corruption, rule of law) than across them. 
This suggests that these various dimensions of governance quality tend in practice to 
align very closely or that the expert raters have in mind some general notion of “the 
country has its act together” rather than being able to actually separate out dimen-
sions of performance. 
One other descriptive statistic about these indicators is worth presenting before 
moving to the analysis. Table 3 shows the percentage of variation for each indica-
tor that is due to variation across countries as opposed to over time within coun-
tries. Almost all of the variation in the WGI indicators is across countries, which 
makes sense given that the time period is just over a decade and state capabilities 
should not be expected to change a great deal from year to year. There is much 
more within-country variation for the longer ICRG and CPIA series, especially for 
the ICRG investment profi le indicator. This will allow us to consider a fi xed-effects 
model with the ICRG and CPIA data.
Governance Measures and Civil War Onset 
Several of the most striking cross-national patterns in civil war onset might be 
explained by an interpretation that puts state capabilities at the center of the story. 
In this view, low per capita income is strongly related to confl ict onset, because it is 
a proxy for the central state’s capability to deter and suppress armed challengers, and 
possibly also to provide public services. A set of alternative interpretations argues 
that there is a direct effect of low income on civil war propensity through some labor 
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market channel. For instance, many have argued that poverty makes joining a rebel 
group relatively more attractive for young men. 
In this section, I present logistic regression models in which the dependent vari-
able is 1 if a civil war or lower-level confl ict began in the country and period of time 
in question, and zero if not. For the ICRG and CPIA governance indicators, we 
can exploit the longer time series by constructing country-year panels, lagging the 
governance measures by two years to avoid contamination of the expert judgments 
with observation of civil war onset (or incipient war). For the WGI measures, I use a 
straight cross-section, using the fi rst available WGI variables (for 1996) as predictors 
for whether a civil war began between 1997 and 2008.13 
The civil war and confl ict measures used here are derived from the Uppsala Con-
fl ict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Confl ict Database (ACD), 
which codes for each country and year since 1945 whether a violent confl ict that 
directly killed at least 25 people occurred between a named, nonstate armed group 
and government forces.14 I work with a version of the data used in the preparation 
of the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) that has (rough) estimates of annual 
battle deaths for each confl ict. Following the WDR’s categorization scheme, I will 
distinguish between major conflicts, or civil wars that are estimated to have killed 
at least 1,000 persons, on average, per year over the duration of the confl ict, and 
all conflicts, which are estimated to have met the low threshold requirement at least 
25 battle deaths each year. Because the ACD codings do not distinguish discrete epi-
sodes of confl ict (they simply identify whether a particular armed confl ict occurred 
TABLE 3.  Percentage Within Versus Between Country Variation in Governance 
Indicators 
Variable Between % Within %
log(income)  85  15
ACD war onset  6  94
WGI: 1996–2008
ge  96  4
voice  97  3
pol. stab.  91  9
corruption  96  4
rol  96  4
reg. qual.  94  6
ICRG: 1984–2006
ip  41  59
corruption  71  29
rol  72  28
bq  82  18
CPIA: 1977–2008
CPIA  58  42
Note: See table 1 for abbreviations used here.
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in each country year), we need additional criteria to demarcate episodes, which is 
necessary to code onsets. Following the standard convention used for the WDR, a 
new confl ict episode is considered to have begun if it is preceded by at least two years 
of peace between the named armed group and the state.15
Table 4 shows the distribution of civil war and all confl ict onsets by region and 
decade since the 1960s. We see a substantial drop in new confl icts in the past decade, 
especially for major civil wars, and even relative to the years before the confl ict-prone 
1990s. Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia have seen the most confl ict, in terms of both 
onset and average country years of war (the latter are not shown here).
The statistical models below also include typical covariates for civil confl ict 
regressions. Most important, for the reasons discussed above, is the log of per capita 
income (lagged one year). The measure I use is based on Penn World Table 6.3 but 
has been extended using World Bank and Maddison growth rates where necessary 
to get the most complete possible coverage.16 I also include
• log of country population (lagged one year); 
• log of the percentage of the country judged to be mountainous; 
• dummy marking country years in which at least one-third of GDP came from oil 
or gas production (based on a variable in the World Development Indicators, with 
missing cases fi lled in by country-specifi c data); 
• measure of recent political instability, which is 1 if there was any change in the 
Polity measure of degree of democracy in the previous year; 
• measure of anocracy (partial democracy), which is 1 if in the previous year Polity 
rated the country as between –5 and 5 on its –10 to 10 democracy scale; 
• commonly used measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), based on data 
from a 1960 Soviet ethnographic atlas but with some missing countries fi lled in 
using country-specifi c sources (Fearon and Laitin 2003); and
• variable that is 1 if there was a civil war (or confl ict) going on in the previous year. 
Note that because the dependent variable is onset rather than incidence, the latter 
is not a lagged dependent variable. Rather, “prior war” is included as a control 
because the odds of a new civil war starting are likely to be infl uenced by whether 
the country already has a civil war in progress. 
ICRG
Tables 5 and 6 show the results for the four ICRG governance indicators considered 
here: investment profi le (a general measure of business climate), corruption, rule of 
law, and bureaucratic quality. For ease of comparison, the variables have been scaled 
to range between zero and 1.17
In table 5 the dependent variable is major confl icts, of which there were only 20 
in the set of country years for which we have ICRG data (about 140 countries from 
1984 to 2008). We fi nd that all four governance measures have estimated coeffi cients 
that correspond to large substantive effects, with all but bureaucratic quality statisti-
cally signifi cant (investment profi le and rule of law strongly so). For investment pro-
fi le, moving from the 75th to the 25th percentile is estimated to be associated with 
TABLE 4. Civil War and All Confl ict Onsets by Region and Decade 
Civil war onsets 
Total
All confl ict onsets 
Total60s 70s 80s 90s 00s 60s 70s 80s 90s 00s
Asia  3  8  3  3  1  18  8  13  9  23  10  63
E. Eur/FSU  0  0  0  10  0  10  0  0  1  21  6  28
L. Am/Carib  2  4  1  0  0  7  8  6  6  3  2  25
MENA  2  5  5  3  2  17  5  10  9  10  5  39
SSA  6  7  3  7  1  24  14  17  13  32  18  94
West  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  2  2  0  5
World  13  24  12  23  4  76  35  47  40  91  41  254
Note: “E. Eur/FSU” stands for Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union; “L. Am/Carib” for Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA for the Middle East and North Africa; SSA for Sub-Saharan 
Africa; and “West” for Western Europe, the U.S, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.
2
6
0
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TABLE 5. ICRG Governance and Civil War Onset (Major Confl icts)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
investment profi let–2 –5.99***
(1.41)
control of corruptiont–2 –1.94† 
(1.14) 
rule of lawt–2 –3.53***
(1.02)
bureaucratic qualitygt–2 –0.91
(1.25)
log(gdpt–1) –0.13 0.33 0.04 0.23 0.04
(0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.34)
log(popt–1) 0.23 0.30 0.21 0.27 0.25
(0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
log(% mountains) 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.10
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
oil producer 1.34** 1.09* 1.18* 1.14* 1.23*
(0.46) (0.46) (0.51) (0.47) (0.49)
political instabilityt–1 –0.02 –0.06 0.02 –0.11 –0.03
(0.58) (0.54) (0.58) (0.59) (0.59)
anocracyt–1 1.08* 1.05* 1.06* 1.08* 1.08*
(0.50) (0.45) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49)
ELF 0.92 1.55t 0.99 0.93 1.07
(0.87) (0.88) (0.87) (0.85) (0.88)
prior war –0.06 –0.52 –0.13 –0.45 –0.13
(0.70) (0.76) (0.69) (0.69) (0.68)
constant –7.55** –9.25*** –7.92** –9.10** –8.73**
(2.83) (2.62) (2.86) (3.07) (3.12)
N 2,777 2,777 2,776 2,776 2,776
SEs clustered by country. 
Note: ELF = ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
†Signifi cant at p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
an increase in annual civil war odds of a factor of 5.9. Moving from the 75th to the 
25th percentile on rule of law and corruption is associated with increasing the annual 
onset odds of 4.6 and 1.9, respectively. Note that the estimates for investment profi le 
and rule of law are remarkably large in substantive terms. By comparison, in typi-
cal confl ict models, the estimate of the effect of income implies that a country at the 
25th percentile has about twice the annual odds of a country at the 75th percentile. 
Model 1 of table 5 is the same as model 2 but restricted to the country years that 
have ICRG data and data for the other variables. It shows that almost all the usual 
covariates of civil war are more weakly related in this sample than in typical analy-
ses, which usually span 1945 to 1999 or 2008, and cover a larger set of countries. 
Still, in all cases, the signs are consistent with what we fi nd in larger and more 
262    |    JAMES D. FEARON
TABLE 6. ICRG Governance and Confl ict Onset (All ACD Confl icts) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model S
ipt–2  –3.19***
 (0.78)
corruptt–2  –1.09†
 (0.62)
rolt–2  –1.21* 
 (0.54) 
bqt–2  –1.14†
 (0.64)
log(gdpt–1)  –0.45**  –0.17  –0.37*  –0.33†  –0.23
 (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.19)
log(popt–1)  0.30**  0.35***  0.28**  0.32**  0.34**
 (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11)
log(% mountains)  0.12  0.09  0.13  0.13  0.10
 (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)
oil producer  0.91**  0.72*  0.83*  0.81*  0.75*
 (0.33)  (0.32)  (0.35)  (0.34)  (0.34)
pol instabilityt–1  0.12  0.10  0.12  0.07  0.11
 (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.26)
anocracyt–1  –0.04  0.03  –0.06  –0.01  –0.03
 (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.31)
ELF  1.23*  1.58***  1.24*  1.24*  1.40**
 (0.52)  (0.47)  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.51)
por war  0.53  0.27  0.49  0.40  0.44
 (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.36)
constant  –3.71*  –5.02**  –3.77*  –4.19*  –5.45**
 (1.75)  (1.59)  (1.81)  (1.91)  (1.84)
N  2,777  2,777  2,776  2,776  2,776
SEs clustered by country.
Note: ip = investment profi le; corrupt = control of corruption; rol = rule of law; bq = bureaucratic quality; 
ELF = ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
†Signifi cant at p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01;  ***p < .001.
complete samples. Note that the coeffi cient on income takes its usual negative sign, 
although it is not statistically signifi cant. One reason is that the ICRG measures 
are generally missing for low-income/high-confl ict countries (presumably, investors 
don’t need to be told that Afghanistan has a poor investment profi le). If we consider 
the full post-1983 sample, the coeffi cient on income more than doubles and the 
p value drops to .14. Another reason is that there are few confl ict events when we 
use this relatively high-threshold criterion for major civil war. So although the lack 
of data limits the importance of the fi ndings, it is interesting that the estimated coef-
fi cients for per capita income actually turn positive (though not signifi cantly different 
from zero) when we add the governance indicators in models 2–4. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that income matters because it proxies for state capabilities.18 
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Table 6 is the same as table 5, except it covers all ACD confl icts. Here, all four 
ICRG governance indicators are signifi cantly negatively related to confl ict onset, with 
the strongest effects again being for investment profi le and rule of law. Low income 
is signifi cantly negatively related to confl ict onset in this subsample (model l), and 
while the signs remain negative when governance indicators are added, the estimated 
coeffi cients for income shrink toward zero and in several cases are no longer statisti-
cally signifi cant. This outcome favors the interpretation that income is in large part a 
proxy for state capabilities and administrative or policy competence. 
Could it be that surprisingly good governance causes more rapid economic growth 
in the next few years and lowers confl ict risk through the economy rather than by a 
direct effect of greater state capabilities? When I add the current economic growth 
rate to the models in tables 5 and 6, the results are nearly identical for all confl icts 
and very close for major civil wars; for the latter, the estimated coeffi cients on the 
governance variables diminish slightly, but investment profi le and rule of law remain 
strongly signifi cant. 
Table 7 repeats the exercise for all confl icts, but uses conditional fi xed-effects logit, 
thus controlling for all unmeasured (but temporally stable) country characteristics. 
Remarkably, given the small number of countries in the sample and the relative lack of 
temporal variation in governance quality, all four of the ICRG indicators get  negative 
coeffi cients (though corruption is essentially zero), and the estimates for investment 
profi le and rule of law are statistically signifi cant (p = .002 and .091, respectively). Per 
capita income may take the “wrong” sign and is never close to signifi cant.
Thus, within countries over time, civil war onset has been somewhat more likely 
when investment profi le, corruption, and rule of law were judged worse in recently 
preceding years. This result supports a causal interpretation of the relationship 
between governance quality and confl ict onset more than the previous models, 
because identifi cation is based on within-country comparisons (and because it is 
somewhat remarkable to fi nd anything, given the lack of within-country variation in 
governance indicators).19
One might still worry that a two-year lag is not enough to rule out the possibility 
that expert raters are coding on the basis of indications of incipient civil war more 
than on the quality of governance or institutions. I have constructed a panel with 
three waves—for the 1980s,1990s, and 2000s—asking whether average ICRG rat-
ings in one decade forecast confl ict in the next decade, controlling for prior confl ict 
experience and lagged income levels. I fi nd that the results are quite similar: ICRG 
indicators forecast confl ict outbreak even in the next decade. 
WGI
The WGI series is only for 1996 to 2008, and some of the early years are missing. It 
also has very little over-time variation within countries, and the method of its con-
struction raises some questions about whether and how best to treat it as panel data. 
However, because 14 years have passed since the fi rst set of WGI indicators was 
constructed, we can ask whether expert-based assessments of different dimensions of 
governance quality in 1996 or 1998 actually forecast confl ict experience in the next 
264    |    JAMES D. FEARON
decade, controlling for initial level of income and prior confl ict experience. Using the 
ACD civil war variable, only 10 countries had onsets between 1997 and 2009. Using 
all ACD confl icts, 37 countries had a total of 63 onsets. I control for income level 
in 1996, along with prior confl ict experience and ethnic fractionalization. Thus, the 
question is whether perceptions of surprisingly good governance relative to income 
level and confl ict history can still forecast civil peace. 
Table 8 shows that the perceptions of government effectiveness, political stability, 
and rule of law in 1996 are indeed signifi cantly related to major confl ict outbreak 
over the next 13 years. The result might not be too surprising with regard to politi-
cal stability, which is based on expert surveys intended to capture “perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by uncon-
stitutional or violent means” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009, 6). But the 
results are also present for government effectiveness and rule of law, and the esti-
mated coeffi cients are negative and substantively large for corruption and regulatory 
TABLE 7. ICRG Governance and All Confl ict Onsets, Country Fixed Effects 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ipt–2  –2.735**
 (0.896) 
corruptt–2  –0.227 
 (0.918) 
rolt–2  –1.359† 
 (0.805) 
bqt–2  –0.946
 (0.861)
log(income)t–1  0.287  –0.166  0.015  –0.024
 (0.541)  (0.505)  (0.512)  (0.517)
log(popt–1)  0.517  –0.352  0.104  –0.429
 (0.948)  (0.901)  (0.923)  (0.894)
oil  0.528  0.441  0.383  0.239
 (0.964)  (0.976)  (0.965)  (0.982)
political instabilityt–1  0.184  0.163  0.155  0.161
 (0.324)  (0.325)  (0.326)  (0.325)
anocracyt–1  –0.088  –0.131  –0.169  –0.126
 (0.398)  (0.396)  (0.399)  (0.398)
democracyt–1  –0.587  –0.721  –0.746  –0.687
 (0.478)  (0.488)  (0.487)  (0.487)
prior war  –1.414**  –1.271  –1.342**  –
 (0.359)  (0.355)  (0.362)  (0.357)
N (N countries)  956(44)  955(44)  955(44)  955(44)
Country fi xed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes
Note: ip = investment profi le; corrupt = control of corruption; rol = rule of law; bq = bureaucratic quality; 
ELF = ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
†Signifi cant at p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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TABLE 8. WGI Governance in 1996 and ACD Civil War Onset, 1997–2008
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
gov’t effec. 1996  –0.97†
 (0.58)
voice 1996  –0.52
 (0.44)
pol. stab. 1996  –0.97*
 (0.44)
rule of law 1996  –1.40*
 (0.60)
corruption 1996  –0.96
 (0.66)
reg. qual. 1996  –0.73
 (0.45)
onsets pre- 1997  0.50*  0.46*  0.43†  0.24  0.38  0.40†  0.45*
 (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.27)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.23)
log(income) 1996  –0.42  0.11  –0.20  0.08  0.24  –0.02  –0.02
 (0.34)  (0.47)  (0.38)  (0.42)  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.41)
ELF  –0.71  –0.63  –0.46  –0.59  –0.60  –0.62  –0.60
 (1.29)  (1.28)  (1.32)  (1.30)  (1.32)  (1.28)  (1.30)
constant  0.60  –4.16  –1.51  –3.95  –5.57  –3.11  –2.95
 (2.98)  (4.17)  (3.48)  (3.81)  (4.09)  (4.02)  (3.69)
N  156  156  156  156  156  156  156
Note: DV = ACD civil war onset after 1996. Logit, with standard errors in parentheses.
†Signifi cant at p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
 quality as well. It is evident that adding governance measures tends to turn the sign 
on the estimate for income slightly positive or close to zero, again consistent with 
the hypothesis that income normally proxies for governance or state capabilities. The 
pattern continues to hold if we add region fi xed effects (although the signifi cance of 
government effectiveness weakens a bit), or measures of oil production or popula-
tion in 1996. 
Table 9 repeats the exercise with the dependent variable of all ACD confl icts. The 
results are marginally weaker, and here we see less tendency for the inclusion of gov-
ernance measures to reduce the estimated coeffi cients for income.20
I have run the same models using the WGI indicators from 1998 and the depen-
dent variable as onsets after 1998. The results are similar. This lowers the likelihood 
that the results are a fl uke from one year of WGI data (which, as we have seen, are 
highly stable over time anyway). I have also added average growth rate of GDP per 
capita after 1996, again fi nding little change for the governance indicators. 
Not much evidence exists that different dimensions of governance as measured 
by WGI show notably stronger or weaker relationships to subsequent confl ict risk. 
Political stability, which is supposed to be an expert appraisal of confl ict risk, is the 
most strongly related, while voice and accountability, which is based on assessments 
266    |    JAMES D. FEARON
of democracy, is the weakest. (This is consistent with the standard fi nding in the con-
fl ict literature that measures of democracy are largely unrelated to onset risk when 
one compares countries at similar levels of economic development.) After political 
stability, the most predictive factors are rule of law and government effectiveness. 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009, 6) defi ne the latter as “capturing percep-
tions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such poli-
cies.” But overall, just as we saw that these several “dimensions” of governance are 
highly correlated, these regression results do not allow us to draw strong conclusions 
about which dimension of governance is most important for increasing the odds of 
civil peace. 
The identifi cation strategy here is plausible insofar as the following argument is 
plausible: once we control for 1996 income, prior confl ict experience, and other 
factors, variation in countries’ quality of governance as measured by expert ratings 
in 1996 is essentially random with respect to unmeasured other determinants of 
subsequent civil war risk. I fi nd it diffi cult to think of omitted variables entirely 
distinct from governance or institutions that would plausibly affect both rater 
TABLE 9. WGI Governance in 1996 and All ACD Confl ict Onsets, 1997–2008
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
govt effect. 1996  –0.62
 (0.41)
voice 1996  –0.47
 (0.30)
pol. stab 1996  –0.93**
 (0.30)
rule of law 1996  –0.67†
 (0.38)
corruption 1996  –0.12
 (0.41)
reg. qual. 1996  –0.45
 (0.33)
log(# onsets 
pre- 1997 + 1)  1.26***  1.19***  1.15**  0.72†  1.12**  1.22***  1.17**
 (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.39)  (0.35)  (0.37)  (0.35)
log(income) 1996  –0.55*  –0.24  –0.40  –0.23  –0.27  –0.51†  –0.34
 (0.23)  (0.31)  (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.29)  (0.28)
ELF  1.30  1.39  1.53†  1.58†  1.41  1.30  1.43
 (0.87)  (0.88)  (0.89)  (0.91)  (0.88)  (0.87)  (0.88)
constant  1.72  –1.13  0.18  –1.18  –0.89  1.29  –0.22
 (2.07)  (2.76)  (2.29)  (2.37)  (2.56)  (2.56)  (2.54)
N  156  156  156  156  156  156  156
Note: DV = at least one ACD confl ict onset after 1996. Logit, with standard errors in parentheses.
†Signifi cant at p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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perceptions of governance quality and confl ict performance over the subsequent 
10 years. But the possibility exists. 
The identifi cation strategy here will not do a good job of estimating the long-run 
impact of good governance or state capabilities, since some part of these may be 
incorporated in per capita income in 1996. Depending on how we think about what 
causal effect we are trying to estimate—relatively short-run or long-run impact of gov-
ernance on civil war odds—we will underestimate the long-run impact of governance 
quality if we are omitting an indirect effect through level of economic development.
CPIA 
Table 10 replicates the model presented above for the ICRG indicators but using 
one- and two-year lags of the CPIA index as the governance measure. The estimated 
coeffi cients for the lagged CPIA index are negative and are signifi cantly related to 
TABLE 10. CPIA Governance and All ACD Confl ict Onsets 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
cpiat–1  –0.31†  –0.08 
 (0.16)  (0.17) 
cpiat–2  –0.31† 
 (0.18) 
log(gdpt–1)  –0.48**  –0.37*  –0.33*  0.01 
 (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.42) 
log(popt–1)  0.27*  0.31**  0.31**  0.27) 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.65) 
log(% mountains)  0.17*  0.18*  0.18* 
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
oil producer  0.69t  0.58  0.65†  0.91 
 (0.37)  (0.37)  (0.37)  (0.77) 
pol instabilityt–1  0.03  –0.01  –0.00  0.11 
 (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.29) 
anocracyt–1  –0.04  –0.06  –0.08  0.11 
 (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.37) 
democracyt–1  –0.01  0.04  –0.04  0.09 
 (0.34)  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.43) 
ELF  1.22*  1.23**  1.32** 
 (0.49)  (0.47)  (0.45) 
pnor war  –0.16  –0.26  –0.14  –1.89*** 
 (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.29)  (0.35) 
constant  –3.09*  –3.26*  –3.62* 
 (1.55)  (1.54)  (1.45) 
N  3120  3120  3063  1652(61) 
Country fi xed effects?  No  No  No  Yes 
Note: SEs clustered by country. 
†Signifi cant at p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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confl ict risk despite the truncated sample (no non-aid-receiving countries) and the 
selection bias issues. The substantive magnitude of the estimates is smaller than for 
the WGI and ICRG indicators, however; moving from the 75th to the 25th percentile 
on the CPIA index is associated here with about a 40 percent increase in the annual 
odds of confl ict onset. Results are even weaker with fi xed effects and looking only at 
major confl icts. The estimates hardly change when we use the two-year lag instead of 
the one-year lag, which suggests little coding of CPIA on civil war in progress. There 
is less indication here that the CPIA measure successfully competes with income.
Conclusions 
Even when we compare countries at similar levels of per capita income, those judged 
as having worse governance have subsequently been at greater risk of the outbreak 
of signifi cant civil confl ict or war. And if we compare countries rated similarly on 
governance measures, variation in income appears less strongly or not at all related 
to confl ict risk. For the ICRG measures of investment climate and rule of law—which 
have the longest time series and thus the most within-country variation—there is evi-
dence that worsening governance in a country is associated with higher subsequent 
confl ict risk, with the magnitude of the estimates similar to those derived from the 
pooled time-series cross-section. 
In addition, it does not seem to matter much which dimension of governance we 
consider. There may be a weak tendency for measures of government effectiveness, 
investment climate, and rule of law to perform better than measures of corruption 
or bureaucratic quality; and measures of democracy (often viewed as an important 
dimension of good governance) do not forecast lower confl ict risk across a broad 
range of income categories.21 But overall, apart from democracy, the various expert-
ratings-based governance measures are strongly correlated with each other, even 
after removing a common dimension associated with per capita income. So it is 
diffi cult to say whether particular dimensions are more or less important; whether 
expert raters are basically reporting on a single common dimension regardless of the 
labels they use; or whether good governance and institutions constitute a syndrome 
in which “all good things [need to] go together.” 
These results have implications for research on development and on civil war. For 
example, they may affect performance-based allocation (PBA), the practice of the 
World Bank and most other multilateral donors of conditioning aid allocation on 
an assessment of the quality of a country’s institutional and policy frameworks. The 
Bank began using PBA in 1977, and increased the weight it put on assessment of gov-
ernance in its allocation formulas in the late 1990s (Winters 2010). One motivation 
for increased attention to governance in PBA was cross-national statistical research 
suggesting that aid promoted growth in better-governed developing countries but 
not in badly governed countries (Burnside and Dollar 2000). These results have not 
proved to be robust (Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2004), and the debate continues 
on whether and when aid promotes economic growth. 
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Even if it turns out that aid is more productive in better-governed countries, PBA 
could not meet its objectives if donors’ subjective, expert-ratings-based indicators 
of good governance are not good measures of the relevant latent variable. It is thus 
encouraging that governance measures that are closely related to those used to allo-
cate aid do seem to have value for forecasting events that are plausibly related to 
poor governance, namely, civil confl ict. It is discouraging that the Bank’s CPIA index 
is the least clearly related to the propensity for future confl ict, although this may be 
due to limitations in the CPIA sample rather than the measure being less valid than 
the ICRG and WGI measures. 
A common criticism of PBA is that people in the worst governed, most fragile 
states are most in need of aid projects, even if that aid might be less effi ciently 
deployed. The results here could be used to support this position, since they suggest 
that PBA is directing aid away from countries at highest risk of civil confl ict. How-
ever, it is not clear that increased development aid lowers civil war risk; indeed, it is 
possible that it increases risk, on average, and perhaps especially in poorly governed 
countries. A more compelling concern would be whether PBA is directing aid money 
away from postconfl ict countries, where there may be a window of opportunity for 
improved governance and plausibly high social and economic returns to investments 
that would make an immediate reversion to confl ict more costly for elites. 
Civil confl ict is only one objective indicator of poor governance or fragility. 
Future research should examine whether other objective indicators of government 
performance—for example, the amount and quality of public goods supplied in edu-
cation, health, and other services—are related to the subjective measures produced 
by expert surveys. The intuition that what we call “governance” or “institutions” is 
a critical determinant of foreign aid and economic development outcomes is a strong 
one, but it is disturbing that major policy decisions are driven by expert-based ratings 
when it is hard to know what they are actually measuring. 
The results also have implications for debates about the causes of civil confl ict and 
war. They tend to support the view that low income is strongly related to confl ict 
risk because it is a proxy for low state capabilities rather than because of a direct 
labor market effect. Income growth or decline within a country is not much related 
to subsequent changes in confl ict propensity, whereas changes in perceived quality 
of governance appear to be related (at least for the ICRG measures). It is interesting, 
but also unfortunate in a way, that no one dimension of governance appears mark-
edly more important than the others. If this had been the case, the results might have 
supported greater focus in aid policies on improving corruption, or rule of law, or 
bureaucratic quality, or whatever came up most strongly related to reduction in con-
fl ict risk. Instead, we fi nd that at least for our current measures of good governance 
or institutions, all good things go together and all of them appear related to lower 
confl ict risk to a slightly different extent. This could suggest that good performance 
on all of these various dimensions is a by-product or function of some underlying 
political confi guration or bargain, the nature of which remains unclear and should 
be the subject of investigation (see Besley and Persson 2009; North, Wallis, and 
 Weingast 2009). 
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Notes
 1. In the mid-1980s, there was more civil war in developing countries than there is now but 
essentially no discussion of the problems confl ict posed for development.
 2. The Bank also designates states as fragile if they have had a peacekeeping operation in the 
previous three years.
 3. For examples of onset studies, see Hegre et al. (2001), Sambanis (2001), Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), Collier and Hoeffl er (2004), and Hegre and Sambanis (2006); for duration, Balch-
Lindsay and Enterline (2000), Collier, Hoeffl er, and Soderbom (2004), Cunningham 
(2006), and Fearon (2004); for incidence, Montalvo and Querol (2005) and Besley and 
Persson (2009).
 4. See Fearon (2010) for a detailed review and a replication of these results using confl ict 
data used in this paper.
 5. See Weinstein (2007). Drawing on an exhaustive reading of micro-level accounts of 
particular civil wars, Kalyvas (2006) provides myriad examples of how the relative local 
strength of rebel and government forces shaped local support for the rebels versus the 
government, more than the other way around.
 6. Both papers mention the alternative stressed by the other as a possibility. Fearon (2008) 
develops a model of individual decisions to join a rebel movement, noting that the stand-
ard opportunity cost argument neglects the fact that while there may be less to lose by 
joining a rebel band in a poor country, there is also less to gain. Unless one assumes a 
specifi c sort of preference (increasing relative risk aversion), the propensity to join a rebel 
group will be independent of per capita income in the country. An alternative explanation, 
stressed in that paper, is that in more modern economies it may be more diffi cult for rebel 
groups to extract wealth using typical guerrilla-group methods, given that much of it is 
virtual wealth held in bank accounts, human capital, and businesses that are more mobile 
than are farmers in poor countries.
 7. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009, 6) describe these six areas as follows: “(1) Voice 
and Accountability (VA) capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
(PV) capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence 
and terrorism. (3) Government Effectiveness (GE) capturing perceptions of the quality 
of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the cred-
ibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. (4) Regulatory Quality (RQ) 
capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
 policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. (5) Rule 
of Law (RL) capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confi dence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
(6) Control of Corruption (CC) capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as capture of the state by elites and private interests.”
 8. An advantage of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s (2009) approach is that because they 
draw on a large number of different expert-based measures, their measures may have 
greater reliability than any one source.
 9. For studies of institutions and governance as causes of economic growth, Mauro 
(1995) used ethnic fractionalization as an instrument for corruption as measured by 
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expert surveys; however, it is implausible that the only path through which ethnic frac-
tionalization would be related to economic growth is corruption. Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001) famously used settler mortality in colonies hundreds of years ago as an 
instrument for 1983 expropriation risk (ICRG). Knack and Keefer (1995) did not really 
address the endogeneity issue.
 10. This is a blunt instrument, because clearly civil confl ict causes lower growth, which tends 
to infl ate the estimates for the effect of current growth and so potentially bias the estimates 
for governance downward, given that governance may be related to subsequent growth. 
(In fact, it is not much related to subsequent growth except for the WGI measures and 
income growth in the 2000s, but that’s an issue for another paper.)
 11. One problem with this approach is that a country’s rating may change from one year 
to the next not because anything changed in the country but because other countries 
changed; these measures have more validity as a ranking within a given year than as a 
time-series measure.
 12. This is in a very small part mechanical, since ICRG indicators are one of the many inputs 
into the WGI indicators.
 13. Results are similar if we start the confl ict measurement in 1998 or 2000, and if we use the 
1998 WGI measures instead of the 1996 measures.
 14. http://www.prio.no/CSCWlDatasets/Armed-Confl ict/UCDP-PR101.
 15. See Fearon (2010) for a more detailed discussion of confl ict coding rules and the implica-
tions of different choices. Results presented here appear not to be very sensitive to the 
details of the confl ict coding rules; for example, they are very similar if I use an updated 
version of the civil war list in Fearon and Laitin (2003) instead of the ACD codings. 
 16. List-wise deletion is often a big problem in confl ict regressions, because countries that are 
prone to civil war often do not have economic data.
 17. Means for investment profi le, corruption, rule of law, and bureaucratic quality are, 
respectively, .57, .52, .61, and .53. Standard deviations are .21, .23, .25, and .30.
 18. This effect is stronger if we consider models that drop other covariates; for example, leav-
ing only prior war, income, population, and ethnic fractionalization.
 19. Looking only at major confl icts, there are too few countries (only l7) with a major 
onset in the ICRG subsample to get anything reliable out of fi xed effects. However, 
the coeffi cient for investment profi le is negative and very close to signifi cant at .10. As 
in the pooled analysis, adding current growth rate does not change the results for the 
governance measures.
 20. I log the number of prior onsets (plus one) because some countries have many prior 
low-level onsets and the distribution is quite skewed. Also, because some countries 
have multiple onsets after 1996, a negative binomial model could be used instead of 
logit with whether a country had at least one onset as the dependent variable; results 
are quite similar.
 21. There is some evidence—in the data used here and in other studies (Hegre and Nome 
2010)—that higher levels of democracy correlate with lower confl ict risk among wealth-
ier countries.
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Fragile States and the Paradox of Weak Governance
Is weak governance an independent cause of confl ict? That is the question James 
Fearon addresses in his paper, and his work is most welcome to all of us who par-
ticipate in the policy debates on how to deal with fragile states. His conclusion is 
that low values on various governance indicators do forecast subsequent confl ict 
onset when one controls for a country’s level of economic development. A country 
with worse governance indicators than one would expect given its income level has 
a signifi cantly greater risk of civil war outbreak in the next 5 or 10 years. The policy 
implication is that confl ict prevention cannot limit itself to development aid aiming 
to raise incomes. It suggests that governance issues also have to be addressed directly. 
Yet the fi ndings also show that political instability—defi ned as a change toward 
either more autocracy or more democracy—signifi cantly raises the risk of civil war 
onset. So if bad governance raises the risk of confl ict and changes in governance also 
imply increased confl ict risk, how can fragile states emerge from fragility?1
Refl ections on Fearon’s Paper
Since I am not an expert in the methodologies used by Fearon, I leave the expert 
debate on the validity of his results to others. I will assume here that his results are 
valid and explore some policy implications. However, I would like to raise one issue 
that is relevant to these policy implications. Fearon uses the concept of “surprisingly 
good governance” to control for income levels. In his defi nition, countries have sur-
prisingly good governance when they have high ratings for governance compared 
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with those of other countries at the same level of per capita income. But this strategy 
raises questions. Why has this governance not yet led to the economic level that 
should statistically have been its effect? Could other factors explain both the lack of 
effect on economic development and the confl ict-proneness of the country? Fearon 
promises more on this research strategy and potential threats, and more on the deter-
minants of surprisingly good or bad governance. I look forward to his refl ections.
Findings from a Policy Perspective
One important fi nding in the paper is that the factors most strongly related to 
increased risk of civil war onset are new states, per capita income, and any change 
in governing arrangements, whether in an autocratic or democratic direction. Auto-
cratizing change is slightly more prone to be followed by war than democratizing 
change. The likelihood that democratic reform leads to civil confl ict does not vary 
much across levels of development. The risk is slightly lower as one moves up the 
income scale, but not signifi cantly so. The level of democracy itself is not signifi cantly 
related to the outbreak of confl ict.2
The second policy-relevant fi nding is that low values on various governance 
indicators do forecast subsequent confl ict onset when a country’s level of economic 
development is controlled for. The various dimensions of good governance used in 
the three sets of indicators—the World Governance Indicators (WGI) produced by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi3; the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
indicators; and the World Bank’s aggregate Country Policy Institutional Assess-
ment (CPIA)—are strongly interrelated, and no strong conclusion can be drawn 
about what dimension of governance is most important for increasing the odds of 
civil peace.
Fearon presents an interesting discussion on the role of horizontal inequalities, 
which is notoriously diffi cult to establish mainly because of the diffi culty of measur-
ing inequality across groups. The fi ndings are somewhat inconclusive. On the one 
hand, ethnic fractionalization is signifi cantly related to civil war onset in most but 
not all of the models Fearon uses. On the other hand, he fi nds that ethnic fraction-
alization is almost completely unrelated to surprisingly good governance. These 
fi ndings warrant more research into the role of horizontal inequalities and do not 
yet discredit the view that ethnic diversity may act as a confl ict factor when it is 
politicized and used to exclude groups from access to economic and political power 
(as I argue in Anten 2009).
Policy Implications
The fi rst policy implication is rather straightforward, but it is important to mark 
it, since the debates about fragile state policies often take place among the develop-
ment, diplomatic, and security communities: Confl ict policy cannot limit itself to 
development aid that focuses on raising incomes. The defi ning role of governance 
in causing confl ict warrants specifi c attention to governance. This goes for countries 
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that have never experienced civil war and even more for postconfl ict situations, 
since previous war is an added risk factor.
The next question is how to address weak governance, considering the paradox 
described above, which is familiar to policy makers in fragile countries and in the 
international community. If weak governance increases the risk of confl ict and so 
do changes in government arrangements, how can a country emerge from fragility? 
The second policy implication I propose is that any policy aiming to improve 
governance in order to reduce fragility has to include a security component, since the 
policy raises the risk of confl ict or relapse into confl ict. A country-specifi c analysis 
could shed more light on the “greed and grievance” and “opportunity for violence” 
structures in that country, as well as on the actors involved. This could point the way 
to complementary actions in the domain of security (e.g., armed violence reduction, 
security sector reform) that could mitigate the risks of, and possibly prevent, the 
outbreak of confl ict.
The third cluster of policy implications goes to the heart of the matter of govern-
ance reform. In practice, ways out of the paradox cited above have been sought at 
two levels: at the level of the governance approaches to be followed, and at the level 
of the governance aims to be pursued.
Studies focusing on the approaches to be followed hold on to the conviction that, 
in the end, a substantive democracy is the only governance system that protects 
societies against fragility and confl ict. Democracy may not be perfect, but it is still, 
as Winston Churchill said, “the worst form of government except for all the others 
that have been tried.” Thus it should be the ultimate aim of peace-building and state-
building approaches. In working out approaches to achieve this aim, two dilemmas 
are often encountered. One concerns the sequencing of elections and is particularly 
relevant for postconfl ict situations. The other concerns constitution-building: which 
institutions would result in the highest level of democracy in the given country and 
how these institutions should be designed.
Sisk (2009) reviewed the dilemmas surrounding electoral processes after civil 
war. His overview aligns with Fearon’s fi ndings that a change in government 
arrangements—in this case, toward democratization—increases the risk of instability, 
at least in the short term. The explanation for this phenomenon is that in the absence 
of a democratic culture and well-functioning institutions, including institutions that 
check violence, electoral competition is likely to exacerbate divisions in society to an 
unmanageable level. On the other hand, electoral processes in postconfl ict situations 
may be necessary to validate peace agreements and provide sorely needed legitimacy 
for postwar governance. In some cases (e.g., South Africa in 1984), electoral processes 
have been the critical turning point that ended an uncertain and turbulent transition 
period. Many efforts have been made to defi ne the minimal conditions necessary for 
“good” elections in fragile settings. I have not seen a defi nitive answer, but most 
people stress a minimum level of security and rule of law, suffi cient engagement of 
popular (including subnational) levels, and a functioning election infrastructure. 
The dilemma in constitution-building originates in the fact that democracy comes 
in many forms—the defi ning criterion is not so much a set of specifi c rules but rather 
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the outcome of those rules as applied in the specifi c country. For example, the rules 
can stipulate that every citizen has a vote, but we all know cases in which that vote 
does not lead to an actual say in how the country is ruled. So democracy ensues (or 
does not) from the interplay between the formal and informal rules, the way the rules 
are applied in practice, and context factors such as the level of institutionalization. In 
this view democracy is defi ned as consisting of substantial civil and political rights, 
legal equality, rule of law, institutional checks on elected offi cials, real pluralism, 
and civilian control over the military and state security apparatus. Thus defi ned, it 
comes close to good governance as defi ned by the sets of indicators used by Fearon. 
The challenge in any given country is to know what political system would pro-
duce the best democracy or best governance: a proportional or majority system, 
presidential or parliamentary, centralized or federalized, and so on. Experience has 
taught us that there is no “best package” and that the population is more likely to 
accept a system that is designed in a participatory way. The dilemma is that this 
process can easily take a few years in a weakly organized and fragmented society—
one that has an urgent need for an adapted, effective, and legitimate political system, 
so trade-offs must be made.
Linked to the issue of constitution-building is the question of how best to build 
on existing formal and informal institutions. In many fragile states, informal institu-
tions provide most of the governance; these institutions must be carefully integrated 
into the new systems if the latter are to be effective. The goal is to create effective 
“hybrid orders” that combine old and new institutions. Building on constructive 
societal values (such as participation, consensus-building, sharing, rejection of per-
sonal enrichment), rules and institutions can increase the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of the hybrid order. Such an approach must be country-specifi c.
The second way out of the paradox is more radical—it questions the feasibility of 
the basic goal of strengthening governance or state-building in fragile states. Spurred 
by persistent failures to reform governance in fragile states such as Sudan and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), some authors question whether the basic 
conditions for governance reform exist in these states. De Waal (2009) and Eriksen 
(2009) suggest that we not analyze fragile states for what they are not but rather for 
what they are: political orders responding to their own rules that are not likely to 
develop into neoliberal Weberian states. 
De Waal introduces the concept of the “political marketplace” to analyze how 
governance actually works in countries where state institutions are subordinate to 
strong patronage networks. The basic characteristic of a political marketplace is that 
political loyalty is for sale to the highest bidder. Provincial elites seek to extract from 
the national elites the best price for their allegiance, using the tools at their disposal, 
such as votes, economic cooperation, and violence. The national elites—especially 
those in government—likewise have their economic and military tools. The various 
factions bargain and eventually strike a deal. However, whenever market conditions 
change, the deal is up for renegotiation, so the system is inherently unstable. The mar-
ket could temporarily stabilize if each faction got a stake in proportion to its power 
base; in other words, if all major stakeholders were co-opted in a full buy-in. In some 
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countries (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Afghanistan), the 
political marketplace is plainly dysfunctional; it does not manage to reach endur-
ing bargains or contain violence. In other countries the marketplace functions in 
a mostly nonviolent way behind the façade of formal democratic and bureaucratic 
institutions. However, the political marketplace system is fundamentally at odds with 
good governance and development, because it requires leaders to spend public capital 
to maintain their loyalty base (in a nepotist, arbitrary, and corrupt manner) rather 
than on public development.
The fundamental question is whether it is possible in robust political market-
place orders to work on peace-building and state-building with the aim of achieving 
democracy, even if we follow the best integrated strategies. De Waal warns that 
mandating integrated peace operations in these countries with the task of democ-
ratization would lead to a mission without end: the foreign troops would need to 
remain forever to enforce democratization. In the case of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Eriksen argues that not only must the means (policies, strategies) of the 
standard approach to state-building and good governance be adapted to the context 
but the ends as well. The conditions for successful state-building are largely absent 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The interests of the regime and power are not 
compatible with state-building, regime survival does not depend on strengthening the 
state (and may even be threatened by it), and the regime has alternative strategies for 
political survival. Many actors (the state, companies, warlords) profi t from dealing in 
and with the weak state. The price for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
at least in the short term, could be the reproduction of state weakness.
Entrenched political marketplaces survive as long as they have access to sub-
stantial rentier income—from oil and minerals and also from aid—which provides 
the lifeline for the patronage networks. As long as external interventions do not 
consistently create incentives for leaders to reform and consistently sanction mis-
behavior, it is unlikely that the political order will change. Historically, the inter-
national community has not been able to take such a united stance long enough to 
effect such change.
Concluding Remarks
If we turn back to the original paradox and its policy implications, what can we 
conclude?
First, Fearon’s fi ndings lend support to an integrated approach toward fragile 
states that aims to achieve better governance (e.g., rule of law, government effective-
ness, less corruption), including better economic governance, while trying to contain 
the risk of confl ict through a security component. This approach must deal with the 
inherent paradox that strengthening governance might create confl ict; it requires 
carefully crafted strategies tailored to country-specifi c contexts. The key components 
are building on existing institutions, encouraging participation, engaging all stake-
holders, linking in subnational governance, taking an incremental approach, and 
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making a long-term commitment. In the most fragile states, however—those charac-
terized by an entrenched political marketplace and supported by rentier income—it 
might be wise to set more modest and realistic ambitions, at least for the short and 
medium terms. Preserving stability could be a modest goal. Politically, stability might 
be best served by a full buy-in that co-opted all major stakeholders in a governance 
arrangement. If such political orders are to be reformed, it will take a long-term exer-
cise in which external interventions cooperate to create the right incentives.
Notes
 1. This comment is based on an incomplete draft paper by James Fearon that includes 
material to be used for his paper for the 2010 Annual Bank Conference on Develop-
ment Economics. The author apologizes for any mismatch between this comment and 
the fi nal paper presented at the conference by James Fearon.
 2. Collier (2008) fi nds that in countries with an income of less than US$2,500 per capita per 
annum, a higher level of democracy is related to a greater chance of confl ict onset, while 
above that income level the chance of confl ict is lower.
 3. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
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New Ways of Measuring 
 Welfare

Does economic growth improve the human lot?1 Using several data sets that collec-
tively cover 140 countries and represent nearly all the world’s population, we study 
the relationship between subjective well-being and income, identifying three stylized 
facts. First, we show that in a given country, richer persons report higher levels of 
life satisfaction. Second, we show that richer countries, on average, have higher lev-
els of life satisfaction. Third, analyzing the time series of countries that we observe 
repeatedly, we show that as countries grow, their citizens report higher levels of 
satisfaction. An important fi nding is that the magnitude of the relationship between 
satisfaction and income is roughly the same across all three comparisons, which sug-
gests that absolute income plays a large role in determining subjective well-being.
These results overturn the conventional wisdom that there is no relationship 
between growth and subjective well-being. In a series of infl uential papers, Easterlin 
(1973, 1995, 2005a, 2005b) has argued that economists’ emphasis on growth is 
misguided, because he fi nds no statistically signifi cant evidence of a link between a 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and the subjective well-being of its citizens, 
despite the fact that Easterlin and others (e.g., Layard 1980) have found that richer 
persons in a given country report higher levels of well-being. Researchers have rec-
onciled these discordant fi ndings—called the Easterlin Paradox—by positing that 
well-being is determined by relative, rather than absolute, income. In this view, people 
want only to keep up with the Joneses. The Easterlin Paradox suggests that focusing 
on economic growth is futile; when everyone grows richer, no one becomes happier. 
A related concern—voiced, for example, by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2010)—is that 
subjective well-being adapts to circumstance. If this argument is correct, it implies that 
long-run growth makes people no better off, because their aspirations and expecta-
tions grow with their incomes. A third concern is that even if well-being rises with 
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income for the very poor, a person eventually reaches a satiation point above which 
additional income has no effect on well-being (Layard 2005). However, in this paper, 
we present evidence that well-being rises with absolute income, period. Our evidence 
suggests that relative income, adaptation, and satiation are of only secondary impor-
tance.
Subjective well-being is multifaceted; it includes both how happy people are at a 
point in time and how satisfi ed they are with their lives as a whole (Diener 2006). 
To begin, we briefl y discuss relevant background information on the measurement of 
subjective well-being. Throughout the paper, we focus on life satisfaction—the vari-
able that is most often measured and the one that has been the focus of much of the 
existing literature (although many economists have referred to life satisfaction ques-
tions as measuring “happiness”). Although life satisfaction is the focus of this paper, 
we consider a variety of alternative measures of subjective well-being and show that 
they also rise with income.
We demonstrate that richer people are more satisfi ed with their lives and that this 
fi nding holds across 140 countries and several data sets. The relationship between 
income and satisfaction is remarkably similar in all countries: Our graphical analysis 
suggests that subjective well-being rises with the log of income. This functional form 
implies that a 20 percent rise in income has the same impact on well-being, regard-
less of the initial level of income: Going from $500 to $600 of income per year yields 
the same impact on well-being as going from $50,000 to $60,000. This specifi cation 
is appealing on theoretical grounds because a standard assumption in economics is 
that the marginal impact of a dollar of income is diminishing. Indeed, estimating 
well-being as a function of log income fi ts the data much better than the simple lin-
ear function of income emphasized by previous authors, and this holds whether we 
are making comparisons across individuals, among countries, or over time. Thus, 
all our formal analyses involve the log of income rather than its level, although we 
present scatter plots and nonparametric fi tted values to allow readers to assess the 
functional form for themselves.
After this discussion, we turn to the cross-country evidence. Using larger data 
sets than previous authors have examined, we fi nd an economically and statistically 
signifi cant relationship between average levels of satisfaction in a country and the 
log of GDP per capita. The data also show no evidence of a satiation point: The 
same linear-log satisfaction-income gradient we observe for poor and middle-income 
countries holds equally well for rich countries; it does not fl atten at high income.
Whereas Easterlin (1974) argued that the relationship between well-being and 
income seen within countries was stronger than the relationship seen between coun-
tries, and that this provided evidence for the importance of relative income, our 
 evidence undermines the empirical foundation for this claim. Instead, we show that 
the relationship between income and well-being is similar both within and between 
countries, thereby suggesting that absolute income plays a strong role in determining 
well-being, and relative income is a less important infl uence than previously believed.
We then turn to the time-series evidence. While the within- and between-country 
comparisons cast doubt on the Easterlin Paradox, they do not by themselves tell 
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us whether economic growth translates into gains in subjective well-being. This 
question has challenged researchers for some time because of a lack of consistent 
time-series data on subjective well-being. We analyze the time-series movements in 
subjective well-being using two sources of comparable repeated cross-national cross- 
sections. Each data set spans two decades and covers dozens of countries.
In analyzing the time-series data, we can subject the relative income hypothesis to 
a test: If notions of the good life change as the incomes of one’s fellow citizens grow, 
we should see only a modest relationship between growth in satisfaction and growth 
in average income relative to our point-in-time estimates. We present economically 
and statistically signifi cant evidence of a positive relationship between economic 
growth and rising satisfaction over time, although limited data mean that these esti-
mates are less precise than those from the within- or between-country regressions. 
The magnitude of the estimated gradient between satisfaction and income in the time 
series is similar to the magnitude of the within- and between-country gradients. These 
results suggest that raising the income of all does indeed raise the well-being of all.
Finally, we turn to alternative measures of subjective well-being, showing that 
they too rise with a country’s income. We fi nd that happiness is positively related 
to per capita GDP across a sample of 69 countries. We then show that additional, 
affect-specifi c measures of subjective well-being—such as whether a person felt 
enjoyment or love, or did not feel pain—are all higher in countries with higher per 
capita GDP. Our fi nding that subjective well-being rises with income is therefore not 
confi ned to an unusual data set or a particular indicator of subjective well-being.
Taken together, these new stylized facts suggest that subjective well-being, however 
measured, rises with income. Other recent papers have noted this as well. Deaton 
(2008) fi nds that people in richer countries have both higher levels of subjective well-
being and better health. Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), performing an analysis paral-
lel to this one—although using slightly different methods2—report similar fi ndings to 
those described here and discuss in detail why previous researchers failed to identify 
the strong link between subjective well-being and income.
Background on Subjective Well-Being
Subjective well-being has many facets. Some surveys, such as the World Values 
Survey, ask respondents about their life satisfaction: “All things considered, how 
satisfi ed are you with your life these days?” The Gallup World Poll includes a vari-
ant of this question in which respondents are shown a picture and told, “Here is a 
ladder representing the ladder of life. Let’s suppose the top of the ladder represents 
the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the worst possible life for you. On 
which step [between 0 and 10] of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the 
present time?” This question, which we refer to as the satisfaction ladder, is a form 
of Cantril’s Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (Cantril 1965). Other surveys ask about 
happiness directly: “Taking all things together, how would you say things are these 
days—would you say you’re very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy?” Gallup 
also asks a battery of more specifi c questions, ranging from “Were you proud of 
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something you did yesterday?” to “Did you experience a lot of pain yesterday?” 
Whereas the satisfaction question invites subjects to assess the entirety of their well-
being, the more specifi c questions hone in on affect; they measure feelings rather than 
 assessments (Diener 2006). In this paper, we will largely focus on life satisfaction, 
although we do examine the relationship between income and particular components 
of well-being.
We focus on satisfaction rather than other measures of subjective well-being, 
such as happiness, for two reasons. First, we would like to use as many data sets as 
possible to assess the relationship between subjective well-being and income, and life 
satisfaction and the satisfaction ladder are used more than any other measures. Sec-
ond, the previous literature documenting the Easterlin Paradox (including Easterlin 
1974, 1995, 2005a, 2005b, 2009) has largely focused on life satisfaction questions, 
even though researchers have tended to refer to their work as analyses of “happiness.” 
Thus, we focus our attention on analyzing similar questions for direct comparability 
with the previous literature. However, we also assess the income- happiness link in 
detail, along with other, more affective, measures of well-being—and the results are 
similar to the income-satisfaction link.
Subjective well-being data are useful only if the questions succeed in measuring 
what they intend to measure. Economists have traditionally been skeptical of subjec-
tive data because they lack any objective anchor and because some types of subjective 
data, such as contingent valuations, suffer from severe biases (e.g., Diamond and 
Hausman 1994). These objections apply to subjective well-being data, but a variety 
of evidence points to a robust correlation between answers to subjective well-being 
questions and alternative measures of personal well-being. For example, self-reported 
well-being is correlated with physical measures such as heart rate and electrical activ-
ity in the brain, as well as sociability and a propensity to laugh and smile (Diener 
1984). Self-reported well-being is also correlated with independently ascertained 
reports from friends and with health and sleep quality (Diener, Lucas, and Scollon 
2006; Kahneman and Krueger 2006). Measures of subjective well-being also tend 
to be relatively stable over time, and they have a high test-retest correlation (Diener 
and Tov 2007). If people answered subjective well-being questions without rhyme 
or reason, we would not see these correlations across questions and people and over 
time. Individual subjective well-being data are likely based on actual well-being.
Subjective well-being data lack a natural scale and are reported differently across 
data sets. For example, happiness questions often ask respondents to choose a level 
of happiness from “very happy” to “very unhappy,” with one or two nominal values 
in between. Life satisfaction can be measured on a similar scale or on a ladder of 
life with 10 or 11 rungs. To compare answers across surveys, we convert all sub-
jective well-being data into normalized variables, subtracting the sample mean and 
dividing by the sample standard deviation. Whenever we report the subjective well-
being–income  gradient, therefore, we are effectively reporting the average number of 
standard deviation changes in subjective well-being associated with a one unit change 
in income (or log income). This rescaling has the disadvantage of assuming that the 
difference between any two levels of life satisfaction is equal, although in fact the 
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difference between the fi fth and sixth rungs on the ladder of life may be very different 
from the difference between the ninth and tenth rungs. There are many alternative 
ways to standardize the scale of subjective well-being; Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) 
use an ordered probit and show that the results we discuss here are robust to alterna-
tive approaches.3
Within-country estimates of the satisfaction-income gradient. We begin our 
study of life satisfaction and income by comparing the reported satisfaction of rela-
tively rich and less rich persons in a given country at a point in time. Many authors 
have found a positive and strong within-country relationship between subjective 
well-being, measured in various ways, and income. For example, Robert Frank 
argues for the importance of income as follows: “When we plot average happiness 
versus average income for clusters of people in a given country at a given time . . . 
rich people are in fact a lot happier than poor people. It’s actually an astonishingly 
large difference. There’s no one single change you can imagine that would make your 
life improve on the happiness scale as much as to move from the bottom 5 percent 
on the income scale to the top 5 percent” (Frank 2005, 67). We confi rm this relation-
ship and, taking advantage of the enormous size of many of our data sets, estimate 
precisely the magnitude of the within-country satisfaction-income gradient.
We assess the relationship between satisfaction and income by estimating lowess 
regressions of satisfaction against the log of household income. Lowess regression 
effectively estimates a separate bivariate regression around each point in the data 
set, but weights nearby points most heavily (Dinardo and Tobias 2001). Traditional 
regression analysis imposes a linear relationship, while the lowess procedure allows 
researchers to study the functional form of the relationship between two variables, 
such as life satisfaction and the log of income.
In fi gure 1, we plot the lowess estimate of the relationship between the satisfaction 
ladder score and the log of household income for each of the 25 largest countries in 
the world (estimated separately), using data from the Gallup World Poll.4 (Analyz-
ing income per equivalent household yields similar conclusions.) Satisfaction scores 
are shown as both raw (0–10) scores on the left axis and in their standardized form 
(obtained by subtracting the whole sample mean and dividing by the standard devia-
tion) on the right axis. To ease comparison with subsequent fi gures, the standardized 
satisfaction scale and the income scale are kept approximately constant in the various 
charts throughout this paper.
Figure 1 reveals the well-known fi nding that richer citizens of a given country are 
more satisfi ed with their life. For most countries, this plot reveals that satisfaction 
rises linearly with the log of income (as the horizontal axis is on a log scale). Moreo-
ver, the gradient is similar across countries, with the estimated line for each country 
looking like parallel shifts of each other. In spite of the enormous differences among 
these countries, the relationship between income and life satisfaction is remarkably 
similar. Finally, we note that this fi gure provides no evidence of satiation. While some 
have argued that, above a certain point, income has no impact on well-being, in these 
countries we see that the curve is just as steep at high levels of income as at low  levels.
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While these 25 countries account for the majority of the world’s population, 
Gallup polled individuals in 132 countries, making this poll the widest survey of 
 subjective well-being ever undertaken. We summarize and quantify the relationship 
between well-being and income by pooling data from all the countries in our data 
sets and estimating regressions of the following form:
Standardized satisfactionic = +countries α c + β individual ln(Incomeic) + Xicδ + εic,     (1)
where i indexes individuals; c indexes countries; Income is self-reported household 
income; and X is a vector of individual-level controls including sex, a quartic in age, 
and their interaction. We include a country-specifi c intercept, α c, which adjusts for 
differences in average satisfaction and income across countries, thereby ensuring that 
the estimation results are driven by differences between rich and poor within each 
country. We denote the coeffi cient of interest β individual because it isolates the well-
being–income gradient obtained when comparing individuals within a country. In 
contrast to much of the literature, we focus on the relationship between subjective 
well-being and the log (rather than level) of income. Our graphical evidence supports 
FIGURE 1.
Relationship between Well-Being and Income, within Individual Countries,
Gallup World Poll
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Note: The fi gure shows, for the 25 largest countries, the lowess fi t between individual satisfaction ladder scores and 
the log of household income, measured in the Gallup World Poll. The satisfaction data are shown both on their raw 
(0–10) scale on the left axis and as standardized variables on the right axis. We plot the lowess fi t between the 10th 
and 90th percentiles of each country’s income distribution. Satisfaction is assessed using the ladder of life question.
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this focus, since we observe that the satisfaction-income gradient is approximately 
linear-log.5
Table 1 presents the results, estimated separately in a variety of data sets. We 
begin by showing results from the 126 countries in the Gallup World Poll with 
valid income data. Next, we present results from the fi rst four waves of the World 
Values Survey, which spans 1980–2004 and asks respondents to assess their life 
 satisfaction on a 1–10 scale; we pool all waves and include wave fi xed effects to 
account for changes through time and changes in surveys between waves. Stevenson 
and Wolfers (2008) document that for several countries in this survey the sampling 
frames are not nationally representative, so we drop these observations from all of 
our analyses. Finally, we also analyze the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which 
covers 44 countries at all levels of development and uses the same ladder of life 
question as Gallup.
The fi rst column of table 1 reports the regression results without any controls 
(beyond country fi xed effects), and the estimated satisfaction-income gradient ranges 
from 0.216 in the World Values Survey to 0.281 in the Pew Global Attitudes Sur-
vey. In the second column we add controls for age and sex, but our results remain 
similar.6 Within a given country, at a point in time, people with higher income tend 
to report greater life satisfaction.
We would like to compare the estimates from equation (1) to estimates of the 
cross-country subjective well-being–income gradient, but to do so we need to have 
a comparable concept of income changes. While differences in income between indi-
viduals within a country refl ect both transitory and permanent differences (and each 
has different implications for subjective well-being), income differences between 
countries are likely to be much more persistent and close to entirely permanent.
How much of the cross-sectional variation in income within a country represents 
variation in permanent income? Standard estimates for the United States suggest 
TABLE 1. Within-Country Satisfaction-Income Gradient
Dependent variable: 
Standardized life 
satisfaction
Without 
controls
With 
controls
Permanent 
income 
adjusted
Instrumental 
variables Sample size
Gallup World Poll: 
Ladder question
 0.236***
 (0.014)
 0.232***
 (0.014)
0.422  0.449 ***
 (0.027)
171,900
(126 countries)
World Values Survey: 
Life satisfaction
 0.216***
 (0.017)
 0.227***
 (0.037)
0.413  0.26***
 (0.035)
116,527
(61 countries)
Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey: Ladder question
 0.281***
 (0.027)
 0.283***
 (0.027)
0.515  0.393***
 (0.033)
32,463
(43 countries)
Note: The table reports the coeffi cient on the log of household income, obtained from regressing standardized life 
satisfaction against the log of household income and country fi xed effects using the indicated data set. Additional 
controls include a quartic in age, interacted with sex, plus indicators for age and sex missing. Our permanent income 
adjustment is to scale up our estimates by 1/0.55; see the text for the explanation. We instrument for income using 
a full set of country 3 education fi xed effects. We report robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in 
parentheses. For further details on the standardization of satisfaction and the exact wording of satisfaction questions, 
see the text.
***, **, and * denote statistically signifi cant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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that around two-fi fths to one-half of the cross-sectional variation in annual income 
comes from permanent income (Gottschalk and Moffi t 1994; Haider 2001).7 Our 
survey asks about monthly income, suggesting that the transitory share is larger; to 
be conservative, we simply choose the upper end of these estimates. We also need 
to convert the variation in transitory income into its permanent income equivalent. 
If each extra dollar of transitory income persists for only one year, people would 
be indifferent between one extra dollar of transitory income and a rise in perma-
nent income of about 5 cents (assuming a 5 percent discount rate). Estimates of the 
transitory component of annual income suggest that it does not all dissipate in one 
year; indeed, the autoregressive process estimated by Haider (2001) suggests that the 
permanent income equivalent of a $1 rise in transitory income would be about twice 
the one-year value, or 10 cents. Consequently a $1 increase in income in the cross-
section represents, on average, a 50 cent rise in permanent income plus a 50 cent rise 
in transitory income, and this transitory income is valued equivalently to a rise in 
permanent income of about 5 cents. This implies that to interpret our estimated well-
being–income gradient in terms of a $1 rise in permanent income, our cross-sectional 
estimates should be scaled up by about 80 percent (1/0.55). We report the adjusted 
estimates in the third column of table 1, and they tend to be slightly larger than 0.4.
We can also address this concern empirically by using an instrumental variables 
strategy designed to isolate variation in income that is likely permanent. Specifi cally, 
we use a full set of country 3 education fi xed effects as instruments for permanent 
income. The instrumental variables estimates of β individual—reported in the fourth 
column of table 1—are larger than the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, and 
in the Pew and Gallup data, they are close to the estimates we obtain after making 
the permanent income adjustment. Education, however, is very likely an imperfect 
instrument for permanent income. While education is correlated with permanent 
income, it likely also directly affects satisfaction, leading to upward bias on the 
instrumental variables estimates of β individual. Our reading of the within-country 
evidence, therefore, is that the life satisfaction–log permanent income gradient falls 
between 0.3 and 0.5.
We should not push these adjustments too hard, however. While it seems straight-
forward to think that permanent rather than transitory income determines subjec-
tive well-being, direct evidence suggests the opposite: Subjective well-being and the 
business cycle move quite closely together. Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) report that 
the output gap strongly predicts subjective well-being, at least in the United States. 
Wolfers (2003) shows this also holds in Europe and across states in the United States.
International comparisons of satisfaction and income. The within-country 
relationship between income and life satisfaction is well known and admits at least 
two interpretations. The fi rst interpretation is that greater earning capacity makes 
people satisfi ed with their lives: It purchases health care; allows people to enjoy their 
leisure time with fancier food and TVs; and affords them freedom from fi nancial stress. 
A second interpretation, however, is that people care less about money than about 
having money relative to some reference point (Easterlin 1973). One reference point 
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is their neighbor’s income; others are a country’s or the world’s average income. Or 
perhaps people use their own previous income as a reference point. Under this view, 
people are stuck on a “hedonic treadmill”: as they grow richer, their expectations 
adapt to their circumstances, and they end up no more satisfi ed than they were before 
(Brickman and Campbell 1990). On the other hand, on an “aspiration treadmill,” 
even as higher income yields greater well-being, people may eventually report no 
higher well-being than they previously reported, because their expectations have 
grown with their income and well-being.
To sort out these interpretations, we turn to national data. If all that matters 
for satisfaction is my income relative to my neighbor’s income, or relative to mean 
national income, people in countries with high average income should be no more 
satisfi ed than people in poorer countries. Alternatively, to the extent that national 
differences in income refl ect long-lasting differences, people should adapt to them (if 
adaptation is important), so adaptation predicts that the cross-country satisfaction-
income gradient should be small. On the other hand, if absolute income matters 
(or if the relevant reference point is mean global income), we would expect richer 
countries to be more satisfi ed. Thus, we now assess the satisfaction-income gradient 
across countries.
Our measure of average income in a country is GDP per capita, measured at 
purchasing power parity to adjust for international differences in price levels. These 
data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database; where 
we are missing data, we turn fi rst to the Penn World Tables (version 6.2) and then 
to the CIA Factbook. For earlier years for which data are unavailable, we turn to 
Maddison (2007).
Figure 2 plots average (standardized) life satisfaction data drawn from each of the 
fi rst four waves of the World Values Survey against GDP per capita (shown on a log 
scale). The fi gure shows both the OLS regression line and a nonparametric (lowess) 
fi t. As previously noted, some of these observations were not based on nationally 
representative surveys (typically missing groups that might be expected to have low 
satisfaction), so we plot these with squares rather than circles; they clearly lie far 
from the regression line (which we calculate by excluding them).8
The early waves of the survey, which contain mostly wealthy nations, provide 
suggestive but not overwhelming evidence for a positive link between the log of 
GDP per capita and subjective well-being. A researcher who mistakenly included the 
nonrepresentative countries and who plotted satisfaction against the level rather than 
the log of income could (erroneously) fail to fi nd a statistically signifi cant relationship 
between GDP per capita and subjective well-being. Successive waves of the survey 
included more middle- and low-income countries, and the relationship between 
income and well-being is clearer in the later waves. The four waves span 25 years 
and 79 distinct countries, with income ranging from less than $1,000 to more than 
$32,000 (in 2000 international dollars). This fi gure shows a clearly positive and 
approximately linear-log relationship between life satisfaction and GDP.
Other data sets employing alternative measures of satisfaction show a similar 
positive relationship. Figure 3 plots the relationship between the satisfaction ladder 
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scores estimated from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey and GDP per capita. The 
Pew data show the same pattern as the World Values Survey data: Richer countries 
exhibit higher levels of satisfaction. The nonparametric fi t confi rms the visual impres-
sion that there are no important nonlinearities: Satisfaction grows with log income 
at about the same rate whether we focus on rich countries or poor countries. This 
 fi gure provides no evidence that the satisfaction–log income gradient diminishes as 
income grows, suggesting that no country is rich enough to have hit a satiation point, 
if such a point exists.
FIGURE 2.
Life Satisfaction and Real GDP per Capita, World Values Survey
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Source: World Values Survey.
Note: Respondents are asked, “All things considered, how satisfi ed are you with your life as a whole these days?”; 
respondents then choose a number from 1 (completely dissatisfi ed) to 10 (completely satisfi ed). Data are aggregated 
by fi rst standardizing individual-level data to have mean zero and unit standard deviation, then taking country-year 
averages of the standardized values. The left axis gives the raw average satisfaction, and the right axis gives the 
 standardized satisfaction. Dashed lines are fi tted from an OLS regression; dotted lines are fi tted from lowess regres-
sions. These lines and the reported regressions are fi tted only from the nationally representative samples. The units 
on the regression coeffi cients refer to the normalized scale. Real GDP per capita is at purchasing power parity in 
 constant 2000 international dollars. Sample includes 20 (1981–84), 42 (1989–93), 52 (1984–99), or 69 countries 
(1999–2004) from the World Values Survey. Observations represented by hollow squares are drawn from countries 
in which the World Values Survey sample is not nationally representative. For details, see Stevenson and Wolfers 
(2008, appendix B).
WELL-BEING, INCOME, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND GROWTH   |    293
Although the Pew and World Values Survey results provide strong evidence for 
the cross-country link between satisfaction and income, neither survey has quite the 
global coverage of the Gallup World Poll. In fi gure 4, we plot the satisfaction ladder 
scores against per capita GDP for 131 countries included in this poll (we exclude 
Palestine, because we were unable to fi nd reliable GDP data). Every part of the GDP 
distribution is well represented. This fi gure confi rms our strong impression that 
richer countries have higher levels of life satisfaction than poorer countries and that 
this relationship is approximately linear-log. Indeed, the correlation between average 
satisfaction scores in a country and its log of GDP per capita is above 0.8.
Because average well-being is rising in the log of average income, our results sug-
gest that transferring a given amount of money from rich to poor countries could 
raise life satisfaction, because $100 is a larger percentage of income in poor countries 
than in rich countries. The linear-log relationship revealed by the nonparametric fi ts 
FIGURE 3.
Life Satisfaction and Real GDP per Capita, Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002
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Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002.
Note: Respondents are shown a picture of a ladder with 10 steps and asked, “Here is a ladder representing the ‘lad-
der of life.’ Let’s suppose the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the worst 
possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?” Data are 
aggregated by fi rst standardizing individual-level data to have mean zero and unit standard deviation, then taking 
country-year averages of the standardized values. The left axis gives the raw average satisfaction, and the right axis 
gives the standardized satisfaction score. Dashed lines are fi tted from an OLS regression; dotted lines are fi tted from 
lowess regressions. Regression coeffi cients are in terms of the standardized scaling. Real GDP per capita is at pur-
chasing power parity in constant 2000 international dollars. Sample includes 44 developed and developing countries.
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also provides evidence against satiation: The relationship between well-being and 
income does not diminish at high levels of income, except to the extent implied by 
the log functional form. If anything, the lowess curve appears to tick upward even 
more sharply at high levels of GDP.
We quantify the magnitude of the satisfaction-income link by running similar 
regressions to equation (1) but analyzing the satisfaction of individuals i in country 
c as a function of the log of average per capita income in their country instead of 
individual income (consequently, we also drop the country fi xed effects):
Standardized satisfactionic = α  + β aggregate ln(GDP per capitac) + Xicδ + εic     (2)
FIGURE 4.
Life Satisfaction and Real GDP per Capita, Gallup World Poll
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Source: Gallup World Poll.
Note: Respondents are shown a picture of a ladder with 10 steps and asked, “Here is a ladder representing the 
‘ladder of life.’ Let’s suppose the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the 
worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?” Data 
are aggregated by fi rst standardizing individual-level data to have mean zero and unit standard deviation, then tak-
ing country-year averages of the standardized values. Dashed lines are fi tted from an OLS regression; dotted lines 
are fi tted from lowess regressions. The units on the regression coeffi cients refer to the normalized scale. Real GDP 
per capita is at purchasing power parity in constant 2000 international dollars. Sample includes 131 developed and 
developing countries.
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Alternatively, we aggregate our satisfaction data up into national averages, 
and run:
Standardized satisfactionc = α  + β aggregate ln(GDP per capitac) + εc            (3)
We are interested in β aggregate, which says by how much average satisfaction in a 
country increases (in standard deviations) when the log of average per capita income 
in a country is higher.
These results, summarized in table 2, confi rm the impression given by the 
graphical analysis: All three of our data sets show a statistically signifi cant and 
positive relationship between satisfaction and the log of GDP. These results sug-
gest that absolute income plays an important role in explaining the relationship 
between satisfaction and income. The magnitude of the relationship is similar 
whether we estimate it in the individual-level data or the national averages, and 
whether or not we adjust for the differential age and sex composition of respond-
ents. The coeffi cients on the log of average income vary somewhat but are cen-
tered on 0.3 to 0.4.
This range is striking for its resemblance to the within-country satisfaction-income 
gradient. To emphasize the similarity, fi gure 5 plots data from the Gallup World Poll. 
Each point in the fi gure is a separate country, and for each country we have plotted 
both a dot representing the average satisfaction and income in that country, and an 
arrow whose slope represents the slope of the satisfaction-income gradient when 
comparing people within that country. As we look across the 126 countries with 
valid household income data, we fi nd that no country has a statistically signifi cantly 
negative relationship between satisfaction and income; the bulk of the lines point 
in similar directions and have a similar slope. These slopes are roughly parallel to 
TABLE 2. Cross-Country Regressions of Life Satisfaction on Log GDP per Capita
Dependent variable:
Standardized life satisfaction
Microdata
National 
data Sample size
Without 
controls
With 
controls
Gallup World Poll:
Ladder question
 0.357***
 (0.019)
 0.378***
 (0.019)
 0.342***
 (0.019)
291,383
(131 countries)
World Values Survey: 
Life satisfaction
 0.360***
 (0.034)
 0.364***
 (0.034)
 0.370***
 (0.036)
234,093
(79 countries)
Pew Global Attitudes Survey:
Ladder question
 0.214***
 (0.039)
 0.231***
 (0.038)
 0.204***
 (0.037)
37,974
(44 countries)
Note: The table reports the coeffi cient on the log of per capita GDP, obtained from regressing standardized life 
satisfaction against the log of GDP, using individual data with and without controls, and using national-level data 
without controls, in the indicated data set. In the national-level regressions, we take the within-country average 
of standardized life satisfaction as the dependent variable. GDP per capita is at purchasing power parity. The 
additional controls include a quartic in age, interacted with sex, plus indicators for age and sex missing. We report 
robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses. For further details on the standardization of 
satisfaction, the exact wording of satisfaction questions, and the sources for GDP per capita, see the text.
*** denote statistically signifi cant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively.
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the dashed line, which shows that the slope one obtains when comparing individu-
als within a country is similar to that obtained when making comparisons between 
country averages.
Thus, our estimates of the satisfaction-income gradient are similar whether esti-
mated within or between countries. Recall that the Easterlin Paradox rested on the 
belief that the well-being–income gradient observed within countries is larger than 
that seen between countries. Earlier estimates of a statistically insignifi cant cross-
country relationship between average satisfaction and average income refl ected the 
fact that previous researchers were looking at small samples of fairly homogeneous 
FIGURE 5.
Within-Country and Between-Country Estimates of the Life Satisfaction–Income 
 Gradient, Gallup World Poll
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income, controlling for gender, a quartic in age, and their interaction. Usable household income data were una-
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countries. It was the juxtaposition of this statistically insignifi cant fi nding with 
evidence of a statistically signifi cant well-being–income relationship that led 
Easterlin to declare the data paradoxical. But the historical absence of evidence 
for a proposition—that richer countries are happier—should not have been con-
fused as being evidence of its absence. And indeed, with our larger data sets, we 
fi nd statistically signifi cant evidence that high-income countries are happier than 
their low-income counterparts. Instead, a claim about the importance of relative 
income comparisons should rest on the quantitative magnitudes of the estimated 
well-being–income  gradients.
Indeed, the similarity of the within- and between-country gradients has an impor-
tant interpretation that we can express more formally. Suppose that:
 
Satisfaction Income
Income
ic
absolute
ic
relative ic
= + +α β βln( ) ln
Income
Income Inco
c
absolute relative
ic
relative
= + + −α β β β( )ln ln mec  (4)
where β absolute and β relative measure the importance of absolute and relative income in 
determining life satisfaction. Equation (1) estimates regressions of this form, regress-
ing standardized satisfaction scores on In(Incomeic) yielding a coeffi cient  β individual, 
and country fi xed effects controlling for the infl uence of In Incomec. Thus, our table 1 
estimates of the within-country satisfaction-income gradient β individual is the sum of 
the absolute and relative income effects: β individual = β absolute + β relative.
Next, taking country averages of equation (4) yields:
 Satisfaction Income MLc
absolute
c
absolute relative
= + − +α β β βln ( ) Dc  (5)
where MLDc (which equals In Income Income− ln ) is the mean log deviation, a 
measure of a country’s income inequality. This equation is very similar to the cross-
country estimates of equation (3) shown in table 2. Indeed, if we had estimated 
β aggregate conditional on the mean log deviation, our estimate of β aggregate would 
give an exact estimate of  β absolute. Stevenson and Wolfers (2010) show that the 
covariance between MLDc and In (GDPc) is small, so whether or not one controls 
for the mean log deviation has only a minimal impact on our estimate of β aggregate. 
Our estimate of β aggregate is, therefore, approximately β aggregate.
Consequently, the importance of relative income in determining life satisfaction, 
β relative, is equal to the difference β individual – β aggregate. Since we estimate that the 
between-country gradient (β aggregate) is similar to or slightly larger than the within-
country gradient (β individual), we conclude that relative income plays at best a minor 
role in determining life satisfaction.
An alternative explanation of reference-dependent preferences is based on adapta-
tion. In this view, what matters for satisfaction is income relative to expectations, 
and these expectations adapt in light of recent experience. Thus, economic growth 
simply speeds up the pace of the hedonic treadmill, as we all run faster just to stay 
in place. This implies that variation in income that has persisted long enough for 
expectations to adapt should be unrelated to satisfaction. The differences in log GDP 
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per capita shown in fi gures 3–5 are extremely persistent, and across the 131 countries 
in the Gallup World Poll, the correlation between the log GDP per capita in 2006 
shown in fi gure 4 and its value in 1980 is 0.93. Consequently, this theory suggests 
that these persistent cross-country differences in GDP per capita should have little 
explanatory power for satisfaction. The data clearly falsify this hypothesis, too.
Satisfaction and economic growth. So far, we have shown that richer people 
report higher life satisfaction than poorer people in a given country, and that, on 
average, citizens of rich countries are more satisfi ed with their lives than are citizens of 
poor countries. These comparisons suggest that absolute income plays an important 
role in determining well-being, but they do not directly address our central question: 
does economic growth improve subjective well-being?
We answer this question by turning to the time-series evidence on life satisfaction 
and GDP, which allows us to assess whether countries that experience economic 
growth also experience growth in subjective well-being. Estimating the time-series 
relationship between GDP and subjective well-being is diffi cult, because suffi ciently 
comparable data are rarely available. For example, the General Social Survey in 
the United States and the Life in Nation surveys in Japan both surveyed subjec-
tive well-being over a long horizon, but both are affl icted by important changes in 
the  wording and ordering of questions that, if not recognized, can lead to serious 
interpretation errors. Nevertheless, many scholars have found that the United States 
has not gotten any happier over the past 35 years, despite becoming wealthier, 
and Stevenson and Wolfers (2009) note a somewhat puzzling decline in female 
happiness. In contrast, Japan, which was once thought to have experienced little 
increase in happiness over the postwar period, has in fact experienced signifi cant 
happiness gains that are similar in magnitude to what one would expect given the 
cross-sectional and cross- country relationships between subjective well-being and 
income. However, these happiness gains become apparent only once changes in the 
survey over time are taken into account (Stevenson and Wolfers 2008); the failure 
to take account of these changes had led many previous scholars astray (including 
Easterlin 1995, 2005a).
We draw on two long-running data sets to examine the relationship between 
subjective well-being and economic growth: the World Values Survey and the Euro-
barometer. We analyze the fi rst four waves of the World Values Survey, which span 
1980 to 2004 and cover 79 distinct countries. Because the World Values Survey added 
many countries in later waves, however, it is not possible to make many comparisons 
of a given country.9 The Eurobarometer survey has the advantage that it has been 
surveying people in member nations of the European Union virtually continuously 
since 1973; however, it has the disadvantage of covering only relatively homogeneous 
countries. Unlike the other surveys, the Eurobarometer ascertains life satisfaction 
on a 4-point scale.10
Nine countries were included in the original Eurobarometer sample. Analyzing 
data through 1989, Easterlin (1995) concluded that the data failed to show any 
relationship between life satisfaction and economic growth. In fi gure 6, we present 
FIGURE 6.
Changes in Life Satisfaction and Economic Growth in Europe, Eurobarometer
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Note: Solid circles represent separate observations from each round of the Eurobarometer survey from 1973 to 1989; these were the data analyzed in Easterlin (1995). Open circles extend 
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2
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 scatter plots of life satisfaction and the log of GDP per capita for the nine countries 
 Easterlin analyzed. In the figure, dark circles represent the original data he analyzed; 
hollow circles denote data that have subsequently become available through to 2007. 
The dark circles by themselves do not always show a strong relationship; however, 
over the full sample, eight of the nine countries show a positive relationship between 
life satisfaction and growth, and six of the nine slopes are statistically significantly 
positive. The slopes range from –0.25 in Belgium to 0.68 in Ireland. This reanalysis 
not only suggests a positive relationship between income and growth but also hints 
at the difficulty of isolating this relationship when data are scarce.
The positive relationship between life satisfaction and economic growth is not 
confined to European countries. In figure 7, we turn to the World Values Survey and 
plot changes in life satisfaction against cumulative changes in real GDP. This survey 
covers more countries at very different levels of development, which allows us to see 
whether populations become more satisfied as their countries transition from low to 
moderate income and from moderate to high income. To keep the comparisons clean, 
figure 7 excludes countries in which the sampling frame changed.
Each of the six graphs compares a different pair of waves. The top row compares 
short differences (the waves are separated by about five years), while the bottom row 
shows longer differences (10–20 years). All six graphs indicate a positive association 
between changes in subjective well-being and changes in income; the estimated gra-
dients range from 0.22 between waves I and III to 0.71 between waves I and II. The 
figure shows that life satisfaction is more sensitive to short-run changes in income 
than to long-run changes, suggesting that business cycle variation may be driving 
some of the association. An alternative interpretation is that over time people adapt 
to their new circumstances or their aspirations change, so that even though their 
material welfare is increasing, their subjective well-being gains from these increases 
recede over time.
Figure 7 also reveals some potentially interesting (or problematic) outliers. The 
Republic of Korea, for example, often falls outside the GDP change scale but had 
only a modest change in subjective well-being; Hungary experienced very little growth 
but had a serious decline in life satisfaction. In regression results reported below, we 
include these outliers, but it is clear that excluding them could change our estimates.
The comparisons in figure 7 are particularly valuable because they are all between 
common pairs of waves, so they automatically adjust for the various changes in the 
survey—both question order and survey techniques—that occurred between waves. 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) document that these World Values Survey data are 
strongly influenced by methodological changes, so this control is important. Indeed, 
the influence of the changes is large enough to render naïve comparisons of raw 
survey averages through time to be problematic (Easterlin and Angelescu 2009; 
Easterlin and Sawangfa 2008).
To distill the information from these figures into a single estimate of the inter-
temporal relationship between satisfaction and economic growth, we estimate panel 
regressions of the following form:
 Satisfactiontc = b time series ln(GDPtc) + ∑c∈countries ac + ∑t∈waves mc + ¨tc (6)
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FIGURE 7.
Changes in Life Satisfaction and Economic Growth, World Values Survey
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where the time fi xed effects μc control for changes in question order between waves, 
and the country fi xed effects αc ensure that only within-country changes through 
time drive the comparisons.
Panel A of table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (6) using the World 
Values Survey and the Eurobarometer. We fi nd a substantial and statistically sig-
nifi cant relationship between life satisfaction and economic growth. The estimates 
are not particularly precise, however, and they differ considerably between the two 
data sets. The satisfaction-income gradient is 0.51 in the World Values Survey and 
0.17 in the Eurobarometer. In neither data set can we reject the hypothesis that the 
true β time series lies between 0.3 and 0.4, the central estimate from the cross-country 
regressions. We can, however, reject the null hypothesis that β time series = 0, which is 
the outcome suggested by the view that relative rather than absolute income deter-
mines well-being.
To assess whether these regressions are driven by outliers, fi gure 8 shows the 
variation underlying our World Values Survey panel regression estimates, while 
 fi gure 9 illustrates the variation underlying our Eurobarometer results. Our panel 
regressions refl ect variation in satisfaction and log GDP per capita, stripped of 
country and wave fi xed effects. Thus, the vertical axis shows residual satisfaction 
defi ned by
Satisfaction Satisfaction E Satisfaction country andct ct ct= − [ | wave effects],
TABLE 3. Time-Series Regressions of Life Satisfaction on GDP per Capita
Dependent
variable:
Standardized 
life satisfaction
World Values
Survey (WVS):
All countries
WVS: Transition 
countries
WVS: 
Nontransition 
countries
Eurobarometer: 
All countries
Panel A: Panel regressions
ln(GDP) 0.505***
(0.109)
0.628**
(0.239)
0.407***
(0.116)
0.17**
(0.074)
N 166 observations
79 countries
31 observations
10 countries
135 observations
66 countries
776 observations
31 countries
Panel B: Long differences
ln(GDP) 0.47***
(0.128) 
0.694*
(0.387)
0.35**
(0.163)
0.278*
(0.164)
N 66 differences 10 differences 46 differences 30 differences
Note: The table reports the coeffi cient on the log of GDP per capita. In the panel regressions, we regress standard-
ized life satisfaction against the log of GDP per capita as well as wave and country fi xed effects. In the long differ-
ences, we regress the change in standardized satisfaction against the change in log GDP per capita, after adjusting 
satisfaction and log GDP for wave and country fi xed effects. Long differences in the World Values Survey are taken 
between the fi rst and last time we see a country; in the Eurobarometer, between decadal averages. We report robust 
standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses. For further details on the standardization of satisfaction, 
the exact wording of satisfaction questions, the sources for GDP per capita, the procedure used to compute long 
differences, and the defi nition of transition countries, see the text.
***, **, and * denote statistically signifi cant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
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which is obtained as the residual from a regression of satisfaction on country and 
wave fi xed effects. Likewise, the horizontal axis shows residual log GDP,
ln( ) ln( ) [ln( ) | ],GDP GDP E GDP country and wave effectsct ct ct= −
which is obtained from a similar regression in which log GDP is the dependent vari-
able. As can be seen, when a country is experiencing relatively high levels of GDP 
(relative to its country average and the estimated wave fi xed effects), it also experi-
ences high levels of satisfaction. By construction, our panel data regression coeffi cient 
in panel A of table 3, βˆ time series, is exactly equal to the slope of the dashed bivariate 
regression line shown in each fi gure. These fi gures confi rm that the results in table 3 
are not driven by a few outliers; the points fi t the regression line well, and the cor-
relation is quite strong. The data in fi gure 9 paint a somewhat noisier picture for the 
Eurobarometer panel, although roughly similar conclusions hold.
FIGURE 8.
Life Satisfaction and Log GDP, Relative to Country and Year Fixed Effects,
World Values Survey
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In obtaining these estimates, however, we have drawn on all the variation in GDP 
in our sample, including possibly high-frequency changes to which people do not 
have a chance to adapt. If adaptation occurs slowly, it would be better to focus on 
long-run changes in GDP. Indeed, Easterlin and Angelescu (2009) argue that only 
long-run economic growth can be used to assess the relationship between growth 
and well-being.
So far, only the data plotted on the bottom row of fi gure 7 speak to this point, 
showing that even 10-year changes in GDP continue to infl uence life satisfaction. 
However, each of these comparisons is limited to the sets of countries that are com-
mon to a pair of waves. Instead, we can assess long differences for all countries by 
comparing changes in Satisfactionct and ln( )GDPct  between the fi rst and last time we 
observe a country in the World Values Survey.
We plot these variables against each other in fi gure 10 for each of the 56 countries 
in the World Values Survey that we observe multiple times. The average difference 
in time between the fi rst and last observations is about 11 years. (This number is 
FIGURE 9.
Life Satisfaction and Log GDP, Relative to Country and Year Fixed Effects,
Eurobarometer
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 comparable with Easterlin and Sawangfa’s notion of the “long run”—they require 
data spanning at least 10 years—but somewhat lower than Easterlin and Angelescu’s 
12-year requirement.) The majority of countries are located in the northeast and 
southwest quadrants; therefore, their GDP and satisfaction move together (relative 
to wave fi xed effects). A notable number of countries, however, lie in the northwest 
and southeast; their life satisfaction and GDP move in opposite directions. Even so, 
the correlation between these variables is positive and remarkably strong, given that 
we are analyzing fi rst differences.
In panel B of table 3, we report the estimate of the relationship between well-being 
and growth obtained from regressing these long differences in Satisfactionct against 
long differences in ln( )GDPct . We bootstrap our standard errors to account for the 
uncertainty in generating residual satisfaction and GDP.11 The coeffi cient is 0.47 and 
statistically signifi cantly different from zero, and with these long differences, once 
again, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the true β time series lies between 0.3 and 0.4.
FIGURE 10.
Long Differences in Life Satisfaction and Log GDP, World Values Survey
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Using these same data (although including the observations from the unrepre-
sentative national samples and not adjusting for wave fi xed effects), Easterlin and 
Sawangfa argue that “the positive association between the change in life satisfaction 
and that in GDP per capita reported by Stevenson and Wolfers rests almost entirely 
on the positively correlated V-shaped movement of the two variables during the post-
1990 collapse and recovery in the transition countries” (2008, 13). To investigate 
this claim, we separately estimate our panel regressions and long differences for the 
sample of transition countries only and for all other World Values Survey nations. 
Although breaking the sample apart like this reduces our statistical precision, the key 
inferences remain the same in both samples: The infl uence of GDP growth on satis-
faction is positive and statistically signifi cantly different from zero. We cannot reject 
that these coeffi cients lie between 0.3 to 0.4 and, if anything, the World Values Sur-
vey yields estimates of the time-series satisfaction-income gradient that is somewhat 
larger. The critique leveled by Easterlin and Sawangfa seems, quite simply, wrong.
Figure 10 provides further evidence for why estimating the relationship between 
subjective well-being and long-run growth has challenged researchers. Many coun-
tries do not fi t the general trend that growth in satisfaction is correlated with GDP 
growth. Bulgaria, Estonia, Ukraine, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela all 
experienced considerable declines in income with no accompanying decline in well-
being. Furthermore, a researcher who is worried about outliers could easily drop 
a handful of infl uential countries from the sample—for example, Hungary, Korea, 
the Russian Federation, and Slovenia. Removing these countries clearly does not 
eliminate the positive correlation between these long differences, but it substantially 
reduces the statistical power of the regression, because these extreme cases involve 
so much of the variation in Δ ln( )GDPct . When we exclude these countries from our 
regression of long differences, our estimate of β time series remains positive and compa-
rable to other estimates at 0.26, but the standard error grows to 0.15.
We repeat this exercise using the Eurobarometer data. The advantage of these 
data is that they include many observations for each country, which we can combine 
to reduce the infl uence of measurement error. Thus, we construct long differences 
in the Eurobarometer by taking averages of Satisfactionct and ln( )GDPct  for each 
country in each of the decades 1973–82, 1983–92, 1993–02, and 2003–07. We then 
construct decadal differences in satisfaction and GDP by comparing adjacent decades 
and plot these decadal differences in fi gure 11. Each point represents a single decadal 
difference in satisfaction and GDP for a given country. Many countries experienced 
sluggish income growth but no relative slowdown in subjective well-being. Most of 
these countries are in Western Europe. For a majority of countries, however, GDP 
and satisfaction move in the same direction, although the correlation is much weaker 
than in our previous estimates. The estimated satisfaction-income gradient result-
ing from these long differences, also reported in the right-hand column of table 3, 
summarizes the results from this fi gure. We fi nd a marginally statistically signifi cant 
gradient of 0.28.
Overall, we fi nd a positive but somewhat less precise relationship between growth 
in subjective well-being and growth in GDP. When we use all the time-series  variation 
in GDP, we fi nd a well-being–income gradient that is similar to the within- country 
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and cross-sectional gradients. When we estimate longer differences, the  precision of 
the relationship falls but the point estimate is similar in magnitude. This remains true 
whether we exclude potentially problematic “transition” economies from the sample 
or not; whether we limit our attention to long-run changes in income or not; and 
whether we analyze data from the World Values Survey or the Eurobarometer. None 
of our estimates using the full variation in GDP allows us to reject the hypothesis that 
β time series lies between 0.3 and 0.4, the range of our estimates of the static relation-
ship between well-being and income.
Alternative measures of subjective well-being. Thus far, we have shown that 
there is a positive, statistically signifi cant, and quantitatively important relationship 
between life satisfaction and income, and that this satisfaction-income gradient is 
similar in magnitude whether one analyzes individuals in a given country, countries 
at a point in time, or a given country over time. But life satisfaction is not the only 
FIGURE 11.
Decadal Differences in Life Satisfaction and Log GDP, Eurobarometer
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measure of subjective well-being, so we consider the relationships between various 
other measures of subjective well-being and income. For brevity (and for reasons of 
data availability), we will focus on cross-country comparisons of these alternative 
indicators.
In fi gure 12 we begin by studying happiness, showing the cross-sectional rela-
tionship between happiness and the log of GDP per capita, using data from the 
fourth wave of the World Values Survey. We follow the same graphing conven-
tions as in previous charts, showing the national averages as both their average 
on their original 4-point scale and as standardized values (on the right axis). We 
also show both the regression line (where the dependent variable is the standard-
ized measure of happiness) and the nonparametric fi t; this regression line shows a 
FIGURE 12.
Happiness and GDP: World Values Survey, 1999–2004
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positive and statistically signifi cant relationship between happiness and per capita 
GDP, although the estimated happiness-income gradient is not as large as the 
satisfaction-income gradient we estimate in table 2. The presence of two extreme 
outliers, Tanzania and Nigeria, skews the regression estimates considerably. These 
countries are particularly puzzling because they are the poorest in the sample, but 
they report among the highest levels of happiness. They also have much lower 
average life  satisfaction; indeed, Tanzania is the least satisfi ed of any country in 
our sample. Perhaps there is a banal explanation for this puzzle: Survey docu-
mentation suggests that there were diffi culties translating the happiness question 
in Tanzania. Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) discuss the happiness-income link 
more fully and fi nd very similar results to the  satisfaction-income link: Happiness 
increases at any aggregation of the data, and the magnitude of the link is not much 
affected by the degree of aggregation.
We turn now to alternative and more specifi c measures of subjective well-
being. The Gallup World Poll asks respondents about many facets of their emo-
tional health and daily experience. For several experiences—such as enjoyment, 
physical pain, worry, sadness, boredom, depression, anger, and love—the Gallup 
poll asks, “Did you experience [feeling] during a lot of the day yesterday?” These 
questions sketch a psychological profi le of hundreds of thousands of people 
spanning the world’s income distribution. In fi gure 13, we present scatter plots 
of the probability that a person in a given country experienced various emotions 
yesterday against GDP per capita. The fi gure suggests that citizens of richer coun-
tries are more likely to experience positive emotions and less likely to experience 
negative emotions. Enjoyment is very highly correlated with GDP, while love is 
moderately correlated. Physical pain, depression, sadness, and anger all decline 
moderately with GDP.12 Worry increases slightly with GDP, although there is 
not a strong pattern.
The Gallup poll also probes respondents for an array of sentiments about their 
day yesterday, asking whether they felt well rested, were treated with respect, chose 
how to spend their time, smiled or laughed a lot, were proud of something they did, 
or ate good-tasting food. The daily experience questions, which uniformly measure 
positive experiences, paint a picture that is consistent with our analysis thus far. 
 Figure 14 shows the percentage of people in each country that felt a certain way in 
the previous day. People in richer countries are more likely to report feeling better 
rested and respected, smiling more, and eating good-tasting foods than people in 
poorer countries, although they are no more likely to take pride in what they did or 
to have learned something interesting.
These data point to a more nuanced relationship between well-being and income. 
While they provide no reason to doubt that well-being rises with income, they also 
suggest that certain facets of well-being respond less to income than  others. These 
data hint at the possibility of understanding which emotions and experiences trans-
late into the part of life satisfaction that is sensitive to changes in income.
FIGURE 13.
Cross-Country Measures of Recalled Feelings and GDP, Gallup World Poll
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Cross-Country Measures of Daily Experience and GDP, Gallup World Poll
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Conclusions
This paper revisits the stylized facts on the relationship between subjective well-being 
and income. We fi nd that in a given country, rich people are more satisfi ed with their 
lives than poorer people, and we fi nd that richer countries have signifi cantly higher 
levels of average life satisfaction. Studying the time-series relationship between sat-
isfaction and income, we fi nd that economic growth is associated with increases in 
life satisfaction.
The key innovation is this paper is to focus explicitly on the magnitude of the 
subjective well-being–income gradient (rather than its statistical signifi cance), while 
also bringing the greatest quantity of data to bear on these questions. We show that 
the within-country, between-country, and over-time estimates all point to a quanti-
tatively similar relationship between subjective well-being and income. This relation-
ship is robust: We fi nd it not only at different levels of aggregation but using different 
data sets. We also fi nd that income is positively associated with other measures of 
subjective well-being, including happiness and other upbeat emotions.
The fact that life satisfaction and other measures of subjective well-being rise with 
income has signifi cant implications for development economists. First, and most 
important, these fi ndings cast doubt on the Easterlin Paradox and various theories sug-
gesting that there is no long-term relationship between well-being and income growth. 
Absolute income appears to play a central role in determining subjective well-being. 
This conclusion suggests that economists’ traditional interest in economic growth has 
not been misplaced. Second, our results suggest that differences in subjective well-being 
over time or across places likely refl ect meaningful differences in actual well-being.
Subjective well-being data, therefore, permit cross-country well-being  comparisons 
without reliance on price indexes. As Deaton (2010) notes, if we wish to use some 
kind of dollar-a-day threshold to count poverty, we need price indexes that account 
for differences in quality and quantity of consumption in different countries. In the-
ory, constructing these indexes is straightforward, provided one is ready to assume 
identical homothetic preferences across countries. In practice, however, a central 
challenge to creating price indexes is that many countries consume very different sets 
of goods—there is no price of smoked bonga in some countries. As countries grow 
richer, previously unavailable goods start being traded as very expensive specialty 
items. Paradoxically, as a country grows richer, its poverty count can grow because 
its prices are revised upward, devaluing income.13
As Deaton suggests, many changes in purchasing power parity (PPP) adjust-
ments simply involve better data and should not be ignored. But it can be diffi cult 
to know how much of the change in the poverty count refl ects actual changes in 
global poverty and how much refl ects updated measurement methods. In light of 
these  diffi culties, Deaton says, “Why don’t we just ask people?” Using data from 
87  countries spanning 2006–08, Deaton computes average life satisfaction for the 
world. “For the world as a whole,” he writes, “2007 was a better year than 2006; in 
2008, more households reported being in diffi culty and being dissatisfi ed with their 
lives, and these reports were worse still in 2009” (Deaton 2010, 30).
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Deaton notes that these comparisons are valid only if life satisfaction responds to 
absolute rather than relative well-being. If people assess their lives relative to con-
temporary standards, then as countries and the world grow richer, reported satisfac-
tion may not change. However, our analysis suggests an important role for absolute 
income in determining life satisfaction; therefore, we conclude that subjective well-
being data are likely to be useful in assessing trends in global well-being.
We have focused on establishing the magnitude of the relationship between sub-
jective well-being and income rather than disentangling causality from correlation. 
The causal effect of income on individual or national subjective well-being, and the 
mechanisms by which income raises subjective well-being, remain open and impor-
tant questions.
Notes
 1. This paper revisits—and, we hope, clarifi es and simplifi es—many of the fi ndings originally 
described in Stevenson and Wolfers (2008).
 2. Some of the results in this paper differ from results in the earlier study, because we con-
sider a simpler and more transparent scaling of subjective well-being, and we use more 
recent data from the Gallup World Poll.
 3. In Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), we estimated well-being aggregates as the coeffi cients 
from an ordered probit of well-being on country fi xed effects, which yielded very similar 
estimates. The most important difference is that the ordered probit scales differences rela-
tive to the standard deviation of well-being conditional on country dummies, while the 
simpler normalization in this paper scales differences relative to the (larger) unconditional 
standard deviation of well-being. Given that country fi xed effects account for about 
20 percent of the variation in well-being (that is, R2  0.2 in an OLS regression of satisfac-
tion on country fi xed effects), this simpler normalization will tend to yield estimates of the 
well-being–income gradient that are about nine-tenths as large ( . )1 0 92− ≈R .
 4. We are using a more recent version of the Gallup World Poll than Stevenson and Wolfers 
(2008), incorporating data made available through October 13, 2008.
 5. Throughout the paper, therefore, when we refer to the subjective well-being–income gra-
dient, we mean the SWB-log income gradient.
 6. These estimates are slightly smaller than those found in Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), 
which is partly due to the different normalization of satisfaction scores and partly due to 
the more recent vintage of the Gallup data analyzed here.
 7. While our calculations will use these U.S. estimates as if they are representative of the 
entire world, we really need similar studies for countries at different levels of development.
 8. For more details about the World Values sampling frame and which country-years include 
nationally representative samples, see appendix B in Stevenson and Wolfers (2008).
 9. As noted earlier, some of the country samples in earlier waves of the World Values Survey 
are not directly comparable with later waves, as their survey frames were (intentionally) 
not nationally representative. Our analysis focuses on nationally representative samples.
 10. For the analysis, we keep West Germany and East Germany as separate countries. For 
details on the Eurobarometer and our data procedures, see Stevenson and Wolfers (2008).
 11. We bootstrap the two-step procedure as follows. For each bootstrap iteration, we fi rst 
compute the residuals as described and then regress Satisfactionct Satisfactionct against 
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ln( ) ln( )GDP GDPct ic . We perform 1,000 iterations and take the standard deviation of the 
distribution of computed gradients as our estimated standard error (after making a 
degrees-of-freedom adjustment).
 12. See Krueger, Stevenson, and Wolfers (2010) for a more thorough exploration of the rela-
tionship between experiencing pain and income.
 13. As Deaton notes, adjusting for this diffi culty is straightforward in theory: weight goods 
by whether they are considered luxury items. This task may be quite diffi cult, however, 
because it requires making judgments about many thousands of goods for each country 
in the world.
References
Brickman, P., and D. T. Campbell. 1990. “Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Soci-
ety.” In Adaptation Level Theory: A Symposium, ed. M. H. Appley. New York: Academic 
Press.
Cantril, Hadley. 1965. The Pattern of Human Concerns. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press.
Deaton, Angus. 2008. “Income, Health and Well-Being around the World: Evidence from the 
Gallup World Poll.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(2): 53–72.
———. 2010. “Price Indexes, Inequality, and the Measurement of World Poverty.” American 
Economic Review 100(1): 5–34.
Di Tella, Rafael, and Robert MacCulloch. 2010. “Happiness Adaption to Income beyond 
‘Basic Needs.’” In International Differences in Well-Being, ed. Ed Diener, John Helliwell, 
and Daniel Kahneman. New York: Oxford University Press.
Diamond, Peter A., and Jerry A. Hausman. 1994. “Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number 
Better than No Number?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8(4): 45–64.
Diener, Ed. 1984. “Subjective Well-Being.” Psychological Bulletin 95(3): 542–575.
———. 2006.”Guidelines for National Indicators of Subjective Well-Being and Ill-Being.” 
Journal of Happiness Studies 7(4): 397–404.
Diener, Ed, Richard E. Lucas, and Christie Napa Scollon. 2006. “Beyond the Hedonic 
Treadmill: Revising the Adaptation Theory of Well-Being.” American Psychologist 61(4): 
305–314.
Diener, Ed, and William Tov. 2007. “Culture and Subjective Well-Being.” In Handbook of 
Cultural Psychology, ed. Shinobu Kitayama and Dov Cohen. New York: Guilford.
Dinardo, John, and Justin L. Tobias. 2001. “Nonparametric Density and Regression Estima-
tion.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4): 11–28.
Easterlin, Richard A. 1973. “Does Money Buy Happiness?” The Public Interest 30: 3–10.
———. 1974. “Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence.” 
In Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramowitz, 
ed. Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder. London: Academic Press.
———. 1995. “Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?” Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 27(1): 35–48.
———. 2005a. “Feeding the Illusion of Growth and Happiness: A Reply to Hagerty and 
Veenhoven.” Social Indicators Research 74(3): 429–433.
———. 2005b. “Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income? Caveat Emptor.” Social Indicators 
Research 70(3): 243–255.
WELL-BEING, INCOME, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND GROWTH   |    315
———. 2009. “Lost in Transition: Life Satisfaction on the Road to Capitalism.” Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 71(1): 130–145.
Easterlin, Richard A., and Laura Angelescu. 2009. Happiness and Growth the World Over: 
Time Series Evidence on the Happiness-Income Paradox. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4060.
Easterlin, Richard A., and Onnicha Sawangfa. 2008. Happiness and Economic Growth: Does 
the Cross Section Predict Time Trends? Evidence from Developing Countries. IZA Discus-
sion Paper No. 4000.
Frank, Robert H. 2005. “Does Absolute Income Matter?” In Economics and Happiness: 
Framing the Analysis, ed. Pier Luigi Port and Luigino Bruni. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Gottschalk, Peter, and Robert Moffi t. 1994. “The Growth of Earnings Instability in the U.S. 
Labor Market.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1994(2): 217–254.
Haider, Steven J. 2001. “Earnings Instability and Earnings Inequality of Males in the United 
States: 1967–1991.” Journal of Labor Economics 19(4): 799–836.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Alan B. Krueger. 2006. “Developments in the Measurement of Subjec-
tive Well-Being.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1): 3–24.
Kahneman, Daniel, Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur A. Stone. 
2006. “Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion.” Science 
312(5782): 1908–1910.
Kruger, Alan, Betsey Stevenson, and Justin Wolfers. 2010. “A World of Pain.” Mimeo, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.
Layard, Richard. 1980. “Human Satisfaction and Public Policy.” Economic Journal 90(363): 
737–750.
———. 2005. Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. London: Penguin.
Maddison, Angus. 2007. “Historical Statistics for the World Economic: 1–2003 AD.” www
.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontal-fi le_03-2007.xls.
Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers. 2008. “Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: 
Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2008(1): 
1–87.
———. 2009. “The Paradox of Declining Female Happiness.” American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy 1(2): 190–225.
———. 2010. “Inequality and Subjective Well-Being.” Working paper.
Wolfers, Justin. 2003. “Is Business Cycle Volatility Costly? Evidence from Surveys of Subjec-
tive Well-Being” International Finance 6(1): 1–26.

CAROL GRAHAM
The study of happiness was of great interest to early economists and philosophers 
such as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, but as quantitative methods in econom-
ics called for more parsimonious defi nitions of welfare and utility became synony-
mous with income, happiness fell out of fashion. More than a century later, economists 
seem to have circled back around: Research on happiness has gone from the fringes 
of the profession to the mainstream. There is a renewed debate over the relationship 
between happiness and income, and economists are using happiness surveys to study 
a host of questions, ranging from the happiness effects of health, marriage, leisure 
time, and institutional and environmental arrangements to the unhappiness effects 
of unemployment, divorce, commuting time, and infl ation. 
Happiness surveys depart from traditional approaches in their reliance on 
expressed versus revealed preferences. Put more simply, happiness economics relies on 
data based on what people say as opposed to what they do (via consumption choices). 
While not without fl aws, these data are uniquely suited to answering questions that 
standard revealed preference approaches do not answer well, such as the welfare 
effects of institutional arrangements that people are powerless to change. How can a 
poor peasant in Bolivia, for example, who is made unhappy by inequality or macro-
economic volatility, reveal his or her preferences, short of emigrating or protesting? 
Happiness surveys can also be used to explain behaviors that do not refl ect optimal 
choices but rather norms, addiction, or self-control problems. Seemingly perverse sav-
ings or schooling choices by very poor people with limited education and information, 
and public health problems such as obesity and smoking come to mind. 
As a result of the burgeoning research on happiness and the kinds of questions 
it addresses, a number of efforts are under way to develop national-level well-being 
317
The author is senior fellow and Charles Robinson Chair at the Brookings Institution and Professor at the University of 
Maryland, College Park. She would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments on an early version 
of this paper. The paper draws heavily on her recently published book, Happiness around the World: The Paradox of 
Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2011, Global 
© 2013 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank
Happiness Measures as a Guide 
to Development Policy? Promise 
and Potential Pitfalls
318    |    CAROL GRAHAM
measures. The objective is to develop metrics that can be compared within and 
across countries and ultimately used as complements to traditional income and gross 
domestic product (GDP) data. Recently, the Sarkozy Commission, chaired by two 
Nobel Prize–winning economists and sponsored by the president of France, called for 
an international effort to develop and use such measures to assess human well-being 
and progress.
Surely this research is relevant to developing economies. And fi nding a defi nition 
of well-being that is broader than income seems to be an exercise that can contribute 
to our understanding of the development process, both across and within countries. 
Beyond that, should we be using happiness measures as a guide to development poli-
cies? Should happiness be an objective of these policies? The pursuit of happiness is 
written into the U.S. Constitution. Should it be part of the charter of the international 
fi nancial institutions? 
This paper addresses these questions, fi rst reviewing what we know about the deter-
minants of happiness across and within countries of different development levels, and 
then raising the challenge that adaptation poses for the use of these measures as com-
parative indicators. In conclusion, I discuss the potential for applying these measures 
to policy and identify a number of questions that must be resolved before doing so. 
Happiness around the World: How Do Developed 
and Developing Countries Compare? 
Most of the early studies of happiness focused on the developed economies, and pri-
marily on the United States and Europe, and assumed that the developing economies 
were different because of their much higher levels of poverty. My research over the past 
decade has focused on the study of happiness around the world, with a focus on the 
developing economies. What is remarkable about my fi ndings is the remarkable con-
sistency in the determinants of happiness across the two contexts, regardless of the 
differences in income levels. 
Study Methodology
In happiness surveys, people are asked, “Generally speaking, how happy are you 
with your life?” or “How satisfi ed are you with your life?” Possible answers are on 
a 4- to 7-point scale. These questions measure reported happiness, but they do not 
defi ne happiness. We do not know when people answer these questions if they are 
thinking about happiness as contentment today or in the context of their overall 
lives and opportunities. I discuss the importance of this issue later in the paper, but 
generally I am using “happiness” as shorthand for reported well-being rather than 
as defi ned in a particular manner. 
Different surveys use different happiness questions, at times interchangeably. 
Answers to happiness and life satisfaction questions, for example, correlate quite 
closely (Blanchfl ower and Oswald 2004; Graham and Pettinato 2002).1 Still, the 
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specifi c question can affect the results. For example, respondents’ income level seems 
to matter more to their answers to life satisfaction questions than it does to their 
answers to questions focused on the innate character component of happiness (affect) 
as gauged by questions such as “How many times did you smile yesterday?” 
Happiness questions are also particularly vulnerable to order bias. People will 
respond differently to an open-ended happiness question at the beginning of a sur-
vey than to one that is framed or biased by the questions posed beforehand, such as 
those about whether their income is suffi cient or about the quality of their job. Bias 
in answers to happiness surveys can also result from unobserved personality traits. 
A naturally curmudgeonly person, for example, will tend to answer all sorts of 
questions in a manner that is more negative than the average. (These concerns can 
be addressed via econometric techniques if and when we have panel data.) Related 
concerns about unobservable variables are common to all economic disciplines and 
not unique to the study of happiness. For example, a naturally cheerful person may 
respond to policy measures differently or put more than average effort into his or 
her job. 
Despite the potential pitfalls, cross-sections of large samples of respondents 
across countries and over time fi nd remarkably consistent patterns in the determi-
nants of happiness. Psychologists, meanwhile, fi nd validation in the way people 
answer these surveys on the basis of physiological measures of happiness, such as 
frontal movements in the brain and the number of “genuine” (Duchenne) smiles 
(Diener and Seligman 2004). 
The data in happiness surveys are analyzed via standard econometric techniques, 
with an error term that captures the unobserved characteristics and error described 
above.2 Because the answers to happiness surveys are ordinal rather than cardinal, 
they are best analyzed via ordered logistic (logit) or probability (probit) equations. 
These equations depart from standard regression equations, which explore a contin-
uous relationship between variables (e.g., happiness and income). Instead, they 
explore the probability that a person will place him- or herself in a particular cate-
gory, typically ranging from unhappy to very happy. These regressions typically yield 
lower R-squares than economists are used to, refl ecting the extent to which emotions 
and other components of true well-being (in addition to any number of other unob-
servables) are driving the results, as opposed to the variables that we are able to 
measure, such as income, education, and employment status. 
While it is impossible to measure the precise effects of independent variables on 
true well-being, happiness researchers have used the coeffi cients on these variables as 
a basis for assigning relative weights to them.3 For example, they have estimated how 
much income a typical person in the United States or Britain would need to produce 
the same change in stated happiness that comes from the well-being loss resulting 
from divorce ($100,000) or job loss ($60,000) (Blanchfl ower and Oswald 2004). 
Because of the low R-squares in these equations, as so much of happiness is explained 
by individual-specifi c character traits, these fi gures should be interpreted in relative 
terms (e.g., how much the average person values employment relative to marriage) 
rather than as precise estimates of willingness to pay. 
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Happiness within Countries
My research around the world builds on the extensive studies of happiness in the 
advanced economies and fi nds a remarkable consistency in the determinants of hap-
piness across countries of all different levels of development. On average, stable 
marriage, good health, friendships, and enough income are good for happiness 
(how much income varies among countries), and unemployment, divorce, and eco-
nomic instability are bad for happiness. We cannot always establish the direction 
of causality—at least when we are relying on cross-section data—and it may be that 
happier people are more likely to have friends or to get married rather than the other 
way around. The same goes for health and higher levels of income. Some evidence 
suggests that the causality runs in both directions for many of these variables. Sev-
eral studies suggest that happier people are healthier, more optimistic, invest more in 
their future, and perform better in the labor market, among other things. 
Age and happiness have a remarkably consistent U-shaped relationship, with the 
turning point in the mid- to late forties, when happiness increases with age as long 
as health and partnerships stay sound. I have studied this relationship in countries as 
diverse as Uzbekistan and United Kingdom, and Chile and Afghanistan, and it holds 
in all of them, with modest differences in the turning point. Among other things, this 
relationship refl ects an alignment of expectations and reality as people “grow up.”
On the other hand, my fi ndings on gender are mixed. Women are typically happier 
than men in the United States and Europe, while there is no difference in Latin America. 
Men are happier than women in the Russian Federation, while in Afghanistan the few 
women we were able to interview were happier, on average, than men. (However, they 
were, no doubt, outliers and primarily urban and educated; we were unable to 
measure the happiness of women who were afraid to respond to our interviewers. 
Our priors are that they would be less happy than the average, but we have no way 
of testing that.) The differences in these fi ndings may refl ect differences in the satis-
faction of gender rights in these places, among other things.
Context also mediates the relationship between happiness and religion. In places 
where religion is a moderate force—such as Europe, the United States, and Latin 
America—respondents with faith are happier, on average, than others. The direction 
of causality is unclear: It may be that happier people are more likely to have faith. 
There are some indications, though, that religiosity per se (and broadly defi ned) has 
positive effects on happiness. A recent study in Europe fi nds that even atheists are 
happier when they live in neighborhoods where there are more religious people 
around them, likely because of the positive social externalities that come from reli-
gious organizations (Clark and Lelkes 2009). In places where religion is a more divi-
sive force, such as Afghanistan and Central Asia, there is no consistent relationship 
between faith and happiness (Graham 2010). 
Participating in politics and in civic associations is associated with higher levels 
of happiness (Helliwell, Harris, and Huang 2008). Indeed, one study based on 
research in Swiss cantons fi nds a happiness effect from political participation (vot-
ing in referendums) that is above and beyond that of the public goods and freedom 
democracy provides (Frey and Stutzer 2002). My own research in Latin America 
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fi nds that happier people are more likely to be satisfi ed with democracy and with 
market policies (Graham and Pettinato 2002). 
Happiness across Countries: The Easterlin Paradox Revisited
In the mid-1970s, Richard Easterlin, the fi rst modern economist to study happiness, 
uncovered a seeming paradox: Average happiness levels did not increase over time 
as countries grew wealthier, nor was there a clear relationship between average per 
capita GDP and average happiness levels across countries, once they achieved a cer-
tain minimum level of per capita income. This now well-known puzzle is called the 
Easterlin paradox. 
In recent years there has been a renewed debate about whether or not the Easter-
lin paradox holds. Studies by Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers (2008), and by 
Angus Deaton (2008), based on new data from the Gallup World Poll, fi nd a consis-
tent log-linear, cross-country relationship between income and happiness, directly 
challenging Easterlin’s fi ndings. These new fi ndings have resulted in a heated and at 
times even acrimonious debate among economists. 
Ironically, both sides of the debate may be correct. One reason for this is substan-
tive: On the one hand, it makes sense that people in richer countries are happier than 
those in destitute ones; on the other, many things other than income contribute to 
people’s happiness, regardless of their level of income. Many of these things—such 
as freedom, stable employment, and good health—are easier to come by in wealthier 
countries. Still, there is plenty of variance in their availability, even across countries 
with comparable income levels. 
The other reason is methodological. The later studies use new data from the 
 Gallup World Poll that include many more (unweighted) observations from small, 
poor countries in Africa and from the transition economies than Easterlin’s original 
and more recent studies. The transition countries in particular have relatively low lev-
els of happiness, in part because of the painful structural changes that accompanied 
the collapse of centrally planned economies. And some of the Sub-Saharan African 
countries have had fl at or even negative rates of growth over time. Thus, rather than 
a story of higher levels of income pulling up happiness at the top, we may be look-
ing at falling or volatile income trajectories pulling down happiness at the bottom. 
Differences also exist in the questions used to measure happiness. Easterlin’s 
work is based on the World Values survey, the U.S. General Social Survey, and the 
Eurobarometro survey, among others. All of these use open-ended happiness or life 
satisfaction questions (“Generally speaking, how happy are you with your life?” 
“Generally speaking, how satisfi ed are you with your life?”) with possible answers 
ranging from “not at all” to “very” on a 4- or 5-point scale. The Gallup World Poll 
uses Cantril’s best-possible-life question: “Please imagine a ladder with steps from 
zero to ten. If the higher the step, the better the life, on which step of the ladder do 
you personally feel you stand?”
Both sets of questions are reasonable gauges of happiness, broadly defi ned, and 
both correlate in a similar manner with the usual variables used to study happiness. 
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At the same time, there is some variance in the fi ndings based on different ques-
tions. The best-possible-life question is more framed than the open-ended happiness 
questions, providing respondents with a relative component when they are asked to 
assess their lives. Mario Picon, Soumya Chattopadhyay, and I tested the questions 
against each other in the Gallup World Poll for Latin America, a region for which we 
had both sets of questions in the same survey (Graham, Chattopadhyay and Picon 
2010b). We found that the answers to the best-possible-life question correlate more 
closely with income, both across and within countries, than open-ended happiness 
questions. The difference is greater across countries than within them, suggesting 
the extent to which unobservables across countries—including cultural differences—
infl uence answers to open-ended happiness questions more than they do answers to 
more highly framed best-possible-life questions. 
The objectives driving the particular study will dictate which happiness question 
is most appropriate. If the objective is to fi nd a measure of reported well-being that 
has the most consistency across countries, a more highly framed question may be 
more appropriate. If the objective is to see how happiness varies across countries 
and cultures, a more open-ended question is more appropriate. Depending on which 
question is used, the happiness-income relationship may vary. 
Two recent studies—one based on worldwide data and another on detailed data 
for the United States—provide strong support for the basic direction of our fi nd-
ings. They also highlight the various dimensions of happiness. Ed Diener (2010), in 
a study based on the Gallup World Poll (136,000 respondents in 132 nations), fi nd 
that income is strongly correlated with how people evaluate their lives on the ladder-
of-life question but only moderately correlated with day-to-day positive feelings, like 
smiling yesterday. 
Daniel Kahneman and Angus Deaton (2010), in a study of 450,000 respondents 
to a Gallup daily survey of U.S. respondents from 2008 through 2009, also used the 
ladder question as well as questions about emotional experiences the previous day. 
They found that hedonic well-being (the emotional quality of a person’s everyday 
experience) correlated less closely with income than did life evaluation (the thoughts 
people have about their life as measured by the ladder-of-life question). Both ques-
tions correlated closely with income in a log-linear manner at the bottom end of the 
income ladder, but the correlation between hedonic well-being and income tapered off 
at about $75,000 per year, while the correlation between life evaluation and income 
did not. Thus, more money does not necessarily buy more happiness, but less money 
is associated with emotional pain. Their fi ndings highlight the importance of the 
distinction between the judgments people make when they think about their life and 
the feelings they experience as they live it. The former are sensitive to soci oeconomic 
status; the latter, to circumstances that provoke positive and negative emotions, 
such as spending time with friends or caring for a sick relative. 
Thus, it is possible to come to different conclusions about the Easterlin paradox 
simply by using a different methodology; that is, a different sample of countries or 
different happiness questions. The substantive question of what beyond income 
makes people happy is an additional and more complicated part of the story. This is 
illustrated in fi gure 1, from my research with Stefano Pettinato and based on an 
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open-ended happiness question and a very simple linear specifi cation of income. 
While the richer countries are, on average, happier than the poorer ones, there is no 
clear income and happiness relationship within each set of countries, making it 
impossible to draw a clear conclusion about the Easterlin paradox. 
The fi gure makes the point that wealthier countries are, on average, happier than 
destitute ones, but after that the story is more complicated. Country-level averages 
are infl uenced by, among other things, cultural differences in the way people answer 
surveys, and these cannot be controlled for in the cross-country comparisons the 
way they are when we assess happiness across large samples of individuals within 
and across countries. 
Cross-country comparisons are also infl uenced by factors that are diffi cult or 
impossible to measure, such as the nature of public goods. Some cross-country stud-
ies fi nd, for example, that countries with higher levels of social capital and more 
democracy are happier, on average. And these variables correlate closely but not 
perfectly with income. While at some level we can isolate their specifi c effects, cross-
country comparisons in this arena are rife with endogeneity problems. 
Unhappy Growth, Happy Peasants, and Frustrated Achievers
We know that within societies wealthier people are happier than the average, but 
after that the income-happiness relationship becomes more complicated. At the 
FIGURE 1.
Happiness and Income per Capita, 1990s
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 macroeconomic level, the relationship between happiness and income may be affected 
as much by the pace and nature of income change as it is by absolute levels. Both the 
behavioral economics and happiness literature highlight the extent to which people 
adapt very quickly to income gains and disproportionately value income losses. 
Using the Gallup World Poll in 122 countries, Eduardo Lora (2008) and col-
laborators fi nd that countries with higher levels of per capita GDP have, on average, 
higher levels of happiness. But controlling for levels, they fi nd that individuals in 
countries with positive growth rates have lower happiness levels. When they split the 
sample into above- and below-median growth rates, the unhappy growth effect holds 
only for countries that are growing at rates above the median (table 1). In related 
work, Lora and I have called this the “paradox of unhappy growth” (Graham and 
Lora 2009).4 
Deaton (2008) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) also fi nd evidence of an 
unhappy growth effect using the Gallup World Poll. Stevenson and Wolfers fi nd 
insignifi cant effects of growth in general but strong negative effects for the fi rst 
stages of growth in “miracle economies” such as Ireland and the Republic of Korea 
during their takeoff stages. The negative effect becomes insignifi cant in later stages. 
Deaton fi nds that including region dummies makes a major difference in the results, 
with the results being driven by Africa and Russia, which were both growing fast 
at the time. It is important to distinguish between levels and change effects: Happi-
ness levels in Russia are lower than income levels would predict, while in some—but 
not all—African countries, such as Nigeria, happiness levels are higher than income 
TABLE 1. The Paradox of Unhappy Growth
The relationship among satisfaction, income 
per capita, and economic growth
 122 countries
 GDP per 
 capita
 Economic  
 growth
Life satisfaction  0.788***  –0.082***
Standard of living  0.108***  –0.018***
Health satisfaction  0.017*  –0.017***
Job satisfaction  0.077***  –0.006
Housing satisfaction  0.084***  –0.006
Source: Lora 2008. 
Note: OLS regression; dependent variable is average life satisfaction per 
country; growth rates are averaged over the past fi ve years. N = 122. The 
coeffi cients on GDP per capita are marginal effects; how much does the 
satisfaction of two countries differ when one has two times the income of 
another? The coeffi cients on growth imply how much an additional per-
centage point of growth affects life satisfaction. The life satisfaction vari-
able is on a zero to 10 scale; all others are the percentage of respondents 
who are satisfi ed. 
* statistically signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
** at the 5 percent level.
*** at the 1 percent level.
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levels would predict. People in both Russia and Africa seemed to be unusually 
unhappy at times of rapid growth, for any number of plausible reasons. It is also 
possible that the unhappiness started before the growth and not after it. 
Soumya Chattopadhyay and I (2008b), using Latinobarometro data, also fi nd 
hints of an unhappy—or at least irrelevant—growth effect. In contrast with the 
above studies, we use individual rather than average country happiness on the 
lefthand side, with the usual sociodemographic and economic controls (including 
individual income) and clustering the standard errors at the country level. When 
we include the current GDP growth rate in the equation as well as the lagged 
growth rate from the previous year (controlling for levels), we fi nd that the effects 
of growth rates and lagged growth rates are, for the most part, negative but insig-
nifi cant (table 2).
Another way of interpreting these fi ndings, noted by both Justin Wolfers and 
Charles Kenny, is that past income still matters to well-being but is less important 
than current income.5 Thus, countries that started from lower income levels in past 
years (remember, the growth rate is an average of the past fi ve years) had lower 
happiness in those years than those with higher incomes. So the unhappy “growth” 
effect may be due to the starting point rather than to the effects of growth. In short, 
it is better to have had high levels of income for a long time than to start at lower 
levels and increase them quickly. 
The diffi culty in disentangling these two interpretations is that both levels and 
change effects are likely at play. The unhappy growth paradox focuses on the change 
effect, while the Wolfers and Kenny interpretation focuses on levels. Stevenson and 
Wolfers’ own work (with Sacks, 2010) fi nds that short-term changes seem to have a 
more marked impact on subjective well-being than long-term trends. 
To the extent the fi ndings are driven by the change effect, a number of factors 
are easily identifi able, such as the insecurity attached to rapidly changing reward 
structures and macroeconomic volatility, and the frustration that rapidly increasing 
inequality tends to generate. The fi ndings show that people are better able to adapt to 
the gains that accompany rapid growth than to the potential losses and uncertainty 
that are also associated with it. They suggest that people are often more content in 
low-growth equilibrium than in a process of change that results in gains but also 
includes instability and unequal rewards. 
The within-country income and happiness story also refl ects this paradox. I have 
described the micro-level version as the “paradox of happy peasants and frustrated 
achievers.” It is typically not the poorest people who are most frustrated or unhappy 
with their conditions or the services to which they have access. Stefano Pettinato and 
I found, based on research in Peru and Russia, that a majority of very poor and des-
titute respondents reported high or relatively high levels of well-being, while much 
wealthier people, with more mobility and opportunities, reported much greater frus-
tration with their economic and other situations (Graham and Pettinato 2002). The 
poor respondents may have a higher natural level of cheerfulness, or they may have 
scaled their expectations downward. The upwardly mobile respondents, meanwhile, 
have constantly rising expectations (or are naturally more curmudgeon-like). A third 
explanation is possible: that more driven and frustrated people are more likely to 
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TABLE 2. Happiness and Growth in Latin America
Dependent variable: happy
age –0.0240 –0.0230 –0.0230 –0.0220
 (4.40)** (4.34)** (4.23)** (4.29)**
age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 (3.53)** (3.88)** (3.72)** (3.76)**
gender 0.0330 0.0070 0.0070 0.0070
 –1.5500 –0.4800 –0.5200 –0.4800
married 0.0790 0.0910 0.0940 0.0930
 –1.7800 (2.40)* (2.56)* (2.60)**
edu –0.0410 –0.0260 –0.0280 –0.0260
 –1.5300 –1.1800 –1.2900 –1.2800
edu2 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
 –0.8800 –0.7000 –0.7900 –0.7600
socecon 0.2110 0.2160 0.2150 0.2170
 (5.22)** (5.76)** (5.77)** (5.78)**
subinc 0.2900 0.2900 0.2940 0.2920
 (8.78)** (8.02)** (8.36)** (8.41)**
ceconcur 0.2340 0.2260 0.2360 0.2370
 (9.04)** (9.50)** (7.66)** (8.92)**
unemp –0.1810 –0.1760 –0.1900 –0.1880
 (2.05)* (3.45)** (3.59)** (3.69)**
poum 0.1800 0.1890 0.1830 0.1840
 (4.48)** (5.42)** (5.56)** (5.59)**
domlang 0.5380 0.4810 0.4840 0.4810
 (2.73)** (2.48)* (2.48)* (2.48)*
vcrime –0.1160 –0.1060 –0.1060 –0.1080
 (2.30)* (2.98)** (2.89)** (3.08)**
els 0.0900
 (5.48)**
growth_gdp 0.0170 –0.0090 –0.0040 –0.0060
 –0.5300 –1.1100 –0.6000 –0.7700
gini –0.0170 –0.0270 –0.0240 –0.0240
 –0.7000 –1.2400 –1.1200 –1.1900
gdpgrl1   –0.0190 –0.0180
   –1.4000 –0.9900
gdpvol2    0.0030
    –0.1400
Observations 34,808 67,308 67,308 67,308
Source: Graham and Chattopadhyay 2008b.
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
 * signifi cant at 5%.
** signifi cant at 1%.
Regressions clustered at a country level.
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seek to escape situations of static poverty (via channels such as migration), but even 
when they achieve a better situation, they remain more driven and frustrated than the 
average. Some combination of the three explanations could be at play. 
The poor, some of whom rely on subsistence agriculture rather than earnings, 
have little to lose and have likely adapted to constant insecurity. Recent research on 
job satisfaction shows that reported job insecurity is actually higher among formal 
sector workers with more stable jobs than it is among informal sector workers. The 
latter either have adapted to higher levels of income and employment insecurity or 
have selected into jobs with less stability but more freedom (Graham and Lora 2009). 
Other studies fi nd analogous results in China, where urban migrants are materi-
ally better off than they were in their premigration stage yet report higher levels 
of frustration with their material situation. Upon migrating, their reference norm 
quickly shifted to match that of other urban residents rather than of their previous 
peers in rural areas (Knight and Gunatilaka 2007; Whyte and Hun 2006). Mean-
while, very poor rural migrants are much more likely to use their situation the year 
before as a reference point than to use comparisons with their neighbors, not least 
because they have less of an informational base on which to make those comparisons 
(Davey, Chen, and Lau 2009). 
People seem to adapt much more quickly to income gains than to status gains 
(DiTella and MacCulloch 2006). In the context of frustrated achievers in very vola-
tile emerging markets, where currencies are often shifting in value and social welfare 
systems and the rewards for particular skill and education sets are in fl ux, income 
gains may seem especially ephemeral.6
Crises bring about signifi cant losses and uncertainty, and their unhappiness effects 
dwarf those of unhappy growth. Not surprisingly, they result in movements in hap-
piness of an unusual magnitude. While national average happiness levels typically 
do not move much, they surely do at times of crisis, although they eventually adapt 
back. Our research on crises in Russia, Argentina, and the United States suggests that 
the unhappiness effects of crises are as much due to the uncertainty they generate as 
to the actual drops in income level they cause, because people have a much harder 
time adapting to uncertainty than to one-time shocks (Graham and Chattopadhyay 
2008a; Graham, Chattopadhyay, and Picon 2010a; Graham and Sukhtankar 2004). 
The Adaptation Conundrum
Although my research as well as that of others has established that the standard 
determinants of happiness demonstrate fairly stable patterns worldwide, the same 
research throws a monkey wrench into the equation because of the remarkable 
human capacity to adapt to both prosperity and adversity. Thus, many people liv-
ing in conditions of prosperity report being miserable, while many others living in 
contexts of remarkable adversity report being very happy (Graham, forthcoming). 
People in Afghanistan are as happy as Latin Americans, and report smiling as 
often—above the world average. Kenyans are as satisfi ed with their health care as 
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Americans. My research with Eduardo Lora fi nds that cross-country patterns in 
health satisfaction are better explained by cultural norms of health than by objective 
indicators such as life expectancy or infant mortality. In Latin America, Guatemalans 
are more satisfi ed with their health care than are Chileans, even though objective 
health standards in Guatemala are near Sub-Saharan African levels, while those in 
Chile are on par with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
standards (Graham and Lora 2009). 
Crime makes people unhappy, but it matters less when there is more of it; the same 
goes for both corruption and obesity. Soumya Chattopadhyay and I fi nd that crime 
and corruption have negative effects on reported happiness across Latin America, 
but those effects are mitigated by how common the phenomena are  (Graham and 
Chattopadhyay 2008b). 
In each case, we created a variable for each respondent’s unexplained probability 
of being a victim of crime or corruption—a probability that was not explained by the 
usual variables such as age, income, gender, or rural versus urban. We found that this 
unexplained probability—a proxy for higher crime and corruption norms— mitigated 
the negative well-being effects of crime and corruption victimization (table 3). In 
places where crime and corruption are common occurrences, the well-being effects 
are lower, most likely because people have come to expect these phenomena and there 
is less stigma associated with being victimized. Our fi ndings also hold for Africa and 
Afghanistan (Graham 2010).
Andrew Felton and I fi nd that obese people in the United States are less happy 
than the average, but the effects are much stronger in low-obesity, high-skilled 
professional cohorts than in high-obesity, low-skilled cohorts or in regions where 
obesity is the norm (Graham 2008) (fi gure 2). Again, some combination of reduced 
stigma and adaptation is likely at play. In contrast, in Russia, where obesity is still 
seen as a sign of prosperity, the obese are, on average, happier than the nonobese, 
despite the health consequences. Similarly, several studies of the unemployed fi nd 
that the unhappiness effects associated with the condition are mitigated by higher 
levels of unemployment and therefore less stigma (Clark and Oswald 1994; Egg-
ers, Gaddy, and Graham 2006; Stutzer and Lalive 2004). An extreme analog of 
these fi ndings is recent work showing that suicide rates are higher in happier states 
in the United States, suggesting that stigma is associated with being unhappy when 
the norm is to be happy (Daly et al. 2010). 
Freedom and democracy make people happy, but they matter less when these 
goods are less common. Cross-country research by Helliwell, Harris, and Huang 
(2008) fi nds that the coeffi cient on freedom (on happiness) is higher in countries 
with higher average levels of freedom, while the coeffi cient on corruption is lower 
in countries that have more corruption. The bottom line is that people can adapt to 
tremendous adversity and retain their natural cheerfulness, while they can also have 
virtually everything—including good health—and be miserable. 
One thing people have a hard time adapting to is uncertainty. For example, my 
newest research—with Soumya Chattopadhyay and Mario Picon, based on a new 
Gallup survey of approximately 1,000 Americans a day from January 2008 to the 
present—shows that average happiness in the United States declined signifi cantly as 
   3
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TABLE 3. The Effects of Crime and Corruption on Happiness in Latin America
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: happy Explanatory variables Dependent variable: happy
age –0.0230 –0.0200 –0.0210 –0.0180 age –0.0230 –0.0210 –0.0230 –0.0190
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.005)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.003)**
age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** –0.051  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.035)*
gender 0.0070 0.0210 0.0400 0.0240 gender 0.0100 0.0410 0.0500 0.0470
 –0.614 –0.201 (0.050)* –0.199  –0.473 (0.014)* (0.014)* –0.075
married 0.0850 0.0600 0.0630 0.0620 married 0.0840 0.0620 0.0710 0.0690
 (0.000)** (0.001)* (0.104)** –0.104  (0.000)* (0.001)** (0.001 )** (0.030)*
edu –0.0220 –0.0260 –0.0280 –0.0240 edu –0.0240 –0.0350 –0.0400 –0.0380
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** –0.385  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** –0.129
edu2 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 edu2 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0020
 –0.077 (0.038)* (0.024)* –0.451  –0.053 (0.002)** (0.006)** –0.263
socecon 0.2110 0.2140 0.2280 0.2280 socecon 0.2120 0.2270 0.2360 0.2400
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
subinc 0.2870 0.3030 0.3060 0.3140 subinc 0.2910 0.3150 0.3120 0.3280
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
ceconcur 0.2190 0.1970 0.2350 0.2180 ceconcur 0.2170 0.1840 0.2310 0.2120
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
unemp –0.1770 –0.2170 –0.1990 –0.2300 unemp –0.1680 –0.2000 –0.1890 –0.2190
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.002)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)**
poum 0.1750 0.1410 0.1470 0.1530 poum 0.1760 0.1580 0.1690 0.1730
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
(continued)
TABLE 3. (Continued )
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: happy Explanatory variables Dependent variable: happy
domlang 0.5950 0.6520 0.6360 0.5490 domlang 0.5970 0.6680 0.6450 0.5880
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.006)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)**
vcrime –0.0960 –0.5360 –1.0770 –0.8930 vcorr –0.1570 –0.9160 –0.9070 –1.1420
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** –0.239  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.017)*
crresid  0.4460 1.0170 0.8020 corrresid  0.8090 0.8330 1.0340
  (0.000)** (0.000)** –0.286   (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.027)*
els   0.1000  els   0.0970
   (0.000)**     (0.000)**
vcrimel1 (1 year lag)   –1.4710 –1.8190
   (10.77)** –1.67
vcrimel2 (2 year lag)   1.8550 1.6760
   (15.52)** –1.47
Control for gini No No No Yes Control for gini No No No Yes
Control for GDP      Control for GDP  
  growth rate No No No Yes   growth rate No No No Yes
Control for lagged     Control for lagged  
  GDP growth rates No No No Yes   GDP growth rates No No No Yes
Source: Graham and Chattopadhyay 2008b.
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
 * signifi cant at 5%.
** signifi cant at 1%.
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the Dow fell with the onset of the crisis. Happiness declined 11 percent, from 6.94 
(on an 11-point scale) before the onset of the crisis to a low of 6.19 on November 
16, 2008. But when the market bottomed out and some semblance of stability was 
restored in late March 2009, average happiness recovered much faster than the Dow. 
By June 2009 it was higher than its precrisis level—7.15 on June 21—even though 
living standards and reported satisfaction with those standards remained markedly 
lower than they were before the crisis. Happiness levels remained that high at least 
through 2009. Once the period of uncertainty ended, people seemed to be able to 
return to previous happiness levels, while making do with less income or wealth 
(Graham, Chattopadhyay, and Picon 2010a). (See fi gure 3.)
We can point to analogous fi ndings in the health arena. Eduardo Lora, Lucas 
Higuera, and I compared the life and health satisfaction effects of various health con-
ditions, based on Gallup data for Latin America for 2007, a data set that also included 
respondents’ scores on an indicator of self-reported health, the Euro-Quality Five 
Dimensions Index (EQ5D), which correlates very closely with objective indicators of 
health. We found that problems with mobility or self-care had very small, if any, last-
ing effects on life and health satisfaction, while those associated with uncertainty, such 
as pain and anxiety, had much stronger effects (table 4). While direction of causality 
likely plays a role (more anxious people are more likely to report unhappiness), our 
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Obesity and Unhappiness
Source: Graham 2008.
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Happiness and Crisis in the United States
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TABLE 4. Life and Health Satisfaction Costs of Various Conditions
 Health satisfaction 0–10 Life satisfaction 0–10
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
EQ5D index 5.188***  1.436***
Mobility moderate  –0.460***  0.086
Mobility extreme  –0.032  0.091
Self-care moderate  –0.142  0.157
Self-care extreme  –0.236  0.281
Usual activities moderate  –0.690***  –0.230*
Usual activities extreme  –1.136*  –0.498
Pain moderate  –1.016***  –0.135
Pain extreme  –2.143***  –0.477**
Anxiety moderate  –0.480***  –0.303***
Anxiety extreme  –0.883***  –0.786***
Observations 8,249 8,249 8,250 8,250
Countries 17 17 17 17
Source: Graham, Higuera, and Lora 2009. 
Notes: Results presented in this table are excerpts from columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 in appendix 1, where full regression 
results are presented.
***p<0.01.
  **p<0.05.
    *p<0.1.
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fi ndings suggest that people are better able to adapt to the unpleasant certainty of 
mobility and other physical conditions than to the uncertainty surrounding unpredict-
able pain and anxiety. Our research is supported by that of others on conditions such 
as uncontrolled epilepsy (Graham, Higuera, and Lora 2009).
In general, people seem to be better at adapting to unpleasant certainty than to 
uncertainty. It is surely a good thing that most Americans have been able to adapt 
to the economic costs of the crisis and return to their natural happiness levels, and 
even better that the average person in Afghanistan can maintain cheerfulness and 
hope despite the situation in that country. While this capacity to adapt may be a 
good thing from the perspective of individual psychological welfare, it may also 
result in collective tolerance for conditions that would be unacceptable by most peo-
ple’s standards. This may help explain why different societies tolerate such different 
norms of health, crime, and governance, both within and across countries. Without 
understanding these norm differences, it is diffi cult to craft policies to improve 
health, living conditions, and governance structures. 
The capacity to adapt and the mediating role of norms and expectations pose all 
sorts of measurement and comparison challenges, especially in the study of the rela-
tionship between happiness and income. Can we really compare the happiness levels of 
a poor peasant in India (who reports being very happy, owing to low expectations or 
a naturally cheery character or both) with those of a successful and very wealthy chief 
executive offi cer (CEO) (who reports being miserable, owing to his or her relative 
ranking in comparison with other CEOs or to a naturally curmudgeonly character)? 
At one level, the capacity to adapt suggests that all happiness is relative. At 
another, it suggests that some unhappiness might be necessary to achieve economic 
and other kinds of progress. Examples come to mind of migrants who leave their 
home countries and families to create better futures for their children and revolu-
tionaries who sacrifi ce their lives for the greater public good. This leads to more 
diffi cult questions. One is whether outside observers, such as development prac-
titioners, should tell poor peasants in India how miserable they are according to 
objective income measures to encourage them to seek a “better” life. A related ques-
tion is whether we should worry more about addressing the millionaire’s misery or 
increasing the peasant’s happiness. 
Challenges for Policy
Happiness surveys have provided us with a new and powerful tool to study and bet-
ter understand the determinants of human welfare and well-being across and within 
countries, and across time as countries undergo the sometimes unsettling process 
of economic development. The fi ndings from these surveys are relevant to a host of 
questions that policy makers care about, and they can inform policy decisions. The 
consistency in the relationship of the key variables that correlate with happiness 
across countries of all different levels of development allows us to test for variance 
in the effects of all sorts of contextual variables, ranging from macroeconomic and 
institutional regimes to the environment to changes in policy regimes. 
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Although these surveys and their results provide us with a great many opportuni-
ties to broaden our understanding of human welfare and our ability to craft policies 
to enhance it, a number of unanswered questions must be resolved—or at least further 
discussed—before we can think about happiness as a benchmark for progress or as 
an objective of development policy. Among these are the adaptation conundrum, the 
defi nition of happiness, intertemporal trade-offs, and cardinality versus ordinality. 
The adaptation conundrum may be the most diffi cult question to resolve. On the 
one hand, it is a marvelous thing that people can adapt to all sorts of adversity and 
maintain their natural cheerfulness and psychological welfare. On the other, as noted 
above, adaptability may result in collective tolerance for a bad equilibrium. The 
seeming variance in this tolerance across societies suggests that happiness is relative. 
If that is the case, how can we use it as a benchmark for progress? But the within-
country fi ndings suggest that happiness is not all relative: Clear patterns exist across 
income, age, and employment cohorts, among others. We do not yet have a complete 
answer to this question. 
One issue is whether the happy peasants are more or less able to change their 
situation. Are our frustrated achievers unhappy because the process of change is 
painful, or were they unhappy and more likely to seek change in the fi rst place? 
Are migrants who report being unhappy today unhappy because their expectations 
have gone up and their reference norms for income have changed or because they 
have left their family behind to fi nd longer term fulfi llment (and happiness) in 
providing their children with an opportunity to lead better lives? While we cannot 
answer these questions at this juncture, they must be addressed, both because they 
can help resolve the question of how best to use happiness research in the policy 
arena and because they are fundamental to development. 
The happy peasant and frustrated achiever (or miserable millionaire) paradox 
raises the related question of the appropriate defi nition of happiness. What makes 
happiness surveys such a useful research tool is their open-ended nature. The defi -
nition of happiness is left up to the respondent—we do not impose an American 
concept of happiness on Chinese respondents or a Chinese defi nition on Chilean 
respondents. The open-ended nature of the defi nition results in consistent patterns 
in the basic explanatory variables across respondents worldwide, allowing us to 
control for those variables and explore variance in the effects of all sorts of other 
factors on happiness, ranging from crime rates to commuting time to the nature of 
governing regimes. 
At the same time, if we think about happiness as a measure of welfare with rel-
evance to policy (a topic that is increasingly in the public debate), the defi nition does 
matter. Are we thinking of happiness as contentment in the Benthamite sense or as 
a fulfi lling life in the Aristotelian sense? There is much room for debate. My studies 
suggest that respondents’ conceptions of happiness vary according to their norms, 
expectations, and ability to adapt, among other things. Our priors as economists 
and policy makers likely suggest that some conceptions of happiness (such as the 
opportunity to lead a fulfi lling life) are worth pursuing as policy objectives, while 
others (such as contentment alone) are not. That choice entails normative judgments 
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and a debate we have not yet had, and the answer is likely to vary across societies. 
Some societies (such as the United States) seem to place more value on the ability of 
individuals to pursue opportunities, while others place more value on guaranteeing 
at least some level of collective welfare. Those normative differences could infl uence 
varying conceptualizations of happiness across societies. 
A related question is how to measure intertemporal trade-offs in happiness. Do 
we care more about happiness today or happiness tomorrow? Surely some objectives 
are worth pursuing (such as reducing fi scal defi cits, reforming malfunctioning public 
sectors, and overthrowing despots) that are likely to increase unhappiness today 
but increase it in the future. Perhaps the answer is as simple as the income account-
ing framework suggests: People vary in their ability to trade off income today for 
income tomorrow, and they have different discount rates. The same might apply to 
happiness: Some people value contentment today more than fulfi llment tomorrow, 
while others are more vested in the future. And, as in the case of discount rates, peo-
ple’s capacity to make these trade-offs depends to some extent on their prospects of 
upward mobility or their vision of the future. 
On the other hand, there are complexities in trading off happiness today for 
happiness tomorrow. Trading off a dollar today for two tomorrow, for example, 
is different than making a sacrifi ce today (such as working very hard in graduate 
school) for an outcome you expect will make you happier in the future (such as 
higher status and more freedom in your future career), because the prospect of the 
future may make you less unhappy about your current sacrifi ce or state.7 This ques-
tion is not unresolvable, but it needs to be addressed.
Finally, there is the question of cardinality versus ordinality. Responses to hap-
piness surveys are categorical and ordinal in nature; respondents place themselves 
in categories that range from very unhappy to very happy, but these categories do 
not have cardinal weights. Yet a policy framework would require choices, not least 
because resources are limited. Do we care more about reducing the unhappiness of 
the miserable or increasing the happiness of the already happy? From a development 
perspective, do we care as much about the misery of a millionaire who lives in a 
country with very high average levels of income and widely accessible public goods 
as we do about that of a person who lives in a very poor context and is unhappy? 
Again, it is possible to imagine both a theoretical framework and an empirical base 
upon which to test these questions, but we have not yet done so. 
We cannot resolve all these questions at this juncture, but the discussion raises 
important issues for development policy. These conundrums will give economists 
fodder for debate—about happiness and income, and beyond—for years to come. 
Despite the diffi culty that happiness as a concept poses for both method and 
economic philosophy, it forces us to think deeply about what measures of human 
well-being are the most accurate benchmarks of economic progress and human 
development. We may reach a point in the future where we are comparing hap-
piness across and within countries in the same way we now compare income. For 
now, however, many unanswered questions remain that both researchers and 
broader publics must address.
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Notes
 1. The correlation coeffi cient between the two (based on research on British data for 
1975–92, which includes both questions, and Latin American data for 2000–01, in which 
different phrasing was used in different years) ranges between 0.56 and 0.50.
 2. Microeconometric happiness equations have the standard form: Wit = α + ﬂxit + εit , where 
W is the reported well-being of individual i at time t, and X is a vector of known variables, 
including sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Unobserved characteris-
tics and measurement errors are captured in the error term.
 3. The coeffi cients produced from ordered probit or logistic regressions are remarkably 
similar to those from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions based on the same 
equations, allowing us to substitute OLS equations for ordered logit or probit and 
then attach relative weights to them. For an extensive and excellent discussion of the 
methodology underpinning happiness studies, and how it is evolving, see Van Praag and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004.
 4. It is also possible that initially happier countries grew faster than initially unhappy coun-
tries with the same income (because they had happier, more productive workers?), and 
thus the coeffi cient on growth in a regression that compares the two with fi nal income and 
fi nal happiness is negative. I thank Charles Kenny for raising this point. 
 5. I thank both Justin Wolfers and Charles Kenny for thoughtful conversations on this point. 
 6. A related body of research examines the effects of inequality and relative income differences 
on well-being and studies how inequality mediates the happiness-income relationship. At 
some level, people probably adapt to inequality as they do to other things—and they are 
less skilled at adapting to changes in inequality. I do not cover this topic here; it merits an 
entire paper of its own (Graham and Felton 2006; Luttmer 2005). 
 7. I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this excellent point. 
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Introduction
The Easterlin Paradox
Plenty of empirical work supports the proposition that, within any given country, a 
person with a higher income is more likely to report a higher level of happiness or 
other measure of life satisfaction. Easterlin’s (1974) “paradox” arose because aver-
age reported happiness seemed to increase little, if at all, with growth in national 
income per head, at least for developed countries, in which most of the population 
has suffi cient income to meet basic needs. In particular, although U.S. income per 
head rose steadily between 1946 and 1970, it seemed that average reported happi-
ness showed no long-term trend and actually declined between 1960 and 1970. This 
suggests that, after basic needs have been met, further economic growth may fail to 
enhance the average of people’s reports of their own happiness or life satisfaction. 
Easterlin’s original paper appeared in a Festschrift for Moses Abramovitz, who 
devoted his career to understanding the process of economic growth in a historical 
context. At about the same time, the benefi ts of economic growth were also being 
questioned by scholars such as Hirsch (1977) and Scitovsky (1976).
The Easterlin paradox is the subject of the 2010 paper by Sacks, Stevenson, and 
Wolfers (henceforth SS&W), as well as a previous extensive article by Stevenson and 
Wolfers (2008). Under a wide variety of circumstances, they fi nd that an increase in 
personal income does increase the average level of reported well-being. Indeed, if one 
were to give a specifi c numerical estimate of the ratio between the increase of the 
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average level of reported well-being (measured using their particular cardinal scale) 
and the increase in the logarithm of personal income, that number would probably 
be 0.35. This directly contradicts the Easterlin paradox, if it could be applied in 
unmodifi ed form to the SS&W data sets.
Debates have been ongoing for several decades over the precise circumstances 
under which growth leads to increased subjective well-being when both are suit-
ably measured. The recent survey by Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008), along with 
Easterlin’s prize-winning 2010 volume, suggests that the debates can be expected to 
continue. SS&W have done us all a great service by examining the data so carefully 
and in such detail.
An orthodox discussion might quibble with some of those details. For example, 
it might be important that SS&W follow Deaton (2008) and others in using propri-
etary data from the Gallup World Poll. Or, as Easterlin and colleagues (2010) sug-
gest, to consider data over a long enough period to exclude any possibility of busi-
ness cycle effects. We might have been expected to discuss such details, perhaps by 
taking up Justin Wolfers’ very kind offer to use some of this proprietary data to run 
alternative regressions on our behalf. We did not do so because we see no particular 
reason to doubt the validity and robustness of SS&W’s results, at least for the kind 
of data set they have chosen to analyze. Nor will we attempt to settle the differences 
between Easterlin and SS&W.
Instead, we raise the broader question of whether the debate matters. That is, 
we consider what signifi cance, if any, this kind of empirical work could have for 
economic policy analysis. This, we believe, accords with the general theme of this 
plenary session, “New Ways of Measuring Welfare.” Moreover, suppose we were 
to accept Easterlin’s strongest empirical claims, along with the concomitant value 
judgment that development does nothing to enhance individual well-being. Then we 
would have to wonder what is left of the original raison d’être of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA), two of the oldest and most prominent agencies of what has 
become the World Bank Group. Clearly, much is at stake.
Separating Facts from Values
Hume (1739, book III, part I, section I, paragraph 27) remarks that “in every system 
of morality, which I have hitherto met with” there is an “imperceptible” change so 
that, “instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.” Thus, philoso-
phers speak of Hume’s Law as the claim that one cannot derive an “ought” from 
an “is.” More precisely, the law refers to an “is–ought” or “fact–value” distinction 
between, on the one hand, descriptive or positive statements of fact and, on the other 
hand, prescriptive or normative judgments of ethical value.
Despite philosophers’ criticisms of Hume’s Law, one could argue that econo-
mists should be especially alert whenever the propositions put before us slip over 
the often unnoticed barrier between purely factual descriptions and the values that 
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purport to describe our aspirations. A good example of how often the barrier goes 
unobserved comes in the familiar phrase “measuring welfare” in the title of this 
session. After all, measurement by itself can only answer descriptive or positive 
questions and so is defi nitely on the fact side of the fact–value distinction. Whereas 
we take the view that the whole purpose of any attempt to measure individual 
economic welfare should be to provide an indicator of how effectively an economic 
system provides the goods, services, and public environment that benefi t its vari-
ous individual participants in their attempts to pursue a good life. This obviously 
makes welfare an inherently normative concept, on the value side of the fact-value 
distinction.1
W ell-Being As Evidence for Welfare?
Easterlin’s (1974) title—“Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?” is con-
siderably more subtle than “Measuring Welfare.” Slightly rephrased and expanded, 
his title could be “Is There Any Evidence That Economic Growth Causes Its Pre-
sumed Benefi ciaries to Express More Satisfaction with Their Lives?” The rephrased 
question is obviously purely descriptive or positive. It acquires much more interest, 
however, if the objective evidence is thought to inform the answer to the prescrip-
tive or normative question “Should economic policy be less or more oriented toward 
growth and development?”
These thoughts lead rather naturally to others more profound: 
1. With Hume’s Law in mind, can any kind of factual evidence ever be relevant for 
economic policy? 
2. If some kind of evidence can be relevant, what kind would it be? 
3. In particular, is there anything at all relevant in individuals’ responses to questions 
about their own life satisfaction? 
A negative answer to the fi rst question would deprive economic science of most 
of its interest for those of us who were drawn to study it in the hope of learning 
how the world can be made better. And the second question can be answered in 
part by a positive response to the third, toward which we now turn. The rest of 
this commentary will consider attempts to measure subjective well-being (SWB) 
in ways that can provide evidence related to the normative concept of individual 
welfare.
In the next section, we briefl y recapitulate the traditional welfare measures. 
Some of these purport to be objective, while others depend on preferences. Then we 
address the question of what, if anything, the new subjective measures might add to 
the old measures, considering their relevance to the normative concepts of individual 
and social welfare. We describe an empirical test that shows a strong positive asso-
ciation between income and subjective well-being. In the fi nal section, we suggest 
how further work could help us understand the usefulness of measures of subjective 
well-being for providing factual evidence on which to base normative judgments of 
economic welfare.
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Traditional Measures of Welfare
Real Income
A traditional and objective measure of welfare is annual income per head. In any 
given year, we can compare and even add the incomes of various individuals who 
face identical prices for all commodities. When prices vary over time or people 
face different prices, incomes need correcting for these variations. This is often 
done simply by dividing income by a consumer price index or defl ator to produce 
a measure of real income. Provided this index is the value of an observable fi xed 
commodity bundle or market basket—or even a more sophisticated price index 
based on observable aggregates such as mean expenditure shares for different kinds 
of goods—the result is an objective measure, as in Oulton (2008). In principle, one 
could even divide personal income by a different price index for each consumer. See, 
for example, the discussions in Boskin and colleagues (1996, 1998) and associated 
articles in the Journal of Economic Perspectives devoted to the Boskin  commission.
However, only in a special case do such objective measures correspond to an exact 
price index based on the individual consumer’s preferences. As discussed by Hulten 
(1973) and by Samuelson and Swamy (1974), following the pioneering work of Ville 
(1946, 1951), the consumer’s preferences must be homothetic, which is equivalent 
to the very special case in which the demand for every commodity has an income 
elasticity of exactly 1. In that case, a Divisia or chain price index with continuously 
revised quantity weights will be exact.
Even when preferences may not be homothetic, real income can still be measured 
by what Samuelson (1974) calls a “money metric” utility function based on Hicks’s 
(1956) measure equivalent variation—see, for example, Chipman and Moore (1980), 
Hammond (1994), and Weymark (1985). This money metric, however, is generally 
subjective to the extent that it depends on detailed estimates of parameters that deter-
mine the consumer’s demand functions. It also depends on a reference price vector 
and, when extended to consider aspects of the public environment, a reference level 
for each aspect.
Human Development and Other Objective Measures
A self-suffi cient farmer with no offi cially recorded income is obviously better off than 
somebody with no resources at all beyond a pittance in the form of an inadequate but 
offi cially recorded income. This neglect of what Sen (1977, 1981) calls “entitlements” 
is just one way in which a measure of real income overlooks important dimensions 
of human well-being. Other dimensions—including nutrition, health, functioning, 
capabilities, and dignity—feature prominently in writings such as  Dasgupta (1993) 
and Sen (1980, 1981, 1987). All these additional dimensions can, in principle, be 
objectively measured on the basis of a person’s observed circumstances. For example, 
the UN’s Human Development Index includes life expectancy, adult literacy, and 
education, along with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
Especially in health economics and medical decisions, well-being is often meas-
ured using quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), which are also based on medical 
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practitioners’ observations and assessments of individual health states. A sampling 
of the relevant literature can be found in Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1997); Bleichrodt, 
Wakker, and Johannesson (1997); Broome (1993); Pliskin, Shepard, and Weinstein 
(1980); and Wakker (1996, 2008). Canning (2007) has proposed an interesting way 
of integrating QALYs into a real income measure of well-being.
New Measures of Well-Being
Subjective Well-Being
Psychologists’ use of individuals’ reports of their happiness or life satisfaction goes 
back at least to Watson (1930), who asked subjects to provide answers on a graphi-
cal scale. For an extensive review, see Wilson (1967), who emphasizes the reliability 
or intrapersonal consistency of “avowed” happiness. Later surveys by Diener (1984) 
and Diener and colleagues (1999) encourage us to use the term “subjective well-
being” (SWB). Easterlin’s (1974) results relied on measuring a similar concept. So 
does the richer interpersonal concept introduced by van Praag (1968) and explained 
more thoroughly in van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008).
One question raised by the work of Easterlin (1974), Simon (1974), van Praag 
(1971), and many successors is whether new ways of measuring welfare would make 
any difference. That is, if we measure SWB along with real income and other, older 
objective economic indicators of welfare, do we derive any information we can use 
to guide policy?
An Ordinal Objective Measure of SWB
For some specifi c value of n, such as 10, consider the question: “On a scale of 1 to 
n, how satisfi ed are you with your life in general?” We readily admit that we lack 
confi dence in how to give this question any concrete interpretation and wonder what 
the “right” answer could possibly be even in our own case. About all one can say is 
that this is a relatively clear case in which more should always be better. This refl ects 
how hard it is to give the concept of life satisfaction any objective meaning. Anyway, 
this leads us not to attach too much signifi cance to our own putative responses or, 
by extension, to those of other individuals.
Nevertheless, suppose we were to consider the results of a large survey whose 
respondents report not only a degree of life satisfaction or happiness h in the set 
H: = {1, 2, …, n}, but also what they believe to be their current annual income y ≥ 0. 
For each x ≥ 0 and for each h ∈ {1, 2, …, n}, let Fh(x) denote the proportion of individ-
uals in the sample who combine reports of an annual income y ≤ x with a satisfaction 
level of h. Also, for each h ∈ {1, 2, …, n}, let Ph denote the proportion of the overall 
sample who report SWB level h. By defi nition, note that the sum F(x): = ∑nh=1 Fh(x) 
is the overall cumulative distribution function for income. Of course, Fh(0) ≥ 0, while 
F(x) is nondecreasing in x. Furthermore, the defi nition of Ph implies that 
 Fh(x) → Ph as x → ∞ (1)
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Now, for each x ≥ 0 with F(x) > 0 and for each h ∈ {1, 2, …, n}, let 
 Ph(x): = Fh(x)/F(x) (2)
denote the relative proportion, among all individuals with incomes y ≤ x, who report 
life satisfaction levels h. We note that, because F(x) → 1 as x → ∞, equations (1) and 
(2) imply that 
 Ph(x) → Ph as x → ∞ (3)
With these defi nitions, an objective measure of SWB among all persons reporting 
incomes of y ≤ x is given by the n-dimensional vector2
 P(x) = (P1(x), P2(x), P3(x), …, Pn(x)) (4)
Next, consider the n-vector of cumulative measures 
 Q(x) = (Q1(x), Q2(x), Q3(x), …, Qn(x)) (5)
where, for each h ∈ H, we defi ne 
 Qk(x): = ∑kh=1 Ph(x) (6)
This is the proportion of individuals with incomes y ≤ x who report satisfaction 
levels h ≤ k. Obviously, Qn(x) = 1 for all income levels x. These cumulative measures 
are important because an obvious necessary and suffi cient condition for SWB to rise 
with income is that Qk(x) falls as x increases for each k = 1, 2, …, n − 1. That is, the 
proportion of individuals whose reported satisfaction level is low must fall as one 
moves up the income distribution.
Note that, like an ordinal equivalence class of utility functions that represent the 
same preference ordering because all are strictly increasing transformations of each 
other, the n-dimensional vector P(x) is ordinal because its defi nition depends only on 
which happiness levels are ranked higher.
A Cardinal Objective Measure of SWB
A lot o f empirical work, including most linear regression studies, ignores much of 
the richness in the data by simply replacing the different components of each vector 
P(x) with the one-dimensional mean statistic 
 P
–
(x) = ∑nh=1 Ph(x) h (7)
This not only discards a lot of information, but constructing P
–
(x) requires 
that happiness be measured on a cardinal scale. Specifi cally, for every possible 
 comparison such as P
–
(x) > P
–
(x') to be preserved whenever the happiness scale 
H:  = {1, 2, …, n} is replaced by the new n-point happiness scale H': = {η1, η2, …, ηn} 
with η1 < η2 < … ηn, it is necessary and suffi cient that there be an additive constant 
α and a multiplicative constant ρ > 0 such that 
 ηh = α + ρh for all h ∈ H. (8)
Finally, we note that virtually all existing work concerning the Easterlin paradox 
relies on cardinal measures of mean happiness such as P
–
(x) defi ned by equation (7). 
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We do not know if, along with different data sets, this is really signifi cant in helping 
to explain apparently inconsistent empirical results. For the following discussion, 
we make a point of keeping track of all n components in the vector P(x) defi ned by 
equation (4) for all relevant different income levels x.
Could SWB Be Relevant? An Empirical Test
A Null Hypothesis
Consider the following rather extreme null hypothesis: for each x ≥ 0, the relative 
proportions Ph(x) of individuals with incomes y ≤ x who report different satisfaction 
levels h ∈ H are all independent of x. Equation (3) implies in this case that Ph(x) = Ph, 
independent of x.
Suppose that for all h ∈ H and x ≥ 0, we defi ne 
 Gh(x): = Fh(x)/Ph (9)
as the proportion of all interviewees reporting satisfaction level h whose income is 
y ≤ x. Then each Gh(x) is a cumulative income distribution function for those inter-
viewees, which satisfi es Gh(x) → 1 as x → ∞. Using equation (2) to substitute for 
Fh(x) in (9) gives 
 Gh(x) = Ph(x)F(x)/Ph (10)
The null hypothesis that Ph(x) = Ph independent of x ≥ 0 is therefore equivalent 
to having Gh(x) = F(x), independent of h. Under this null hypothesis, any reports of 
SWB would tell us nothing at all relevant to any statements regarding the relative 
subjective values of different income levels y ≥ 0.
An Alternative Hypothesis
A natural alternative to the null hypothesis that Gh(x) = F(x), ind ependent of h, is 
that Gh(x) decreases as h increases for each fi xed x ≥ 0. This corresponds to the 
hypothesis that, among people reporting happiness level h, the proportion of poorer 
persons with incomes y ≤ x decreases as h increases.
Data Sources
Two different versions of both the null and alternative hypotheses can be tes ted 
using data from the World Values Survey (WVS), a particularly accessible source. 
The data were collected from interviews conducted in fi ve waves between 1981 and 
2008, for a total of 117,876 observations. In an attempt to ensure representative-
ness, the data we used were restricted to wave–country combinations with at least 
30 observations.
In addition to happiness measured on a 4-point scale, the interviewers collected 
income data measured on an interval scale. To arrive at corresponding distributions 
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of annual individual income measured consistently in year 2000 US dollars, the raw 
WVS data were transformed as follows: 
• Extract the lower and upper bounds of whatever income range was reported by 
the interviewee, then transform both bounds to measures of annual income. 
• Use an interval regression to estimate a probability distribution of possible 
incomes for each interviewee. 
Adjust for both exchange rates and price changes using data taken from World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 2010. 
The fi rst version of the null hypothesis uses the income data directly. However, 
at least one version of Easterlin’s paradox considers whether people become hap-
pier as the country they live in experiences growth in GDP per capita. It would be 
interesting to see how our null hypothesis fares with the kind of long-run growth 
data whose use Easterlin advocates. For the time being, however, we have limited 
ourselves to a second static version of the null hypothesis, in which individual 
income is replaced by contemporaneous GDP per capita for the country in which 
the interviewee lives.
Results for the First Version of the Null Hypothesis
Figure 1 represents the transformed d ata graphically, with income x measured along 
the horizontal axis using a logarithmic scale. It displays the graphs of the four condi-
tional cumulative income distribution functions, Gh(x), corresponding to each of the 
four possible happiness levels, h ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The four graphs show a very clear positive association between happiness and 
income, at least for the 98 percent of interviewees whose income levels, measured 
in year 2000 US dollars, lie between about 50 cents and $300 a day. Indeed, the 
association is so strong that no two curves cross. Specifi cally, for every threshold 
income level x, among all the individuals who report the same happiness level h, 
the proportion Fh(x) whose income is y ≤ x always decreases as h increases. In other 
words, those who report a higher h on the WVS 4-point happiness scale are less likely 
to have low incomes, regardless of what threshold we choose to distinguish between 
high and low incomes.
We applied a formal, two-sample, one-sided version of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test three times to the different adjacent pairs of conditional income distributions 
to see whether each graph lies signifi cantly above its successor, in accordance with 
the alternative hypothesis laid out earlier. The test was passed in every case with a 
p-value of 0.000.
Results  for the Second Version of the Null Hypothesis
To consider the second version of the null hypothesis, fi gure 2 replaces the absolute 
income levels in fi gure 1 with national GDP per capita. The cumulative income 
distribution reports the proportion of interviewees living in countries whose contem-
poraneous GDP per capita, again measured in year 2000 US dollars, was no greater 
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than the income level marked on the horizontal axis. Not surprisingly, there are some 
signifi cant jumps in the constructed distribution, refl ecting how every interviewee in 
some quite large countries shares the same national GDP per capita.
Once again, the four curves are not only distinct but clearly ordered in the same 
way they were in fi gure 1. The same three Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were passed 
with a p-value of 0.000. Thus, reported life satisfaction is defi nitely positively asso-
ciated with both personal income and with GDP per head. Of course, this does 
not contradict the version of Easterlin’s negative fi ndings that focuses on long-run 
growth trends, particularly in countries that were either already developed or have 
recently become much more developed.
Should SW B Be Relevant? Ethical Values
Two Extre me Views
Establishing a positive association between happiness and income is one thing. Its 
relevance for policy is quite another. We have not even distinguished the hypothesis 
that income causes happiness from the alternative possibility that happiness raises 
income, perhaps even at the national as well as the individual level. Nevertheless, let 
FIGURE 1. 
Four Income Distribution Functions
Source: WVS 1981–2008, offi cial aggregate, 2009.
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us provisionally accept the hypothesis that policies that increase economic opportu-
nities will add to measured SWB. Does that make a case for basing policy recommen-
dations on SWB measures? On this question there is room for two extreme opposing 
views, as well as, no doubt, many positions in between.
The fi rst extreme is the skeptic’s claim that any empirical SWB analysis is bound 
to lack normative signifi cance. This is the implicit position of traditional welfare 
economics, based as it is on concepts such as revealed preference, willingness to pay, 
and money metric utility. It may be reinforced by the view that people’s expressions 
of their own subjective well-being constitute no more than how Shakespeare chose 
to describe life itself: “ … a tale/Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,/Signifying 
nothing” (Macbeth, act 5, scene 5).
The second extreme is the “hedonometric” claim that not only is SWB relevant; in 
fact, only the mean of all individuals’ SWB reports matters, and any other measure 
can be disregarded. This appears to be the position advocated by Layard, among 
others—see, for example, Dolan, Layard, and Metcalfe (2011) and Layard (2005, 
2010). As discussed earlier, this extreme attaches cardinal signifi cance to the different 
happiness levels.
SWB and P areto Dominance 
Between these two extremes is the view that SWB measures are relevant to the com-
parisons one needs as a basis for policy recommendations.
Source: WDI 2010, World Bank.
FIGURE 2. 
Four Distribution Functions Based on GDP per Capita
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For example, rather than base social welfare judgments on individuals’ reported 
preferences, could we not use SWB measures instead? Then one might say that policy 
A has better effects than policy B for individual i, and so increases i's welfare if—and 
only if—the change from B to A would increase the estimated SWB, not necessar-
ily of i personally in a world of unreliable reports, but of most people suffi ciently 
like i for the comparison of SWB measures to be deemed relevant. Such personal 
comparisons of different policies are already enough to determine a modifi ed Pareto 
criterion, according to which policy A Pareto dominates policy B if—and only if—the 
estimated SWB for every person under policy A is higher than it would be under B. 
Used in this limited way, estimated SWB might be a more reliable guide than the 
usual welfare measures based on concepts such as revealed preference, willingness to 
pay, and money metric utility.
Comparing Welfare Lev els
For policy changes that are not Pareto improvements, however, some way of trading 
off different people’s gains and losses is required. To see whether this is possible, we 
might fi rst ask when one can say that person i has a higher welfare level than person 
j. Traditionally, the answer has been if—and only if—i's real income is higher than 
j's, but a fundamental diffi culty is the lack of any objective measure of real income.
A new answer can use objective measures of SWB. Then we can say that person 
i has a higher welfare level than person j if—and only if—people whose objective 
circumstances are like those of i generally report higher SWB levels than do those 
whose objective circumstances are like those of j.
SWB and Suppes-Sen Dominance
 Once we introduce comparisons between different people’s estimated SWB levels, 
there may be an appealing way to express a preference between policies A and B, 
even though neither Pareto dominates the other. A fi rst idea is to use Suppes’ (1966) 
grading principle as discussed in Sen (1970). Specifi cally, policy A will dominate 
policy B if—and only if—A would Pareto dominate a (possibly infeasible) policy 
alternative B in which different people’s SWB measures are derived by permuting 
those achieved under policy B. In particular, the distribution of SWB measures under 
policy A should dominate that of those under policy B.
A different way of expressing the same dominance condition involves multidi-
mensional cumulative distributions such as the Qk(x) considered earlier. The idea 
is to reduce the proportion of individuals whose happiness levels falls below each 
possible different h. For similar ideas see Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett (1973) and 
Saposnik (1983).
Progressive Transfers
Dalton (1920, p. 2 51), following an idea he ascribes to Pigou (1912), enunciated 
what has since become known as the Pigou-Dalton principle of progressive transfers. 
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This is the claim that transferring income costlessly from a richer to a poorer person 
will reduce inequality so long as the transfer is not large enough to reverse the rank-
ing of the two persons’ incomes. A similar idea can be applied with measured SWB 
replacing income. That is, one can regard favorably a different kind of progressive 
income transfer from individuals with higher SWB levels to those with lower levels, 
as long as the transfer is not large enough to reverse the ranking of their SWB levels. 
In this way, some pairs of policies can be ranked even though neither dominates the 
other according to the Suppes-Sen criterion.
An extension of the same idea would be to apply the equity axiom suggested by 
Sen (1973) but often ascribed to Hammond (1976). This would regard any policy 
change as benefi cial provided it affects only two people’s estimated SWB level and 
increases the minimum of the two SWB levels. Pushed all the way, this would take 
us to a modifi ed “Rawlsian” policy that maximizes the lowest estimated SWB level 
in the whole population. This will usually differ from the usual maximun policy, 
because estimated SWB differs from individual utility, as usually measured, and also 
because the measure applies not just to each person separately but equally to a group 
of people who share similar objective circumstances.
Welfare Weights
We conclude with a fi nal warning. The kind of ordinal estimated SWB measure we 
have been discussing cannot provide suffi cient information, in general, to derive the 
welfare weights that are generally needed whenever policy choices force us to trade 
off some individuals’ welfare gains against others’ losses. Those trade-offs require 
some form of cardinal information or at least social marginal rates of substitution 
between estimated SWB measures for different groups of people whose objective 
circumstances are similar.
Notes
 1. Some authors, citing the tradition of Robbins (1932), claim that one should instead give 
the word “welfare” purely descriptive content. But then, at the risk of oversimplifying 
Little’s (1965) cogent critique in a mere metaphor, we are in danger of pursuing mirages 
in the arid desert of Archibald’s (1959) “essentialism.”
 2. We ignore the loss of one dimension that arises because the n proportions must add up 
to 1.
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If we all seek happiness, and living a happy life is our ultimate goal, shouldn’t happi-
ness be at the center of development studies and be the guide for development policy? 
In a deep, comprehensive, and insightful essay, Carol Graham tackles these issues 
with the balance of someone who has extensively studied the topic and knows its 
promises as well as its limitations and pitfalls. Graham surveys the happiness litera-
ture, highlights its challenges, illustrates the main points with results from her own 
research, and provides an assessment of the current state of the debate. In this com-
ment, I share some thoughts motivated by Graham’s arguments and evidence, and 
illustrate some points with results from my own research.
Happiness As an Objective for Development Policy 
A debate exists on the relevance of happiness measures as benchmarks for develop-
ment. At one extreme, some people say that aggregate measures of happiness should 
be the only indicators to evaluate progress and policy (Layard 2005). If people 
behave so as to maximize utility, some aggregate indicator of happiness seems to be 
a reasonable measure for aggregate welfare. Others emphasize the several pitfalls of 
this position, ranging from serious measurement issues to the more conceptual prob-
lems of adaptation and awareness (Sen 1999). In fact, according to many analysts, 
happiness measures should not be of any concern for development policy. This was 
the overwhelming position in economics until recently, and it is probably still the most 
widespread view. In what follows, I address some of the “antihappiness” arguments.
As Graham notes, the “adaptation conundrum” is one of the main challenges for 
people advocating happiness as a benchmark for development. This phenomenon has 
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been documented in recent papers. For instance, Di Tella, Haisken-De New, and 
MacCulloch (2007), using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel, fi nd that life 
satisfaction adapts completely to income within four years: growth implies only a 
temporary boost to happiness. This phenomenon of “hedonistic habituation” is well-
known in psychology (Myers 2000). Humans derive a great deal of enjoyment from 
any new form of positive experience. However, people quickly become familiar with 
the new source of joy, and the initial happiness fades away. 
The conundrum triggered by adaptation is illustrated in fi gure 1. Suppose devel-
opment policy boosts productivity and a person gets a permanent wage increase at 
time t1. Then the credit market improves at time t2 and the same person gets a loan 
to buy a house. Under full habituation, happiness jumps at both t1 and t2, but it 
always returns to the long-run level h0.
Thus, if happiness is our social goal, what is the use of development policy? This 
conundrum has led many people to discard happiness as a sensible benchmark for 
development. In my view, and according to evidence provided by Graham and other 
researchers in this fi eld, there are at least two reasons why discarding happiness indi-
cators may be an overreaction. The fi rst is that recent studies conclude that although 
there might be an overshooting after a positive change, long-run happiness is affected 
by economic changes. With new and better data, Deaton (2008), Stevenson and 
 Wolfers (2008), and others challenge the Easterlin paradox, according to which happi-
ness does not increase with development. These studies fi nd that development is good 
for happiness. Figure 2—showing happiness under partial habituation—seems to be a 
better representation of the real world than fi gure 1. In this context, development pol-
icy can play a role if maximizing happiness is the social target. Policy makers might be 
frustrated by the fact that the initial boost in happiness does not last, but that is not a 
valid argument against policies that are successful in increasing long-run happiness. 
The second argument against discarding happiness indicators has to do with the 
nature of happiness, a topic that Graham also discusses. In the world of fi gure 1, 
notice that even when happiness returns to its long-run value after a policy shock, 
lifetime average happiness is greater with policy than without it. If policy can provide 
a person with many happiness episodes, his or her life will be substantially happier 
FIGURE 1.
Happiness under Full Habituation 
h0
happiness
t1 t2 time
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on average. In fact, some say that happiness is no more than brief moments of ful-
fi llment (see Morris 2004). We can hope to have more of these moments but not 
aspire to a permanent higher level of happiness.1 In this framework, development 
policy has a role even when its impact on happiness is only temporary.
Other arguments against the use of happiness indicators are related to measure-
ment issues. However, as Graham noted, many of the same concerns apply to other 
common measures of welfare, such as income or consumption. Measurement issues 
might be more serious in happiness than in income, but that will not necessarily be 
the case if we can improve surveys and apply new techniques and technology from 
psychology and neurosciences. In the future it might be easier to measure some 
dimensions of happiness than to estimate all sources of income. 
If happiness is our welfare measure, should we give resources to rich people who 
feel sad? This question, although valid, also applies to income and consumption: if 
these welfare variables are used to guide policy, resources should be transferred 
to lazy or dishonest people whose incomes are low despite the fact that they have 
opportunities to work. There are several conceptual problems in having outcome 
variables such as happiness, income, or consumption as guides for policy. The devel-
opment literature is increasingly dealing with opportunities rather than outcomes, 
and this will affect the happiness literature. 
The previous paragraphs argue that some of the concerns about the use of happi-
ness measures as a guide for development policy may not be too serious. In fact, some 
people disregard these concerns and support happiness measures as the only devel-
opment goal. This extreme view also has problems. Suppose that some policy does 
not have any positive effect on happiness. For instance, sometimes it is even argued 
that certain areas of education make people less happy by making them more aware 
of the injustices in the world, the fragility of life, or their position in society. Even if 
these arguments were true, it is likely that most people will not support a reduction in 
education, because happiness is not the only thing that drives our lives. Other values 
are more or equally important. People are ready to compromise happiness for these 
other values, both in their lives and in the policies they support. 
FIGURE 2.
Happiness under Partial Habituation
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Research in psychology shows that about 50 percent of one’s overall sense of 
happiness is genetically determined and cannot be changed; 10 percent is due to cir-
cumstances (e.g., income, education); and 40 percent comes from day-to-day experi-
ences and behavior (Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and Schkade 2005). This is bad news for 
development policy, because it implies that policy is not very important for people’s 
happiness. However, we should not abandon policy but rather be aware of the size of 
the policy effects we can expect on happiness indicators. And policy should pay more 
attention to factors that signifi cantly increase people’s sense of happiness: mating, 
employment, friends, holidays. Of course, there are limits to public interventions, 
but policy can do many things in these areas. To start with, it can support evidence-
based studies in psychology, neurosciences, economics, and other areas to learn 
more about what can be done to help people feel happier. This kind of research is 
almost nonexistent in most developing countries.
Dimensions of Welfare and Trade-Offs
Suppose we agree that self-reported happiness is one of the many dimensions of 
welfare. Is it possible to ignore it in the analysis, given that it is correlated with other 
objective measures of well-being? In a recent study for Latin America using data from 
the Gallup Poll and a simple factor analytic model, we concluded that welfare can 
be appropriately summarized by three dimensions: income, variables associated with 
basic needs, and subjective welfare measures (Gasparini and et al. 2010). This result 
acknowledges the importance of happiness measures but also suggests that welfare 
is a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be fully captured by one dimension. 
Any policy aimed at one dimension would likely be suboptimal in the others.
In some cases, the inclusion of the happiness dimension may not affect the policy 
debate. For instance, investment in water and sanitation increases measures of objec-
tive welfare as well as subjective satisfaction, at least for awhile. In other cases, 
however, there might be a trade-off, and this is when the question of happiness as a 
benchmark for development policy becomes more interesting.
Graham mentions some of these trade-offs. For instance, development policy that 
promotes competition and productivity may reduce happiness, at least temporarily. 
A wide net of social protection and labor regulations may hinder economic growth 
but may reduce uncertainty and hence increase happiness. 
Gasparini and others (2010) found several areas with potential confl ict for pol icy 
recommendations when looking alternatively at income and happiness. In several 
Latin American countries, older people are among the most disadvantaged in terms 
of subjective welfare but not in terms of income or consumption. This reversion has 
implications for targeting social policies. The gap between rural and urban areas is 
enormous in terms of income, smaller but still large in terms of consumption, and 
substantially narrower in terms of happiness. For instance, while 66 percent of 
the income poor in Ecuador live in rural areas, just 42 percent of the “happiness 
poor” live in those areas. Large family size is associated with low welfare measured 
by income or consumption (adjusted for demographics), but the association with 
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happiness is weaker. For instance, in Latin America, the difference in the average 
number of children between households in the bottom 30 percent of the income 
distribution and the rest of society is more than 1, but the happiness difference is 
just 0.2. Targeting social programs on the basis of family size may imply signifi cant 
biases when other dimensions of deprivation beyond income and consumption 
are considered.
In many countries poor people (when we defi ne poverty by income or access to 
goods and services) are, on average, more satisfi ed than the nonpoor with social 
policy. In Latin America the difference is not negligible: 7 to 9 points (Gasparini et al. 
2010). When we consider the subjective defi nition, the results change: the happiness 
poor are less satisfi ed with efforts to deal with poverty and lack of employment. This 
result could be driven in part by unobservable personality traits; for example, those 
who are more likely to rank themselves as poor (even if they are not poor according 
to objective measures) are also more likely to be less satisfi ed with a range of other 
things, including efforts to deal with poverty. The result is challenging: Should we 
partially disregard the low levels of approval of the subjective poor because they are 
in part driven by unobservable individual factors, such as pessimism, that lead some 
of these people to incorrectly consider themselves poor? Or Should we give special 
attention to this negative view of the social policy because the happiness poor are the 
real poor, whom our weak scheme to measure poverty with incomes and consump-
tion cannot properly identify? 
New evidence seems to support the view that development is generally good for 
happiness.2 However, as Graham stresses in her paper, the process by which an econ-
omy develops matters a lot. Giving happiness a greater weight as a social goal com-
pared with, for instance, GDP will not affect the need for development policies but 
may affect decisions about the type of policies and the speed of growth. Large changes 
seem to be very traumatic. The paradox of unhappy growth documented by Graham 
and Lora (2009) and others should be taken seriously. Graham says that insecurity 
regarding a rapidly changing reward structure, volatility, and inequality are happi-
ness-reducing factors during high-growth episodes. A factor she does not mention 
but one that is probably relevant is the reduction in leisure during growth episodes. 
People may feel that they have to take advantage of the boom and may overreact— 
working too many hours, feeling stressed and frustrated. As Graham acknowledges, 
people seem to be happier in low-growth equilibrium. Development policy should not 
ignore this fact, although we should not try to avoid any change because it might be 
traumatic: long-term gains in happiness may outweigh short-term losses.
In conclusion, including happiness in the benchmarks for development will not 
affect the need for development policy but may affect the speed, type, and nature of 
interventions. 
Notes
 1. This argument is related to the philosophical discussion on happiness as contentment or 
happiness as a fulfi lling life.
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 2. The study of the causal effects of policy on happiness is plagued by empirical problems. 
One of the more serious is that of bicausality, noted in Graham’s paper. A large body of 
evidence exists in psychology on the effect of happiness on income and other indicators 
of successful performance in the labor market. In a well-known survey of that literature, 
Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener (2005) conclude that if you make people feel happy, they 
perform better in many dimensions. Happiness not only is caused by success but actually 
causes it.
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Social Programs and Transfers: 
Are We Learning?

The Evolution and Impact of 
Unconditional Cash Transfers in 
South Africa
INGRID WOOLARD AND MURRAY LEIBBRANDT
At the time of the transition to democracy in 1994, the South African social security 
system was already notably well developed for a middle-income country (Case and 
Deaton 1998; Lund 1993; van der Berg 1997). It was originally developed under 
apartheid as a welfare state for whites, then incrementally expanded under social 
and political pressure to incorporate other groups. Thus, at the advent of the new 
postapartheid society, some important planks for a social assistance system were in 
place. Since then, policies have been implemented that have expanded this system sub-
stantially. Direct spending on cash transfers currently stands at 3.5 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP). This is more than twice the median spending of 1.4 percent 
of GDP across developing and transition economies (World Bank 2009). 
Most of these policies are implemented through unconditional cash transfers. The 
size, shape, and design aspects of the social assistance system make South Africa an 
interesting case study. Are cash transfers well targeted and redistributive? Do we 
know if they enhance human capital accumulation? Are they fi scally sustainable? 
Have changes in social policy been evidence-based or rights-based?
We begin by documenting the historical context for the current cash transfer 
programs. Then we look at evidence concerning the aggregate impact of these cash 
transfers on poverty levels. We review the literature on the impact of the cash trans-
fers on specifi c socioeconomic outcomes and behaviors. We conclude by looking at 
the feasibility and appropriateness of introducing conditions into what is currently 
an unconditional cash transfer program.
Social Security, Social Assistance, and Social Insurance
There are two separate aspects of social security: the insurance concept (social insur-
ance) and the redistribution concept (social assistance). The social insurance prong of 
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South Africa’s social security system is far smaller than the social assistance prong. 
However, we provide a brief review of the social insurance programs to ensure that 
our discussion is located within a complete picture of the social security system. 
Figure 1 shows the basic architecture of this system.
The insurance concept focuses on insuring workers against the risk of income loss 
and hence increases lifetime income smoothing. Most programs based on this concept 
are fi nanced from premiums and contributions, and benefi ts depend on contributions. 
In South Africa, the government is responsible for three primary social insurance 
mechanisms: the Unemployment Insurance Fund, the Compensation Funds, and the 
Road Accident Fund. 
The Compensation Funds provide medical care and income benefi ts to workers 
who are injured at work or develop occupational diseases. These funds also pay 
survivor benefi ts to the families of workers who are fatally injured while on the job. 
The Road Accident Fund provides compensation for the loss of earnings and general 
damages to victims of road accidents caused by the negligent or wrongful driving of 
another person. We do not consider these funds further, because they provide very 
specifi c risk benefi ts that are not directly related to poverty alleviation.
For the purposes of this paper, the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) is of 
much greater signifi cance. All private-sector/formal-sector workers and their employ-
ers must contribute 1 percent of salary to the UIF. The UIF pays benefi ts to contrib-
utors in cases of unemployment, illness, maternity, or adoption of a child, and pays 
benefi ts to the worker’s dependents if the worker dies in service. It is estimated that 
in 2009 approximately 8 million workers (and their employers) contributed to the 
fund, but only 10 percent of the 4.1 million unemployed received any unemployment 
benefi ts (Leibbrandt et al. 2010).1 Part of the explanation for this large gap between 
FIGURE 1.
Social Security in South Africa 
Source: Government of South Africa, 2010.
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the number of unemployed and the number of people with claims on the fund lies in 
the fact that more than half of the unemployed report that they have never worked 
(Statistics SA 2008) and thus have not contributed to the UIF. Of those who have 
worked, almost half have been unemployed for more than a year and would have 
exhausted their benefi ts if they were ever eligible for them. Thus, while the UIF 
clearly plays an important role in providing replacement income to the short-term 
unemployed with work experience, the vast majority of the unemployed fall out-
side this system.
Redistribution programs, on the other hand, do not focus on workers alone, 
and the key element is poverty relief. In South Africa, the term “social assistance 
grants” refers to noncontributory and income-tested benefi ts provided by the state 
to vulnerable groups such as the disabled, the elderly, and children in poor house-
holds. Benefi ts are fi nanced out of general tax revenues. 
The major grant types in South Africa are the state old age pension (for income-
eligible persons over age 60), the disability grant (for income-eligible working-
age adults who are temporarily or permanently unable to work because of poor 
health or disability), the child support grant (currently for children under 16 but 
being phased in up to age 18) who are living with low-income caregivers, and 
the foster care grant (for children who have been placed with a foster parent by 
court order). By April 2010, 14 million people (out of a population of 49 million) 
were benefi ting from social assistance grants. Of these, 2.5 million were receiving 
old age pensions, 1.3 million were receiving disability grants, 9.4 million children 
were benefi ting from child support grants, and 570,000 children were benefi ting 
from foster care grants. 
The rest of the paper focuses on these social grants rather than the UIF or other 
aspects of South Africa’s social insurance system. Fiscally, these grants are completely 
dominant. In the 2009/10 fi scal year, the UIF paid out benefi ts amounting to R8.2 
billion (purchasing power parity [PPP] $1.7 billion), which is less than one-tenth of 
the amount spent on cash transfers in the same year. As UIF is the major prong of 
the social security system directed at vulnerable sections of the working-age popula-
tion, the system as a whole is heavily skewed toward income support for the young, 
the elderly, and the disabled, with little direct support to the unemployed. We return 
to this point in our conclusion. The next section provides the historical context that 
gave rise to this broad coverage of the young and the elderly while providing little 
direct support to working-age adults.
How the System Developed 
Noncontributory social pensions were instituted in 1928 for whites and coloreds 
who were not covered by occupational retirement insurance.2 Pensions were subject 
to age criteria and a means test to ensure that only the poor were targeted. The pro-
portion of the white population that was dependent on social pensions remained 
relatively small despite an increasingly liberal means test, as occupational retirement 
insurance covered the majority of the white population. In 1943, take-up rates 
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among the elderly were 40 percent for whites and 56 percent for coloreds (van der 
Berg 1997). By that year, only 4 percent of all social assistance spending was on 
Africans, and this consisted of targeted relief and pensions for the blind (van der 
Berg 1997). 
In 1944 the Smuts government extended social old age pensions to Africans, 
though benefi t levels were less than one-tenth those for whites. By 1958 (a decade 
into the apartheid era), Africans made up 60 percent of the 347,000 social old age 
pensioners, although they received only 19 percent of all old age pension spending 
(van der Berg 1997). 
In the 1970s and 1980s the apartheid government worked hard to give the “inde-
pendent homelands” political legitimacy. Ironically, a major impetus for what  Kruger 
(1992) describes as the “deracialization” of social assistance came from attempts to 
bolster the homeland system of racial separation. This led to a rapid increase in the 
funds fl owing to the homelands for old age pensions. The coverage of the African 
elderly population increased steadily, and by 1993 there were almost twice as many 
African pensioners inside the homelands as outside (van der Berg 1997).
In the late 1970s the principle of moving to parity in social spending levels was 
reluctantly accepted (van der Berg 1997). From that time on, fi scal expenditures on 
social assistance rose rapidly in an attempt to incorporate all race groups into the 
system and to provide similar levels of benefi ts. Spending on social old age pensions 
rose from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1970 to 1.8 percent by 1993 (van der Berg 1997). 
Fiscal constraints precluded increasing the benefi ts for all race groups to the level of 
those previously enjoyed by white pensioners, and white benefi ts were eroded while 
African benefi ts were rapidly increased. As shown in fi gure 2, African pension ben-
efi ts rose fi vefold in real terms between 1970 and 1993, while white pension benefi ts 
fell by a third.
The 1992 Social Assistance Act fi nally did away with all discriminatory provi-
sions. Thus, the social pensions and grants that were set up to protect the white 
population gradually expanded their eligibility rules to include all South Africans. 
“This [made] it . . . an unusually comprehensive system compared with that found 
in other developing countries” (Lund 1993, 22).
Figure 2 shows that the real value of the pension declined somewhat through the 
late 1990s but recovered from 2004 onward to retain the same real levels offered at 
the start of the postapartheid period. This grant, inherited from the apartheid era, 
was the core component around which the other components of the postapartheid 
social grant system were added or expanded.
One of the components that has expanded dramatically is the disability grant. 
This is the only grant intended for working-age adults. It goes to disabled and chroni-
cally ill persons over the age of 18 but below the age at which they would be eligible 
for the old age pension. The means test is the same as for the old age pension. The 
main criterion is that recipients must be disabled to the extent that they are unable 
to support themselves. Permanent grants are awarded to those who are perma-
nently disabled. Temporary grants are awarded for a shorter period—for example, 
six months—to those who are expected to regain the ability to support themselves. 
Numbers for the disability grant increased signifi cantly in the late 1990s but have 
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leveled off in the past decade. Today, about 6 percent of working-age adults receive 
a disability grant each month. 
Thus, improved coverage and parity in benefi ts occurred in the case of the old 
age pension and the disability grant. However, in the case of child grants, the 
incoming postapartheid government confronted a highly inequitable inheritance. 
At the time of the political transition in 1994, little was being spent on children, 
and expenditure was highly unequal by race. At that time, three grants were 
directed at children. A foster care grant was available to children who had been 
placed with foster parents through a court order. A care dependency grant (CDG) 
was given to caregivers of children who were disabled enough to need full-time 
care. Finally, there was a state maintenance grant. We deal with this grant fi rst as, 
fi scally, it is by far the most important of the three and its postapartheid evolution 
holds important lessons.
The state maintenance grant was intended for a parent or guardian living with a 
child under 18 years of age if the applicant was unmarried, widowed, or separated; 
had been deserted by a spouse for more than six months; had a spouse who received 
a social grant; or had a spouse who had been in prison, a drug treatment center, or 
FIGURE 2.
Monthly Value of Pension Benefi ts by Race, 1960–2010 (constant 2010 PPP$ prices)
Sources: Nominal data from 1960 to 1994 kindly provided by Servaas van der Berg (personal communication); data 
from 1995 onward, Government of South Africa, various years.
Note: Data defl ated to 2010 prices using headline consumer price index and a PPP$ exchange rate of 4.67 in 2010.
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similar institution for more than six months. Applicants had to prove that they had 
made efforts to apply for private maintenance from the other parent but had been 
unsuccessful. There were limitations not only on nonparents’ receipt of the grant 
but also on eligibility with respect to children born outside marriage. As a result 
of signifi cant differences in both the rules and how they were applied, very few 
African children and their caregivers received the grant. In 1993, the last year for 
which racially disaggregated welfare spending data are available, only 0.2 percent 
of  African children were receiving maintenance grants, while 1.4 percent of white 
children, 4.0 percent of Indian children, and 5.0 percent of colored children received 
grants (Lund 2008). 
The new African National Congress (ANC) government quickly recognized that 
providing equal access to the state maintenance grant would have large fi scal impli-
cations. Simulations based on household survey data suggested that there would be 
more than a 20-fold increase in expenditures if all caregivers became aware of their 
rights (Haarman and Haarman 1996). To be fair to the government, the fi scal impli-
cations were not their only consideration. The grant was also deemed inappropriate 
for the South African context, with its underlying basis that the only children in need 
were those living with single mothers. Many children in need lived with both or nei-
ther of their parents. As Simkins and Dlamini put it at the time, “[T]ransfer payments 
in support of children have traditionally assumed a nuclear family context, whereas 
this is by no means the only basis of social organization” (1992, 65). 
The government moved swiftly to institute reform. In December 1995 the Lund 
Committee was established to evaluate the existing system of state support and 
explore alternative policy options targeting children and families. The committee 
recommended a new strategy that included a child-linked grant that had a lower 
monetary value than the state maintenance grant but targeted a much wider group 
of benefi ciaries.
The child support grant (CSG) was introduced in April 1998 at a level of R100 
(PPP$37) per month for each eligible child younger than seven years of age. The 
money was to be paid to the child’s primary caregiver. Applicants for the grant 
were required to pass a means test (based on household income), produce certain 
documents, and demonstrate efforts to secure funds from other sources. The strict 
requirements prevented many genuine caregivers of poor children from applying 
for the grant. By 1999 only 21,997 children had been signed up. In response to the 
low take-up rate, the government altered the means test from a household measure 
to one that considered only the income of the primary caregiver and his or her spouse, 
net of other social assistance grants.
When the CSG was introduced, it included several conditions. Applicants were 
initially expected to participate in “development programs” and to have proof that 
the children for whom they were applying were immunized. The requirement regard-
ing development programs was dropped after it became obvious that such programs 
simply did not exist in many areas. The immunization requirement was dropped 
because it often discriminated against children who were already disadvantaged in 
terms of access to services.
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The CSG is a good example of how a program can be improved if it is found to 
be ineffective. Take-up of the CSG was very low in the fi rst three years. Surveys of 
provincial social development offi ces showed that take-up was being severely under-
mined by contradictory interpretations of the means test and the conditions. Despite 
the changes to the law, some welfare offi ces still required single mothers to provide 
proof that they had tried to obtain private maintenance from the father of the child or 
were actively seeking work (Samson, van Niekerk, and McQuene 2006). As shown in 
fi gure 3, by 2000 (two years into the program) only 150,000 children were receiving 
their entitlement. 
In 2000 the South African cabinet appointed a Committee of Inquiry into Compre-
hensive Social Security (the Taylor Committee), which examined the shortcomings of 
the system. Under the leadership of Viviene Taylor, the committee recommended the 
introduction of a universal grant to all South Africans (a basic income grant), begin-
ning with the extension of the child support grant to all children. Following the sub-
mission of the report, the Department of Social Development extended the grant from 
age 7 to age 14, doubling its scope. In his January 2002 state-of-the-nation address, 
President Thabo Mbeki announced a government-led campaign to “regis ter all who are 
eligible for the child grant” (Samson, van Niekerk, and McQuene 2006). The president’s 
strong commitment sent a clear message to the bureaucracy that social grants were 
FIGURE 3.
Number of Children Receiving the Child Support Grant, by Year and Age Group
Source: South African Social Security Agency, special request.
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the central pillar of the poverty eradication strategy. By April 2003, 2.6 million 
children had been signed up for the grant, and take-up continued to escalate. 
Since then this grant has been further expanded and older age groups have been 
gradually included. Beginning in 2010, all income-eligible children born after 1996 
will receive the CSG until they turn 18. The means test has also been relaxed. In 
October 2008 the test was increased to 10 times the value of the grant for single 
caregivers and double that for married caregivers. Until that time the means test 
had been fi xed at R800 in urban areas and R1100 in rural areas for 10 years. In 
the most extreme situation, this meant that the means test for a married caregiver 
in an urban area changed from an income ceiling of R800 (PPP$183) per month 
to R4600 (PPP$1,053). Estimates based on survey data suggest that this change in 
the means test should have brought an additional 1.5 million children into the net 
(Leibbrandt et al. 2010).
Let us return briefl y to the two other child grants that have been in existence since 
before the CSG was established. Both have seen marked increases in take-up over 
recent years. This can be partly attributed to an increase in general awareness of the 
grants, but it is also related to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, as both grants are used in 
some cases to provide for children affected or infected by AIDS.
The foster child grant (FCG) is paid to those who have gone through a court process 
to become registered as foster parents of a child. The grant is intended for children up 
to the age of 18 years who are “in need of care” and are not receiving such care from 
their biological parents. This includes children who are abused as well as children in 
trouble with the law. The grant is not primarily intended to deal with poverty and 
thus has no means test unless the child has independent income. Because the grant 
value is almost three times larger than the CSG, there is a clear incentive to caregiv-
ers to choose the FCG over the CSG if they can. The signifi cant difference between 
the two amounts is a legacy of the haphazard way the grant system came into being. 
The Lund Committee was aware of this problem when it deliberated, but it could 
not propose a higher amount for the CSG and still stay within the budget limit in its 
terms of reference and did not want to recommend lowering the value of the FCG. 
The care dependency grant is given to caregivers of children who are severely 
disabled to the extent that they need full-time care. If such care were not available in 
the home, they would have to be institutionalized. The grant is available for children 
from 1 to 18 years of age.
All in all then, over the postapartheid period social grant policy evolved in a way 
that continued and modifi ed some inherited grants (the old age pension, the dis-
ability grant, and the foster care grant), removed the state maintenance grant, and 
replaced it with the child support grant. Table 1 provides a contemporary snapshot, 
showing the current value of the various cash transfer payments. The old age pension 
and the disability grant are regarded as quite generous, equating to 1.75 times the 
average per capita household income. Another way to benchmark the amount is to 
compare it with the minimum wage. In South Africa minimum wages differ according 
to sector. In 2010 one of the lowest wage determinations was for domestic workers 
in nonmetropolitan areas: at R1192 per month, which was only about 10 percent 
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more than the pension or disability benefi t. The CSG is much smaller than the adult 
grants or the FCG. 
Putting this system of grants in place over the postapartheid era meant a rapid 
increase in spending on social assistance (see fi gure 4). While spending on edu-
cation and health has remained fairly constant in real terms, social assistance 
(excluding administration) now consumes 3.2 percent of GDP, up from 1.9 percent 
in fi scal year 2000/01.
Coverage
The grants have an extensive reach. Simulations based on survey data suggest that 
about three-quarters of the elderly are income-eligible for the old age pension, and 
almost all of them report receiving the grant. As noted earlier, about 6 percent of the 
working-age population receives disability grants. While 60 percent of age-eligible 
children receive a grant of some form, our survey estimates suggest that 70 percent 
are income-eligible for the child support grant. There are a number of reasons for 
this. First, take-up among infants is very low, partly because caregivers procrastinate 
or there is a delay in obtaining a birth certifi cate for the child. Second, our simula-
tions use the new means test, which may not have been widely communicated. Third, 
and of greater concern, some groups seem to be outside the reach of the grant. One 
of the most at-risk segments of the child population is orphans. Figure 5 shows how 
many orphans under the age of 15 years are currently receiving social assistance, 
according to 2008 data from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS).3 What 
is most striking is the high number of paternal orphans receiving grants, particularly 
the CSG, and the low number of maternal orphans receiving grants. This fi nding 
matches evidence in Case, Hosegood, and Lund (2005) that the probability of a child 
receiving a grant decreases when the mother is absent. Woolard, Carter, and Agüero 
(2005) draw the same conclusion using the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamic Study 
(KIDS) data. Children living with their widowed fathers are the least likely to be 
receiving grants. Unsurprisingly, orphans who have lost both parents are the most 
likely to be receiving the foster care grant. Surprisingly, though, orphans (outside of 
TABLE 1. Value of the Grants in 2010
Grant type
2010 value in Rands 
(and PPP$) per month 
Grant value as percentage 
of median monthly 
per capita income
Old age pension R1080 (PPP$230)  1.75
Disability grant R1080 (PPP$230)  1.75
Child support grant R250 (PPP$53)  0.40
Foster care grant R710 (PPP$150)  1.15
Source: Author calculations.
Note: Per capita income is from the 2008 National Income Dynamics Study, infl ated to 2010 prices using headline 
Consumer Price Index.
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paternal orphans) are less likely than children with both parents to be receiving the 
CSG. This may be a result of the more complex documentation required without the 
child’s mother as caregiver.
Impact of Cash Transfers on Household Poverty
The immediate objective of cash transfer programs is to alleviate hardship among 
vulnerable groups. In this part of the paper, we take an aggregate look at the extent 
to which cash transfers in South Africa achieve this aim. Precise measurement of the 
impact of specifi c programs on poverty is a largely intractable problem because of the 
diffi culties involved in establishing a legitimate counterfactual as a benchmark. As a 
result, studies tend to focus on determining whether cash transfer programs target 
the poor and on comparing the adequacy of household income with and without the 
pension income component (Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock 2002). We follow this 
approach here. 
FIGURE 4.
Social Expenditures As a Percentage of GDP
Source: Government of South Africa, 1999–2010.
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In fi gure 6 we disaggregate household income sources by income quintile to high-
light the role of social assistance grants in providing income support to the poorest 
households. It is striking that fully two-thirds of income to the bottom quintile comes 
from social assistance grants, with most of this income coming from child grants (the 
CSG, FCG, and CDG combined). As households move up the income distribution, 
labor market income becomes increasingly important and reliance on social assis-
tance is commensurately reduced.
Table 2 shows the proportion of households reporting access to cash transfers. 
Note that in 1997 households in quintile 2 were much more likely to be getting a 
grant than households in quintile 1. The reason is straightforward: The magnitude 
of the old age pension and the disability grant were enough to lift all but the biggest 
households out of the fi rst quintile (Leibbrandt et al. 2010). The rapid roll-out of the 
much smaller child support grant from 2000 onward is clear in table 2; whereas in 
1997 just under a third of households were receiving a grant, by 2006 this propor-
tion had risen to about half. Signifi cantly, the percentage of households in the bottom 
quintile with access to social assistance rose from 16 percent to 64 percent between 
1997 and 2008. 
Table 3 shows the percentage of households in each income quintile that received 
income from specifi c social assistance grants in 2008. More than half of the house-
holds in the bottom quintile received some income from the child support grant, 
in comparison with only 9 percent of households in the top quintile. Owing to the 
effect of the old age pension in lifting many households out of the poorest quintile, 
FIGURE 5.
Percentage of Children Receiving Social Assistance, by Vital Status of Parents
Source: Author calculations using SALDRU 2008.
Note: CDG = care dependency grant, FCG = foster child grant, CSG = child support grant.
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FIGURE 6.
Sources of Household Income, by Quintile
Source: Author calculations using SALDRU 2008.
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TABLE 2. Percentage of Households Reporting Any Income from Grants
Quintile 1997 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008
1  15.9  32.0  31.7  40.2  47.7  69.4  63.7
2  54.0  55.8  50.9  71.2  73.3  69.9  73.7
3  46.7  51.6  53.2  67.1  69.1  69.4  66.8
4  33.8  33.2  34.8  35.8  40.1  45.4  47.6
5  14.0  11.3  7.9  8.8  10.0  12.0  12.4
Total  32.9  36.8  32.0  38.6  45.5  55.2  52.2
Sources: Author calculations using Statistics SA 1997, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, and SALDRU 2008.
TABLE 3. Percentage of Households Reporting Any Income from Social Grants, 
by Quintile
Quintile
% reporting any 
income from child grants
% reporting any income 
from disability grant
% reporting any income 
from old age pension
1  55.8  5.7  9.8
2  57.9  10.9  27.1
3  45.4  14.7  23.5
4  26.5  9.9  17.7
5  9.0  2.8  5.0
All  33.6  8.2  15.3
Source: Author calculations using SALDRU 2008.
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households that received the old age pension were more likely to be in the second or 
third quintile than in the very poorest quintile. 
In table 4 we present a “morning after” simulation of the increase in poverty if 
the grants were abruptly discontinued and households did not have the opportunity 
to dissolve and reconstitute. This is obviously a highly unrealistic counterfactual, 
since many households would not be sustainable economic units in the absence of 
grants. Nevertheless, such simulations give some sense of the signifi cance of grants in 
poverty alleviation. The table shows that government grant income does not change 
the headcount measure (P0) substantially. However, when the depth (P1) and severity 
(P2) of poverty measures are used, poverty is seen to diminish markedly as a result of 
government grants. This effect became stronger between 1993 and 2008, especially 
between 2000 and 2008, when the CSG was rolled out.
Table 4 suggests that without government grants, poverty would have worsened 
over time. primarily because the postapartheid labor market has operated in such a 
way as to leave an increasing number of South African households outside its ambit. 
Households can be linked directly to the labor market through employment and 
earnings or indirectly through remittance income from migrant workers and other 
remitters. Table 5 shows that the share of households with no direct or indirect link 
TABLE 5. Household Labor Market Attachment and Access to Grants of the 
Unemployed (%)
1997 2006 2008
No one employed, no remittances, no social grants  11.8  13.2  16.9
No one employed, no remittances, social grants  17.5  24.7  24.9
No one employed, remittances  21.3  11.2  12.9
One employed  35.8  39.4  36.6
Two or more employed  13.5  11.5  9.4
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0
Sources: Author calculations using Statistics SA 1997 and 2006, and SALDRU 2008.
Note: This table covers only selected years owing to lack of data in other surveys on either remittances or labor 
market status.
TABLE 4. Poverty With and Without Government Grants
Poverty when income includes government grants
Year
Poverty line = PPP$223 per capita 
per month
Poverty line = PPP$121 per capita 
per month
 P0  P1  P2  P0  P1  P2
1993  0.72  0.47  0.36  0.56  0.32  0.22
2000  0.71  0.45  0.33  0.54  0.29  0.19
2008  0.70  0.44  0.32  0.54  0.28  0.18
Poverty when income excludes government grants
 P0  P1  P2  P0  P1  P2
1993  0.73  0.53  0.43  0.60  0.4  0.32
2000  0.72  0.5  0.4  0.57  0.37  0.29
2008  0.71  0.54  0.46  0.60  0.44  0.37
Sources: Author calculations using SALDRU 1993 and 2008, and Statistics SA 2000.
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to the labor market has risen sharply, from 30 percent in 1997 to 42 percent in 2008. 
The rapid expansion of the grants has coincided with these substantial changes in 
the number of households with no link to the labor market. There is little doubt that 
the postapartheid record on poverty alleviation would have been much more dismal 
without the expansion of the social security system. 
Impact of the Grants in the Long Run 
The inability of poor households to invest in the productive capacity of their mem-
bers, especially the education and health of children, has implications for the persis-
tence of poverty. Cash transfer programs provide a predictable and reliable source 
of income that can signifi cantly affect the capacity of households to invest in human 
and physical capital, and thus break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. In this 
section, we review the evidence on the effect of cash transfers on education and 
health. We also review the substantial literature on the effect of the grants on labor 
supply. Most of the literature has focused on the old age pension, which has been 
in place much longer than the child support grant. We focus on papers that take an 
econometric approach. For a broader review of both quantitative and qualitative 
studies, see Budlender and Woolard (2006). 
Case and Deaton (1998), using data from the 1993 Project for the Study of Living 
Standards and Development (PSLSD), found that pension income is spent like other 
income—that is, “a Rand is a Rand.” They also found that because of the very high 
prevalence of three-generation and skip-generation households among South Africa’s 
African population, young children were found disproportionately in households 
receiving pensions, and pension money received by women was more likely to be 
spent in ways that enhance child outcomes (e.g., on food and school fees). 
Also using the 1993 PSLSD data, and focusing on children under fi ve, Dufl o 
(2000) examines the extent to which allocating resources to women rather than to 
men affects the distributional outcome and, in particular, investments in children. 
More than a quarter of African children of this age group live in the same household 
as an old age pension recipient. The effect on children is measured through weight- 
for-height and height-for-age. The presence in the household of a woman who is eligible 
for the old age pension results in an increase in girls’ (but not boys’) weight-for-height 
and height-for-age z-scores. Dufl o fi nds no effect on either boys’ or girls’ nutritional 
outcomes when men receive pensions. This paper is important for two reasons. First, 
Dufl o presents robust evidence that children are benefi ting from a cash transfer pro-
gram intended for a completely different target group. Second, because these effects 
differ according to the gender of the person who receives the transfer, the paper rejects 
the unitary model of the household in which all household income is pooled and then 
allocated according to a joint household utility function.
Edmonds, Mammen, and Miller (2005) use a nonparametric regression disconti-
nuity design to examine changes in household composition associated with the old 
age pension. They fi nd that households in which a person reaches pension age expe-
rience a decrease in women aged 30 to 39 and an increase in children under 5 and 
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women aged 18 to 23. Using data from a 1999 child labor survey, Edmonds (2006) 
identifi es changes in schooling and child labor when a household member becomes 
eligible for the pension. School attendance and completed schooling rise, and market 
work declines. The effects are limited to pension-eligible men, a result that Edmonds 
attributes to greater liquidity constraints for men. Because Edmonds examines chil-
dren over age fi ve, his results are not necessarily inconsistent with Dufl o’s results for 
younger children. 
Case and Ardington (2008) investigated whether having a pensioner in the house-
hold reduces the negative effect of maternal orphanhood on schooling. They fi nd that 
having a female pensioner mitigates the impact of orphanhood with respect to school 
enrollment and progress but not with respect to school-related expenses. Having a 
male pensioner in the household has a negative effect on progress in school and an 
insignifi cant effect on enrollment and school-related expenditures. 
Hamoudi and Thomas (2005) examined the effect of the pension on educational 
attainment of children using the 1998 National Demographic and Health Survey. 
They looked at children aged 6 to 19, and estimated total years of schooling on the 
basis of current or last grade. Overall, the authors fi nd that pension income has a 
greater benefi cial effect on girls’ education than on boys’ education. This accords 
with results of earlier analyses (such as Dufl o 2000) but adds the nuance that for 
older children (aged 13 to 19), a male pension tends to increase education among 
boys and decrease education among girls, whereas a female pension has little effect 
on either. Among younger children (aged 6 to 12), a female pension has a positive 
effect on girls and no effect on boys. Further analysis shows that, overall, boys aged 
6 to 15 who live with their mothers are further ahead in school than those who do 
not. Boys who live in pensioner households, however, are likely to have gone less far 
in education if they live with their mothers. The same pattern is found among girls, 
although it is not as marked. 
Case (2001) investigated the effect of old age pensions on health status. Her 
analysis was based on a small sample of households in the Langeberg health district 
of the Western Cape. The study found that old age pension income was pooled in 
84 percent of households. Where income was not pooled, benefi cial health effects 
were experienced only by the pensioner; where income was pooled, children were 
taller, suggesting a benefi cial effect on them. The study suggested that this effect 
works partly through improved sanitation, partly through improved nutritional sta-
tus, and partly through reduction in psychosocial stress.
All in all, clear evidence exists of the positive effect of the old age pension on 
human capital outcomes. The evidence on the labor market effects of grant receipt is 
mixed. Early research on the old age pension suggested that it had substantial nega-
tive effects on adult labor supply. Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller (2003) found 
a reduction in working hours of members of working age when another member 
of the household reached pension age, suggesting that pension receipt represents an 
income shock on the household level. However, the reduction in hours is highest 
when the pensioner is a woman, evidence that is complementary to Dufl o’s in terms 
of a rejection of perfect household income pooling. Posel, Fairburn, and Lund (2006) 
followed the same methodology but expanded the defi nition of the household to 
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include nonresident members. They found that African women were signifi cantly 
more likely to be migrant workers when they were members of a household that 
received a pension, especially when the pension recipient was female. The authors 
hypothesized that the pension provided the means to migrate and freed the older 
person to care for the children of the migrant, freeing the migrant to seek work. 
The work of Ardington, Case, and Hosegood (2009) also disputed the earlier 
fi ndings of Bertrand and colleagues (2003). This study used data on nonresident 
(migrant) household members and panel data that allowed the authors to control for 
time-invariant differences between pension recipients and nonrecipients. Their results 
suggested that the old age pension had a positive effect on adult labor supply—the 
probability that working-age adults are employed is approximately 3 percentage 
points higher in households with at least one pension recipient. Like Posel, Fairburn, 
and Lund (2006), Ardington and colleagues argued that the old age pension relieved 
fi nancial and child care constraints, which were short-run impediments to migrating.
Recently Ranchhod (2010) has used panel data from the national Labour Force 
Survey to look at the effect of the cessation of the pension (owing to the pensioner’s 
death or outmigration) on household formation and labor supply. For people who 
maintained their residency status across waves, Ranchhod found large and statisti-
cally signifi cant increases in employment rates for middle-aged women and men 
(9.3 and 8.1 percentage points, respectively), as well as for older adult women and 
men (10.3 percentage points for both). These fi ndings are consistent with those of 
Bertrand and colleagues (2003) and not necessarily inconsistent with the fi ndings of 
Posel and colleagues (2006) and Ardington and colleagues (2009), who broadened 
their defi nition of household membership to include migrants. 
In one of the few analyses of the child support grant, Agüero, Carter, and 
 Woolard (2007) used KIDS data to test whether receipt of the grant during the fi rst 
36 months of a child’s life had an effect on child nutrition as measured by height-for-
age. The paper conditioned on a measure for eagerness of the mother in an attempt 
to capture the true causal effect of the grant. The authors found that children who 
received the CSG during the fi rst three years of their life (the so-called “nutritional 
window” during which adult height is largely determined) had signifi cantly higher 
height-for-age than children who did not. 
In summary, we do not know a great deal with a high degree of certainty. It 
seems clear that access to either a pension or a child support grant can improve 
the health status of benefi ciaries and other household members by improving their 
nutrition and access to health care. And some evidence exists that older people, 
particularly women, are inclined to allocate this income in ways that directly ben-
efi t more vulnerable household members, such as young children. Evidence about 
the effect of cash transfers on the labor supply of benefi ciaries and their household 
members is mixed. Basic economic theory suggests that cash transfers are an injec-
tion of nonlabor income into the households and should have an income effect on 
direct and indirect benefi ciaries in the household. Thus, these transfers may have 
the effect of reducing incentives for work. The empirical analysis in two of the 
papers we reviewed supported this theory. On the other hand, a cash transfer might 
help overcome a liquidity constraint if migrant laborers initially need to draw 
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resources from the original sending household. There seems to be some empirical 
support for this theory. 
To Condition or Not to Condition?
The South African behavioral evidence is particularly interesting because it shows 
behavioral responses from cash transfers that are means-tested but unconditional. 
Behavioral responses are therefore seen to be outcomes of a pure income effect. This 
is unusual in the contemporary international policy milieu and has stimulated a dis-
cussion of whether behavioral responses to grants could have been more effectively 
shaped by imposing conditions on recipients. In this section we draw out some of the 
implications of the implementation of the CSG for this issue.
As discussed earlier, when the CSG was introduced, it was intended to be a 
conditional cash transfer. Applicants had to provide proof that the child had been 
immunized, that they were participating in development programs, that they had 
not refused employment without good reason, and that they had attempted to secure 
private maintenance for the child from the other parent if they were separated or 
divorced. The development program requirement was dropped after it became 
obvious that such programs simply did not exist in many areas. The immunization 
requirement was dropped because it often discriminated against children who were 
already disadvantaged in terms of access to health services. As noted earlier, initial 
take-up of the grant was slow, in part because of these conditions. Once the regula-
tions were changed and increased effort was put into rolling out the grant, take-up 
increased rapidly. 
Grants are an important element of the post-1994 South African government’s 
rights-based approach, in line with the right to social security granted in the con-
stitution. This rights-based approach does not square easily with the imposition of 
conditions. Despite this (and despite the early problems associated with implement-
ing behavioral conditions), the issue of conditions has resurfaced regularly over the 
past decade. The recent extension of the CSG to children until they turn 18 coincided 
with renewed efforts by the government to impose behavioral conditions. 
Having decided that it would be good to impose conditions, the government 
considered what conditions might be appropriate. In Budlender’s (2008) inter-
views with high-ranking government offi cials, several said that reproductive 
health issues and knowledge are especially important for young adults, but none 
had workable suggestions for conditions that might be imposed. Eventually it 
became clear that any conditions attached to a CSG for children aged 15–17 years 
should focus on education.
The question then arose as to whether an education condition should relate to 
enrollment, attendance, or performance. One argument against enrollment as a con-
dition is that this is a once-off measure at the beginning of the year, and that enroll-
ment without regular attendance brings little benefi t. The argument for enrollment is 
that it is easy to measure. Almost all schools are now covered by a centralized infor-
mation system that can provide individual enrollment information, including school 
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and grade. Similar comprehensive information systems with respect to attendance 
and performance will not be in place in the foreseeable future.
Beginning in January 2010, caregivers of CSG benefi ciaries “need to ensure that 
children for whom they are in receipt of a grant are enrolled and attending school. 
Regular proof of school enrollment needs to be submitted to the Department of 
Social Development, along with reports from the school. Upon receipt of any infor-
mation regarding a child not attending school, the Department of Social Develop-
ment will send a social worker to investigate and put in place steps to ensure that 
the child attends school. While punitive measures such as stopping the grant are not 
envisaged, these provisions will allow government to improve school attendance 
and provide the necessary support to households where needed” (Republic of South 
Africa 2010, 104).
This is a very soft condition, since the grant will not be stopped if a child does 
not attend school. In addition, it seems that “regular proof of enrollment” will be 
annual submission of a school report card, meaning that the intervention of a social 
worker may come too late to be effective. Also, given the shortage of social workers 
and the demands on them, it seems unlikely that monitoring and intervention will be 
a priority area for the Department of Social Development. 
Nevertheless, even a soft condition may have some effect if caregivers believe they 
are required to send their children to school to get the grant. However, it is unclear 
that there is a demand-side problem with school enrollment. As shown in fi gure 7, 
it is already very high. 
FIGURE 7.
School Enrollment, Ages 0–17
Source: Author calculations using Statistics SA 2009. 
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School attendance is a much bigger problem than school enrollment (Budlender 
2008); however, conditioning on school attendance would entail a signifi cant admin-
istrative burden on the Department of Education and would require intersectoral 
coordination between the Department of Social Development and the Department of 
Education. It is unclear that the administrative capacity exists to implement a proper 
monitoring and reporting system. It would also be much more costly to implement 
than a condition related to enrollment. 
Conclusion
In some respects, South Africa is an exceptional case for a developing country. 
The fi rst exceptional factor for this paper is the extent of its social assistance pro-
vision, with cash transfers going to more than a quarter of the population. The 
second factor is that it is a middle-income country with almost no public debt, so 
the cash transfer programs are fi nanced from tax revenue rather than donor fund-
ing or borrowing. The third factor is the extreme inequality in the country. The 
South African government is committed to reducing inequality and poverty, and 
redistribution through progressive taxes and pro-poor cash transfers is seen to be 
an effi cient way to accomplish this. 
We have shown that the reduction in poverty over the postapartheid period has 
been strongly associated with the expansion of social grants. Also, drawing on the 
benefi t-incidence literature (van der Berg 2001, 2009), it seems clear that the dis-
bursement of these grants has been strongly redistributionist. Thus, at the aggregate 
level, there is no doubt that they have had a positive effect on poverty and inequality. 
However, these outcomes are the result of very large increases in social spending, so it 
would have been surprising to see no aggregate effect. In addition, providing evidence 
of these effects is not the same as making a case that these social grants are the best 
policy instruments for alleviating poverty. This case would require an assessment of 
the grants against a set of alternative policies. We have not done this in the paper.
Rather, we have discussed the body of work that has assessed the effects of the 
grants on key micro-outcomes such as health, education, and labor supply. Evidence 
exists that the money fl owing into households through grants is used in part to 
improve health and education outcomes for household members other than the direct 
benefi ciary. These effects are crucial for longer-run poverty alleviation. The evidence 
on the labor supply effects of grants is mixed: Grants seem to promote migration in 
search of employment but also seem to provide some disincentive for working-age 
household members to look for work.
Thus, at the end of the day we face a dilemma. There is no doubt that the social 
assistance system in South Africa is channeling grant income into needy households 
and that this income changes the behavior of some members of such households. 
Nonetheless, the current system, which focuses on children and the elderly, is an 
artifact of history rather than a coherently designed system. In the absence of com-
prehensive social insurance, working-age adults can benefi t from social assistance 
grants only if they are disabled or live with a child or an elderly person. Many people 
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believe that the social grant system should be extended to focus directly on the unem-
ployed who are not covered by other grants. Such arguments are strengthened by the 
limitations of the unemployment insurance fund discussed earlier. 
However, we should remember that the contemporary context is one of a massive 
post-2000 expansion of the cash transfer system. Further expansion in the future 
will face the issue of fi scal sustainability. So far, economic growth has supported 
the increase in the grant system, and the high returns in social well-being have justi-
fi ed this expenditure. But the country will face a tougher growth environment over 
the medium term, and it is unlikely that the fi scal space exists for expanding cash 
transfers. The overriding goal of economic and social policy must be the assimila-
tion of many more of the unemployed into the labor market. It seems that a positive 
employment environment is the key parameter for sustainable social transformation. 
We would therefore argue for a stronger focus on active labor market policies to 
complement the extensive system of cash transfers. 
In sum, we are cautious about further expansion of social grants. However, we 
are also cautious about internal reforms to current systems. We looked briefl y at 
the possibility of imposing behavioral conditions. There are costs associated with 
the imposition of these conditions, and they are likely to be high in the South 
African context. The desire to introduce conditions seems to be driven by politi-
cal economy considerations; that is, the belief that taxpayers may be more likely 
to support transfers to the poor if they are linked to efforts to overcome poverty in 
the long term, particularly if those efforts involve actions to improve the welfare of 
children. This approach is not helpful to the poor, and, in the absence of sensible 
conditions that are easy and inexpensive to monitor and enforce, there seems little 
reason to tamper with the current system of unconditional cash transfers.
Notes
 1. Since the maximum benefi t period is 238 days, this implies that fewer than 10 percent of 
the unemployed are receiving unemployment benefi ts at any given time. 
 2. South Africa under apartheid used race as a primary classifi cation of the population into 
African, colored, Indian, and white groups. Statistics continue to be collected using these 
classifi cations. The term “black” is used to signify African, colored, and Indian people in 
the context of signifying previously disenfranchised groups. 
 3. Unfortunately, there is no information on grant receipt by children over the age of 15.
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In their paper, “The Evolution and Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers in South 
Africa,” Ingrid Woolard and Murray Leibbrandt describe the origins and recent his-
tory of the South African social security system. They draw a distinction between social 
insurance (which is intended to protect against risk of income loss and is often a con-
tributory system) and social assistance (which is intended to combat poverty through 
redistribution and is usually noncontributory and means-tested). In South Africa, the 
social security system includes both social insurance and social assistance funds, though 
social assistance accounts for the bulk of social security spending. The South African 
social insurance system includes three main funds: the Unemployment Insurance Fund, 
the Compensation Funds, and the Road Accident Fund. The social assistance system 
includes numerous types of grants, the most prominent of which are the child support 
grant, the state old age pension, the disability grant, and the foster care grant.
After describing the evolution of the current social security system, Woolard and 
Leibbrandt provide a rich picture of social assistance programs in South Africa, 
highlighting spending levels and program details. They present descriptive statistics 
for several of the key social assistance programs, including take-up rates and char-
acteristics of benefi ciaries. Finally, they present evidence on the effect of these grants 
on poverty and other outcomes, including health, education, and labor supply. In 
addition to reducing poverty and inequality, evidence suggests that social assistance 
grants have improved some educational and health outcomes, at least for certain 
subgroups (see, e.g., Agüero, Carter, and Woolard 2009; Case 2001; Dufl o 2000; 
Edmonds 2006). Evidence on the effect of social assistance grants on labor supply 
is mixed and is complicated by the presence (or absence) of migrant workers in the 
household (see, e.g., Ardington, Case, and Hosegood 2009; Ranchhod 2010).
Though South Africa—with high rates of income inequality and extensive social 
assistance fi nanced by tax revenue—may be a special case, the origins and effects of 
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the South African social assistance system can nevertheless provide lessons for other 
countries. South Africa shares some of the same challenges faced by other countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, including HIV/AIDS and unemployment (Tortora 2009). 
Understanding the effect of grants in South Africa may provide an indication of what 
the effect might be elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in southern Africa.
As we think about how these lessons might be generalized in designing social assis-
tance systems elsewhere, the authors’ work generates two key questions: (1) Should 
transfers be conditional or unconditional? (2) Are transfers the best way to achieve 
improvements in the outcomes we care about? 
Should Transfers Be Conditional or Unconditional?
Conditional cash transfers have been shown to be an effective policy tool in other 
 settings, particularly in Latin America (e.g., Schultz 2004). Making payments to house-
holds conditional on certain behaviors—such as school attendance or immunizations— 
can incentivize behavior and may be an effective way to encourage behavior when 
there are social benefi ts not internalized by the household. The South African child 
support grant (CSG) was originally introduced as a conditional cash transfer pro-
gram. However, the conditions (including proof of immunization and proof of efforts 
to secure employment) hindered take-up, and there were concerns that some of the 
neediest children would not be able to access grants because of their inability to access 
services. Since 2000, all age- and income-eligible children have been able to receive the 
grant unconditionally. Imposing conditions could enhance the behavioral benefi ts of 
the CSG and could generate additional support for the program among taxpayers. 
However, as Woolard and Leibbrandt explain, imposing conditions has numerous 
drawbacks. First, the South African Constitution grants a right to social security, and 
conditioning grants on behavior is not in line with a rights-based approach. Second, 
if access to services is limited, imposing conditions may effectively exclude households 
without access to services, which may be among the neediest. Third, imposing condi-
tions would introduce administrative costs to assess compliance. Finally, conditions 
are effective in improving outcomes only if they are closely related to outcomes and if 
we can monitor compliance. The outcomes we might be most interested in improving, 
such as school attendance and sexual behavior, may be the most diffi cult to monitor. 
Outcomes that are easier to monitor, such as school enrollment, may not be the ones 
we are most interested in improving. For example, in South Africa, a cash transfer 
conditional on school enrollment would not likely result in increased enrollment, since 
enrollment is already nearly universal among children aged 7–14.
The solution recently adopted in South Africa is “soft” conditionality, which 
in this case means that school enrollment and attendance are said to be required, 
but the CSG will not be stopped if the child does not attend school. Though this 
conditionality will not affect grant receipt, it might affect outcomes if caregivers 
believe that their children are required to attend school to receive the CSG. 
Several studies in South Africa have shown that unconditional cash transfers can 
lead to improved health and education outcomes for children (e.g., Agüero, Carter, 
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and Woolard 2009; Case, Hosegood, and Lund 2005); in other settings, conditional 
cash transfers have also been shown to lead to improvements in outcomes (e.g., 
Schultz 2004). Given the nonnegligible costs associated with imposing conditions 
(including the costs of compliance as well as the potential exclusion of the neediest 
households), we may want to measure the marginal benefi t of conditionality. 
A recent paper by Baird, McIntosh, and Özler (2010) provides the fi rst experi-
mental evidence on the marginal effect of conditionality. Enumeration areas (EAs) 
in a region of Malawi were randomly assigned to three study arms: a group eligible 
for conditional cash transfers; a group eligible for unconditional cash transfers; and 
a control group. Adolescent girls enrolled in school at baseline in treatment EAs 
were eligible to receive grants ($5–$15 monthly); in the conditional cash transfer 
EAs, grants were conditional on school attendance. (In both treatment arms, the size 
of the transfer was also randomized at the individual level.) The authors found that 
both unconditional and conditional cash transfers led to increases in enrollment and 
attendance, but the marginal effect of the conditionality was not signifi cant. Their 
results suggest that, in some settings, unconditional cash transfers may generate some 
of the same improvements as conditional cash transfers. 
Previous nonexperimental evidence from Latin America has suggested that 
conditionality has positive marginal effects. Baird and colleagues (2010) is the 
fi rst experimental study of the effects of conditionality; differences between their 
study and earlier work could refl ect differences in methods. However, the effect of 
conditionality might also vary depending on the context. In Latin America, where 
much of the previous work was conducted, enrollment rates and income levels 
may be higher and teen marriage rates may be lower than rates in Malawi, where 
Baird and colleagues conducted their study. These and other factors could affect 
the marginal impact of conditionality. Nevertheless, the study suggests that, at least 
in some contexts, unconditional cash transfers and conditional cash transfers may 
generate similar impacts. Because the administrative and political costs of imposing 
conditions can be substantial, unconditional cash transfers might be preferable to 
conditional cash transfers when their effects are likely to be similar.
Are Transfers the Best Way to Achieve Improvements in the 
Outcomes We Care About?
While transfers (unconditional or conditional) may generate positive effects on edu-
cation and health among children, they are among many policy instruments that can 
generate improvements in child outcomes. The design of the optimal social assistance 
system depends on our objectives. For example, redistribution might be a very effec-
tive way to reduce poverty in the short term. However, if the goal of social assistance 
is to increase intergenerational mobility by infl uencing children’s outcomes, cash 
transfers are just one of many possible strategies and might not be the most cost-
effective strategy available.
For instance, a range of strategies could be used to generate increases in educa-
tional attainment for children in poverty. If demand-side impediments to schooling 
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exist, possible strategies to increase educational attainment include cash transfers 
(conditional and unconditional), deworming, and informational interventions. 
Through their Deworm the World initiative, the Young Global Leaders have drawn 
attention to deworming as a potential strategy to improve health and increase school-
ing in developing countries in which intestinal worms are prevalent. Deworming can 
achieve educational gains similar to those from cash transfers at a fraction of the cost 
(Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab 2005; Miguel and Kremer 2004). Providing 
information about the perceived returns to schooling may increase schooling at a 
low cost. For example, Jensen (2010) found that providing information to adolescent 
boys in the Dominican Republic about the returns to schooling led to large increases 
in educational attainment. In addition to these kinds of interventions, other strategies 
might stimulate demand for schooling, including interventions that improve health 
or improve labor market prospects.
However, in some settings, signifi cant supply-side impediments to schooling exist. 
Cash transfers and other strategies to stimulate demand may not achieve much in 
places where good-quality schooling is not provided. In those places, improving the 
supply of schooling is likely to achieve greater benefi ts. School-building programs 
and programs that monitor and incentivize teacher attendance are two of many pos-
sible strategies to improve the supply of schooling (Dufl o, Hanna, and Ryan 2010; 
Levy et al. 2009). 
As these examples illustrate, the appropriate policy instrument depends on our 
objectives and on the context. If social assistance is aimed at increasing educational 
attainment for children in poverty, cash transfers may not be the cheapest or most 
effective way to generate improvements in many settings.
Concluding Remarks
Woolard and Leibbrandt describe the characteristics of the social assistance system in 
South Africa, documenting its reach and highlighting some of the key considerations 
in designing social assistance systems. Their discussion centers on the child support 
grant, a cash transfer program that recently introduced soft conditionality for benefi t 
receipt. They discuss the challenges in imposing conditions for receipt of social assis-
tance grants, raising important questions about the marginal benefi ts of conditions 
and whether these benefi ts offset their limitations.
Existing evidence suggests that conditional cash transfers might be a useful 
policy tool in settings in which demand-side impediments to schooling exist and the 
costs of compliance (logistical or political) are low. However, new evidence from 
Malawi suggests that unconditional cash transfers may achieve similar benefi ts with 
fewer costs, at least in some settings (Baird the McIntosh, and Özler 2010). Cash 
 transfers—unconditional or conditional—redistribute income and can improve 
children’s outcomes. However, they are among many possible strategies that can 
increase intergenerational mobility by improving children’s outcomes. Therefore, 
policy makers should think broadly about the policy instruments they use to infl u-
ence outcomes, paying careful attention to demand- and supply-side factors that may 
threaten child well-being.
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Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, the 2010 ABCDE conference is coming to an 
end. Three very full days have passed. Five Nobel laureates have shared their fi nd-
ings. Some 20 parallel sessions have been held with almost 600 participants. Myriad 
ideas have been aired. I trust that you will leave Stockholm with new insights and 
 inspiration, reassured that we will continue our joint drive toward global develop-
ment. For those of us staying behind—representatives of the Swedish government, of 
institutions and agencies—your research and thinking will be important contributions 
to our policy formulation and our continued reform of development cooperation.
The ABCDE has been something of a checkpoint—an opportunity to pause and 
refl ect. Are we on the right path toward a global society in which economic growth 
occurs together with poverty reduction and empowered individuals? I think we are, 
but there are twists and turns in the road ahead and choices to be made. We need to 
keep an eye on the map and perhaps redraw it once in a while. Diffi cult? Yes, but a 
little less so after these three days.
On one level it is easy to summarize this conference in a few words: It’s been 
 marvelous. But at the same time it’s impossible to do justice to the totality of the 
 discussions. How does one summarize three days of conversation in a brief closing 
statement? Given the sheer number of speeches and contributions, any selection of 
highlights will be subjective.
In an attempt to bring some scientifi c method to the process, Ann and I have 
compared notes. We have also had tremendous help from three Ph.D. students from 
the Institute of International Economic Studies here in Stockholm. Of course, a full 
 written report on the conference will be forthcoming. I hope you will agree with me 
that the following issues deserve to be mentioned. I’ll start with the fi rst half of the 
conference, and Ann will continue.
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After the welcome addresses from World Bank chief economist Justin Lin, 
 Swedish minister for fi nance Anders Borg, and minister for international develop-
ment  cooperation Gunilla Carlsson, we turned our attention to Nobel laureate 
Elinor Ostrom. In her keynote address, “Overcoming the Samaritan’s Dilemma in 
Development Aid,” she reminded us of the necessity to continuously question our 
basic assumptions and terminology. We must look deeper into questions of owner-
ship, sustainability, and evaluation, as well as the complex structure of incentives 
and motivations. She emphasized the need to make better use of our knowledge base 
and identifi ed processes and methods for individual and organizational learning as 
critical components of more effective development cooperation.
In the plenary session on “Environmental Commons and the Green Economy,” 
Thomas Sterner challenged our thinking on climate change and the options avail-
able to address it. He stressed the need for global coordination, binding agreements, 
voluntary pledges, and green growth, and called for strict measures. As one concrete 
example, he suggested substantial increases in fuel costs; we look forward to his 
upcoming book, in which he promises to explore the effects of such decisions on pov-
erty. In the same plenary session, Ramón López discussed the complex relationship 
among consumption, production, and environmental impact. He argued that over 
the past few decades, production in advanced countries has become dematerialized 
while consumption has not, implying that rich countries have not become cleaner but 
rather better at dumping dirt elsewhere. In his comment, Simon Levin stressed the 
necessity to achieve cooperation at the global level, which in turn calls for adaptive, 
adequate institutions.
In “Postcrisis Debates on Development Strategy,” Abhijit Banerjee summed up 
lessons learned in development policy over the past 20 years and described the 
gradual shift away from the Washington Consensus. We now have a more nuanced 
view of the role of private enterprise and export promotion, and more attention is 
being directed toward institutions and human resources.
Shang-Jin Wei enhanced our understanding of the concept of leapfrogging—the 
use of policy instruments to engineer a faster industrial transformation than what 
might emerge naturally. However, there does not seem to be strong, uncontestable 
evidence that a leapfrogging industrial policy results in faster economic growth. 
Discussants Geoffrey Heal and Franjo Štiblar highlighted the shift from macro to 
micro perspectives and noted issues of deregulation and outsourcing, challenges with 
growth models, and the need for a wider analytical framework.
In the second keynote address, Torsten Persson shared his theories about weak 
states, strong states, and development. He argued that state capacity—in the form of 
extractive capacity (or physical power) and productive capacity (or legal power)—
has been overlooked in most mainstream economic models. A lack of state capacity 
is often accompanied by low gross domestic product and political violence.
It was a pleasure for me to chair the third plenary session yesterday morning on 
“The Political Economy of Fragile States.” Stephen Ndegwa presented key fi ndings 
from the forthcoming World Development Report 2011. He said expectations for 
progress will have to shift in terms of both time horizon and size of the effect.
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James Fearon showed that a country’s level of income has little or no relevance 
in trying to predict the outbreak of violent confl ict. Poor countries are more often 
prone to confl ict because of weak political institutions rather than poverty per se. 
Aid in confl ict-affected countries, therefore, needs to do more than just raise income 
levels. Conditionality should be based on institution-building rather than policy. In 
their comments, Alan Gelb and Louise Anten added their perspectives on the need to 
address dilemmas and trade-offs, the complexity of emerging from fragility, and the 
relationship between governance and confl ict.
As we near the end of this conference, I’d say that the strength and beauty and 
dynamism of a research conference like this one are the differences and disagree-
ments, the courage to challenge conventional wisdom, the enthusiasm for new 
possibilities, the readiness to question and be questioned, the integrity to defend 
one’s  convictions, and the openness to change one’s mind. But I think we do have 
consensus about one thing: the need for more meetings and platforms like this one.
In that context, I’d like to mention that while today is the last day of the ABCDE, 
it is the fi rst day of YES, the global Youth Employment Summit, “Rework the 
World.” The summit is organized by the Tällberg Foundation and YES, Inc., with 
support from the Swedish government. It will be an arena for discussing another 
burning global issue: youth employment. Some one hundred initiatives from around 
the world will be presented and examined—all with the objective of creating the jobs 
of tomorrow and building a more socially, fi nancially, and ecologically sustainable 
society. I know that some of you will attend the summit, and I hope you will take 
some inspiration from ABCDE with you.
Before I offi cially close ABCDE 2010, one important task remains: thanking 
everyone who helped organize this event. It has been a pleasure to cohost this con-
ference with the World Bank. With ABCDE 2010, we have added yet another layer 
to an excellent long-standing relationship. Ann, with you and your collaborators— 
including Leita Jones—by our side, we’ve had the greatest support and experience to 
lean on. Thank you very much. And to Mia: you, Julia, Kerstin, and the rest of your 
team already know how much we appreciate your efforts. You all have a close to 
magical ability to make things happen in the most effective, effi cient way.
Our sincere thanks also to the entire steering committee. You’ve done a tremen-
dous job securing the highest level of participants, putting together an impressive 
program, and foreseeing potential problems and preventing them from materializ-
ing. Also, of course, a big thank-you to Boris Pleskovic, who’s been a driving force 
behind this conference for so many years and who is still around, despite having 
retired. And last but not least, a warm, sincere thanks to all of you distinguished 
Nobel laureates, renowned professors, researchers, students, colleagues from gov-
ernment offi ces and agencies, friends, and members of civil society. The past few 
days have reminded us again of the need for close relationships between policy mak-
ers and researchers. In this interaction, new ideas are born, conventional wisdom is 
challenged, and possibilities are created.
I hope we’ll all meet again at ABCDE 2011. Thank you, and have a safe trip 
home.
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Joakim, thank you very much for your summary of the fi rst half of the conference. 
I will continue with the second half. Following the session on fragile states, Joseph 
Stiglitz gave a keynote address in honor of Partha Dasgupta entitled “Learning, 
Growth, and Development.” He asked questions that are important themes of this 
conference: How can developing countries catch up with developed countries? Does 
industrial policy work, and if so, which policies have proved to be most effective?
Stiglitz began by referring to the heady days in Cambridge, when he and his col-
leagues anticipated “putting a golden nail in the coffi n of capitalism.” He argued that 
markets by themselves do not yield effi cient solutions for promoting innovation, in 
part because knowledge is a public good. There are large spillovers and externalities, 
as well as imperfections in the industrial structure. To overco me these imperfec-
tions, he proposed creating incentives to expand parts of the economy that generate 
spillovers. In particular, he proposed an industrial policy whose goal is not to pick 
winners but to identify these externalities and support them. One goal would be to 
use instruments that give broad-based support, such as the subsidies and other forms 
of support used in East Asia. Since the World Trade Organization has restricted the 
use of subsidies, he suggested using the exchange rate as a tool of industrial policy. 
The fourth plenary was part of a larger movement that advocates going beyond 
the use of standard welfare measures, such as gross domestic product (GDP) or GDP 
growth. The session focused on subjective measures of well-being or happiness. Fol-
lowing the work of Richard Easterlin, social science research on happiness has taken 
off in the past 20 years. The impetus has been the development of surveys that ask 
people how happy or how good they feel. 
At the time of the conference, Ann Harrison was Director of Development Policy, Development Economics, World 
Bank. I am grateful to Jean Jacques Dethier for helping in preparing these remarks.
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Justin Wolfers explored the relationship between happiness and income—across 
individuals within a given country, between countries in the same year, and over 
time. He showed that richer people are more satisfi ed with their lives than poorer 
people in the same country. This relationship is similar in most countries around the 
world, except Belgium. His results suggest that material wealth and subjective well-
being go hand in hand. 
On the other side of the coin, Carol Graham presented an overview of her new 
book, Happiness Around the World: The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable 
Millionaires. She also reported on what happened to happiness in the United States 
when the stock market fell at the onset of the global fi nancial crisis in 2008 (people 
were less happy) and documented the interesting fact that uncertainty makes people 
very unhappy. The critical role of uncertainty in reducing happiness is important in 
an increasingly volatile and globally interconnected world. When developing coun-
tries grow, the process may lead to signifi cant increases in living standards, but the 
process of growth is full of uncertainty and creates a lot of stress. The results pre-
sented by Carol Graham and Justin Wolfers can be reconciled if we take into account 
the fact that they use different measures of well-being and different specifi cations. 
In his keynote address on poverty traps, Partha Dasgupta focused on a phenom-
enon that is all too prevalent in developing countries: child malnutrition. Irreversible 
malnutrition and infection at the earliest stages of life lead to many problems in 
early childhood, including an inability to acquire socio-emotional competencies, and 
have a stranglehold effect on a person’s acquisition of human capital later in life. He 
showed that, in some contexts, preventing the collapse of local institutions should be 
the object of policy design; in others, the provision of meals to schoolchildren should 
be the immediate investment. (In his presentation, he relied on the world develop-
ment indicators; those indicators are free and universally available on the World 
Bank’s new open data website: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/.) 
The fi fth plenary session was dedicated to issues of empowerment and social 
policy. It began with a presentation by Esther Dufl o, who received the John Bates 
Clark medal this year for being the top economist under the age of 40; she is only 
the second woman to receive the medal. In her presentation, she looked at the links 
between women’s empowerment and economic development. She asked whether 
development alone is enough to reduce inequality between men and women, and 
whether empowerment not only promotes equity but also accelerates development. 
She concluded by saying that neither economic development nor women’s empow-
erment is the magic bullet. To bring about equity between men and women, it will 
be necessary to continue to take policy actions that favor women at the expense of 
men, possibly for a very long time. This may result in benefi ts that are not suffi cient 
to compensate for the cost of distortions, but she said we should care about equity 
for its own sake, not simply because it is good for effi ciency or for growth. This 
presentation will be a valuable input for the 2012 World Development Report on 
gender equality. 
Ingrid Woolard and Murray Leibbrandt looked at the evolution and impact of 
unconditional cash transfers in South Africa, where more than a quarter of the 
population receives such social assistance. They are cautious about extending the 
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system to focus directly on the unemployed or further expanding social grants, and 
argue against imposing behavioral conditions because the limited benefi ts may not be 
worth the cost. In her comments, Jane Fortson reinforced this view. 
Finally, we launched the global development debates on development challenges 
in a post-crisis world, the theme of this year’s conference. This was a joint effort with 
the World Bank Institute, with Stephanie Flanders from the BBC moderating, and 
fi ve luminaries—Eric Maskin, James Mirrlees, Robert Solow, Partha Dasgupta, and 
Abhijit Banarjee—joining her on the stage. It was a very exciting debate. 
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